


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
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CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
OPINION OF THE MID-CENTURY
REVOLUTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

ARTHUR JAMES MAY

A THESIS

IN HISTORY

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PHILADELPHIA

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PREFACE

Every study of this character should be prefaced with a brief statement as to its *raison d'être*. Herein the writer has undertaken to narrate and analyze the opinion of Americans abroad and at home with respect of the central European upheavals at the mid-nineteenth century, in order to ascertain the nature and interest of Americans in European affairs. A strenuous effort has been made to keep the account of the happenings in Europe at the irreducible minimum, but in various footnotes, references are given to reliable histories of the revolutions. Full and free expression of the American thought and feeling on revolutionary Europe synchronizes with the visit of the eminent protagonist of Hungarian independence, Louis Kossuth, who came hither at the invitation of Congress. The influence of Kossuth upon national politics, hinted at from time to time, has been summarized in the final chapter. The conclusion, it is hoped, may be of some value to the general student of American history.

In the collection of materials for this work, the writer has become the lasting debtor of numerous individuals and institutions. The staffs of the Library of the Pennsylvania Historical Society in Philadelphia and of the newspaper division in the Library of Congress have been especially helpful. Mrs. Summers and Miss Barney in the manuscripts divisions of the Departments of State and Navy, respectively, have enabled him to unearth hitherto unused materials. Dr. Worthington C. Ford of the Massachusetts Historical Society and Mr. John C. Fitzpatrick of the Library of Congress are two others to whom the writer, in common with dozens of others, is deeply obligated. As the footnotes and bibliography reveal, he has made full use of the investigations of other workers upon topics that impinge on his.

In the preparation of the materials, the writer has had the fruitful advice and constant guidance of Professors W. E. Lingelbach, St. G. L. Sioussat, and Herman V. Ames of the University of Pennsylvania. He desires here to express his sincere appreciation of their inspiration and help. Many blemishes have been removed because of the aid of these men; those

which remain are to be ascribed exclusively to the writer. Without the aid of his wife, Hilda Jones May, the errors in this study would be numerous.

ARTHUR J. MAY.

Rochester, New York.

12 April, 1927

I

OPINION OF AMERICANS IN EUROPE ON THE REVOLUTIONS IN THE GERMANIES

Out of the Napoleonic Wars emerged a "Germany" which was merely a geographical expression, with kings and queens in abundance and with pawns without any voice in the affairs of state. But as the century hastened to its mid-point, unifying, liberal principles gained headway among the people of central Europe. In 1847, democratic programmes vied with nationalistic creeds for the attention of the people. Prussia, in that year, had convoked a United Diet which had quarreled with the King and had been dissolved. Unsatisfied popular demands led directly to the mid-century upheaval in the Germanies, which needed only the revolution in Paris to start it off.*

American observers in Europe in this "annus mirabilis" represented the same groups one might find there in any summer. Government agents prove to be men endowed with no unusual powers of judgment, but full of democratic feeling. Foremost in importance stands Andrew Jackson Donelson, nephew and disciple of him whose name he bore, who remained as Minister to Prussia throughout the hectic period. His secretary, Theodore S. Fay, an author of some distinction, occasionally informed Washington of his views. The historian Bancroft graced the ministerial chair in London, while T. G. Clemson, son-in-law of Calhoun, held a like position at the Hague.

Of particular value are the opinions of A. Dudley Mann, a roving diplomat of no mean ability, who had been in Europe obtaining emigration data for the government. Consular agents likewise wrote their comments. Officers and men of the cruiser *St. Lawrence* had an opportunity to observe conditions while

* The best account of the revolutionary movement in the Germanies is Blum, H., *Die Deutsche Revolution*, (Leipzig, 1898). *Vide*, Curtis, E. N., *American Opinion of French Nineteenth Century Revolutions*, 29 *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 257 ff.

they were in German waters. Enterprising American newspapers kept their readers acquainted with transpiring events through first-hand information sent them by their correspondents abroad.

Shortly after the Parisian revolt had swept the Orleans monarchy into the discard, the German states entered an epoch overloaded with bewildering and complicated events. As soon as news of the French movement reached his ears, Mann predicted that monarchy in "Germany" would be reduced to a mere skeleton. In the south German states the sovereigns would accede to all the concessions demanded by the people. Perhaps the Zollverein, the commercial bond between the states, would be dissolved. Graebe, consul at Hesse-Cassel, hoped the Germans would obtain freedom of the press, a militia system, and the convocation of a national Parliament. In Berlin, Donelson confidently expected that the King would take measures to quiet the complaints of his subjects as expressed in the United Diet in the previous year, but he had no apprehension that the people would overthrow the Hohenzollern. If necessary, Prussian troops would be employed to enforce legal authority, a measure which would provoke a bloody revolution.¹

Pleased with the concessions granted in Saxony, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Baden, Donelson believed that a peaceful compromise in which the doctrines of the revolution were confirmed, would bring permanent quiet. Only when the rights demanded by the people were granted would the panic be stilled. In spite of the fierce riots that followed the killing of several citizens in front of the Prussian royal palace, Donelson found nothing in the general state of affairs to alarm the true friend of gradual progress. In his judgment the world had never seen so remarkable a transformation whose political and social consequences would be felt the world over. Eventually the Prussian monarchy would go, since it no longer met the needs of society. Above all, at the moment, "Germany" required a patriotic states-

¹ Mann to Buchanan, 2, 13 Mch. 1848, 1 Ap. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Special Agents to German States and Hungary.

Donelson to Buchanan, 4, 7, 8 Mch. 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Prussia, IV.

Graebe to Buchanan, 6 Mch. 1848, *Ibid.*, Consular Letters, Hesse-Cassel, I.

Graebe to Donelson, 4 Mch. 1848, Donelson Mss.

man and a soldier, not a Frederick the Great but a Washington.²

Throughout the era of revolutionary disorders, Donelson, though keenly interested in the establishment of a united, liberal, German government, did not permit his wishes to swerve him from the path of traditional policy. He issued an injunction to Americans not to participate in the revolution in any way. America should impart by her example an effective moral support which if not then sufficiently strong to command victory would ultimately bring it to pass. Several Americans sustained slight injuries in street scuffles, but none seems to have disobeyed the official warning; they were content to sympathize, feeling that the distance between the two countries, great as it was, was not so great as the distance that separated their institutions. Whenever possible to make a friendly suggestion which might aid the cause of German liberty and reform, Donelson did not refrain from doing so. After the Märztage, he felt that no harm had been done in brilliantly illuminating the embassy as a tribute alike to the "gallant conduct of people and of King." At the same time, the Consul at Frankfort-am-Main unfurled the star-spangled banner as a manifestation of his sympathy with the liberal movement.³

At the outset of the revolt, German nationalists had demanded that action be taken to unify the several states, and Americans in Europe were not ignorant of the possibilities of a federal system comparable to their own. As early as November, 1846, Mann believed that nothing could prevent the union of Germany on principles similar to those followed in this country. Donelson saw in the unionist movement a development which might lead in the end to "the adoption of that system, which with one central head for the management of internal concerns, will leave to the parties of the union a local sovereignty for municipal purposes." Prussia ought to be the leader in the new combination, though he doubted whether it would be willing

² Donelson to Buchanan, 10, 18, 19, 20, 23, 28 Mch. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, IV.

Donelson to Donelson, A. J., Jr., 28 Mch. 1848, Donelson Mss.

³ Mann to Buchanan, 13 Mch. 1848, 1 Ap. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Special Agents to German States and Hungary.

Donelson to Buchanan, 5, 18, 20, 28, 31 Mch. 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Prussia, IV.

to act in a manner desired. Bancroft recognized that the American federative system guided the Germans in their demand for a general political union. Another writer ventured to assert that the doctrines of Jefferson would quickly be extended over all Germany. In the new nation governed under a constitution modelled on that of America, the reigning princes would be the counterparts of American governors.⁴

If words could change a state from an absolute monarchy into one "almost as free as the United States," wrote Donelson at the end of March, "the fruit of the revolution would be glorious." He suggested to Buchanan that in the new order a written constitution would define the functions of the Federal Central Government. The American policy in the matter should harmonize with her political sympathies; besides, better commercial treaties might be arranged with a United Germany than with independent states. Realizing that only the wonderful prologue of the drama had been played, Donelson warned his government that the federation scheme at best was embryonic.⁵

A group of Badenese who hoped to introduce into Germany both the socialistic doctrines of Louis Blanc then regnant in France, and a republic, revolted in mid-April. Americans invariably criticised this movement which tended to arouse popular antagonism to any change of government and conversely, to strengthen the cause of monarchy. At length the rebellion was driven underground and its leader, Hecker, escaped to America. Bewildered by this movement and the general confusion, Clemson at the Hague could discover no unifying principles in Germany. Confidence seemed gone, the necessities of the moment alone governed.⁶

⁴ *Wash. Union*, 4 May 1848.

Donelson to Buchanan, 7, 10 Mch. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, IV.

Bancroft to Buchanan, 10, 24 Mch. 1848, 5, 16 May 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., England, LVIII.

Mann to Buchanan, 13 Mch. 1848, 17, 24 Ap. 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

⁵ Donelson to Buchanan, 22, 28, 30 Mch. 1848, 8 Ap. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, IV.

⁶ Mann to Buchanan, 1, 8, 15 May 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Graebe to Buchanan, 1 May 1848, *Ibid.*, Consular Letters, Hesse-Cassel, I. Clemson to Buchanan, 29 May 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Belgium, III.

Americans had earlier considered the utility of a republican government for Germany. In March, Donelson noted that if the Germans had capable leaders and a little more political experience they might resort to a republic, but such a striking change might endanger the rights already acquired. If the Prussian king or his government committed some great mistake, he wrote later, then a republic might follow. Bancroft could see no final settlement of the form of government unless it should be a republic based on a confederation of the several states. Only the fear that a republican government would not produce immediate order and tranquillity prevented its adoption, Clemson decided. But officials of lesser rank were convinced that a republic would be a colossal misfortune; the Germans were not yet ripe for a republican government.⁷

American opinion concerning the revolutionary movement must have been affected by the influence that America and its institutions had upon the Germans. Donelson learned that Prussians who sympathized with American political doctrines were making these ideas felt in the royal councils in Berlin. Copies of the Declaration of Independence and of the Federal Constitution were found everywhere. Later at Frankfort, Donelson noticed that members of the Assembly were diligently studying the various American constitutions. Members of this body frequently referred to the American government as the best example for Germany to imitate. Francis Lieber,* in attendance at the sessions of the Frankfort Assembly, said that men of all parties had told him that the more they studied the Constitution, "the more they were amazed at its simple grandeur and deep wisdom." A German gentleman obtained from Mann his views on a constitution for Germany and wrote them down for the use of the Assembly. Mann could

⁷ Donelson to Buchanan, 14 Mch. 1848, 10, 21 Ap. 1848, 4 Je. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, IV.

Bancroft to Buchanan, 14 Ap. 1848, 16 May 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., England, LVIII.

Clemson to Buchanan, 28 Mch. 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Belgium, III.

Graebe to Buchanan, 3 Ap. 1848, *Ibid.*, Consular Letters, Hesse-Cassel, I.

Flugel to Donelson, 22 Mch. 1848. Donelson Mss.

* Francis Lieber, a German refugee, was professor of history and political science at South Carolina College from 1825 to 1856.

never forget the political discussions of the liberal leaders in Bavaria. In debating what they had the right to demand from their monarch "one would observe to another 'die demokraten von Nord Amerika' have things thus and so 'und wir wollen sie auch haben.'" Likewise the stability of the American economic order made a wide appeal. Noble families informed Donelson that they would flee to America, "the only conservative society in the world." Capitalists formulated plans for the transfer of their wealth to America. Eventually they would emigrate. Thousands called on the consular agent at Darmstadt to get information about the United States for investment or emigration purposes.⁸

On March 31, 1848, a hastily chosen liberal German assembly met in Frankfort to arrange for a gathering of representatives which should determine the future German government. Mann, on the spot at the opening, marvelled at the huge crowds that assembled daily to hear the debates. Well aware of the importance of the gathering, he planned to remain and devote himself exclusively to it. This preliminary Parliament decreed that a Constitutional Convention should be convoked in Frankfort—a city, Mann said, which would be as much the centre of attraction until the new government was established as Vienna was in 1815. Little confidence did Donelson have that the Germans would select the proper sort of men for the task of making a constitution, and his suspicions were amply justified by later events.⁹

On May 18, 1848, the German Constitutional Assembly, which Stiles, the American chargé in Austria, considered might be the most important convention that ever assembled in Europe, since it might effect a revolution in the political institutions of

⁸ Donelson to Buchanan, 23, 25 Mch. 1848, 6 Ap. 1848, 5 May 1848, 4 Je. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, IV.

Mann to Buchanan, 13 Mch. 1848, 1, 11, 25 Ap. 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Mann to Buchanan, 4 Jl. 1848. Buchanan Mss.

Perry, T. S., *Life and Letters of Francis Lieber*, 214-223.

De Vere to Hunter, 23 Je. 1848, A.H.A. Rept., 1916, II, 93.

⁹ Mann to Buchanan, 1, 11 Ap. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Donelson to Buchanan, 1, 5 May 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Prussia, IV.

the countries represented, met at Frankfort. Americans freely expressed their opinions as to the calibre of the representatives in the Assembly. Mann thought that the body included as learned a group of men as any similar one ever assembled, but he noticed the absence of any practical statesmen. Donelson, who saw the large number of young and inexperienced men present doubted whether they would formulate a workable, sound constitution. Graebe, though he granted that some good men were in evidence, maintained that the great number of professors whose knowledge had been acquired exclusively from books, would prevent progress. Kendall, European correspondent for the New Orleans *Picayune*, placed a low estimate on the body. He doubted whether there were three men who could cope with the problems at hand. In appearance, the men seemed like so many buffalo bulls, two-thirds of whom, in the United States, would be considered candidates for the first barber shop in the vicinity. Another journalist was astonished at the extremely mean complexion presented by the assembled learning of Germany.¹⁰

One of the best contemporary American opinions of the personnel of the Frankfort Assembly comes from William Wells, a highly intelligent friend of Donelson:

“The Assembly here is the most conglomerate mass that can be imagined and contains every shade of political element from republicans to princes. The extreme left numbers about thirty who are open republicans without expediency . . . the left centre is very strong and they are all favorable to the republic the moment that it can be introduced without the tremor of civil war and anarchy . . . the right centre may be called liberal constitutional monarchists . . . on the extreme right sit the Catholic bishops and priests in clerical robes . . . The most remarkable man in the Assembly is, unquestionably, Robert Blum, of Leipzig, leader of the radicals. His mind is strong and clear; his influence with the masses immense, and a violent introduction of the republic may make him President . . . Von Gagern, President of the Assembly, is called their Washington.”

¹⁰ Stiles to Buchanan, 26 Ap. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Austria, II. Mann to Buchanan, 22 May 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Donelson to Buchanan, 25 May 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Prussia, IV.

New Orleans Picayune, 16 Nov. 1848; *Newark Daily Advertiser*, 1 Mch. 1849.

Bancroft, too, considered Von Gagern "one of the ablest statesmen of the time."¹¹

From the outset the Frankfort Assembly dissipated its vitality in interminable debate, while, as Americans recognised, the position of the German monarchs improved. As Mann wrote, the monarchical serpent had not been exterminated by the revolts, it had only been scotched. After a lengthy, academic discussion over the executive for the temporary central government, the Assembly agreed upon an official to be known as the "Grand Vicaire". For this office Archduke John, brother of the Hapsburg sovereign, was elected. "A simple-minded Prince as relates to ambition," wrote Mann, "a republican in the abstract." The absurd program of selecting an executive before the rest of the government had been created aroused the ire of Stiles, who felt this action characteristic of everything being done.¹²

Since they believed or, better, hoped that the Frankfort Assembly would develop into a permanent central government, Americans bestirred themselves to establish diplomatic relations with it. Donelson requested that the President "without taking any part in the great struggle of the German States" grant him the right to follow his own discretion regarding recognition. After the Archduke had been elected, Mann held recognition to be unavoidable and supposed that the duty had already been assigned to Donelson. Bancroft, to whom intimation had been made that the Germans would be pleased at some act of recognition of the German Union, suggested that the President should direct a member of the diplomatic corps "to recognise the new federative creation." A Congressional vote of congratulation,

¹¹ Wells to Donelson, 11 Je. 1848. Donelson Mss.

Bancroft to Buchanan, 30 Je. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., England, LVIII.

¹² Mann to Buchanan, 15 May 1848, 29 Je. 1848, 4, 18 Jl. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Donelson to Buchanan, 13, 25 May 1848, 24, 30 Je. 1848, 1, 15 Jl. 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Prussia, IV.

Stiles to Buchanan, 5 Jl. 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Austria, II.

Donelson to Buchanan, 1 Ag. 1848. Buchanan Mss.

wrote another "American gentleman of great intelligence", would cement friendship and lead to greater commercial privileges.*¹³

When Donelson received no reply to his numerous pleas concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations with Frankfort, he wrote Buchanan that he had decided to go there and act as he saw best. In passage, this letter crossed one from the Secretary of State advising Donelson to proceed to Frankfort; if he found the government in successful operation, he should recognize it. Thereupon, Donelson, as the duly accredited American agent, presented himself to the "Grand Vicaire", and assured him that American opinion strongly favored the movement to unite Germany. America expressed this conviction "not in the spirit of propagandism, but out of sincere respect for the German states."¹⁴

Though this action on Donelson's part exhibits his optimism for a unified Germany, other Americans despaired. Fay, perhaps the most judicious of all the officials, doubted whether the obstacles that blocked the path to unity could be surmounted. "Germany, never much united, is at the moment less so than

* One American at Frankfort decided to take time by the forelock and recognize the temporary government. Professor Schele de Vere, of the University of Virginia, had written his Senator, R. M. T. Hunter, of the situation at Frankfort. He found conditions much better than he had anticipated and expressed indignation that no agent was present to recognize the new state and to look after American commercial interests. At length he informed the consul at Frankfort that he had been sent by the American government to assist in organizing the German government and to act as chargé to it. When President Polk learned of De Vere's audacious activity he declared in a special message to the Senate that he knew not the man and that he had no power to act for the United States in any capacity whatsoever.

Schwendler to Buchanan, 10 Jl. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Consular Letters, Frankfort, I.

Graebe to Donelson, 18 Jl. 1848. Donelson Mss.

De Vere to Hunter, 23 Je. 1848, A. H. A. Rept., 1916, II, 91.

Richardson, *Messages etc. of Presidents*, IV, 605.

¹³ Donelson to Buchanan, 24, 30 Je. 1848, 1 Jl. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, IV.

Mann to Buchanan, 29 Je. 1848, 18 Jl. 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Bancroft to Buchanan, 28 Jl. 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., England, LVIII.

Wash. Union, 27 Jl. 1848.

¹⁴ Donelson to Buchanan, 1 Ag. 1848. Buchanan Mss.

Buchanan to Donelson, 30 Oct. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Inst., Prussia, XIV.

Wash. Union, 15 Oct. 1848.

ever." His prediction that the Frankfort fabric would fall in like a pack of cards was fulfilled.* As the summer wore on, other "doubting Thomases" developed apace. Mann could not see order coming from the European chaos; indeed, in Germany matters seemed to be getting progressively worse. Graebe, never very enthusiastic over the Frankfort venture, felt that the Assembly had lost its opportunity because of lack of despatch in forming a constitution. A journalist found everything in the Assembly at sixes and sevens; only a miracle could now unite all the elements in Germany. "It must be admitted," said Kendall, "the politics of Germany are as difficult to understand as metaphysics."**¹⁵

Early in the revolutionary period, Donelson had urged his government to send some of the warships released from active duty through the cessation of the Mexican War to the Baltic "ready for eventualities." Accordingly, on October 8, 1848, the frigate *St. Lawrence* commanded by Captain Hiram S. Paulding*** arrived at Bremerhaven. The German people considered the ship as on a mission of fraternal republican sympathy. Officers walking in the streets of Berlin were hailed as "the officers of the new German fleet."¹⁶ Paulding made an excursion through

* When on September 9, 1848, Berlin witnessed a terrible émeuté, Fay momentarily thought that Prussia might give way to the Frankfort Assembly.

** Of the riotous excesses in Frankfort in September, 1848, Donelson is strangely silent. Mann had gone to London to use his influence to push through the repeal of the Navigation Acts.

Mann to Buchanan, 18 Jl. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Spec. Agent to German States and Hungary.

¹⁵ Fay to Donelson, 26, 31 Jl. 1848, 26 Ag. 1848. Donelson Mss.

Graebe to Donelson, 18 Jl. 1848. *Ibid.*

Graebe to Buchanan, 1, 28 Ag. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Consular Letters, Hesse-Cassel, I.

New Orleans Picayune, 14 Sept. 1848, 21 Nov. 1848.

Mann to Buchanan, 4 Jl. 1848. Buchanan Mss.

*** Hiram Paulding (1797-1878) had seen service in the war of 1812 and against the Barbary pirates. Elevated to a captaincy in 1844, he had spent several years in East Indian waters before his appearance in Germany.

¹⁶ Donelson to Buchanan, 10, 11 Ap. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, IV.

Mann to Buchanan, 17 Ap. 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Paulding to Donelson, 7 Oct. 1848. Donelson Mss.

Phila. Sunday Despatch, 26 Nov. 1848.

the German states and formulated his opinion on the political situation.

To his mind, all Germany seemed to favor a republican federal government. The hope of peace and the preservation of society rested with the Frankfort Assembly, but since it lacked trained political leaders, he foresaw that confusion and violence would reign in the immediate future. Together with Donelson, he called upon the Prussian king, and in the course of a special interview the Minister reiterated the American attitude toward the movements in Germany. Said he: "The United States, though attached to the scheme of federal unity does not obtrude its example or experience on other sovereigns." In sending him to Frankfort, it was far from the intention of his government to make itself a party for or against "any scheme of reform which was of doubtful bearing on the prospects of the German states whether viewed as a Federal whole or as sovereignties."¹⁷

Berlin in November experienced a revival of revolution when the King, having appointed the reactionary Brandenburg as Cabinet head, prorogued the Prussian Assembly. Donelson considered the King's action unjustifiable and sensed some great convulsion in the near future. In adjourning the Berlin assembly the monarch had struck a savage blow at the representative principle—at the Frankfort Assembly. Donelson expected that the revolution would begin "de novo", in which case the Central Power would probably be at once dissolved.¹⁸

Quickly the disorders became general so that Donelson could write Buchanan, "all Prussia—all Germany is coming under martial law." Still he had hopes that the Frankfort government, which "was acquiring more and more the public confidence," might formulate a satisfactory form of union. But Stiles saw only the complete destruction of German hopes which recently had been "so auspicious and so cheering." Presently

¹⁷ Paulding to Mason, 14 Oct. 1848, 16 Nov. 1848, Mss., Dept. of Navy, Cruise of St. Lawrence, 1848-50.

Paulding to Donelson, 14 Nov. 1848. Donelson Mss.

Donelson to Buchanan, 3 Nov. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, V.

Donelson to Buchanan, 5 Nov. 1848. Buchanan Mss.

¹⁸ Donelson to Buchanan, 9, 13, 18 Nov. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, V.

Donelson conceded that affairs were terribly confused, and hinted at a tremendous civil conflict which would bring on universal bankruptcy. On Christmas Day, he informed Buchanan that he doubted whether the Frankfort Assembly would succeed. A month later, with Austria torn by civil discord, he was certain that a federal union of all the German states was impossible.¹⁹

While events were transforming Donelson's opinions on the central government, Kendall voiced his disgust with the procedure of the Assembly. Germany needed some governing mind to lead, instead of the idle and dissolute boys or swaggering demagogues who controlled affairs at Frankfort. By its antics, the Assembly would alienate the middle classes. Republicans, through the crimes they committed or through their legislative tomfooleries, had fallen short of what lovers of liberty expected of them. Because of its incompetency, the Assembly had lost its influence and would soon crumble.²⁰

From February, 1849, to the time when the Frankfort movement hopelessly collapsed, Donelson's shifting opinions attest the general confusion that prevailed throughout the Germanies. On February 1, he believed that a German union would be consummated; two days later the probabilities were against "the preservation of a popular power at Frankfort," on February 5, he wrote to one man, "A few days will give us the last act as far as the play is with the present Assembly;" to another, "I indulge the hope that the German states leaving out Austria will establish a federal system calculated to pacify the people." As the month wore on he anticipated another revolution in which the democratic party would renew the struggle for German unity.²¹

Meanwhile the Frankfort Assembly, having drawn up a con-

¹⁹ Donelson to Buchanan, 6, 14, 19, 25 Dec. 1848, 15, 19 Jan. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, V.

Donelson to Buchanan, 26 Nov. 1848, 14 Dec. 1848. Buchanan Mss.

²⁰ *New Orleans Picayune*, 15 Oct. 1848, 16, 21 Nov. 1848, 6, 24 Dec. 1848, 11 Jan. 1849.

²¹ Donelson to Buchanan, 1, 3, 19 Feb. 1849, 1 Mch. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, V.

Donelson to Von Roenne, 5 Feb. 1849. Donelson Mss.

Donelson to Parker, 5 Feb. 1849. *Ibid.*

stitution which excluded Austria, offered the permanent executive office to the Prussian king, who should have the title of Emperor. By that action Mann thought the German legislators had proved themselves "utterly unworthy of the sympathies of a people so free as those in America." Kendall had no confidence in the selection. Donelson anticipated that the Prussian king would reject the crown unless the other German sovereigns approved the proposal of the constitutional convention. When he heard that the King had actually refused the new crown, Donelson doubted whether the cause of unity could succeed.²²

As soon as the Frankfort group learned of the adverse decision of the Prussian monarch, it decided that the central government should function without Prussia. Donelson was fully convinced that the King, having recalled the Prussian delegates from the Assembly, would employ all his resources against the new government. Nevertheless, since twenty-nine states had accepted the constitution, Donelson thought it might yet be put into operation. Doubtless a civil war would test the strength of the "German" government.²³

When the Prussian army advanced into the Rhineland, the "rump" national Assembly transferred its activities to Stuttgart, whither at least one American thought Donelson should follow. Donelson, however, saw that the move was fatal, since the mass of the German people would not approve. At last the truth seems to have dawned on him. The revolutionary movement had failed dismally. The hopes of a federal union with a popularly elected parliament had been vain. By the end of September, 1849, the American consul at Stuttgart could write, "all the political strife between government and people seems to be at an

²² Donelson to Buchanan, 11 Mch. 1849. Buchanan Mss.

Donelson to Clayton, 28 Mch. 1849, 5, 25 Ap. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, V.

Mann to Clayton, 28 Ag. 1849, 27 Sept. 1849, *Ibid.*, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Graebe to Clayton, 9 Ap. 1849, *Ibid.*, Consular Letters, Hesse-Cassel, I.

²³ Donelson to Clayton, 7, 24 May 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, V.

end. Confidence is reestablished among men." The revolution with all its exalted hopes belonged to the ages.²⁴

What were the results of the German revolutions as seen contemporaneously by Americans? To Kendall, the populace, politically and socially, seemed to be in the same position as before the revolution started, but physically their condition was worse. The verdict of incompetency had been rendered against the idlers and "the moonstruck professors of the Universities" who had become "drunk on liberty." Though the 1848 movement had failed, it represented merely the prelude to a drama which would "drench the Old World in blood." The sagacious Fay believed that some good had resulted from the upheaval and prophesied that "Germany" would soon be visited by a conflict "of a character such as history had not yet seen." Keenly disappointed by the Frankfort fiasco, Donelson awaited another revolt greater in extent and depth to the one the Germans had just witnessed. Generally aggrieved over the outcome of the 1848 movement, Americans looked hopefully to the future. Eastward the star of liberalism would take its way.²⁵

²⁴ Donelson to Clayton, 4, 8 Je. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, V. Fleischmann, C. L. to Clayton, 30 Sept. 1849, *Ibid.*, Consular Letters, Stuttgart, I.

Corry to Donelson, 9 Je. 1849. Donelson Mss.

Aspenwall to Clayton, 15 Je. 1849. Clayton Mss.

²⁵ *New Orleans Picayune*, 16 Feb. 1849.

Donelson to Clayton, 6 Ag. 1849. Clayton Mss.

Fay to Clayton, 2 Feb. 1850, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, VI.

II

OPINION IN AMERICA ON THE REVOLUTIONS IN GERMANY

Ever responsive to the impulses of the crowd, American newspapers, especially through their editorials, expressed the views of their readers on the revolutionary movements and at the same time succeeded in molding public opinion. From public meetings, one learns the action of the common pulse with respect of problems of the moment. That Americans, on the whole, had comparatively little information on affairs in Central Europe is probably well attested by the dearth of opinion on the revolutions in the correspondence of leading political figures. Finally the government policy influenced by public opinion shows more definitely the thought of Americans as to the revolutions and allied events.

Without exception, American editors wrote favorably regarding the German movement, though there were varying degrees of interest exhibited. The *Mercury* of Charleston looked upon the upheaval as an indication of the value of public education in opening up men's minds to their inherent rights. The *Richmond Enquirer* contained a vigorous editorial. Surprised somewhat at the general moderation with which the great events had been achieved, the editor knew that the German movement, if successful, would receive the applause of his countrymen. He hoped that the new régime founded on "truth, justice, and the inalienable rights of man" would be obtained without bloodshed. But come what would, Americans had a cordial sympathy for the splendid republican spirit already shown. The *Washington Union* lauded the erection in Germany of a government in close sympathy with the American Republic, and anticipated the establishment of favorable commercial relations. Germany would put on the grandeur due her "as the cradle of civilization for centuries."¹

¹ *Charleston Mercury*, 27 Ap. 1848; *Rich. Enquirer*, 24 Ap. 1848; *Wash. Union*, 27, 30 Jl. 1848, 14 Je. 1849.

Southern Whig papers held like views. To the *Savannah Republican*, it seemed as if Germany and all Europe had suddenly been roused from a coma and now struggled for freedom. If a general war should break out in Europe, the end would be a triumph for republican institutions. In case of war, the duty of the American government was plain—sympathy with those struggling, but no entanglement in foreign quarrels. Another waxed eloquent as it observed the spread of American political doctrines. Europe now looked to America to lead the nations. German emancipation had been achieved through the example of American freedom. The revolutions were but “the revolution of 1776 extending itself across the seas.” The cause of Germany—that of right against might and light against darkness—became essentially the enterprise of mankind. The *Philadelphia Public Ledger* gloried in the period “when liberty had gained such a base of operation.” When rumor spread that Germany had announced a republic it hailed the news as “the most important ever received from Europe.” Others looked to the revolutions to benefit America by increasing trade and commerce. Through all vicissitudes, Americans seemed convinced that a united Germany with a central government would eventuate. Royal power would fall before the advance of democracy which most certainly would supplant the waning aristocratic régime.²

When the tide began to turn against the revolutionist forces, newspaper enthusiasm gradually changed to dismay or hostile criticism. Despite the setbacks the popular cause sustained, the *New Orleans Picayune* refused to believe despotism could regain its former power. America should be sympathetic when considering the mountainous difficulties with which German progressives had to contend. The *Mercury* predicted that the selection of Archduke John as the Vicar of the general government would produce continuous turmoil. Hopes of political regeneration, wailed another, faded for the want of counsel from leaders who had German welfare at heart. After the Frank-

² *Savannah Republican*, 24 Ap. 1848, 1 Jan. 1849; *N. O. Picayune*, 3 May 1848, 24 Je. 1849; *Phila. Ledger*, 4, 30 Ap. 1848, 24 Oct. 1848, 28 May 1849; *N. Y. Tribune*, 28 May 1849; *Phila. No. Am.*, 11 Ap. 1848; 19 *Merchants' Magazine*, 85; 33 *Graham's Mag.*, 323.

fort debacle and the consequent flight of hope for German unity, sympathy and advice flowed from many channels. The history of this parliamentary fiasco should serve as an instructive lesson for the future. Time had been wasted in idle talk and the writing of constitutions. If Germany wanted to be united the people would need to act in concert. The Richmond *Whig* declared its lack of confidence in any scheme designed to unify Germany. An empire of Germany seemed nebulous and unreal even to the optimistic New York *Tribune*.³

When word of a fresh upheaval in the southwestern German states in June, 1849, reached the Philadelphia *Ledger*, interest reawakened only to be snuffed out a month later when the movement collapsed due to the interposition of a Prussian army. Disappointed, the editor penned his disgust with the revolutionists who had acted like a group of schoolboys. The Boston *Atlas* feared that the social heresies which had sprung up during the revolution might retard, even though they did not prevent, the ultimate success of liberty in Germany. Horace Greeley, who had long clung to the hope that a republic one and indivisible would eventually triumph, now conceded that the revolution had ended. He called attention to the fugitives foregathered in Switzerland who needed financial aid so that they might migrate to America.⁴

Public gatherings for Germany, though well-nigh eclipsed by similar meetings for France, were held in many American cities. At Newark and New Orleans, individuals presented schemes by which Americans might contribute funds to aid Germany. Volunteers to fight for German unity marched forward in a public meeting in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and a subscription list to defray their expenses was passed around.⁵

³ *N. O. Picayune*, 28 Jl. 1848, 29 Oct. 1848; *Charleston Mercury*, 20 Jl. 1848; *Wash. Intelligencer*, 20 Sept. 1848; *Rich. Whig*, 14 May 1849; *N. Y. Tribune*, 20 Ap. 1849.

⁴ *Phila. Ledger*, 21 Jan. 1849, 12 Mch. 1849, 31 May 1849, 11 Jl. 1849; *N. Y. Tribune*, 26, 28 May 1849, 2, 5 Je. 1849, 2 Ag. 1849; *Boston Atlas*, 10 Jl. 1849; 2 *Mass. Quart. Rev.*, 178; *N. O. Picayune*, 18 Ag. 1849.

⁵ *N. Y. Tribune*, 12 Jl. 1849; *Newark Daily Advertiser*, 28 Je. 1849, 15 Mch. 1849; *Rich. Enquirer*, 26 Ap. 1848; *Phila. No. Am.*, 29 Ap. 1848, 2, 10 May 1848, 10 Oct. 1848; *St. Louis Republican*, 20 Mch. 1849. Cp. Cole, A. C., *Illinois History, The Era of the Civil War*, 23.

In New York, a great parade with the red flag in evidence preceded a series of speeches urging assistance to Germany. Boston held a similar meeting. At a monster assembly in Richmond, the people gloried in the triumph of liberty and justice. At Charleston, a huge throng serenaded the residence of Professor Lieber whose son had shared in the movements in Berlin. When Hecker, the escaped leader of an abortive republican movement in Baden, arrived in Philadelphia, he received a tremendous ovation. America welcomed such exiles, gratified as she was to see the struggles for liberty in other lands. In the same city, a "Revolutionary League" composed, doubtless, largely of foreigners, offered sums of money for the death of the chief crowned heads of central Europe. A body of German-American citizenry in St. Louis immediately repudiated this rash gesture.*⁵

The exiguity of recorded interest among the men high in social and political station is striking. If they revealed their opinions on this revolutionary turmoil, almost all traces of them have vanished. Of those extant, Francis Lieber believed at the outset that a general war would follow the revolt and that the end would be the unity of Germany. Union would be followed by the flight of princes and the adoption of constitutional liberty. J. H. Hammond** expected that the European sovereigns would provoke a war to detract attention from internal affairs. Anxiously he awaited the results in Germany.⁶

The only extensive personal opinion that we have on the revolution is that of Calhoun. From the beginning of the movement his interest appears. The revolutions struck him as being "without parallel in the history of the world." Results were difficult to predict since the events were so much out of the ordinary. To him, Germany seemed considerably changed by

* After a Berlin paper had published news of this "League", the Minister of the Interior used it as a reason for continuing the state of siege there. Donelson to Clayton, 27 Ap. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Prussia, V.

** J. H. Hammond was an able and prominent South Carolina politician and a close friend of Calhoun. He had been Governor, 1842-44.

⁶ Lieber to Mittermaier, 31 Mch. 1848, Perry, T. S., *Life and Letters of F. Lieber*, 213.

Hammond to Maj. Hammond, 3, 21 Ap. 1848. Hammond Mss.

the revolutions, and he hoped improved thereby. The intelligence and progress of the age had outgrown monarchies which would now be cast into discard. The existing political institutions in Germany might easily be transformed into a federalized constitutional government similar to the American. He relied on Germany to be the saviour, politically, of all Europe. Materials for success availed, but would a leader appear who could weave the elements into a satisfactory whole? Time increased his fears. He began to wonder whether the leaders were sufficiently enlightened on political science to devise a stable government. Later he felt that Europe had overthrown the old régime without preparation for the new, and he looked for a long period of anarchy and disorder.⁷

Calhoun's views are colored by his academic interest in the operation of political science in Germany. His political principles "drawn from facts in the moral world just as certain as any in the physical" might be put to a definite test.* Calhoun had no faith in majority rule of itself, and reflecting on the German situation he did not fail to expound his familiar doctrine that "the mere numerical majority is the people and has, as such, the indefeasible right to govern" constituted a vicious error. As the central German government became palpably weaker he explained the decline as due to the misconceptions and the fundamental errors of the political leaders. High and exalted aspirations had vanished in the pursuit of false political premises.⁷

Tucker** thought that the Germans had gone wild having drunk from the "jargon of Kant." He recognized, however, the intense devotion to the fatherland and hoped the efforts might culminate in success. Daniel Webster held the movement in

⁷ Jameson, J. F., *Correspondence of J. C. Calhoun*, A.H.A., Repts., 1899, II, 748-760.

Calhoun to Donelson, 23 May 1848. Donelson Mss.

*It was suspected by contemporaries that Calhoun had sketched a plan of government for Germany. That such was actually the case has been recently discovered.

Graebe to Donelson, 2 Jl. 1848. Donelson Mss.

Vide, Curti, M. E., *Austria and the United States, 1848-52*, 143.

** Beverley Tucker was professor of law in the College of William and Mary and an influential writer on things political.

high esteem. At one time he considered going to Germany as minister to aid in the erection of a federal government.⁸

Opinion in America concerning the revolutions in the Germanies aided in shaping the policy of the government with respect of them. The State Department desired all possible information so that its judgments might be correctly formed and a wise policy followed. Actuated by reports from agents in Europe, the government early in the revolutions felt it advisable to adopt a "watchful waiting" attitude. Accordingly President Polk refused to ratify a convention of extradition arranged with Prussia and some of the other German states, because of the great change which had recently come. If a central government were erected, the United States would treat with it.⁹

Later, reassured by Donelson, the Administration considered the success of the revolution a certainty. Hence in July, 1848, the Minister at Berlin received orders to proceed to Frankfort as the diplomatic representative of the United States and to recognize the new German government if it were in successful operation. The American people, wrote Buchanan, sympathized warmly with anything that would work for the best interests of Germany. While at Frankfort, Donelson had special instructions to do all in his power to promote American commercial interests and to secure a reduction of the duty on the important agricultural and manufacturing productions. Early in the following month, encouraged by the reports from abroad and fortified by the approval of his Cabinet, President Polk decided to make the Frankfort mission a permanent one. Thus with Senate approval, Donelson received an appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to the Federal Government of Germany, with the distinct understanding that he should remain as envoy to Prussia also until word reached Washington that the central government had complete charge of foreign relations, at which time the Prussian mission would be dispensed with. The

⁸ Tucker to Hammond, 11 Oct. 1848. Hammond Mss.
Blair, F. P. to Van Buren, 5 Mch. 1849. Van Buren Mss.
⁹ Richardson, *Messages etc. of Presidents*, IV, 600.
Quaife, *Diary of J. K. Polk*, IV, 18, 19, 28, 33.

most important object of the mission consisted in getting the German tariff reduced to a reciprocal basis. Buchanan impressed on Donelson the government policy and opinion. The United States never interfered with the domestic concerns of foreign states, but it could not "view with indifference" the unification movement in Germany.¹⁰

As the summer wore on, and no Minister from the central government presented his credentials, Polk became suspicious. Donelson's suggestions for a commercial pact fell on adder's ears. Only when the Frankfort government had a well-defined constitution would such a treaty be made. When the Whigs came into office on March 5, 1849, Secretary of State Clayton advocated the same policy with regard to a commercial treaty as that pursued by Buchanan, since Germany had not yet been firmly established. In forceful language, he forbade Donelson to negotiate a commercial treaty until so advised from Washington.¹¹

As the United States had only one envoy in Germany, it was prepared to receive one man representing both Berlin and Frankfort. After a long wait in New York for his commission, Roenne,* the German minister, was received by Polk in January, 1849. Following a felicitous speech from Roenne, Polk declared that the American people had taken a deep and lively interest in the events in Germany during the previous year. While they adhered to the established doctrine of non-interference in the domestic affairs of nations, American sympathy had been with Germany in her struggle for a liberal centralized government. The President expressed pleasure at the reception accorded Donelson in Frankfort and added that America desired

¹⁰ Richardson, *Messages etc. of Presidents*, IV, 605.

Quaife, *Diary of J. K. Polk*, IV, 47, 56-57.

Buchanan to Donelson, 24 Jl. 1848, 3, 7, 15 Ag. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Inst., Prussia, XIV.

¹¹ Buchanan to Donelson, 6 Nov. 1848, 8 Jan. 1849, 17 Feb. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Inst., Prussia, XIV.

Buchanan to Donelson, 26 Jan. 1849, *Ibid.*, Notes to German States, VI.

Clayton to Donelson, 19 Mch. 1849, *Ibid.*, Inst., Prussia, XIV.

Quaife, *Diary of J. K. Polk*, IV, 170, 172, 310, 337.

* Frederick Ludwig von Roenne had been the Prussian envoy at Washington, 1834-43. After sitting in the Frankfort Parliament he had been designated as minister to Washington where he had established numerous friendships.

"to cement the amicable relations which exist" and "to extend commercial intercourse." This reception breathed the same spirit that Polk had exhibited in his recent message to Congress in which he had expressed pleasure at the unification movement. If unity should be accomplished with a guarantee for the protection of states-rights, it would mark "an important era in the history of human events;" the whole world would benefit by the union.¹²

The last official act of Polk made the Frankfort mission a separate one through the appointment, under political pressure, of E.A. Hannegan* to Berlin. Polk's policy was dictated by the belief, formed from Donelson's despatches, that eventually the Berlin mission would be swallowed up in that of Frankfort. Donelson, come what might, would be secure, thought Polk. But Donelson, seeing the rope of sand on which the Frankfort government hung, recognized the futility of having two ministers in Germany.¹³

The Whig Administration, with John M. Clayton as Premier, proceeded more cautiously in its dealings with the German situation. Donelson received orders to go to Frankfort and to assure the Archduke John that the new administration desired to draw the bonds of amity closer than they had ever been before. Considering the complicated circumstances, however, it behooved the American Republic to act with unusual caution and prudence. To be sure, the sympathies of the government and of the American people were with the German group that wanted a government based on the supreme principle that the people are the source of all power. America was prepared to recognize new governments and "to cheer them in every progressive movement that has for its aim the countless and priceless blessings of freedom." Donelson, however, was to act merely as a silent sentinel and keep the government informed of German opinion and

¹² *Wash. Union*, 31 Jan. 1849.

Richardson, *Messages etc. of Presidents*, IV, 630.

Quaife, *Diary of J. K. Polk*, IV, 310.

* E. A. Hannegan, an Indiana debauchee, who had been U. S. Senator, 1845-1849.

¹³ Buchanan to Donelson, 8 Jan. 1849, 18 Feb. 1849, 29 Je. 1849. Donelson Mss.

Donelson to Buchanan, 21 J1. 1849. Buchanan Mss.

Quaife, *Diary of J. K. Polk*, IV, 369, 370.

progress. Developments at Frankfort in the near future would determine whether or not the mission should be abolished. If no progress should be made, Donelson would be recalled and then "we should not renew the experiment of sending a minister to another Government before it shall be organized and capable of treating with us"—a sharp dig at the Democratic Buchanan policy.¹⁴

When the certainty of organizing the central German government had vanished, Donelson was recalled (September 18, 1849) and the mission "for the present" was suppressed.* President Taylor came to this decision because no permanent German government had yet been formed, and fresh reports indicated that none could be erected until Prussia agreed to cooperate. Until that time the United States would keep its representative in Berlin. Though the Frankfort envoy was ordered home, Clayton considered it advisable to have someone there to keep him informed of any developments. A new mission, assigned to Seaton Gales, ex-secretary of the Frankfort Legation, was to be strictly private and confidential. If anything should develop Clayton wanted surety that he would be accurately and readily informed.¹⁵

Democratic party horses at Washington soon attacked the administration policy. In the Senate, Cass demanded the reestablishment of the mission to the Frankfort government because it was the fountain of liberal principles upon which any regeneration of Germany depended. Earlier in the session Foote introduced a bill looking to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. The mission had been suppressed just when it seemed likely to prove highly advantageous to the cause of freedom. Countering, King, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, pointed out that the central government had failed, and no confederated government existed to which a mission could be sent.

¹⁴ Clayton to Donelson, 19 Mch. 1849, 8 Jl. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Inst., Prussia, XIV.

Cp. *Phila. North American*, 24 Ag. 1849.

* It was considered possible that the Frankfort post might later be reestablished. Clay, H. to McNairy, 26 Jan. 1850. Clay Mss.

¹⁵ Clayton to Donelson, 18 Sept. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Inst., Prussia, XIV.

Clayton to Gales, 1 Oct. 1849. *Ibid.*

Richardson, *Messages etc. of Presidents*, V. 11.

On a motion in the House, similar to the one made by Foote, McClernand, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, declared the mission had been suppressed through "the coalition of the Executive with the Kings against the people of Germany." Though this avowed Democratic hostility continued to evidence itself, the Whig government remained obdurate.¹⁶

Another indication of the surpassing interest in, and of American opinion on the revolutionary movement with the concomitant struggle for union, may be observed in the governmental activities with respect of the navy projected for United Germany. Duckwitz, Minister of Commerce at Frankfort, requested through Donelson that the United States allow a naval officer "of high station who has already been in command of a man-of-war and who is perfectly acquainted with the requisites of the marine," to enter the German service. Buchanan had received a request in like tenor through Graebe who added that Germany desired to buy some American warships. At a Cabinet meeting the Secretary of State presented the application, which he and several of his colleagues thought should be granted. But the President interposed several objections. If an American naval officer held a command in the German navy, he would be in an anomalous position. Again, he would be drawing pay from two states. Let an officer go to Germany on a leave of absence, without pay, and if he chose he might voluntarily enter the German naval service, one suggested. Polk compromised by agreeing to grant a leave to an American officer for a short period.¹⁷

With the distinct understanding that he would in no wise jeopardize his position in the American service, Foxhall A. Parker,* was sent on this strictly confidential mission "to ascer-

¹⁶ 31 Cong., 1 sess., *Cong. Globe*, 583, 745-6; 31 Cong., 1 sess., *Sen. Jol.*, 114, 458.

¹⁷ Mann to Buchanan, 1 May 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Graebe to Buchanan, 9 Oct. 1848, *Ibid.*, Consular Letters, Hesse-Cassel, I. Buchanan to Donelson, 30 Oct. 1848, *Ibid.*, Inst., Prussia, XIV.

Quaife, *Diary of J. K. Polk*, IV, 169-172.

* Commodore Parker had a long and varied career in the naval service. As a lieutenant in 1814, he had participated in successful cruises against British merchantmen. In 1843, he commanded the squadron that accompanied Caleb Cushing on his mission to negotiate the first commercial treaty with China.

tain precisely what is desired and what will be the conditions of the temporary service in Germany," since the President wanted "to give every legitimate aid" in establishing the new German navy. Parker embarked for Bremen, December 20, 1848.¹⁸

Meanwhile the German Naval Board awaited the presence of their American adviser, and hesitated to do anything before his arrival. Before going to Frankfort Parker dined with the Prussian king. After several protracted conferences with Von Gagern, President of the Frankfort Council of State, and with Duckwitz, Parker learned that virtually nothing had been done to create a national navy. Laws had not even been devised for the government of the navy, nor had plans been arranged to prevent a blockade in case war should break out with Denmark, which seemed imminent to Parker. Consequently he concluded that no American officer could do credit to himself or his country at the time. American assistance should be confined exclusively to advice. In a letter to Donelson, Parker stated that though Germany wanted thirty-nine American officers to organize the navy, he doubted whether one would accept; personally, he had not the slightest idea of entering the German service. Until the course of the new government should be clearly charted, the United States should rest on its oars.¹⁹

On his return to Washington, Parker made a report, which unfortunately has vanished, to his Department and received thanks for "the promptitude and intelligence" with which the mission was executed. Parker's report convinced the authori-

¹⁸ Mason to Buchanan, 12 Dec. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Miscell. Letters, Oct.-Dec. 1848.

Buchanan to Donelson, 18 Dec. 1848, *Ibid.*, Inst., Prussia, XIV.

Mason to Parker, 16 Dec. 1848, Mss., Dept. of Navy, Officers, Ships of War, XLII.

¹⁹ Graebe to Buchanan, 28 Nov. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Consular Letters, Hesse-Cassel, I.

Graebe to Donelson, 26 Dec. 1848. Donelson Mss.

Duckwitz to Donelson, 12 Jan. 1849. *Ibid.*

Fay to Donelson, 25 Jan. 1849. *Ibid.*

Donelson to Fay, 22, 23 Jan. 1849. *Ibid.*

Parker to Donelson, 25 Jan. 1849. *Ibid.*

Parker to Mason, 24 Jan. 1849, Mss., Dept. of Navy, Capts. Letters, Jan.-Je. 1849.

ties that it was inadvisable for American navalmen to enter foreign service; an opinion that was duly transmitted to Roenne. Learning that the naval invitation had been refused, Donelson assumed that the government had finished with the Frankfort government.²⁰

Meanwhile the Frankfort authorities had determined to augment the diminutive navy through the acquisition of some privately owned American vessels, for which purpose a special agent was despatched to this country. Roenne, who already had secured copies of the naval laws and regulations together with the plan of naval organization, applied for a naval officer to aid in fitting out a vessel and to accompany it to Bremerhaven. Compliance would attest afresh the friendly disposition of the United States to assist Germany in creating a navy. Commander M. C. Perry consented to undertake the task and on his advice a mail packet, the *United States*, was purchased. When the German envoy applied for the use of the Brooklyn Navy Yard facilities in equipping the vessel, the request was granted.²¹

Inherently more conservative in foreign affairs and fearful that the ship might be employed in the Dano-German war then underway, the Whig administration completely altered the policy of the Polk régime. Perry was ordered to sever his relationship with the German authorities; the permit to use the Navy Yard was revoked. Only after a bond to preserve neutrality with all powers with which America was at peace had

²⁰ Roenne to Mason, 15 Feb. 1849, *Wash. Union*, 20 Je. 1849.

Mason to Parker, 28 Feb. 1849, Mss., Dept. of Navy, Capts. Letters, Jan.-Je. 1849.

Mason to Roenne, 1 Mch. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Miscell. Letters, Mch.-Ap. 1849.

Mann to Clayton, 28 Ag. 1849, *Ibid.*, Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Donelson to Clayton, 17 May 1849, *Wash. Intelligencer*, 15 Je. 1849.

Donelson to Buchanan, 21 Jl. 1849. Buchanan Mss.

²¹ Roenne to Mason, 30 Jan. 1849, 15, 19 Feb. 1849. Mss., Dept. of State, Miscell. Letters, Mar.-Ap. 1849.

Mason to Roenne, 6 Feb. 1849, *Ibid.*

Mason to McKeever, 23 Feb. 1849, *Ibid.*

been arranged did the port authorities in New York allow the vessel to depart.²²

The correspondence in the affair was flaunted before the public in the columns of the rival Washington journals, the *Union* and the *Intelligencer*. Editorially, the latter praised the Whig Administration for preventing a violation of the nation's neutrality. The Democratic organ declared that Clayton's action illustrated his sympathy "with the tyrants and aristocrats of Europe in their struggle with the people." Buchanan and Clayton between themselves considered the episode a huge joke.²³

²² Preston to Perry, 19 Mch. 1849, Mss., Dept. of Navy, Officers, Ships of War.

McKeever to Preston, 21 Mch. 1849, *Ibid.*

Clayton to Preston, 21 Mch. 1849, *Ibid.*

Clayton to Roenne, 19 May 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Notes to German States, VI.

Richardson, *Messages etc. of Presidents*, VI, 225. 31 Cong., 1 sess., *Cong. Globe*, 409.

²³ Clayton to Buchanan, 14 Ap. 1849. Clayton Mss.

Buchanan to Clayton, 17 Ap. 1849. Buchanan Mss.

Wash. Intell., 15 Je. 1849; *Wash. Union*, 12, 13, 16, 20 Je. 1849.

Phila. Ledger, 21 Je. 1849.

III

WHAT AMERICANS IN EUROPE THOUGHT OF THE REVOLUTIONS
IN THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE

Long before the revolutionary movement broke out in the Austrian dominions, American observers, recognizing the absence of political harmony, predicted the upheaval. Mann wrote that of all European states the condition of Austria was the most deplorable. Early in March, 1848, William H. Stiles,* who represented the United States at the Hapsburg court, prophesied that the revolutionary spirit would spread from France and shake Austria to its very foundations. In his opinion, this revolution promised to be in no way inferior to the French upheaval which began in 1789. The long awaited contest between peoples and thrones was imminent, and the United States would soon be joined by a number of sister republics.¹

On March 13, the Viennese populace, spurred on by the University students, demanded reforms and began rioting.** At the behest of a mob, Metternich, Chancellor of the Empire, and the incarnation of conservatism, fled from the country. Several reforms requested by the people were speedily promised by the Emperor. To Stiles it seemed as if the empire would quickly be transformed from one of the most absolute to one of the most liberal monarchies in Europe. If the authorities exhibited sufficient wisdom nothing could prevent Austria from enjoying a splendid future. One American believed that the upheaval in Austria produced a more profound sensation in England than did the one in France. The empire needed a

* Stiles, a lawyer from Georgia, had been in Congress, 1843-5, and was Chargé to Austria, 1845-9. His *History of Austria, 1848-9*, (2 vols., N. Y., 1852) is an indispensable study of the period.

¹ Mann to Buchanan, 13 Mch. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Stiles to Buchanan, 4 Mch. 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Austria, II.

** A thorough study of the upheaval in the Austrian Empire is to be found in Helfert, G., *Geschichte Oesterreichs*, (Leipzig, 1869). Maurice, C. E. *The Revolution 1848-9 in Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany*, (London, 1887) gives the best account in English.

liberal constitution with jurisdiction in local affairs vested in the various provinces. Thus could the state be knit together and stability guaranteed. To many Americans Emperor Ferdinand appeared unequal to the gigantic problems that awaited solution.²

Concessions granting freedom of the press, the establishment of a National Guard, and amnesty to political prisoners allayed somewhat the turbulence of the Viennese mobs. Still the situation of the empire, notably in Bohemia and Hungary, remained critical and a fresh outbreak in the capital might occur at any moment. So difficult did Stiles find the task of obtaining accurate and complete information that he requested permission to employ an aide. Outrages in the provinces produced in him a feeling of nausea.³

When a recrudescence of the revolutionary spirit appeared, the Emperor and his family decided to leave Vienna. Stiles considered that the departure might lead to the dethronement of the monarch and the institution of a republican government, though the opposition to such a change would be tremendous. Only with a republic would the masses be satisfied, yet for this type of government Stiles believed the people were totally unready. The American consul in Vienna concurred in this view. No such characters as Washington, Franklin, and Jefferson had emerged, and leaders such as these would be necessary to formulate a sound constitution. The withdrawal of the Emperor aroused intense anxiety in the minds of the Vienna bourgeoisie. A consequent revulsion of feeling set in against his enemies, the students and the proletariat, and a distinct recovery of royal prestige was soon noticeable.⁴

² Stiles to Buchanan, 16 Mch. 1848, 31 May 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Austria, II.

Bancroft, E. D., *Letters from England*, 171.

³ Clemson to Buchanan, 28 Mch. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Belgium, II.

Vide, *Reminiscences James A. Hamilton*, 376-8. This undistinguished son of a famous father visited Vienna during the Märztage.

⁴ Stiles to Buchanan, 29 Mch. 1848, 12 Ap. 1848, 9, 18, 31 May 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Austria, II.

⁵ Stiles to Buchanan, 18, 31 May 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Austria, II.

The appearance on July 7, of a deputation, purporting to be sent from the American government bearing gifts to the Viennese revolutionaries, placed Stiles in an awkward position. The traditional American policy, he well knew, precluded the possibility of the mission being genuine. On the following day, the party, consisting of a Mr. Kohnstam, probably from New York, his brother from Munich, and two negro boys, made speeches about liberty declaring that the movement in Vienna met with a warm response in America. One said, "Not only words, but our money and our arms are at your disposition. One hundred thousand men will be ready to help our brethren." Many people in Vienna believed that the American government had actually sent the embassy to aid in the formation of a republic. Enraged at the whole episode, Stiles roundly denounced the men as impostors and in a newspaper article outlined the principles which the United States followed in respect of the domestic affairs of other states.⁵

In the middle of August, the Emperor, under the impression that tranquillity had been restored, returned to Vienna. Despite the presence of the sovereign the city continued to be disorderly. The students could not be silenced. In the next emergency, wrote one American, the Emperor will need to call in troops to suppress the recalcitrant elements or the latter will overthrow him and institute a new form of government. Financial affairs were in a critical state, and no one had sufficient confidence in the monarch to extend a needed loan. Should Ferdinand abdicate in favor of another member of his family, Mann believed, the bankers would be reassured. In October, the mutiny of soldiers quartered in Vienna, together with the rioting of some of the citizens, produced a fresh crisis. On October 7, the Hapsburgs again quitted their capital, and the Diplomatic Corps were advised to leave. Then an Imperial Army commanded by the veteran Windischgrätz bombarded the city.⁶

⁵ Stiles to Buchanan, 15 Jl. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Austria, II. Schwarz to Plitt, 16 Jl. 1848, *Ibid.*, Consular Letters, Vienna, I.

⁶ Mann to Buchanan, 17 Ag. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Stiles to Buchanan, 24 Ag. 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Austria, II. *Annual Register*, 1848, 401-426.

American opinion differs as to the justification for the bombardment of Vienna. Stiles held that the radical faction deserved the harsh policy carried through by the government. Besides, he knew that the disorders had been fomented in order to prevent the Emperor from sending his entire military strength against the revolting Hungarians then advancing on Vienna. For this reason the attack on the city constituted in his judgment a phase in the contest between the Hapsburgs and the Hungarians. Fay, Legation Secretary in Berlin, "shocked by the outrageous bombardment," failed to see how the action would better the situation of the imperial party. Stimulated by the activities of two emissaries from the Frankfort Parliament, Blum and Messenhauser, the Viennese held out until the end of October. The remarkable fortitude and the determined resistance of the citizenry evoked much praise from Americans. When the city capitulated several Americans expressed their regret over the insurgent failure. The execution of Blum, "who might have been a Samuel Adams," said one, would create added difficulties for the authorities.⁷

While the people in Vienna agitated for political reform, the liberal leaders in the subject kingdom of Hungary utilized the opportunity to gain their "inherent rights." After obtaining several concessions from the Emperor the Hungarians were confronted with the demands of their Croatian subjects for virtual autonomy. A nationalistic war broke out between these two peoples. When the Hungarian Diet had been refused support by the Emperor against the Croats, it invested its leader, Louis Kossuth,* with dictatorial powers and prepared to attack

⁷ Stiles to Buchanan, 2, 14 Nov. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Austria, II.

Fay to Buchanan, 16 Oct. 1848, *Ibid.*, Repts., Prussia, V.

New Orleans Picayune, 6 Dec. 1848.

Newark Daily Advertiser, 8 Dec. 1848.

* Louis Kossuth, (1802-94), born of a noble family, had been carefully trained for his father's profession of law. As early as 1825 he attained prominence through his advocacy of political reform in the Hungarian National Diet. For inflammatory articles that he printed in his personal newspaper, Kossuth was imprisoned for three years. Upon his release he threw all his talents into the cause of Hungarian political and commercial independence. From the beginning of the revolutions, he played a leading rôle, and may be considered in a real sense the personification of the revolutionary movement.

both the Austrians and the Croats. Hopeful that a reconciliation might be effected, the Emperor appointed Count Lamberg as generalissimo of the Hungarian army. An angry Hungarian mob illustrated the feeling of the people when it barbarously murdered Lamberg. Whereupon the imperial government nominated Jellachic, Croat leader and arch-enemy of Hungary, as the chief military official in Hungary. The dissolution of the Magyar Diet was decreed, and the Austrian troops were ordered to advance into Hungary. For a time the military operations of the government were halted by the Viennese disturbances in October. With Vienna under control, Austrian and Croat turned their attention to the Hungarians. Just outside Vienna, at Schwechat, on October 30, the imperial forces defeated the rebels, drove them pell-mell into Hungary, and prepared to advance on nine fronts.⁸

During the retreat, an appeal from the Hungarians afforded Stiles an opportunity to show the American position concerning the revolt. An envoy from Kossuth asked him whether he would intervene to settle the civil strife. Stiles hesitated. Traditionally the United States had abstained from any interference in domestic disputes. Moreover, extensive preparations had been made for the campaign, and Austria probably would not listen to any proposals save unconditional surrender. When the messenger declared that Hungary had been unable to reach official ears with a plea for an armistice, Stiles agreed for the sake of humanity to attempt to open up negotiations for a truce. Kossuth, who looked upon the United States as "the natural supporters of freedom and civilization," signified his eagerness for Stiles to act immediately. The latter attempted to get into communication with Schwartzberg, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Windischgrätz, the military chief, but found them absent from Vienna. To Kossuth he wrote that he had little hope of securing the desired armistice. On December 3, Stiles did obtain an interview with Windischgrätz who listened to him attentively, but refused to treat with the rebels. He said Stiles' plea was the

⁸ *Annual Register*, 1848, 401-426.

first application for an armistice that the imperial government had received. Without in any degree compromising his country, the American Chargé had acted in the best interests of humanity and his policy was approved by President Polk.⁹

Meanwhile Ferdinand resigned the throne to his youthful nephew, Francis Joseph. Considering the unsettled condition in the empire, Stiles questioned the wisdom of the change. Another American thought that the new emperor with a liberal program would be able to control affairs until the people became more sophisticated. Then a fresh revolution would ensue.¹⁰

Early in 1849, Windischgrätz's plans seemed speedily reaching their conclusion. The hasty retreat of the Hungarians disappointed the general expectation and vitiated the confidence reposed in their military ability by Americans. The campaign would long since have ended, wrote one, had it not been for the horrible condition of the highways coupled with the fact that the Hungarians adopted guerilla tactics. Sharp criticism was directed at Kossuth, who, though a great orator, was "devoid of practical talent." Kendall of the *Picayune* concluded that the Hungarians had failed to exhibit the qualities necessary to establish a separate government. Considering the movement at an end, Stiles thought the revolutions had been a blessing in disguise since Austria had changed "from the decrepitude of old age to the vigor of youth." The people, however, could not have freedom until they had learned the first lesson in self-government—respect for authority and obedience to law.¹¹

The early days of March witnessed a complete reversal of the military situation. Changed from a retreating army to one of offense, the spirited Hungarians pushed all before them. Americans were overjoyed at the advance which they thought to be due, in part, to the inferior strategy of Windischgrätz. The issuance of a Hungarian "Declaration of Independence" on

⁹ The correspondence covering this incident may be found in 31 Cong., 1 sess., *Sen. exec. doc.*, 43. Vide, Stiles, W. H., *Austria, 1848-9*, II, 155-7.

¹⁰ Stiles to Buchanan, 3 Dec. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Austria, II. *New Orleans Picayune*, 11 Jan. 1849, 24 Feb. 1849.

¹¹ *New Orleans Picayune*, 1 Mch. 1849.

Stiles to Buchanan, 8 Jan. 1849, 15 Feb. 1849, 1 Mch. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Austria, II.

April 19, was regarded as a most serious step, but one that had been too long delayed. At this juncture, Russia with her ponderous military machine entered the conflict, on the side of legitimacy. The Russian action proved somewhat of a surprise to Americans, who knew that at the beginning of the revolutions the Czar had caused a proclamation to be read in all the churches in which he declared Russia would not interfere with the internal concerns of other states. The entrance of Russia presaged a terrible war whose outcome it was impossible to foresee. Either the coalition would soon march over Hungary or else the latter would secure allies and provoke a general European war. Donelson held the latter view. Only through the preservation of Hungary intact could the peace of Europe be obtained, thought another American. To Richard Rush, minister in Paris, "formidable international strife" seemed about to follow in the wake of the internal collisions. England and France would use their good offices, he hoped, to prevent a general conflict. Other men foresaw in the advance of Russia the ultimate destruction of all liberal hopes. At Warsaw, Silas E. Burrows* marveled at the efficiency of Russia in organizing and shipping the munitions of war. "The invaders go to arrange the affairs of those who are too young in self-government to know what their own interests are." He predicted that at the close of the contest Austria would become the vassal of Russia.¹²

Rather hopeful that the Hungarians might achieve their independence, the American government decided to send a special diplomatic agent "towards" Hungary.** A. Dudley Mann, then

* Burrows was a New York merchant high up in Whig political circles. Devoted to the water he spent much of his time cruising in European seas; hence his appearance in Warsaw.

¹² Sumner, G. P. to Robertson, 8 Mch. 1849. Clayton Mss.

Sties to Clayton, 30 Ap. 1849, 21 May 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Australai, II.

Ingersoll to Buchanan, 1 Ap. 1848, *Ibid.*, Russia, XV.

Donelson to Clayton, 7 May 1849, *Ibid.*, Prussia, V.

Rush to Clayton, 9 May 1849, *Ibid.*, France, XXXI.

Botts, J. to Clayton, 13 Jl. 1849, *Ibid.*, Miscell. Letters, July-Aug. 1849.

Burrows, S. E. to Clayton, 9 Jl. 1849, *Ibid.*

New Orleans Picayune, 8 May 1849, 4 Sept. 1849; *Newark Daily Advertiser*, 15 Ag. 1849.

** Vide, chapter IV.

in Paris, received the ill-fated assignment. He believed that on the Hungarian plains the decision would be made as to whether Europe should be despotic or republican. If the Hungarians should fail, the yoke of despotism would encircle their necks. Should they succeed, the dismemberment of the Austrian empire and the unification of Italy would ensue. He trusted that the battle would not be to the strong and that he might be able to report Hungary successful in establishing her independence. Before Mann could reach Hungary, however, the insurrectionary government had become itinerant.¹³

During the successful advance the Hungarians received hearty applause for their fighting qualities. They fought like Americans and showed all the earmarks characteristic of freemen. Burrows got into the war zone to ascertain how the fighting compared with that "at Monterey and Buena Vista." He trusted the Russian invaders might soon meet their Saratoga. Convinced by what he saw that the Magyars could not be subdued in many campaigns, he believed they could never be conquered. Mann wondered how opponents at least twice as strong numerically as Hungary could be overcome. For skill and invincibility, the Magyars had no superiors. The masterly strategy exercised by the Hungarian general Gorgei* in recapturing the strongly fortified city of Raab evoked much praise. If Russia and Austria were ultimately defeated, it would not be due to their lack of cooperation, but to the remarkable ability of the "Spartan people" who had caused rational liberty in continental Europe to smile and to hope.¹⁴

The stock of Kossuth, Magyar chief, rose in American minds. He became "a new impulse to the cause of liberty and independence." By his matchless eloquence, wrote Mann, he had aroused all classes to the defense of their national honor. Women

¹³ Mann to Clayton, 13 Jl. 1849, 8 Oct. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

* Arthur Gorgei, trained in the Austrian military service, became the leading Hungarian officer during the revolution. After the struggle had ended, he lived in retirement, if not disgrace.

¹⁴ Mann to Clayton, 28 Jl. 1849, 8 Ag. 1849, 27 Sept. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Burrows to Clayton, 14, 15, 16 Jl. 1849, *Ibid.*, Miscell. Letters, Jl.-Ag. 1849.

marched side by side with the men. Kendall considered Kossuth the foremost man produced by the revolutions. In administrative talent he ranked him alongside Napoleon. Liberals admired Kossuth for what he had thus far accomplished and they had large hopes for him in the future.¹⁵

Meanwhile Mann had some consternation as to his own welfare. Since the Russian Czar attributed the spread of liberal principles in Europe to the example and influence of America, Mann wondered what would happen to him if he were apprehended. To add to his worries, a rumor that the United States was prepared to recognize an envoy from Hungary spread through the German papers. To allay suspicion, Mann sent to several journals a letter from Secretary of State Clayton in which the attitude of the government with respect of Hungary was clearly stated. This letter was calculated to show everyone that the American policy was entirely proper and just.¹⁶

On August 13, 1849, attacked by the superior numbers of the coalition, Gorgei determined to have "peace at any price" and surrendered with twenty-three thousand men. This action, Mann knew, would terminate hostilities. That Gorgei had been seduced into betraying his country seemed apparent. At first Stiles believed that the surrender was due to a dispute between Kossuth and Gorgei with the possible introduction of an element of treachery. Later, though he would not commit himself on Gorgei's motive, Stiles declared that the act of unconditional surrender stood forth "without palliation on the pages of history."¹⁷

The battle for Hungarian freedom had been fought and lost. Kossuth and a handful of followers fled into the Ottoman Empire. Convinced that there was no longer any hope for Hungary,

¹⁵ *New Orleans Picayune*, 30 Je. 1849.

Mann to Clayton as in note 14.

¹⁶ Donelson to Clayton, 6 Ag. 1849, Clayton Mss.

Mann to Clayton, 28 Jl. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

¹⁷ Mann to Clayton, 17, 25 Ag. 1849, 27 Sept. 1849, 8 Oct. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Stiles to Clayton, 27 Ag. 1849, *Ibid.*, Austria, II.

Davis, J. C. B. to Clayton, 21 Sept. 1849, *Ibid.*, England, LX.

Webb to Clayton, 15 Feb. 1850, Clayton Mss.

Mann returned to Paris thankful that he had avoided any imprudence which might have injured his government. By February 15, 1850, the American representative in Vienna could write with assurance, "Austria is quiet."¹⁷

IV

OPINION IN AMERICA ON THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN REVOLTS

The trend of opinion on this side of the Atlantic follows in general the same course as that of Americans in Europe. The government, as well as the masses, expressed in an unmistakable manner hearty approval of the ambitions of the revolutionists.

Before the injection of Hungarian affairs into national politics, the newspapers with one accord gave assent to the insurrectionary hopes. The speed with which the old empire of Austria toppled under pressure of "a band of students and idlers" created universal surprise. The flight of Metternich, as bearing witness to the death of despotism, constituted an event more important than the French Revolution. Confidently the split-up of the Austrian empire into a number of states was awaited. Austria proper would then be absorbed into the new German empire. The news of the flight of the emperor from Vienna, coupled with rumors of the creation of an Austrian republic, made true American hearts beat fast.¹

Throughout the era of revolution, the people in the United States anticipated a general war in Europe. This inevitable international struggle would end favorably for human rights. If a general war should break out, soliloquized the *Richmond Whig*, America would gain a large share of the world's carrying trade and would find besides a greater market for her breadstuffs. The advance of Russia into Hungary increased the predictions of a general conflict. Hungary could be subdued only through a long and bloody war, but before it could end all Europe would be drawn into the whirlpool. Through such a war the last vestige of "divine rights" would be destroyed and the people of Europe would be extended all the rights of man.²

¹ *Charleston Mercury*, 14 Ap. 1848; *Phila. Ledger*, 10 Ap. 1848, 24 Oct. 1848; *Phila. No. Am.*, 26 Oct. 1848.

² *Phila. No. Am.*, 10 Jl. 1848; *Phila. Ledger*, 23 Nov. 1848; *Richmond Whig*, 29 Mch. 1848, 29 May 1848; *Boston Atlas*, 17 Ap. 1849; *N. Y. Tribune*, 2 Je. 1849.

The stern advance of the monarchical forces soon prostrated fond American hopes. The havoc wrought in Prague by imperial armies stunned our citizens. In spite of the fall of Vienna, some men believed that democracy would yet prevail. The *North American* inferred from the bombardment of Vienna that the revolutionary movement was confined to the city. If Austrians wanted to be free the revolution would need to take root in the country and be carried on by all the people. As 1848 drew to its close, the newspapers bewailed the fate of the republican element in Europe. Liberalism retreated everywhere. It began to look as if the revolutionary movements were in vain.³

When the revolutions cycled into a civil war between Austria and Hungary, newspaper editorials expressed the renewed public interest. The issue resolved itself into one of nationality with the sovereignty of Hungary at stake. Expressed opinion delighted in the Magyar declaration of independence. The ominous appearance of the Russian legions fighting on the side of Austria stirred American republican enthusiasts to a frenzy. The news of Russian intervention was received everywhere with sorrow and indignation. Russia could have only one motive for her action; namely, to secure free access to the Mediterranean and control of Turkey. Would England and France sustain Hungary in the unequal struggle against Russia? It was hoped that all lovers of liberty would unite against despotism. Stalwart Americans trusted that not one of the Russian myrmidons would be left to tell the tale. "May the Muscovite meet a Hungarian Pultowa," prayed the *Picayune*. All agreed that upon Hungary alone rested the cause of European freedom. She must fight the battles on her own plains, and if she should succeed, the reign of despotism would be at an end, but if she should fail, darkness and slavery would again fall like a pall over Europe.⁴

The bravery of the Hungarians, especially under the added

³ *Phila. Ledger*, 23 Nov. 1848; *Phila. No. Am.*, 10 Jl. 1848, 30 Nov. 1848, 15 Dec. 1848, 13 Jan. 1849; *N. Y. Tribune*, 20 Ap. 1849; 33 *Graham's Mag.*, 322; 22 *The Friend*, 88.

⁴ *Boston Atlas*, 17 Ap. 1849, 26 Je. 1849; *Phila. Ledger*, 15 Mch. 1849, 16 Je. 1849; *Richmond Whig*, 29 Mch. 1849, 25 May 1849; *Phila. No. Am.*, 19 Jl. 1849; *New Orleans Picayune*, 3 Jl. 1849; 17 *So. Literary Messenger*, 505 ff.

pressure of Russian attacks, drew forth great praise in America. The Richmond *Whig* thought the defense as "heroic as any in modern times." Americans sympathized with them in the tremendous burden they were bearing. "Every Whig and we trust every Democrat," ran the Washington *Republic*, "favored the success of the Magyars against the combined imperial forces." Such bravery as the Hungarians demonstrated might yet command victory for them. These folk, "the Americans of Europe," by their courage and intelligence appeared alone of European peoples qualified for liberty. Another, even more enthusiastic, doubted whether the world had ever witnessed a more gallant struggle for liberty and fatherland. No true descendant of those who fought and bled in 1776 could be without sympathy for these men of fortitude. The interest aroused by this heroic resistance made the history and topography of Hungary as well known to the general reader as that of any other country in Europe.⁵

In spite of rumors of reverses, Americans refused to believe the Hungarian cause a hopeless one. Tranquillity in Europe would only be obtained after an order mutually satisfactory had been agreed on, and much depended on the outcome of Hungary's struggle. Hungary would never give up her constitution, said the *Picayune*, and with every class united behind her she might yet be victorious. One defeat of the Russian horde would bring all the Poles into the conflict on the side of Hungary. France and England might then employ an armed force and march their troops to aid the Magyars. The Boston *Atlas* trusted that the contest meant the opening of a mighty and successful struggle of freedom against despotism. Distinctly, the war took on the aspect of a struggle between liberty and despotism, and upon its result probably depended the fate of Europe for centuries to come. The people are conquering into their rights, proclaimed

⁵ *Richmond Whig*, 25 May 1849, 13, 16 Ag. 1849, 4 Sept. 1849; *Wash. Republic*, 26 Je. 1849; *Phila. Ledger*, 20 Jl. 1849; 24 *U. S. Mag. and Dem. Rev.*, 568.

the Cincinnati *Enquirer*, and a good time loomed in the future though the present might be dark.⁶

Early in 1849, faith in the immediate success of Hungary began to wane. Fears, said one, proved to have a better foundation than wishes. Freedom's struggle would temporarily end with the fall of Hungary, but the principle of liberty, being immortal, could never perish. For Kossuth, the journals voiced great praise. Many looked upon him as in certain respects the counterpart of Washington. The announcement that he would retire to private life as soon as a republic was instituted met with approval. Kossuth's situation, when defeat seemed inevitable, was compared to that of Washington at Valley Forge. One enthusiastic admirer urged giving the name of the illustrious Magyar to a portion of American territory. Even the *Liberator* agreed that he was "a sublime specimen of what the world calls patriotism."⁷

When the Hungarians stopped their retreat and began to advance, word of the marvelous progress of the Magyar arms consummating in the recapture of Pesth quickly came to America. "God grant the success may meet no reverses," implored one writer. The *North American* expected word of a Hungarian advance on Vienna. Peace should be made only after Hungary had avenged itself against the Czar and repaid a debt of gratitude to the Poles. The *Tribune* anticipated that the next steamer would bring information of the complete expulsion of the Russians and Austrians. Providence and the good right arms of the Magyars had saved Hungary from becoming another Poland. At the Yale Commencement an alumnus announced the recent news of Hungarian success and proposed that "all who could rejoice in it and give glory to God should give three cheers," which was heartily done. Long before such shouting died away,

⁶ *N. Y. Tribune*, 17, 26 May 1849; *Phila. Sun. Despatch*, 27 May 1849, 3 Je. 1849; *Boston Atlas*, 26 Je. 1849; *Phila. Ledger*, 31 May 1849; *New Orleans Picayune*, 18 May 1849, 16 Je. 1849; *Richmond Whig*, 12 Je. 1849; *Cincinnati Daily Enquirer*, 10 Ag. 1849.

⁷ *Wash. Union*, 9 Ag. 1849; *New Orleans Picayune*, 16 Je. 1849; *Phila. Ledger*, 20 Jl. 1849; *Richmond Enquirer*, 11 Sept. 1849; 25 *U. S. Mag. and Dem. Rev.*, 86.

however, the main Hungarian army had lain down its arms and the hope of freedom had vanished into thin air.⁸

Popular enthusiasm, aroused by the Hungarian successes, rose to a high pitch in a series of public meetings held throughout the nation. After an enthusiastic rally, recent immigrants in New York determined to design a suitable Hungarian flag and send it to Kossuth. A monster mass meeting for all those sympathizing with "Freedom of the World" assembled on August 27, 1849, in the park in New York. Leading men of the city played a conspicuous part in the program. From three stands, speakers addressed the throng in English, French, Italian, and German. The speeches snarled with anti-Russian sentiment. A resolution demanding that the government immediately recognize Hungary as a free and independent nation was adopted. A spirited meeting of a society, the "Young Men of the City of New York," vigorously applauded addresses favoring Hungary and Freedom. In Jersey City, a popular assembly hailed the Hungarian leaders as patriots and soldiers of heroic mold. It was recommended that the Federal government should recognize the independence of Hungary "at the earliest practicable moment." Similar resolutions prevailed in Newark. The Boston mayor announced a meeting to express sympathy for the struggles of Hungary. At two great gatherings in Philadelphia, presided over by the most distinguished of civic leaders, resolutions of sympathy were passed. The meetings invited the administration at Washington to recognise the freedom of Hungary "not with reference to the success or defeat of the revolutionary progress there but because our republican brethren are fighting for their liberty." After adopting measures urging the government to recognize the independence of Hungary, a Wilmington, Delaware, assembly appointed a committee to carry on active propaganda for the Hungarian cause.⁹

⁸ *Savannah Republican*, 31 Jl. 1849; *Phila. Sun. Despatch*, 17 Je. 1849; *Cincinnati Daily Enquirer*, 17 Ag. 1849; *Phila. No. Am.*, 11, 17 Ag. 1849; *N. Y. Tribune*, 2, 16 Ag. 1849; *New Orleans Picayune*, 18 Ag. 1849; *Newark Daily Advertiser*, 17 Ag. 1849.

⁹ *N. Y. Tribune*, 28 May 1849, 27-30 Ag. 1849, 1 Sept. 1849; *Newark Daily Advertiser*, 30 Ag. 1849; *Phila. Ledger*, 6 Jl. 1849, 16, 20 Ag. 1849; *Liberator*, 7 Dec. 1849.

In the West, similar groups gathered. Congressman Disney harangued a great crowd in Cincinnati. On this occasion a resolution was adopted which recognized the similarity between "the struggle of 1776" and the present conflict. Other resolutions spoke of Kossuth as the Washington of Hungary, and advocated the cessation of all intercourse with Austria. Diplomatic relations, on the other hand, should be established with Hungary. A nearby literary club regarded the revolution as an indication of the rapid tendency of Europe toward American institutions and liberty. In a public meeting in Illinois Abraham Lincoln presented a resolution declaring that Hungary commanded the highest admiration and had the warmest sympathy of America in the struggle. He held it to be the opinion of the meeting that "the immediate acknowledgment of the independence of Hungary by our government is due from American freemen to their brethren in the general cause of republican liberty." Nor was the interest confined to the North and West. The citizens of Louisville favored recognition. At Little Rock an association was organized in which each member agreed to contribute ten cents per month for the benefit of Hungary. One of the largest crowds ever gathered in New Orleans agreed to give substantial aid to the republican cause in Europe.¹⁰

The cry for recognition met with some opposition from Whig papers. The Richmond *Whig* believed that much of the agitation had been fomented by foreigners unacquainted with the traditional American policy. America sympathized with the oppressed but the government could take no part nor would it allow within its borders military preparations to aid Hungary. America would rejoice in the overthrow of despots the world over, but those "who would be free, themselves must strike the blow." The *North American* urged caution with respect of recognition. If Hungary should prove successful the fact would soon be known and she would be immediately recognized.¹¹

When word arrived that Gorgei's army had surrendered to the

¹⁰ *Cincinnati Gazette*, 30 Ag. 1849; *Cincinnati Daily Enquirer*, 21 Sept. 1849; *Liberator*, 7 Dec. 1849.

Nicolay, J. S. and Hay, J., *Works of Abraham Lincoln*, I, 158-9.

¹¹ *Richmond Whig*, 12 Je. 1849; *Phila. No. Am.*, 24 Ag. 1849.

Russian forces, it was announced that Hungary had at last mounted the funeral pyre of freedom. Greeley, thoroughly disappointed by the defeat, refused to believe that Europe would remain Cossack. America should be the "agent of Providence" to republicanize Europe. He suggested the wide dissemination in Europe of pamphlets which would stir up the people's minds against their government. As a result, thrones would be shaken to their foundations. He advocated subscriptions to a "Patriotic Loan for Hungary."¹²

The report of the Hungarian defeat produced more profound regret in this country than any other event in the history of recent political convulsions in Europe. The news went over the United States like the tolling of a funeral bell. Numerous poems expressed the hostile feeling toward the harsh and brutal tactics of the Austrian military forces. It was generally conceded that Hungary would have been victorious had Russia not intervened. The *Richmond Whig*, on the other hand, confessed that Hungary's course in the struggle strengthened its belief in the doctrine "that every nation had the degree of liberty which it deserved." With her people determined to be free no force could have conquered them. By far the greater number of news journals, however, merely bewailed the submission of Hungary as the destruction of the last vestige of liberalism. America, said the *Union*, would gladly welcome the defeated leaders if they could escape.¹³

Among public men, interest in Austria and Hungary did not become greatly aroused until the struggle resolved itself into a civil war. At no time could Van Buren be persuaded that a general war would break out among the European states. He told a friend he had far more interest in affairs in Hungary than in those of his own country. Gilpin* wrote Van Buren that nothing had created so strong a sympathy in his heart as the proclamations and proceedings of the struggling republicans. Napoleon's

¹² *N. Y. Tribune*, 4, 6, 7 Sept. 1849; *Phila. Ledger*, 7, 14 Sept. 1849; *St. Louis Republican*, 8 Sept. 1849; *Wash. Union*, 8 Sept. 1849; *Phila. No. Am.*, 7 Sept. 1849; *New Orleans Picayune*, 8, 14 Sept. 1849; *Richmond Whig*, 11 Sept. 1849; 25 *U. S. Mag. and Dem. Rev.*, 560.

* H. D. Gilpin (1801-60) had been Van Buren's attorney-general, 1840-1. He was a frequent contributor to political periodicals.

prophecy hastened to fulfillment; Cossackism or Republicanism would dominate Europe. Crittenden declared that if he were President, in his first message he would denounce the interference of despots with the struggles of peoples for free governments. He would "speak aloud the great doctrines of liberty and free government." Calhoun observed that if Hungary succeeded in maintaining herself against the coalition, the condition of Russia would speedily become critical. From his rural retreat, Tyler revealed his opinions in unmistakable terms. If the Hungarians succeeded, they would have done more for the cause of humanity than had been achieved since the American Revolution. For Kossuth he had the greatest praise. The opponents of Hungary appeared to have become but little better than demons. America should protest against their outrageous conduct and if protest failed she should manifest her displeasure by stopping all diplomatic intercourse. Prayers would continue to ascend for the success of the oppressed. Webster said that the sympathies of everyone were enlisted in the Hungarian struggle for liberty, that until the "despotic power from abroad intervened" he had had more hope for Hungary than for any other part of Europe. Restless after the Mexican campaigns, G. B. McClellan applied to Clayton for permission to go to Hungary as a special agent so as to ascertain the possibility of republican success. Especially did he want to look the situation over "as a military man should." McClellan admitted his keen admiration for the unusual bravery the Hungarians exhibited during the fighting and condemned the Austrian barbarity. The Governor of Pennsylvania in his annual message declared that the people of the United States looked with deepest solicitude on the outcome of the revolt.¹³

¹³ Van Buren to Kemble, 18 Ap. 1848. Van Buren Mss.

Gilpin to Van Buren, 13 Je. 1849. *Ibid.*

Crittenden to Clayton, 28 Je. 1848. Clayton Mss.

Calhoun to Clemson, 24 Ag. 1849, A. H. A., Repts., 1899, 771.

Niles to Welles, 17 Sept. 1849. Welles Mss.

Tyler to Tyler, R., 16 Jl. 1849, Tyler, W. G., *Letters and Times of the Tylers*, II, 491.

Curtis, G. T., *Life of Webster*, II, 558.

McClellan to his sister, Maria, Jan. 1849. McClellan Mss.

McClellan to Clayton, 19 Ag. 1849. Clayton Mss.

McClellan to his mother, 3 Mch. 1850. McClellan Mss.

Annual Message of Gov. Johnston, 1 Jan. 1850, Papers of the Govs., Penna. Archives, 4th Series, VII.

As with the revolutions in Germany, a sound view of American thought on the movements in the Austrian empire may be gleaned from the official policy of the government. Buchanan ordered Stiles to keep him informed as to everything that occurred during the "critical state of affairs," but refused to accede to his request for funds to employ an additional agent. He heartily approved Stiles' course in exposing the deputation that attempted to stir up the Viennese students claiming that they represented the United States. Likewise Buchanan commended Stiles for his method of procedure in handling the Hungarian appeal for an armistice. He expressed the hope that the accession of Francis Joseph would be followed by an era of order and tranquillity which would promote the lasting happiness of the country. But the important expressions of opinion came after Buchanan had given the direction of foreign affairs into the hands of his friend, J. M. Clayton.¹⁴

In German affairs, the Whig Administration, as has been observed, pursued a conservative policy. When Hungarian independence, however, seemed a possibility, it adopted very different tactics. Early in June, 1849, the government received appeals from Professor L. R. Breisach, a Hungarian in New York, urging that a diplomatic representative be sent to the "free and independent republican government of Hungary" for the purpose of recognizing the same. Hungary would probably be glad to enter into commercial relations with the United States through the splendid port of Fiume. Clayton replied that the American practice and policy had long been to recognize all governments which exhibited to the world proofs of their power to maintain themselves. If Hungary proved successful, he believed Congress would sanction her recognition and then the United States would be glad to enter into diplomatic and commercial relations with her.¹⁵

¹⁴ Buchanan to Stiles, 5 Ap. 1848, 6 Jl. 1848, 31 Ag. 1848, Mss., Dept. of State, Inst., Austria, I.

Buchanan to Hülsemann, 6 Feb. 1849, *Ibid.*, Notes to German States, VI.

¹⁵ Breisach, L. R. to Taylor, 9 Je. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Miscell. Letters, May-June, 1849.

Breisach to Clayton, 18 Je. 1849, 27 Ag. 1849. Clayton Mss.

Clayton to Breisach, 25 Je. 1849, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., *Sen. exec. doc.*, 43.

Wash. Intelligencer, 24 Jl. 1849, 3 Ag. 1849.

Despite this evasive note, Clayton had ordered the roving diplomat, A. Dudley Mann, then in Paris, to proceed "towards" Hungary. Though Clayton questioned the ultimate success of the revolutionists, he wanted "to obtain information in regard to Hungary and her resources and prospects with a view to an early recognition of her independence and the formation of commercial relations." In his letter of instructions, the Secretary reviewed the relations between the United States and Hungary and added that if she should succeed "we desire to be the very first to welcome her entrance into the family of nations." Russia's action to sustain the *iron rule of Austria* had aroused most painful solicitude in America. If Hungary established a firm and stable government, recognition would be recommended at the next session of Congress.¹⁶

Relying implicitly on Mann, the President left this delicate and important mission almost wholly to his discretion and prudence. Accompanying the instructions were credentials giving Mann "the full authority for and in the name of the United States . . . to agree, treat, and consult and negotiate of and concerning all matters and subjects interesting to both nations . . . and to conclude and sign treaties or conventions touching the premises." Few foreign agents have ever been permitted such discretionary powers as these committed to Mann.* Clayton informed his friend Crittenden of his action and pleaded with him to urge the President to allow him free rein so that America might "keep up with the spirit of the age." Meanwhile a Hungarian agent, Count Wass, had been presented to the Secretary of State, and had been informed "that if Hungary sustained herself, there was no reason why the United States should not recognize her." When the Democratic papers attacked the Hungarian policy which they considered pusillanimous and undignified, Whig retorts hinted at the despatch of an agent.¹⁶

¹⁶ Clayton to Mann, 18 Je. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Spec. Missions, I.
Clayton to Crittenden, 11 Jl. 1849, Coleman, C.C., *Life of J. J. Crittenden*, I, 344-5.

Boston Atlas, 19 Jl. 1849; *N. Y. Tribune*, 14 Ag. 1849; *Wash. Republic*, 17 Sept. 1849; *Phila. Sun. Despatch*, 23 Sept. 1849, 28 Oct. 1849.

* Vide, Moore, *Digest of International Law*, I, 220.

Clayton set curiosity at ease through an inclusion of the proceedings with regard to Hungary in the President's annual message. "In accordance with the general sentiment of the American people who deeply sympathized with the Magyar patriots," an agent had been dispatched thither to indicate America's willingness to recognize her if she should prove stable. Russian interference, however, had prevented the completion of the task of throwing off the Austrian yoke. The message hastened to add that despite the fact that popular sympathy had been strongly enlisted in the Hungarian cause, the government had at no time interfered in the contest.¹⁷

Soon after the reading of the message, Douglas offered a resolution in the Senate requesting a copy of the instructions given to Mann together with his correspondence in so far as it was "consistent with the public interest." A similar resolution was presented in the House. After a two months wait, the resolution was adopted and the documents in two parts, including the instructions, were handed to the Senate, April 3, 1850.* Clayton accompanied the documents with a statement reiterating the fact that the government had neither accredited an agent to Hungary nor had it received any communication from her. Concluding, he repeated that had Hungary been successful "we should have been the first to welcome her into the family of nations."¹⁷

Before the publication of these documents, Mann assured Clayton that he would have no regrets if all his letters were printed, since there were only a few sentences in them he would care to correct. Presently the correspondence appeared before the European public "and met with the unqualified praise of all Europeans animated by humane and generous sentiments."

¹⁷ Richardson, *Messages etc. of Pres.*, V, 12, 41. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 159, 294, 587, 630.

Mann to Clayton, 19 Feb. 1850, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Mann to Clayton, 16 May 1850. Clayton Mss.

* The second part of the manuscripts containing most of Mann's letters remained closed to historical investigation for over half a century.

Some Austrian journals, however, advocated that diplomatic relations with the United States should be severed—a suggestion that provoked much merriment. Meanwhile the Austrian Government had decided to express its disfavor over the Mann mission.¹⁷

The Austrian protest on the Mann mission and the consequent reaction in the United States enable us to develop further the attitude and opinion of the American government concerning the revolutionary movement. The fact that America had sent an agent towards Hungary was widely known in Europe. To Mann's surprise, on his return to Paris, Count Teleki, the late accredited minister of Hungary to France, greeted him most heartily, and expressed appreciation of the policy of the government in sending him to Hungary. The American agent never understood how information relative to his mission had leaked out. Schwartzberg, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, had complained to his envoy in America, Hülsemann, of the sending of Mann. Somehow or other, Schwartzberg saw or got knowledge of the original instructions. Particularly did the phrase in the instructions "the iron rule of Austria" cause him to wince. Hülsemann pressed on Clayton the views of his government on the subject, and when Webster succeeded Taylor's secretary, the remonstrances were directed to him. Webster found on examination of the archives that nothing in writing had passed between Clayton and Hülsemann. He would let the matter rest.¹⁸

But the Austrian persisted. On September 30, 1850, he penned a note to Webster which outlined the Austrian position on the dispute. After pointing out that the mission violated the principle of non-intervention, he declared Mann's errand laid him open to arrest as a spy. Did not America realize that Austria

¹⁷ Mann to Clayton, 25 Oct. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

¹⁸ Schwartzberg to Hülsemann, 5 Nov. 1849, Van Tyne, C. H., *Letters of Daniel Webster*, 454-6.

Hülsemann to Webster, 27 Jl. 1850, *Ibid.*, 448.

Webster Memorandum, *Ibid.*, 449.

Webster to Fillmore, 16 Jan. 1851, *Webster Works*, National Edition, IV, 585. Vide, Curti, M. E., *Austria and the United States, 1848-52*, 154-5.

—the nation that had struggled twenty-five years against the French Revolution—could not be overcome by the few months rebellion of Hungary? Austria was offended at the harsh language in which Mann's instructions were couched and at the inflammatory anti-Austrian statements found in the American press. The whole matter might have passed away quietly had the Mann correspondence not been published. Now Austria formally protested against the proceedings of the American government. With the curt remark that civil war might possibly occur anywhere, Hülsemann expressed the desire of his government to cultivate relations of friendship and good understanding. Relations he hoped were only momentarily weakened, but they could not again be seriously disturbed "without placing in jeopardy the best interests of the countries." After studying the note, Webster recognized that his prediction of a quarrel with Austria would result from it. He begged Fillmore to reflect carefully on the matter so that a satisfactory reply might be made. On October 24, he completed his answer.¹⁹

The reply portrays, in the peculiar style of its author, the extent of American interest in the "extraordinary events which have occurred, not only in Austria, but in many parts of Europe since February, 1848." Webster proposed to tell Europe just what "America" meant and to impress on foreign minds the unparalleled growth of this country. At the same time, he hoped to touch national pride at home and strike thereby at those who hinted at disunion.²⁰ Bearing these intents in mind, it becomes easy to understand the bombastic reply designated in history as the "Hülsemann Letter."

On December 21, 1850, Webster sent this famous note. After summarizing the protest and complaint of Austria, he argued that the basis of the protest—the publication of the

¹⁹ Hülsemann to Webster, 30 Sept. 1850, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., *Sen. exec. doc.*, 9. Webster to Fillmore, 3 Oct. 1850, Webster, D. F., *Priv. Corr. Daniel Webster*, II, 463.

Webster to Fillmore, 24 Oct. 1850, *Webster Works*, National Edition, IV, 573. Vide, Hunter, W. to Webster, D. F., 3 May 1854, Van Tyne, *Letters of Daniel Webster*, 449–50.

²⁰ Webster to Ticknor, 16 Jan. 1851, *Webster Works*, National Edition, IV, 586.

Mann correspondence—was entirely a domestic affair. Hence Austria had no right to take cognizance of it. Out of deference to the Austrian government and in justice to the late President Taylor, he proposed to restate the history of the whole affair and to show the consistent neutral policy of America. Interest in the revolutionary movements had been in proportion as these extraordinary events appeared to have their origin in those ideas of responsible and popular governments on which the American constitutions themselves were wholly founded. "In the prevalence on the other continent of sentiments favorable to republican liberty," he observed the results of the reaction of America upon Europe. In every way the United States shared in the progress of the age, and they could not "fail to cherish always a lively interest" in the fortunes of nations struggling for institutions like their own. Regardless of this feeling, America claimed "no right to take part in the struggles of nations" contending for popular institutions and national independence.²¹

After outlining the circumstances that led to the despatch of Mann, Webster continued with an elaborate argument defending the nature and the purpose of the mission. The ink fairly boiled when he attacked the passage in Hülsemann's note which had designated Mann as a spy. Had he been treated as such, "the spirit of the people of this country would have demanded that immediate hostilities be waged." The policy of Austria's ally, Russia, in intervening had tremendously increased American sympathies for Hungary. With a parting shot expressing little fear of anything Austria might do in opposition to the United States, Webster indicated his pleasure over the constitution recently granted by Austria which contained "many of the American principles." The letter emphasized with incisiveness at once the interest of Americans in the cause of political liberty and the extent to which the government would go to defend its policy.²¹

The favorable newspaper comments denote the reception of

²¹ Webster to Hülsemann, 21 Dec. 1850, Mss., Dept. of State, Notes to German States, VI.

Vide, Curtis, *Life of Webster*, II, 535-6.

the letter by the public. The *Washington Union* spoke enthusiastically of the clear and eloquent presentation of American principles. The reply would circulate through Europe and serve to demonstrate the superiority of the American system and to inspire European patriots with new confidence. While we should remain aloof from foreign quarrels, said another, we should convince states over there of the sincere sympathy Americans had for peoples who struggle for those principles which "we believe to be the natural inheritance of men."²²

A further index of the almost universal approval that the letter received may be secured from individual opinions. Fillmore wrote Webster of "his unanswerable and unanswered letter to the Austrian Mission." Clayton acknowledged his thanks for the able defense of his policy; Hülsemann had been satisfactorily disposed of. Gilpin rejoiced that Webster could express to the oldest empire in Europe those sentiments regarding republican institutions which every American proudly acknowledged. Francis Lieber thanked him for the "leonine letter," a copy of which he sent to Germany where it would "warm a heart as much as it has mine." Ticknor, the novelist, in a letter to his friend Sir Edmund Head, Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick, referred to it as "satisfactory to the whole of this country without distinction of party." The Pennsylvania Legislature passed a resolution of approbation. But a discordant note marred the harmony of the whole. *Brownson's Magazine*, edited by a man of Catholic persuasion, roundly denounced Webster's reasoning as "extraordinary, indefensible and extremely dangerous." But he desired to point out a far graver fault than the reasoning; namely, that Webster defended the sympathy of the American government and people with European rebels in general and the Magyars in particular on a ground fatal to all political right and social order. Webster had pandered to the basest passions of his countrymen.²³

²² *Wash. Union*, 31 Dec. 1850; *Phila. Ledger*, 6 Jan. 1851; *Phila. Sun. Despatch*, 5 Jan. 1851.

²³ Fillmore to Webster, 19 J1. 1851. Webster Mss.

Clayton to Webster, 12 Jan. 1851, Van Tyne, *Letters of Daniel Webster*, 452.

From Americans abroad came words of commendation. Abbott Lawrence,* Minister to Great Britain, saw in the letter principles that tended to elevate the position of the country at home and abroad. Men everywhere in Europe who valued constitutional liberty would appreciate it, and it should serve to strengthen those who were struggling to establish civil rights. He handed a copy to the doughty Palmerston. Folsom, envoy at the Hague, observed that friends of liberty there gave due meed of praise to the contents of the letter and its author. In Austria the minister, McCurdy, found the friends of free institutions highly satisfied with Webster's reply. Among Americans there developed a great degree of pride and a species of enthusiasm over the letter.²⁴

A Senate resolution requesting all the correspondence that had passed between Webster and the Austrian Chargé, was approved on December 26, 1850. Immediately the contents of the documents produced a sensation. Underwood declared that the correspondence ought to warm the heart of every true American. We should sympathize with the efforts made in every corner of the earth for the purpose of establishing free and liberal principles among men. But when a motion to print 10,000 copies of the correspondence for general distribution was offered, Jefferson Davis opposed "making much ado about nothing," for the paper contained only the traditional American doctrines. With his usual dignity and reserve Clay urged caution in the Austrian policy. Should an American state revolt and an agent be sent towards it by a foreign power, would American sentiment differ

Webster to Clayton, 15 Jan. 1851, *Ibid.*, 453.

Gilpin, H. D. to Webster, 22 Jan. 1851. Webster Mss.

Lieber, F. to Webster, 13 Feb. 1851. *Ibid.*

Boardman to Webster, 20 Jan. 1851. *Ibid.*

Ticknor, G. to Head, 7 Jan. 1851, Ticknor, B., *Life etc. George Ticknor*, 271.

Johnson to Webster, 20 Mch. 1851, Penna. Archives, 4th Series, Papers of of the Governors, VII.

⁸ *Brownson Quarterly Mag.*, 198, 229.

* Abbott Lawrence (1792-1855), was a Congressman, 1834-6, 1839-40. In 1848 he had been a prominent candidate for the Vice-Presidency.

²⁴ Lawrence, A. to Webster, 27 Jan. 1851. Webster Mss.

Lawrence, A. to Webster, 7 Feb. 1851, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., England, LXI.

Folsom, G. to Webster, 18 Feb. 1851, *Ibid.*, Repts., Netherlands, XIV.

McCurdy, C. J. to Webster, 14 Mch. 1851, *Ibid.*, Repts., Austria, III.

from that now held by Austria? Why stir up trouble since Hungary's fate had been sealed? Printing the documents might prove a fresh source of irritation to Austria. With such opposition, the measure failed by three votes. On the succeeding day, Douglas moved to reconsider the action, since some people considered the previous vote either a censure on Webster or else a disagreement with the sentiments advanced by him in the correspondence. His plea carried the day and as a compromise 5,000 copies were ordered to be printed.²⁵

Owing in part to the unsettled condition of affairs in Europe, Austria did not feel disposed to cross swords with Webster again. In a note which the latter considered very amiable, Hülsemann announced that although the letter of December 21, displeased his government, nevertheless, assured by Fillmore's declaration of "good will towards foreign powers and of abstention from interference in their internal affairs," Austria was ready to close the discussion. Webster acquiesced in this view.²⁶

American opinion may again be estimated in the racy debates consonant with a resolution of Senator Cass to suspend diplomatic relations with Austria. Col. J. Watson Webb, editor of the New York *Courier and Enquirer*, had been angling for some time to secure an appointment to a foreign mission. First he sought the one in "Germany", then that in Spain. President Taylor considered him unfit to hold any office. Eventually, however, Webb obtained from him the mission to Austria, and on December 1, 1849, without waiting for Senate confirmation, set out for Vienna.²⁷

²⁵ 31 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 135, 136.

²⁶ Rives, W. C. to Webster, 20 Feb. 1851, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., France, XXXIII.

Hülsemann to Webster, 11 Mch. 1851, *Webster Works*, National Edition, XII, 179.

Webster to Hülsemann, 15 Mch. 1851, Mss., Dept. of State, Notes to German States, VI.

²⁷ Webb to Crittenden, 16 Dec. 1848. Crittenden Mss.

Webb to Clayton, Mch. 1849. Clayton Mss.

Clayton Memorandum, 31 May 1849. *Ibid.*

Clayton to Webb, 21 Nov. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Inst., Austria, I.

Phila. Ledger, 20 Ag. 1849, 29 Nov. 1849, 3, 11 Dec. 1849.

31 Cong., 1 Sess., *Sen. Jol.*, 15, 66, 94, 117.

31 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe, App.*, 54-8.

As has been noted, public meetings in the previous summer had urged the discontinuance of the Austrian mission. The clamor grew in volume and intensity. Petitions circulated everywhere urging Congress to suspend diplomatic relations, while the newspapers portrayed the almost universal antipathy to Austria. All free people, said a typical one, should unite in "unmitigated condemnation of Austria as a nest of pirates of which humanity demands extinction." The canny Cass seized the opportunity to build up his political capital. On December 24, 1849, he moved in the Senate that "the committee on foreign relations be instructed to inquire into the expediency of suspending diplomatic relations with Austria." Shortly thereafter, Cass opened the debate by reminding the Senate that the resolution merely inquired and therefore could not be offensive to Austria. He would be glad when the government, "reflecting the true sentiments of the people," would express sympathy with the millions struggling for liberty. The views of Clay and Webster, he thought from past declarations, would coincide with his. The history of the Hungarian struggle had "awakened too deep an interest" in this country to need a review at his hands. The American people would approve of the resolution.²⁷

The newspapers received the Cass measure according to their political affiliation. The Whig papers carried on a running attack. The "official organ," the *Washington Republic*, conceded that its feelings corresponded with those of Cass, but disliked his mode of expression. Others beheld in the spectacle the ambitious Cass urging the measure in order to bolster his waning prestige through the country. "The title of the publication is Hungarian," parroted the *Liberator*, "but anyone can see that the main object is to call attention to the portrait of the author on the opposite page." On the other hand, the journals of the Democracy raised loud their voices in approval. In a series of editorials in the *Washington Union*, the Cass resolution found service as the text. After denouncing the pusillanimous policy of Clayton which favored the divine right of kings, it praised the eloquent attempt of Cass as a satisfactory expression of the American feeling. Further, it declared the Whig Party to be hostile to the cause of freedom in Europe and to be sympa-

thetic with the despotisms of the old world. It estimated later that the response of the public press to Cass' speech showed that nine-tenths of the people favored suspension of diplomatic relations as a rebuke to Austria. The semi-independent Philadelphia *Ledger* praised very highly the resolution and the speech.²⁸

Meanwhile the debate on the resolution proceeded in the Senate. Hale, who favored the measure, used the opportunity to make one of his absurdly witty speeches. He pointed out that many other countries deserved to be cut off diplomatically, since they had committed crimes as dastardly as those perpetrated by Austria. Clay believed the measure ill-advised and worthless. In Hungary and its heroic people he had a profound interest, but nothing beneficial to them would result from such an inquiry as Cass favored. Foote, in a beastly tirade, made bold to reply to Clay declaring that the Cass proposal meant American sympathy for oppressed Hungary and was a declaration of indignation at the suffering to which her noble people had been subjected. One voice would be heard from American freemen and that would be "unanimous sympathy for down-trodden Hungary and our measureless contempt for her tyrannical oppressors." R. M. T. Hunter roundly denounced the intervention policy which he somehow saw in the resolution. Another Senator wondered whether the resolution would not be an invasion of the rights of the President.²⁹

In view of the opposition to Cass' proposal, Underwood submitted a substitute resolution:

"That while the people of the United States sympathize with popular movements to reform political institutions inconsistent with the enlightened opinions of the present age . . . they disclaim the right to meddle with the domestic policy of other nations."

Supposing that the Cass measure alone could not muster enough votes, Foote offered a resolution proposing

²⁸ *Wash. Republic*, 5 Jan. 1850; *Phila. No. Am.*, 7, 12 Jan. 1850; *N. Y. Tribune*, 11 Jan. 1850; *Phila. Ledger*, 28 Dec. 1849, 7 Jan. 1850; *Liberator*, 11 Jan. 1850; *Wash. Union*, 1, 8, 11, 24 Jan. 1850.

²⁹ 31 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 103-6, 113-4.
31 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe, App.*, 43-7, 84-91.

“that the heroic struggles for freedom in Hungary are, in the judgment of the Senate, entitled to the warmest sympathy and respect of the American people and government, as well by reason of the virtues they have exhibited, as of the sufferings they have been fated to endure,”

together with the original Cass measure and a third provision granting land on liberal terms to Hungarian refugees in this country. Simultaneously Soulé advocated that the government bring Kossuth to America. The Senate, however, soon became wholly occupied with the Clay compromise measures, and the Foote scheme, like its predecessor, temporarily dropped out of sight.³⁰

Individuals outside of the Senate freely expressed their views with respect of the resolution proposing suspension of diplomatic relations with Austria and of the resultant debate. Webster thought Cass' speech a popular one and Clay's response “a sensible performance with some fooleries such as he always commits.” The Cass policy towards Austria, wrote W. L. Marcy, met with the approval of the people. From abroad came word of the ill effects of the proceedings. A. Dudley Mann feared that nothing could be accomplished by suspending relations. Fay commented on the great excitement the discussion produced in Europe. From every side he heard that “all the pride recorded in the history of the Popes, Kings and Emperors never equalled that of the Burghers of the United States.” While in conversation with Prince Schwartzberg, Webb warned him to distinguish between the acts of the government and those of an individual (Cass) opposed to the government. He told him that in the American public mind there was a very general feeling of sympathy for Hungary. In its whole policy with regard to Hungary the government merely reflected public sentiment.³¹

³⁰ 31 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 244, 293.

Ibid., *App.*, 143-8.

³¹ Webster to Harvey, 9 Jan. 1850, *Webster Works*, National Edition, IV, 529.

Marcy to Dickinson, 27 Jan. 1850, Dickinson, *Correspondence D. S. Dickinson*, 420.

Mann to Clayton, 10 Jan. 1850, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Fay to Clayton, 5 Feb. 1850, *Ibid.*, Repts., Prussia, VI.

Webb to Clayton, 15 Feb. 1850, *Ibid.*, Repts., Austria, III.

The Democracy made another move which was designed to display its sympathy for the lost Hungarian cause by refusing to confirm the appointment to Austria of Editor Webb who had numerous political enemies in the Senate. After a lengthy debate, the Senate refused, 34 to 7, to approve the Webb nomination; whereupon Cass renewed his activity to prevent any minister going to Vienna. His plea failed to win approval, for by a vote of 28 to 17, the Senate signified its unwillingness to sever the diplomatic relations. Politics ended at the seashore.³²

³² *Sen. Exec. Jol.*, VIII, 115, 116, 129, 137.
31 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 588, 745-6.

V

THE CONQUERED HERO COMES

Before the defeat and surrender of the Hungarian forces, many of the soldiers had escaped from the Austrian empire. Some found a haven in France and England, while the close associates of Kossuth joined him in seeking safety within the boundaries of Turkey. Eventually after a petty diplomatic dispute between Turkey (with Great Britain and France seconding her) and Austria and Russia, Kossuth and his comrades were confined in the heart of Asia Minor.

With hearts strangely warmed for the Hungarians, Americans continued to evince their interest in them by the way in which they followed their fortunes. When Russia and Austria demanded that Turkey release to them the revolutionary heroes, Americans became indignant. One group living in Paris which included Colt the inventor, Saunders the editor of the *Democratic Review*, and a number of Southerners, urged the minister in Constantinople to protect Kossuth, "an example of our Washington," and his companions. The envoy might be sure of approval from home for there the people had "risen en masse to sympathize with Hungary." America would demand that every energy be exerted in behalf of the refugees. On the other side of the Atlantic, the voice of the influential Webster, then a United States Senator, boomed forth its opposition to the Russian demand, as a violation of human justice and national law. The great republic of the world should speak out its hostility to such an infamous request.¹

From time to time, word reached the United States of the desperate straits in which the refugees were situated. Observers, noting the strong predilection of the Hungarians for the United States, anticipated that many would migrate thither. Appeals to aid them as "republicans and Christians" were circulated

¹ Americans in Paris to Carr, D. S., 22 Sept. 1849, (Copy) 19 Dec. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Turkey, XI.
Curtis, G. T., *Life of Webster*, II, 558.

in the American press. Poets devoted their talents to Kossuth, "exile on a foreign strand," and to his desecrated Hungary. Editors wondered whether the government would lend a hand in the liberation of the heroes. The suggestion that Kossuth might come to America was by no means a new one.²

The frequent repetition in 1849-50 of the plea to transport Kossuth to this country suggests widespread interest. If the government would not act, private individuals offered to raise through voluntary subscription a sum adequate enough to bring him to America. Before the legislature of Ohio, a Rev. Mr. Tefft depicted the marvelous struggle carried on by the Hungarians and urged action to secure the release of Kossuth. Immediately the legislature passed a resolution declaring it to be the duty of Congress to take steps calculated to bring Kossuth and his family to America. Indiana wanted the government to act in order to obtain an amelioration of the conditions of the Hungarian patriots.³

Meanwhile the national government had determined upon its course of action. Assistance would be rendered the refugees provided no entanglement with Austria or Russia should arise therefrom. On this basis Clayton, Secretary of State, ordered Marsh,* the recently appointed Minister at the Porte, to intercede. The government would be glad to convey the exiles to America in one of the national ships—a measure which would certainly please the American people. These instructions preceded by three weeks a resolution of Senator Soulé requesting "the President to intercede with Turkey to secure the liberation of Kossuth and companions."⁴

² 35 *Knickerbocker Mag.*, 169, 203; 36 *Ibid.*, 571; 37 *Ibid.*, 318; *Phila Sun. Despatch*, 16 Je. 1850.

Mann to Clayton, 9 Sept. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

³ Moore, C. W. to Webster, 31 Jl. 1851, Mss., Dept. of State, Miscell. Letters, Jl.-Ag. 1851.

Tefft, B. F., *Kossuth and Hungary*, 8.

Acts of 48th Gen. Ass. of Ohio, 711.

Gen. Laws of Indiana, 34th Session, 233.

* George P. Marsh (1801-1882) diplomatist and philological scholar. 1842-49, M. C. from Vermont; 1849-53, Minister to Turkey.

⁴ Clayton to Marsh, 12 Jan. 1850, Mss., Dept. of State, Inst., Turkey, I. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., *Senate Jol.*, 132.

Brown, J. P. to Clayton, 19 Dec. 1850, 18 Feb. 1850, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Turkey, XI.

In the absence of the Minister, the business at the Legation in Constantinople had devolved upon the dragoman, J. P. Brown. Influenced by the obviously favorable opinion held by Americans for Hungary and by the official attitude as expressed in Taylor's annual message, Brown had been unusually generous in granting to the Hungarians permits which enabled them to obtain entrance into their own country or safe passage to Switzerland. British agents allowed similar evasions. Brown kept foremost in mind, however, the traditions of neutrality in European politics.⁴

In a letter to Kossuth, Brown expressed the high admiration in which Americans held the unfortunate leader. The American people would readily grant him a free asylum in their land, and his acceptance would flatter them immensely. Although Kossuth in his reply cherished the sympathy of America, he said he would not leave Turkey. This reply greatly surprised Brown who had suggested to his government that Kossuth desired to visit the United States. Nevertheless, he advocated government action to succor the "noblest yet the most unfortunate patriot of his times." He ventured to urge the Turkish government not to accede to the Austrian demand to detain Kossuth for a specific period. He felt justified in his action since he knew of the attitude of the American press towards Kossuth.⁵

As soon as Marsh reached Constantinople, he acted on the instructions received from Clayton. At once, he commanded Captain Long of the United States ship, *Mississippi*, to wait in Constantinople while he ascertained whether the Sultan would grant the refugees a release. If the Porte agreed, the refugees would be conveyed to America by Captain Long. Though Marsh believed that Turkey desired to comply with Clayton's suggestion, he doubted whether the government would act since it feared the hostility of Austria and Russia. His fears proved well grounded, for on March 25, 1850, the Turkish minister replied that the Hungarians would not be permitted to leave the country. Three weeks later, however, Marsh reported that the Hungarians at Broussa had been removed to Kutaieh in Asia Minor and that they would be released in the fall. A

⁴ Brown, J. P. to Clayton, 15 Jan. 1850, 18 Feb. 1850, Mss., Dept. of State Repts., Turkey, XI.

hundred who had not been incarcerated inland applied to Marsh for the means of migrating to America, but he felt unable to grant their request. He pleaded with Clayton for power to do something to realize the hopes of the refugees who anticipated aid from the United States. Time and again he appealed to the Sultan in their behalf. At length the latter offered to transport gratis all the refugees, save those detained in Asia Minor, to England, provided the United States would convey them thence to America. With regret, Marsh declined the liberal offer. The refusal disappointed the Porte, which confidently expected that its proposal would meet with the approval of the United States since Americans had shown such "strong manifestations of popular sympathy."⁶

Frequent appeals obliged Marsh to contribute from his personal resources to aid the suffering outcasts. Such donations caused him serious embarrassment, but he felt impelled to make them because of the expressions of public sympathy which came from America. Webster, now Secretary of State, wrote Marsh that the executive could do nothing to reimburse him or to alleviate the hardships of the refugees, since Congress had refused to make an appropriation for that purpose.⁷

From his place of banishment, Kossuth issued an address to the American people which contained a statement of the demands of his country together with the narrative of events that led to Hungary's debacle. American newspapers carried the letter to thousands of readers. Kossuth also wrote an appeal to the government in which he pleaded for intervention with the Turkish authorities so that he might obtain his release and then migrate to America.⁸

Meanwhile Brown, the dragoman, had returned to Washington

⁶ Marsh to Long, 7 Mch. 1850, Mss., Dept. of Navy, Repts., Med. Squadron 1849-1852.

Marsh to Clayton 14, 25 Mch. 1850, 18 Ap. 1850, 15 May 1850, 19 Je. 1850, 4 Jl. 1850, 19 Ag. 1850, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Turkey, XII.

⁷ Marsh to Webster, 15 Nov. 1850, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Turkey, XII.

Webster to Marsh, 25 Jan. 1851, *Ibid.*, Inst., Turkey, I.

⁸ *N. Y. Tribune*, 20 Oct. 1851; *Phila. Ledger*, 15 Feb. 1851; 3 *Harper's Monthly*, 562.

and got into communication with Webster. He emphasized the suffering endured by the unfortunate revolutionists and told of their desire to migrate to America. Kossuth, said he, now hoped that he might soon be "enabled to seek a quiet home on the soil of America." After recounting the cause for the previous failure to secure the release of Kossuth, Brown implored Webster to try again, since the time of detention, so he thought, would soon be ended.⁹

While Kossuth and some companions fled eastward, others of the Hungarians sought a temporary asylum in the western part of Europe. Before the close of 1849, some of these refugees made plans to come to New York where a relief association with the Mayor as President and Treasurer, had been organized to aid the destitute. Ladislaus Ujhazy, ex-Governor of Comorn, assembled a group of refugees in London and embarked for this country. In a note of introduction to Taylor and Clayton, Lawrence, Minister to England, wrote enthusiastically about this man and his family. A card of similar purport was written to A. J. Donelson who returned from England on the boat with Ujhazy. The latter proposed to establish a permanent home in the Middle West in which all the refugees might gather.¹⁰

The reception accorded Ujhazy and his companions gives another clue to opinion on the revolutionary movements. From the time of their landing in New York until their departure for the West, many events indicate the trend of feeling. With great warmth, the Governor of New York assured a home and an asylum to the brave though unsuccessful defenders of liberty. In Philadelphia, after a most enthusiastic welcome the party received a public reception in Independence Hall. Some of the demonstrations bordered on the ridiculous. Various amusement houses gave the proceeds of a performance for the benefit of the

⁹ Brown to Webster, 26 Sept. 1850, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Turkey, XIII.

¹⁰ *Phila. Ledger*, 15 Oct. 1849, 14 Dec. 1849.

Lawrence to Clayton, 19 Nov. 1849. Clayton Mss.

Lawrence to Donelson, 19 Nov. 1849. Donelson Mss.

¹¹ *Iowa Jol. of History and Politics*, 480 ff.

Hungarians. It was now known that Ujhazy intended to ask Congress for aid in securing the release of Kossuth.¹¹

In a very cordial note, President Taylor welcomed the Ujhazy group to "the natural asylum of the oppressed from every clime," where he trusted they might find a second home. When they came to Washington, Taylor received them very pleasantly. Once more he spoke of the sympathy engendered in America by the revolutionary movements and repeated that if Hungary had succeeded in becoming independent, America would have been first to welcome her into the family of nations. He hoped Kossuth might speedily join his comrades. Later the party made visits to the Senate, to the House, and to the Supreme Court as well as to individual officials of prominence. The Democratic Washington *Union* severely criticized the Taylor Cabinet for not calling upon Ujhazy, and suggested that the foreign-born voters keep this snub in mind. After some lobbying in order to procure land the exiles left Washington, spent an enjoyable day in Baltimore and moved on to New York. Thence they set out for Iowa via Buffalo and the Lakes.¹²

The best opportunity for a livelihood for these penniless victims of misfortune lay in the virgin soil of the Middle West. With an eye on the foreign-born vote which Cass and the Democracy aimed to capture, Seward introduced a measure in the Senate granting land free of all charges to Hungarians or other exiles upon their arrival in America. During a debate on the public domain Senator Sam Houston advocated the gift of some of the millions of idle acres to them.* Presently Seward pressed his motion and pleaded that it be sent to the appropriate committee. Objection came from Douglas who disliked the preference given foreigners over native-born citizens. Dawson looked upon the measure as a Seward bid to gain votes, an allegation

¹¹ *Phila. Ledger*, 14 Dec. 1849, 10 Jan. 1850, 6, 7 Nov. 1851; *Phila. Sun. Despatch*, 13 Jan. 1850, 5 May 1850; 11 *Iowa Jol. of History and Politics*, 480 ff.

¹² *Wash. Union*, 17, 29 Jan. 1850; 11 *Iowa Jol. of History and Politics*, 480 ff.

* In an analogous case in 1834, Congress granted land to Polish exiles conditionally upon their cultivation of the soil allotted and the payment within ten years of the minimum price. *Debates in Cong.*, Vol. X, col., 2127, 4799; *Ibid.*, *Appendix*, 351.

which the accused vehemently denied. From the legislature of New York came a memorial favoring the Seward bill, provided that the persons receiving the land became actual settlers thereon. Benton offered a petition from his constituents requesting that Missouri land be given the refugees. A memorial from the legislature of Iowa begged Congress to grant Ujhazy and his associates the land in Decatur County whereon they had settled. Similar resolutions and petitions of a like tenor were presented to later Congresses.¹³

A settlement, New Buda, was started in Decatur County, Iowa, in an area considered fertile and beautiful. Here Ujhazy confidently awaited the arrival of his friend and chief, Kossuth. The energetic workers soon cleared the soil and acquired a splendid herd of cattle together with a few horses. Plans had been conceived for the construction of a town of moderate proportions. The settlers lived in hope that aid would be rendered them by the Federal government. In a cautious letter, Cass gave no definite promise concerning land, but assured Ujhazy of the fervent sympathy the American people had for the Hungarians. "I entertain a confident hope that the subject (of land) will receive the favorable consideration of Congress at its next session," wrote Seward. The exiles might be sure that Seward personally would aid them. President Fillmore believed that Congress would deal generously with the Hungarians, because of the deep sympathy Americans had for the oppressed everywhere. Despite many fine phrases and flowery promises, the exiles never obtained any free land.¹⁴

From time to time other refugees joined forces with the original group at New Buda. One scout had orders to select a site for a colony of 3,000 Hungarian exiles. When Kossuth did arrive, he talked long with an Iowa delegation concerning the conditions at New Buda. The details pleased him and he

¹³ 31 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 128, 263-8.

31 Cong., 1 Sess., *Sen. Jol.*, 113, 216, 463.

31 Cong., 1 Sess., *House Jol.*, 409, 475.

Laws of the State of New York, 73rd Session.

¹⁴ Fillmore to Ujhazy, 21 Oct. 1851, 11 *Buff. Hist. Soc.*, 316-7. *Wash. Intelligencer*, 19 Feb. 1852; *Boston Atlas*, 9 Dec. 1851; 11 *Iowa Jol. of History and Politics*, 484-7.

decided to ask Congress to approve an act for free land. By the time he reached St. Louis, however, Ujhazy had sold his home and had prepared to move on to Texas. By dint of hard labor they had opened farms, but the climate proved unsuitable for the cultivation of those products which they had raised in Europe.¹⁵

A new interest in the revolutionary heroes, still captives in Asia Minor, coincides with the widespread approval which greeted Webster's grandiose Hülsemann letter. On February 17, 1851, Senator Foote introduced a joint resolution which empowered the President to dispatch a vessel to fetch Kossuth to America. After slight amendment by Shields, the Senate adopted the Foote measure and on the same day the bill was presented for action in the House. Southern members, such as Cobb of Alabama and Toombs of Georgia, suggested that the government tend to its own business. Due to the opposition, largely Southern, the bill had to lie over four days before being passed.¹⁶

Before the House approved the bill, Webster sent a note to Marsh, in which he spoke of the unsuccessful attempt of his predecessor to secure the release of Kossuth because the Sultan had decided to confine him for a year. That period now having elapsed, the United States renewed its hope that he might be freed. Webster reaffirmed the old policy that this government had "no desire or intention to interfere in any manner with questions of public policy or international or municipal relations of other governments." Since danger of a new revolt no longer existed, why should not the Turkish government release the captives and permit them "to cross the ocean to the uncultivated regions of America and leave forever a continent which to them has been more gloomy than the wilderness?" Anticipat-

¹⁵ *Phila. Ledger*, 7 Oct. 1851; *N. Y. Herald*, 31 Oct. 1851; *Phila. No. Am.*, 20 Sept. 1850; *Savannah Republican*, 18 Mch. 1852; *Wash. Union*, 13 Jan. 1852; *N. Y. Tribune*, 25 Mch. 1852; 11 *Iowa Jol. of History and Politics*, 486-7.

¹⁶ 31 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 710, 731, 777-9.

ing the House action, Webster assured Marsh that the government would furnish ships to transport the Hungarians.¹⁷

Before Brown, the Turkish dragoman on furlough, returned to his post in Constantinople, he advised Webster that definite arrangements should be made with naval officers in the Mediterranean for a vessel to carry the liberated Hungarians to America. Immediately Webster told Marsh that if the Sultan should release Kossuth, he should advise with Morgan, the ranking officer of the Mediterranean fleet, as to the measures to effect the end in view. In the same packet went a letter from Graham, Secretary of the Navy, ordering Morgan to send the *Mississippi* to receive the exiles as soon as he learned that they could depart for the United States. Morgan sent an officer of judgment, Lieutenant Drayton, to Constantinople to arrange the departure. Such attention from an official source, he felt, would carry much weight with the Porte.*¹⁸

In the absence of both Marsh and Brown, Homes, assistant dragoman, laid before the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs the contents of Webster's letters. In his earlier correspondence Homes showed clearly his doubt as to whether the refugees preferred America to England or France. In either of the latter countries they would be close at hand in case a new revolutionary wave galvanized Hungary into action. If they should go to America, Austria would desire to stipulate that they remain there for several years. After presenting the application for the liberation of Kossuth, Homes ventured to suggest to Webster that the status quo would be maintained since Turkey stood in holy awe of Austria and Russia. Kossuth had written Homes that if the Hungarians should be freed, they would come

¹⁷ Webster to Marsh, 28 Feb. 1851, Mss., Dept. of State, Inst., Turkey, I. Cass to Webster, 18 Mch. 1851, Van Tyne, *Letters of Daniel Webster*, 461.

* Simultaneously Morgan commanded Capt. J. C. Long, *U. S. S. Mississippi*, to repair to Constantinople and confer with Marsh on all matters relative to the Kossuth departure. When the latter was released, he should be taken aboard and carried to New York.

¹⁸ Brown to Webster, 1 Ap. 1851, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Turkey, XIII.

Webster to Marsh, 4 Ap. 1851, *Ibid.*, Inst., Turkey, I.

Graham to Morgan, 4 Ap. 1851, Mss., Dept. of Navy, Record of Confid. Letters, II.

Morgan to Graham, 28 May 1851, *Ibid.*, Med. Squadron, 1849-1852.

Morgan to Long, 5 Ag. 1851, *Ibid.*

to America under no obligation to remain longer than they pleased. Ultimately Homes received definite assurance that the release would occur September 1, 1851. He then wondered whether American or British vessels would bear them away.¹⁹

Upon his return to Turkey, Brown assumed charge of the negotiations with respect of Kossuth. On September 1, everything appeared favorable for the release. Brown, too, imagined that the United States would find England a rival claimant for the honor of carrying away the famous revolutionist. England pressed her invitation upon the Grand Vizier, who left the decision in the matter entirely to the pleasure of Kossuth. In the meantime, Captain Long had been acting under the instructions of his superior. After coaling in Genoa, he steamed for Smyrna and in the neighborhood of that place ran aground, a mishap that necessitated a short delay. Fear prevailed lest the accident might deter Kossuth from boarding the *Mississippi*; he might after all depart in an English vessel. On September 10, however, all fears were banished when Kossuth and his retinue boarded the *Mississippi* which had been handsomely prepared for the illustrious guest. Altogether sixty refugees were taken aboard; two of whom later requested to be put ashore at Smyrna. As soon as he could breathe freely, Kossuth declared that in the United States he did not seek "an asylum for exiles . . . but an avenger . . . against the oppressors of a holy cause."²⁰

On the following day the voyage began, and in spite of the rough water they reached Spezzia on September 21, coaled up, and came into Marseilles on September 26. At both these cities republican demonstrations led to difficulties between Captain

¹⁹ Homes to Webster, 18 Feb. 1851, 5, 25 Ap. 1851, 5, 15 May 1851, 5 Je. 1851, 5 Jl. 1851, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Turkey, XIII.

Homes to Morgan, 15 May 1851, Mss., Dept. of Navy, Med. Squadron, 1849-1852.

²⁰ Brown to Webster, 24 Jl. 1851, 25 Ag. 1851, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Turkey, XIII.

Long to Graham, 10 Nov. 1851, Mss., Dept. of Navy, Capts. Letters, Jl.-Dec., 1851.

Marsh to Webster, 18 Sept. 1851, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Turkey, XIII.

McCurdy to Webster, 4 Sept. 1851, *Ibid.*, Repts., Austria, III.

N. Y. Tribune, 10 Oct. 1851; *Phila. Ledger*, 8 Sept. 1851, 4 Nov. 1851.

Long and Kossuth. At Spezzia, Kossuth indicated his intention of going to England before proceeding to the United States; for that purpose he desired to be put off at Marseilles. From this city, he planned to travel through France to London in order to confer with some compatriots. After consulting with them, he would return to the *Mississippi* at Gibraltar. Though loth to do so, Morgan granted Long permission to disembark Kossuth at Marseilles. Accordingly on the arrival at Marseilles a request for the privilege of traveling through France was addressed to the Minister of the Interior. The government of Louis Napoleon seems to have been averse to having this great revolutionist pass through the French Republic for his plea received a negative response.²¹

Greatly disappointed, Kossuth sent a copy of his request together with the official refusal to *Le Peuple*, a Marseillian journal of a distinct "red" hue. Then ensued a great republican demonstration for Kossuth in the city and about the ship which constituted his home. Finally, fearing an émeuté, the prefect forbade Kossuth to land again in Marseilles. The American consul Hodge sent this order to Captain Long and further requested that Kossuth abstain from sending any other articles to newspapers while under the United States flag, since it might appear that we encouraged the attempt to produce a disturbance. Long soon wished he were rid of his inflammatory cargo. The present duty surpassed in unpleasantness any in which he had ever engaged. Kossuth interpreted the Hodge letter as an allegation that he had compromised the American flag. In consequence of this insulting insinuation he would leave the *Mississippi* at Gibraltar, and upon his arrival in America would appeal to the people to judge whether or not he had compromised their flag and their government. Long denied that Kossuth had compromised the flag, but suggested that there had been danger of it. Agreeable to the Captain's request, Kossuth remained out of sight during the balance of the stay. When the vessel reached Gibraltar, accompanied by his family and the

²¹ The bulky correspondence involved may be found in Mss., Dept. of State, Consular Letters, Marseilles, V. Much of it has been printed in 32 Cong., 1 Sess., *House exec. doc.*, 78.

closest of his comrades, Kossuth disembarked for England. Before he left the ship, the strained relations had been exchanged for feelings more friendly, but news of the difficulties and of the unpleasant occurrences which ensued, speedily reached the United States.²¹

Letters revealed to the country the apparent nature of the misunderstanding and served to produce further expressions of opinion. An American attaché in Paris, supposedly a man of discernment and judgment, decried Kossuth as "a humbug and a demagogue of the first water." His conduct at Marseilles had been "unjustifiable in the highest degree." The writer trusted that official Washington would not be humbugged and deceived by this meretricious company. A former member of Congress writing from Marseilles gave Hodge and the officers of the *Mississippi* a clean slate, and emphasized that Kossuth had earlier planned to stop in England to stir up revolutionary excitement. The *Herald* felt that the despatches received at the Navy Department from Morgan and Long would "dampen somewhat the enthusiasm for Kossuth." The prophecy proved correct, for time and again during the next six months, the dispute created difficulty and tended to change opinion concerning the Hungarian leader.²²

The Marseilles incident undoubtedly aided immensely in turning the New York *Herald* from a friend of Kossuth into an avowed enemy. It announced that the Hungarian approached this country to procure the means to carry on his revolutionary schemes and not to seek a permanent residence. The *Intelligencer*, accepting the letter from the attaché in Paris as an adequate warning, argued that Congress, when it invited Kossuth, had no intention of enlisting this government in any European revolutionary projects. In reply, the *Union* saw in the position of the *Intelligencer* merely an index of the undemocratic feeling that controlled its policies. Americans, said the *Tribune*, would not aid schemes of revolution and brought

²² *Newark Daily Advertiser*, 31 Oct. 1851; *N. Y. Herald*, 1, 3, Nov. 1851; *Wash. Union*, 6 Nov. 1851; *Phila. Ledger*, 4 Nov. 1851; *Wash. Intelligencer*, 5 Nov. 1851; *N. Y. Tribune*, 7 Nov. 1851.

Kossuth here to show that "they dared honor the hero of liberty" despite the opposition of monarchs. Denouncing the apparent effort through the Marseilles episode to prejudice American minds against Kossuth, the Philadelphia *Ledger* asked that he be heard before being condemned.²²

On November 10, 1851, the *Mississippi* with the Hungarians, minus the Kossuth party, docked in New York. Reporters worked assiduously to ascertain the opinion of officers and crew concerning the great hero and the Marseilles imbroglio. News that Long and the Hungarian chief parted company on friendly terms led the *Herald* and the *Picayune* to modify their earlier statements. The constant intercourse of the naval officers in the Mediterranean with "monarchical and aristocratic dignitaries" explained to the *Tribune* their action in the Marseilles affair. Temporarily, at least, the incident reacted in Kossuth's favor, although the Richmond *Whig* saw clearly that the Hungarian had "acted with great insolence and folly." Captain Long requested the Secretary of the Navy to publish Kossuth's last letter to him which would show the people that a friendly feeling existed at the time of the separation at Gibraltar. After approving Long's conduct of the journey, Graham assented to Long's request in order to obliterate any "erroneous impression with regard to the treatment of Kossuth whilst on board ship."²³

Despite the publication of this letter, common opinion continued to feel that Long had done Kossuth an injustice. Long had to deny an allegation that Kossuth had challenged him to mortal combat. In another letter, he intimates his chagrin at the "unmerited reproach" his policy received. He stressed the fact that relations at the time of departure were very cordial. Eventually a call for the papers relative to the dispute passed the House. The documents were then printed and of course served to revive interest in the dispute. One journal saw in them proof that Commodore Morgan had a far greater interest in

²² *New Orleans Picayune*, 11 Nov. 1851; *N. Y. Herald*, 11 Nov. 1851; *N. Y. Tribune*, 12 Nov. 1851; *Richmond Whig*, 25 Nov. 1851.

Long to Graham, 11 Nov. 1851, Mss., Dept. of Navy, Captain's Letters, Jl.-Dec., 1851.

Graham to Long, 11, 14 Nov. 1851, *Ibid.*, Officers, Ships of War, XLVI.

European functionaries than "for an exiled patriot and champion of liberty." The people would sustain Kossuth, for though the flag had been compromised Kossuth had not been guilty. The Vienna correspondent of the *Boston Atlas* wrote that the publication of the correspondence there produced an agreeable sensation, since it condemned Kossuth. Personally, he thought the letters condemned certain cringing American officials abroad. From another quarter sounded a different note. The letters clearly repeated the casuistry and humbuggerly of Kossuth for which the American people would not stand. Nor would they permit any man "to assail their glorious navy." The *Savannah Republican* denied that Long had erred.²⁴

On the *Mississippi* came forty-two of Kossuth's companions and the reception accorded them was a harbinger of the welcome the chief would receive. As guests of the city of New York they bade farewell to the vessel of mercy and took up their lodging in the Irving House. In a number of public addresses, Colonel Berzenczey, the leader of the party, expressed the gratitude of his compatriots for their release from Turkey. The Mayor of New York in a felicitous vein welcomed the refugees. Before a huge audience in Brooklyn, Henry Ward Beecher greeted them heartily and assured them that America deplored the Russian intervention which had caused the Hungarian defeat. Berzenczey brought a letter from Kossuth addressed to the Secretary of State in which he asserted that poor health and the desire to arrange some personal affairs had caused him to interrupt his journey to America.²⁵

While Kossuth's companions tossed on the Atlantic he enjoyed

²⁴ *N. Y. Tribune*, 14 Jan. 1852, 16 Feb. 1852; *Phila. Ledger*, 23 Feb. 1852; *Boston Atlas*, 13 Ap. 1852; *N. Y. Herald*, 24 Jan. 1852; *Savannah Republican*, 26 Feb. 1852.

32 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 391.

32 Cong., 1 Sess., *House Jol.*, 376.

²⁵ *N. Y. Herald*, 11-19 Nov. 1851; *N. Y. Tribune*, 11 Nov. 1851; *Phila. No. Am.*, 13 Nov. 1851.

Long to Graham, 11 Nov. 1851, Mss., Dept. of Navy, Captain's Letters, Jl.-Dec., 1851.

Kossuth to Webster, 18 Oct. 1851, Mss., Dept. of State, Miscell. Letters, Oct., 1851.

a royal reception in England. The ovation accorded him surpassed that which any other individual, save only the Queen, could receive. Bright and Cobden joined in making him welcome. Workingmen by the thousands applauded the Hungarian's fiery orations. Since American newspapers freely printed accounts of the generous welcome, the visit served to augment the enthusiasm here. Americans in England gave vent to their opinions on Kossuth. Abbott Lawrence, Minister at the Court of St. James, declared that Kossuth fully deserved the admiration of all lovers of constitutional government and freedom. Citizens of the United States regardless of party affiliation would welcome him heartily. A former Secretary of the Treasury, Robert J. Walker, potent in the councils of the Democracy, expressed himself unequivocally in favor of the oppressed whose champion Kossuth was.²⁶

At a reception banquet tendered Kossuth in Southampton many notable Americans were in attendance. Colonel T. B. Lawrence, son of the Minister, assured the distinguished guest that a cordial welcome awaited him in America. Croskey, consul at Southampton, intimated that the time rapidly approached when the United States would be forced to take a more active part in European affairs. Walker argued that one state had no right to interfere with another as Russia had so recently done. In the near future he envisaged a conflict between the forces of liberty and despotism, in which England would be supported by millions of his countrymen eager to defend the divine principles of constitutional government. Vessels would be insufficient to transport those who would desire to come to Europe to fight for so holy a cause. Side by side the two nations stood in defense of Kossuth and the ends he strove to attain.²⁶

Both sides of the Atlantic reverberated with Walker's speech. In Washington the *Union* revelled in the "fearless and eloquent terms in which our distinguished fellow citizen responded to the spirit of the occasion." The *Intelligencer* savagely attacked the

²⁶ *Phila. No. Am.*, 10, 15, 26 Nov. 1851; *Wash. Union*, 2, 18 Nov. 1851; *14 Am. Review*, 537; *Wash. Intelligencer*, 20 Nov. 1851; *Phila. Ledger*, 20 Nov. 1851.

speech. America would not, should not, interfere in European politics. The *North American* denied that Americans would flock to Great Britain to aid in the overthrow of despotism.²⁶

In the course of his tour through England, Kossuth suggested Walker as his candidate for the Presidency of the United States. Nor was this thought the chance expression of the orator, for on three separate occasions he made like declarations. Some critics recognized in this gesture the hand of Kossuth, but the voice of England. On November 24, Kossuth set sail for New York. Reviewing his stay in England, Thurlow Weed,* then in London, concluded, "He created a stir here and is regarded as a man of decided ability. . . . He is cast for a part in the world's drama and means to play out the play"²⁷

²⁶ *Phila. Ledger*, 4 Dec. 1851; *N. Y. Herald*, 28 Nov. 1851. Barnes, T. W., *Memoirs of Thurlow Weed*, II, 201.

* Thurlow Weed (1797-1882) a Whig journalist of importance in New York, and a confederate of Seward.

VI

CONGRESS DEBATES THE EXILE'S RECEPTION

While the *Humboldt*, bearing the Hungarian leader, made its way over the Atlantic, Congress beat about to determine the method of receiving him. Fillmore in his annual message recounted the activity of the government in securing the release of "Governor" Kossuth. After reiterating that America offered a safe asylum for "those whom political events exiled from their own home," in a discreet manner he placed on Congress the decision as to the way in which the Hungarians, brought hither by its authority, should be treated. He thus relieved the executive of any possibility of trouble with Austria over Kossuth's reception.¹

In the Senate Foote announced that at the instance of the Secretary of State he proposed to offer a joint resolution for the reception and entertainment of the Hungarian. As presented, the measure created a joint committee of Congress to welcome "the governor" and to assure him of "the profound respect entertained for him" by Congress and people alike. As sponsor of the measure, Foote emphasized that he acted merely as "the organ of those who entertain the common American feeling" in reference to the distinguished statesman. There had been but one Washington, there was but one Kossuth. Regardless of party, opposition, largely Southern, became vocal. Dawson, a Georgia Whig, objected to showing as a senator the respect as an individual he held for Kossuth. The people and not the government should extend the welcome. Underwood, Clay's colleague, feared that an official reception might lead to an inference that the government favored the doctrine of intervention. From the North came a different note. Cass sought the opportunity "to let off steam" and "bid for popularity," said an administration paper. With all his heart he wanted the resolution pushed through expeditiously. Kossuth

¹ Richardson, *Messages etc. of the Presidents*, V, 119-120.

should be received as the nation's guest. A champion of free-soil, J. P. Hale, capitalized the opportunity by pointing out the irrefutable similarity between the subject people in America and those in Europe. In an amendment he advocated that an expression favorable to the oppressed everywhere be included. Thus he attempted to unite indissolubly the antislavery program with sympathy for freedom in Europe. In the face of these developments Foote withdrew his resolution.²

On the very day that Kossuth landed in New York, a substitute bill introduced by Senator Seward welcomed "Louis Kossuth to the capital and the country in behalf of the people of the United States." Seward declared that since the exile had been brought here by an act of Congress he should be accorded a reception in the national capital. Miller and Stockton, Senators from New Jersey, spoke in favor of the Seward proposal, although they wanted it distinctly understood that intervention, which some people might see hinted at in a reception, was distinctly indefensible. Chase of Ohio and Hale of New Hampshire supported whole-heartedly the sentiments held by their free-soil colleague, Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, who in his maiden speech in the Senate paid an eloquent tribute to the Hungarian and the cause of liberty, and announced his intention of voting for the Seward measure.³

The Democracy of the Northwest eagerly proclaimed opinions on the reception and its implications. Shields of Illinois offered an amendment which provided an introduction to the Senate similar to that accorded Lafayette a generation earlier. More hard things, he believed, had been said about the Hungarian in the Senate than in Europe. In no wise did the resolution commit the government to intervene in Hungary. Stephen A. Douglas believed that the Russian intervention into the Austro-

² 32 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 5, 12, 21-3, 25, 30.

A thorough account of the Austrian policy in regard to the Kossuth visit may be found in Curti, *op. cit.*, 173-184.

³ 32 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 41-2, 44, 50-3.

Chase to his wife, 10 Dec. 1851. Chase Mss.

Choate to Sumner, 29 Dec. 1851, *Works of Chas. Sumner*, III, 3.

Tyler to Cunningham, 15 Feb. 1852, Tyler, *Life and Times of the Tylers*, II, 499.

Hungarian dispute was a violation of the law of nations such as to authorize England or the United States to interfere had either chosen to do so. He could not see how the proposed reception to Kossuth could cause offense to any power on earth. Walker of Wisconsin went further. Against such interference as Russia had committed in the affairs of Hungary, he would in the future interpose both moral and physical force with or without England. Surely the Hungarian patriot deserved a cordial welcome. Rhett, Borland, and Mallory, Southern Democrats, favored Seward's resolution.⁴

Other Southern Senators raised their voices in protest. Berrien of Georgia, a well-known conservative Whig, feared Europe might soon be visited by another revolutionary convulsion. Difficulties might then arise from the Kossuth reception. In view of this possibility, he proposed an amendment which declared that the reception of the Hungarian did not indicate that Congress proposed to depart from the settled policy of the government which forbade all interference with the domestic concerns of other nations.* Badger, North Carolina, saw nothing but evil in the whole affair. Clemens of Alabama based his opposition on the ground that it would lead to interference in the politics of Europe.⁵

After a lengthy debate, shorn of amendment, the original Seward bill passed by a vote of 33-6 with the entire opposition from the South—four Whigs, two Democrats. Seward won a great victory both for himself and the cause he championed.** Finally the Shields suggestion for a committee of three obtained approval, though not without the opposition of the South. Party lines failed to hold as had been the case in the votes on the Clay compromise measures. "In many respects," said the *Boston Atlas*, "this legislation has no parallel in the annals of

⁴ 32 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 34, 53, 70, 82, 90.

* By a two to one vote the Senate declined to approve this amendment.

⁵ 32 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 41-2, 44, 50-3.

** "Mr. Webster had taken Foote into close confidence and they had arranged to anticipate me as they thought on Kossuth. Foote introduced his resolution; slavery took alarm; Webster advised Foote (he says) to withdraw. I supplied a new resolution, and after all manner of contrivance to displace it, the Democrats were obliged to vote for it." Seward to Weed, 26 Dec. 1851, *Seward at Washington*, II, 176.

of Congress; in its results it will mark an advance movement in the history of human progress and the rights of man."⁶

Meanwhile the House debated. Very definitely and inextricably the question of the reception to Kossuth had intertwined itself with the traditional foreign policy and with the abolition movement. As in the Senate, the opposition developed its main strength from Southern men irrespective of party affiliation. On the first move to adopt the Seward bill in the House the opposition emerged victorious, but after the Senate passed the measure the House acquiesced by the overwhelming vote of 181-16 with every negative vote from the South. After reading the speeches Kossuth delivered in New York, Smith of Alabama denounced him unsparingly. With biting invective he charged the exile with attempting to instruct Americans in the correct interpretation of Washington's doctrines. He argued that the President should arrest Kossuth for such speeches. A resolution for a committee of five to present the Hungarian paved the way for a further revelation of the distinct nexus between the revolutionary movement in Europe and the slavery question. One Southern representative wanted it clearly understood that if the House adopted the measure, it did so believing that Kossuth had no sympathy for the Abolitionists. He pointed out that Abolitionists in the House, such as Giddings, Mann, and Rantoul, had been especially eager to welcome the refugee; in the Senate, Seward and Sumner had been in the van in the matter. Stephens, a Georgia Whig, held that the passage of the resolution could not be construed otherwise than as an endorsement of the principle of intervention. Two Whigs, whose districts lay in southern Ohio, had a similar fear. Millson, a Virginia Democrat, on the other hand, saw neither a commitment to intervention in the affairs of Hungary nor any necessary connection between slavery and a public welcome to the Hungarian. He based his disapproval on the ground that the resolution showed bad taste. Another Virginian denied that the march of free principles in

⁶ 32 Cong., 1 Sess., *Sen. Jol.*, 59.
Phila. No. Am., 19 Dec. 1851; *Boston Atlas*, 16 Dec. 1851; *N. Y. Tribune*, 20 Dec. 1851.
Chase to his wife, 11 Dec. 1851. Chase Mss.

Europe constituted an advance against the South, although he conceded that the vote on the reception had assumed a sectional character. Among Northern representatives the sentiment showed sharp divisions. One offered an amendment that the measure should not be construed as impairing the Clay compromise measures. Several Northerners believed that the United States should now commit itself unequivocally to the intervention doctrine. Eventually the proposal for the introduction committee of five secured a favorable vote, 123-54; Southerners numbering 45, opposed the resolution, fought hard, but lost. "The South and the 'Old Hunkers' have been in a tight place," wrote Horace Mann. "How could they vote to honor one fugitive from slavery, and chain and send back another?"⁷

⁷ 32 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 58, 96, 186-191, 200.

32 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe, App.*, 101.

32 Cong., 1 Sess., *House Jol.*, 123.

Choland to Welles, 31 Dec. 1851. Welles Mss.

Mann to Clap, E. W., 5 Jan. 1852, Mann, *Life of Horace Mann* I, 345.

VII

VOX POPULI, VOX DEI?

While the government debated the nature of its welcome to the distinguished exile, the masses in the Northern cities gave vent to their feeling in an unmistakable manner. Long before Kossuth's arrival in New York, great enthusiasm in his favor presaged a cordial welcome. The *Herald* termed him "despotism's great foe," and declared that the day of his reception should be another Fourth of July.

From the time that the naval salute on December 5, 1851, announced his approach to the commercial capital until his departure, he received a grand and tremendous ovation. One observer of the events, writing nearly half a century later, confessed that he still felt "the shouts of welcome tingling in his veins." The reception attained such proportions, said he, because Kossuth was "a martyr representing in his failure all the down-trodden nationalities of Europe" which, "by the swift reactions that followed the spasms of 1848," had succumbed to the despots. America welcomed him as the protagonist of great principles, and the acclamation was bestowed not upon Kossuth the man but upon him as the representative and champion of liberty against the despotic powers of Europe. At the same time, the welcome exhibited the American detestation of the tyranny of Austria and the perfidy of Russia. The *Richmond Enquirer* recognized him as the "embodiment of the popular thought of Europe . . . the incarnation of the genius of freedom . . . who has kindled hopes of liberty buried for ages under despotism." It was not Kossuth whom the American people were to honor "but the noble, eternal and ever-enduring principles of which that mighty man is the able and eloquent exponent and vindicator." In the light of these views, the reception given the Hungarian leader assumes its real significance.¹

¹ *N. Y. Herald*, 15 Oct. 1851, 22, 24 Nov. 1851, 4 Dec. 1851; *New Orleans Picayune*, 22 Oct. 1851, 11 Nov. 1851; *Richmond Enquirer*, 24 Dec. 1851. Godwin, P., *Commemorative Addresses*, 127. 32 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 82.

At the very outset the reception which "surpassed any that would be accorded any other European or living American" took on every aspect of a frenzy.* The telegraph wires transmitted nothing but Kossuth news. A thoughtful editor utilized the excitement for a disquisition on national characteristics in which he predicted that the enthusiasm would be succeeded by a violent reaction. The mission became a theme for the clergy; one of whom proclaimed that present events were intended to precede the coming of Christ. Kossuth had been sent by God to prepare the way. Political observers noticed that the devotion had no party, sex, or color limits, but inspired young and old with a holy zeal never before witnessed. If any party should oppose "Kossuthism", it would assuredly be doomed to defeat. The *Intelligencer* correspondent feared that the tides of popular enthusiasm might sweep the ship of state from the old established moorings into the maelstrom of European politics. The masses displayed their exuberance in parades, serenaded the Magyar with speeches, and a large number made contributions to a liberation fund.²

Shortly after Kossuth and his party had settled in a hotel, individuals and delegations began pouring in to express sympathy for the cause associated with his name. To all he responded in a remarkable manner. Indeed the superior quality of his diction together with the Oriental flourishes he used account in some measure for the great personal tribute meted out to him.** M. P. Fillmore, the President's son and private secretary, expressed his father's desire to welcome the exile at the seat of the govern-

* The reception was equalled only by that given Dewey on his return from Manila, writes a reliable contemporary of both events. McClure, A. K., *Recollections of a Half Century*, 199.

² *N. Y. Tribune*, 8, 13 Dec. 1851; *Wash. Union*, 24 Dec. 1851; *Wash. Intelligencer*, 17 Dec. 1851; *Phila. Sun. Desp.*, 7 Dec. 1851; 4 *Harper's Monthly*, 265. Belmont to Buchanan, 6 Dec. 1851. Buchanan Mss. Byrdsall to Buchanan, 18 Dec. 1851. *Ibid.*

** During his confinement in a Hapsburg prison and in a Turkish fortress, Kossuth had capitalized his time by acquiring a knowledge of the English language, chiefly from the Bible and Shakespeare.

ment. Disgruntled by the acrimonious Senatorial debate, Kossuth questioned whether he would go to Washington at all. Unless Congress voted to receive him, he would immediately return to Europe without accepting any more American hospitality. Among the other prominent callers were W. H. Stiles, late Chargé to Austria, Senator Fish of New York, Governor Hunt of the same state, and Lt. Governor Lawrence of Rhode Island. Towns, large and small, sent representatives laden with portentous resolutions and with invitations to visit them. To the Philadelphia delegation he refused to say whether he would go beyond New York. He intimated that had knowledge of the Congressional proceedings reached him before he left England he would have hesitated about coming at all. Later, after William Hunter an attaché in the State Department handed him the formal invitation of the Senate to visit it, much of the bitterness passed away.³

Organizations and societies of every description waited on the famous revolutionist with bulky addresses—some written in English, others in German, Spanish, and Hungarian. Deputations appeared from the various evangelical religious bodies. Nor did the educational world permit the occasion to pass without some demonstration on its part. Columbia College came en masse, while President King identified Kossuth with the cause of education and good letters. Yale paid similar respects. In case another revolution should prove unsuccessful, the students of the Ballston Law School agreed to provide for Kossuth's children. The New York Board of Education sent an invitation to a banquet.⁴

Divers sorts of groups phrased their sentiments in many well-chosen words. The Democrats with an invitation to Tammany Hall, and the Whigs with a thousand dollars, called to voice

³ Godwin to Sumner, 8 Dec. 1851. Sumner Mss.
 Fillmore to Webster, 16 Dec. 1851. Webster Mss.
Phila. No. Am., 11 Dec. 1851; *N. Y. Herald*, 9 Dec. 1851; *N. Y. Tribune*, 9, 10 Dec. 1851. Greeley urged Kossuth to overlook the debates in Congress.
⁴ *Boston Atlas*, 12 Dec. 1851; *Liberator*, 19 Dec. 1851; *N. Y. Tribune*, 8-19 Dec. 1851; *N. Y. Herald*, 8-19 Dec. 1851.

their sympathy. The New England Society and the New York Bar adopted resolutions expressive of their feelings for depressed Hungary. The Total Abstinence Society sent a message in a similar vein. After a declaration of fellow-feeling, a colored delegation announced that it would give a liberty offering "even though it may be but the widow's mite." A situation pregnant with trouble arose when a committee from the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society presented itself. Fortunately the spokesman merely voiced sympathy with the cause of Hungary, said nothing as to abolition, and explained that the visit had not been prompted by a desire to connect the guest with any party in this country. Kossuth lavishly thanked the committee for not attempting to entangle him in any domestic issue. He hoped that others would exhibit the same consideration.⁴

Representatives of labor likewise obtained interviews. The Brotherhood of the Union, a workingmen's society, and the Workingmen's Industrial Congress, a radical combination, offered resolutions of sympathy. The Novelty Iron Works, Taussig's Military Leather company, the watch case manufacturers, the cash boys from Stewart's store, each presented letters of approval together with material aid. The officers and men of the ship *Mississippi*, and a group of Mexican war volunteers received a hearty welcome. Several societies admitted "the lion of the hour" into full membership. Quickly his name was inscribed on the rolls of the American Bible Society, the New York Typographical Union, and the Mercantile Library. The Philoclean Society of Rutgers College extended him an honorary membership, while the Mechanics Mutual Benefit Society eagerly offered a life insurance policy. An enterprising artist brought a picture of R. J. Walker, which led Kossuth to remark that if everyone in the United States entertained the same principles as that gentleman the world would soon be free. Not to be outdone, a composer produced a piece of music which he called the "Kossuth Welcome Quick-Step."⁴

Unfortunates of many lands made themselves known to Kossuth. The Italian Foresti, a friend of Mazzini, was followed by Kahgegagabowh, an Indian refugee. Hungarians, Cuban exiles, Austrians, Jews, all alike paid homage to the champion

of political and religious liberty. Altogether, groups to the number of forty, in ten days, caused Kossuth to listen and respond to their divagations. Well might the claim be advanced that New York exhibited more interest in this European character than in any other save possibly Lafayette.⁴

While these deputations continued to crowd on him by day, the evenings were devoted to addresses wherein the Magyar defined his mission. In a series of formal speeches he outlined his policy and his aims. On December 6, 1851, Castle Garden resounded with the first prepared pronouncement. England, said he, whose fraternal greeting he brought, desired an alliance with the United States to secure to every nation the sovereign right to dispose of itself. After stating that he would not have left troubled Europe, save only to give warm thanks to Congress for his liberation from Turkey, he declared that generous act a manifestation of America's resolution to throw its weight into the balance where the fate of Europe would be determined. He desired not the support of a party or a faction, for he proposed to abstain from domestic affairs, but of a united people. "Within the limit of your laws," he continued, "I will use every honest exertion to gain your operative sympathy and your financial, material, and political aid for my country's freedom and independence." As France had aided the colonists three-quarters of a century earlier, so he wanted the United States to succor Hungary.⁴

Typical newspapers reacted sharply to the implications of the speech. Though the editor of the *Herald* foresaw some modification of the foreign policy, he denounced the Kossuth program as utterly chimerical and impossible. Even the *Tribune*, a staunch admirer of the champion, dissented from the speech, and affirmed that America still believed in the old policies of neutrality and of no entangling alliances.⁴

Since a further elaboration of policy seemed advisable, Kossuth supplied the need in a splendid attempt before a distinguished assemblage which included Bancroft and Irving, the historians, Governor Cleveland of Connecticut, and Congressman Rantoul of Massachusetts. Letters from many public men conveyed their regret at being unavoidably absent. Web-

ster's note contained the statement that the distinguished guest knew the government's sympathy for him as was shown by sending a national vessel to bring him from Turkey. Clay wrote: "It would afford me great satisfaction to be able to unite in any demonstration . . . to that . . . gentleman." In his speech, after a hurried recital of the reasons why the United States should abandon the foreign policy of Washington, Kossuth enumerated the definite things he wanted America to do. First, he wanted America to agree that the Russian intervention into Hungarian affairs constituted a violation of international law, which if repeated would not be regarded indifferently; second, Great Britain should be asked to unite in this policy. Further, he advocated that meetings be held to declare American approval of Hungarian independence. Lastly, he desired that financial aid either as a gift or as a loan might be forthcoming. The tremendous applause indicated the impression made by the speaker on his audience, and when Webb, editor of the *Courier and Enquirer*, and a man favorably disposed toward Austria, attempted to speak in opposition, cries and coughs prevented him.⁴

These speeches contain the substance of the more than five hundred other addresses that Kossuth delivered while in the United States. Thoroughly conversant with the hostility to him and his mission at the national capital, he hoped to arouse a public opinion strong enough to cause his opponents to alter their convictions. But he failed, for the speeches alienated many who had hitherto been his potent supporters. For example, the Washington *Union*, which interpreted the vociferous applause as northern approval of Kossuth's program, realized the political significance of the reception. Certainly the country would unite in cordial approval of the Hungarian cause and of unhesitating condemnation of the policy which crushed it, but beyond that point the United States would not budge.⁵

Expressions of opinion at a banquet tendered the Hungarian by the New York Press Association again evince the great enthusiasm for his cause. The company included such powers in the

⁵ *Wash. Union*, 14 Dec. 1851.

journalistic world as Charles A. Dana, Horace Greeley, Henry J. Raymond, and Parke Godwin, also Henry Ward Beecher, a Rev. Mr. Brace, recently released from an Austrian dungeon, and President King of Columbia; William Cullen Bryant presided.* When the latter read a short curt note from Webster declining to be present, a storm of hisses and groans arose in all parts of the hall—a movement not overlooked at Washington. In his oration, Kossuth praised the titanic influence and size of the independent American press. He anticipated its generous aid in securing the formation of societies to collect funds to be loaned to Hungary. At another banquet, given by the New York Bar, Kossuth addressed the assembly in a like fashion. Afterwards, a respected Judge Duer pleaded that the Hungarian's proposals should not hastily be adopted by the government. Mature deliberation should precede action. Soon after the speech ended, the disorder became so great that the chief guest, vexed, retired.⁶

After these speeches, America understood precisely what Kossuth wanted. The responses must have confirmed in his mind the facts that although he made a great popular appeal, an appreciable element of the conservative class opposed his hopes. His plea for material aid, however, met with a rather generous response. Genin, a hatter, (as an advertisement, claimed a competitor) contributed a thousand dollars and expected ninety-nine other men to do likewise. A Mr. O'Reilly offered either a thousand dollars or two hundred acres of land. Groups of workingmen sent in respectable sums. From Boston came 300 muskets, to which a man from Buffalo added ten. Even members of the Peace Society made contributions. Some real sacrifices were made for the cause of European liberty. The cash boys in Stewart's store offered five dollars. One individual enclosed four dollars, half of his week's wages; another sent three dollars, a fifth part of his month's pay. On one day

⁶ *N. Y. Tribune*, 16 Dec. 1851; *N. Y. Herald*, 17 Dec. 1851; *Wash. Intelligencer*, 18 Dec. 1851.

Hudson, F., *Journalism in America*.

* After considering the men in attendance, the *Herald* termed it an abolition affair and alleged that that faction completely controlled the refugee. *N. Y. Herald*, 17 Dec. 1851.

the receipts amounted to \$2,497.07. From a speech delivered in Beecher's Plymouth Church, a sum variously estimated at from \$5,000 to \$12,000 was added to the fund. Horace Greeley who furnished \$1,000 and induced the Whigs to give a similar amount, became a most ardent advocate of a Hungarian loan. He urged that \$1,000,000 be raised to accompany Kossuth on his return to Europe. Accordingly a committee with George Bancroft as temporary chairman was organized to push the loan. When Hungarian bonds appeared, Greeley proposed that every man purchase at least a day's work worth and that some should buy a week's work worth. Material aid, wrote a correspondent, has been contributed in unexpected abundance; the subscription totalled \$11,523.92. A hostile writer claimed that Kossuth sent the money daily to the bank and exchanged it for gold for which he had "a peculiar fondness."⁷

After the Senate vote of invitation, Kossuth arranged to go to the national capital. His departure from New York evoked a series of expressions from the newspapers. "He leaves us," read the *Tribune*, "inspired by a very general conviction that this country both could and should do something decisive in behalf of European liberty. He has taught thousands to prize the rich blessings of civil and religious liberty. We are better citizens and better Americans for having seen Louis Kossuth." Another journal was pleased that he departed for the South, away from the malign influences that surrounded him in the metropolis. In its New Year poem, the *Herald* in rapturous verse reviewed the visit of the celebrated Magyar.

"When Kossuth came that splendid day
 Ah! who shall e'er forget
 When first upon our city's soil
 His wandering feet were set
 The scene transcending e'en the scene
 To welcome Lafayette.

* * * * *

⁷ *N. Y. Tribune*, 15, 18, 23 Dec. 1851, 4 Feb. 1852; *Wash. Union*, 24 Dec. 1851; *Boston Atlas*, 31 Dec. 1851.

'Tis gone with all those thrilling scenes
 By night, and day by day
 Of honors to the Magyar Chief
 Thru his eventful stay.
 They're gone! Their moral, their effect
 Will never pass away."⁸

Philadelphia received "the greatest living apostle of human liberty" and his party with a tumult which vied in quality and quantity with that in New York. In the former city, the largest throng on record crowded about Independence Hall that it might touch the hem of the garment of the great guest. The German citizens aroused interest and enthusiasm with a monster torchlight parade. At a reception banquet, George M. Dallas, Polk's Vice-President, and United States Senators Cooper and Cameron, occupied seats on the platform. In a letter to the committee, Buchanan agreed that America had greater sympathy for Hungary than for any other nation save possibly Russia. In the great struggle soon to occur he hoped that Hungary "under the guidance of her patriotic, enlightened Governor" might emerge "a free, an independent and a powerful republic." A series of resolutions known as the Harrisburg Resolutions, which endorsed the Kossuth program as enunciated in his New York speeches, was approved amidst wild acclamation. Dissident voices secured little attention. Morton McMichael, a Whig stalwart, tried to warn against intervention on the part of the government in the affairs of Hungary, and Major-General Patterson's derogatory remarks were drowned in turbulent clamor. On another occasion, Rev. John Chambers, leader of the evangelical clergy, invoked divine blessing on the Hungarian's cause. Material aid appeared in appreciable quantities. Houses of entertainment tendered the receipts from benefit performances. The soft felt hat introduced by the Hungarian "Beau Brummel" soon became the accepted style and won a popularity never lost.⁹

⁸ *N. Y. Tribune*, 22 Dec. 1851; *Wash. Union*, 24, 27 Dec. 1851; *N. Y. Herald*, 1 Jan. 1852.

⁹ *Phila. Ledger*, 26-29 Dec. 1851, 2 Jan. 1852; *N. Y. Tribune*, 25 Dec. 1851; *Wash. Union*, 14 Jan. 1852; *Phila. Sun. Dispatch*, 28 Dec. 1851.

Baltimore repeated the cordiality of New York and Philadelphia. Through the sheer eloquence of the orator thousands more were drawn into accord with Kossuth's views. Numerous endorsements were given the Harrisburg Resolutions. Once more crowds battled the inclement December weather in order to glimpse the hero. A Hebrew lodge presented a banner containing likenesses of Moses, Washington, and Kossuth. An enterprising druggist heralded a new mixture guaranteed to conquer "Kossuth Grippe" which hundreds developed from exposure. To this day, Baltimoreans speak in glowing terms of a dainty pastry concoction, Kossuth cake, whose origin coincides with the memorable visit. Kossuth cigars still choke uninformed speculators.¹⁰

By the time Kossuth reached the capital city, the probability of American desertion of the foreign policy enjoined by Washington had begun to grow faint. Public men, statesmen and politicians alike, feared the difficulties the visit might create with Austria. Yet the latter group sedulously utilized Kossuth, in so far as it could, for personal or partisan ends. Extensive preparations had been made to receive the guest and his approach caused a great stir. The House, Administration, diplomatic and social circles, stand aghast with fear and trembling, wrote the Washington correspondent of the *Tribune*. Nurses frightened their children to sleep with the Hungarian name. Cognizant of the potential strength in the movement and wishing to do nothing impolitic, Webster, Secretary of State, faced the visit with consternation. He knew that his chances for the forthcoming presidential nomination and ultimate election might hinge on his manoeuvres during Kossuth's stay in Washington. Quite embarrassed, he confessed himself at a loss to know just what to do or say. He would conduct himself with caution so as to keep clear of Scylla and Charybdis. He would draw a sharp line of demarcation between his official course of action and his procedure as a private citizen. Officially, he proposed to follow the established policy, and in new exigencies to be guided by the

¹⁰ *Baltimore Patriot*, 29 Dec. 1851; *Wash. Union*, 31 Dec. 1851; *N. Y. Tribune*, 29-30 Dec. 1851; *Phila. Ledger*, 29 Dec. 1851.

English example. A haunting fear ran through his mind that Democratic politicians might use this opportunity to bring the country to the doctrine and practice of intervention. Influenced by this dread, he wrote the Minister in England, "I am sure you see, and I wish others might see the expediency and importance of settling everything connected with England without delay."¹¹

The Kossuth party reached Washington December 30, 1851, and immediately Seward and Shields, of the Senatorial reception committee, took it in charge. Soon after the arrival, Webster called and indicated that the President desired to meet the distinguished guest on the morrow.* Close on the heels of the Secretary of State came a delegation from the famous Jackson Democratic Association to evince an interest in the European refugees. Next day, Fillmore received Kossuth at the White House.¹²

The presidential reception revealed to the Magyar the attitude of the government toward his pleas. Kossuth, Seward, Shields, and three Cabinet officers composed the party. Though Webster preferred to have the Senate committee present the guest, the dignity fell upon him. Straightway Kossuth read a short address which conveyed his gratitude for the hearty welcome accorded him by the nation. Then he continued,

"I stand before your Excellency a living protestation against the violence of foreign interference oppressing the sovereign right of nations to regulate their own domestic concerns. . . . May I be allowed to take it for an augury of better times that in landing on the happy shores of this glorious republic, I landed in a free and powerful country whose honored magistrate proclaims to the world that this country cannot remain indifferent when the

¹¹ *N. Y. Tribune*, 31 Dec. 1851, 5 Jan. 1852; *N. Y. Herald*, 4 Dec. 1851.

Webster to Paige, 25 Dec. 1851, Webster, F., *Private Corres.*, II, 499.

Webster to Haven, 23 Dec. 1851, *Ibid.*, II, 497.

Webster to Lawrence, 29 Dec. 1851, *Webster Works*, National Ed., IV, 633.

* After his visit, Webster wrote to a friend, "a gentleman . . . handsome . . . intellectual . . . dignified, amiable and graceful in his manners," but added, "I shall treat him with all personal and individual respect but if he should speak to me of the policy of intervention I shall have ears more deaf than adders." Webster to Blatchford, 30 Dec. 1851, Webster, F., *Priv. Corres.*, II, 501.

¹² *Wash. Union*, 31 Dec. 1851.

strong arm of a foreign power is invoked to stifle public sentiment and repress the spirit of freedom in any country?"¹³

The character of the address took the President unawares. It had been agreed beforehand that Kossuth should make no allusion to the subject of intervention. On the spur of the moment, then, Fillmore happily replied. In part he said,

"As an individual I sympathized deeply with you in the struggle for the independence and freedom of your native land. The American *people* can never be indifferent to such a contest; but our policy as a nation in this respect has been uniform from the commencement of our Government; and my views as the Chief Magistrate of this nation are fully and freely expressed in my recent message to Congress. They are the same whether speaking to Congress here or to the nations of Europe. Should your country be restored to independence and freedom I should then wish you . . . a restoration to your native land, but should that never happen, I can only repeat my welcome to you and your companions here and pray that God's blessing may rest upon you wherever you may cast your lot."

The interview lasted only twenty minutes but that time was ample to convince Kossuth that American official interest in European liberty differed widely from that suggested by the popular demonstrations. The Magyar's face registered extreme disappointment as he left the reception room. Well pleased with the presidential response, Webster wrote,

"Sympathy, personal respect and kindness, but no departure from our established policy."¹⁴

The newspapers reacted to this speech in their usual manner. Journals which formerly had supported the European refugee critically attacked the presidential reply. The *Union* said, "the President has fallen short of the wishes entertained by the

¹³ *N. Y. Tribune*, 5 Jan. 1852.

¹⁴ Fillmore's Speech, 10 *Buff. Hist. Soc. Proceedings*, 426.

Butler, *Reminiscences of Daniel Webster*, in Moore, *Digest International Law*, VI, 53.

Webster to Blatchford, 31 Dec. 1851, Webster, F., *Private Corres.*, II, 501. *N. Y. Herald*, 1 Jan. 1852.

people of the country" as to what was due to the representative of the principle involved in the Hungarian struggle. He should have assured the guest of our disapprobation as a government of the principle on which Russia acted. Another commented on the executive reception as not "what the dignity, the honor and the position of the country demanded." Through material aid, the people had concretely exhibited their sympathy, but the frigid executive welcome was unmanly. The whole affair revealed a vacillating policy toward European monarchies. Papers that had consistently opposed Kossuth's audacious proposals approved Fillmore's action. The *Herald* suggested that despite the personal sympathy of the President with the cause, as an official, he needed to be guided strictly by the proceedings of Congress. In spite of the great excitement, the wisdom of Washington had prevailed upon the President and had led him to remain loyal to the well-established policy. Realizing that Kossuth's anticipations had been severely dampened by Fillmore's reply, the *North American* declared that Kossuth had received just the reply his speech warranted.¹⁵

Chagrined over the turn of events, Kossuth remained sulky if not unmannerly throughout the rest of his stay in Washington. On New Year's Day, he called on Secretary and Mrs. Webster and when the latter attempted to open conversation with him by remarking on the brightness of the day, he replied that the weather had no interest for him, that "his mind was absorbed in painful thoughts about his country." Two days later, the President gave a dinner in honor of Kossuth with General Scott, Commodore Morris, Amperé, the noted French savant, and several Cabinet officers in attendance. During the gathering one could not fail to notice the stately constraint of the honored one. Fillmore remarked that the rebuff at his presentation explained "the moody Hamlet" attitude.¹⁶

Having come to Washington at the behest of the Senate, to

¹⁵ *Wash. Union*, 1 Jan. 1852; *N. Y. Herald*, 1 Jan. 1852; *N. Y. Tribune*, 8 Jan. 1852; *Phila. No. Am.*, 5 Jan. 1852; *St. Louis Rep.*, 10 Jan. 1852.

¹⁶ Butler, *Reminiscences of Daniel Webster*, in Moore, *Digest International Law*, VI, 52-53.

Phila. No. Am., 5, 6 Jan. 1852.

which was added an invitation to visit the House, Kossuth next called on these bodies. Attired in military costume, accompanied by a share of his retinue, and escorted by Senators Shields, Seward, and Cass, the Magyar was introduced to the Senate in the selfsame words used on presenting Lafayette. The crowded galleries offered no applause. Temporary adjournment gave every Senator the opportunity to greet the Hungarian chief. The whole proceeding reflected favorably upon the dignity and character of the Senate. Much the same ceremony prevailed in the House, save that Kossuth said: "The legislative authorities of this great republic bestow the highest honors upon a persecuted exile not conspicuous for glory . . . but engaged in a just cause. There is a triumph of republican principles in this fact." At best, the receptions appeared formal, matter-of-fact and cold, yet the *Tribune* believed the whole affair signified a step forward as a nation, for in itself, the reception by both branches of Congress constituted a protest on the part of the country against Austrian oppression and Russian interference.¹⁷

In a letter to King, President of the Senate, expressing his appreciation for the welcome, Kossuth made clear that he never desired the United States "to put in jeopardy its own welfare and prosperity for the sake of Hungary," but he hoped some pronouncement on the international law at stake in the case would be made by the Senate. When the Committee on Printing reported in favor of printing this letter an animated debate ensued. Once more the Senate expressed its varying attitude toward the Kossuth pleas. Ultimately by a vote of only 21-20 the Senate granted the committee's request.¹⁸

A group of men from each House arranged a public dinner for the Hungarian champion. The active managers included Representatives Clingman, North Carolina Whig, and Mann, Massachusetts Free Soiler, and Senator Gwin, California Demo-

¹⁷ *Wash. Union*, 6 Jan. 1852; *N. Y. Tribune*, 14 Jan. 1852.

32 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 199, 225.

¹⁸ *N. Y. Tribune*, 20 Feb. 1852; *New Orleans Picayune*, 27 Feb. 1852.

32 Cong., 1 Sess., *Sen. miscell. doc.*, 39.

32 Cong., 1 Sess., *Sen. Jol.*, 213.

crat. Kossuth accepted the invitation for January 7, and promised the committee that he would not then discuss the subject of intervention. Three hundred guests gathered to meet and hear the great orator. It was by far the most illustrious assemblage that greeted him during his visit. Cabinet members, Senators, and Representatives, together with a sprinkling of the judiciary put in their appearance. Senator King presided with Kossuth and Webster at either side. Responding to a toast to the President, Webster assured the company that the President was firmly attached "to the great principles of political and religious liberty and national independence" which the guest represented. Kossuth, in turn, delivered a "well wrought chapter of political philosophy" in which he referred to the aid the United States had received from France. Abiding by his agreement, no mention was made of intervention. Touches of pathos added to the effectiveness of the speech which was generally acknowledged as among the most successful efforts he made in America. During the speech Seward shocked his neighbor by his excessive applause with hands and feet, while Webster remained as motionless as a Sphinx. Presently Webster had an opportunity to give free rein to his convictions.¹⁹

The Secretary of State had hesitated about attending the banquet and indeed came only to prevent the statement being made that no member of the administration would pay Kossuth the respect of attendance. Such a declaration would provoke popular attack especially in the interior. In a dignified but elaborate speech Webster declared the welcome would most certainly have an influence across the water. Real human liberty and human rights were everywhere gaining the ascendancy. The Hülsemann letter written in the free air of New Hampshire reflected his convictions on these principles. With a flourish he concluded, "Hungarian Independence, Hungarian control of her own destinies—Hungary a distinct nationality among the nations of Europe." This speech, though it fell heavily

¹⁹ *Phila. No. Am.*, 1, 2, 5, 10 Jan. 1852; *N. Y. Tribune*, 8 Jan. 1852.

Butler, *Reminiscences of Daniel Webster*, in Moore, *Digest International Law*, VI, 54.

Corwin to Crittenden, 8 Jan. 1852. Crittenden Mss.

on the ears of the audience, contained opinions very different from those he had expressed earlier in the evening in reply to the President's toast.* Certainly the effect of the message across the Atlantic would arise from who said it rather than what was said.** Now the *Tribune* exonerated Webster from any share in the shabby treatment meted out to the guest by the executive branch of the government. Other papers considered the speech a fair bid for the German vote. Many Hungarian enthusiasts, however, complained that Webster had not gone far enough; a grievance to which he replied, by stating that he wanted to observe consistency with other speeches, and though conservative, he wanted to guard against the charge, by his political opponents, of coolness in the cause of liberty. Last, but not least, he wished to preserve peace with other governments.²⁰

After Webster, other presidential aspirants at the banquet sought to record their opinions on European liberty and the true American policy in relation to it. Unprepared for a speech, Douglas wanted the United States to remain aloof in case of a new Hungarian struggle for freedom until Russia intervened; then the country should decide its mode of action. This attitude pleased the South, and after a peculiarly happy allusion to the unhappy Irish, he felt he had satisfied two elements of the nation. Cass, who had lost the Presidential election in 1848, went a step in advance of Douglas and favored intervention "to sustain the great national law which prescribed that one power should not interfere with the domestic concerns of another." He said nothing, however, about practical intervention. By the time Cass finished, the wine had flowed quite freely and the reception of his speech reminded one guest of

* One contemporary explains the change thus: In the first speech Webster carefully guarded his remarks "but later in the evening when the champagne had flowed freely, he indulged in what appeared to be his impromptu individual opinions, but he unluckily dropped at his seat a slip of paper, on which his gushing statements had been carefully written out." Poore, B. P., *Perley's Reminiscences*, 404.

** A study of the Austrian reaction to Webster's speech has been made by Curti, *op. cit.*, 184.

²⁰ Webster to Fillmore, 7 Jan. 1852, Webster, F., *Priv. Corres.*, II, 503. *N. Y. Tribune*, 12, 14 Jan. 1852; *N. Y. Herald*, 10 Jan. 1852; *New Orleans Picayune*, 18 Jan. 1852.

Bird to Clayton, 12 Jan. 1852. Clayton Mss.

"nothing but a revival at a Methodist camp meeting in full blaze." The fervor continued unabated while Seward announced himself in accord with Cass. General Houston left the room so as to avoid being called on to speak.* The Congressional banquet had thus resolved itself into an occasion for political stump speeches. Prestige and votes loomed larger in the eyes of these politicians than any abstract doctrine of human liberty for Europe.²¹

The reception accorded the distinguished Magyar had a distinct reaction in the chancelleries of Europe. McCurdy awaited notice from the Austrian authorities that diplomatic relations had been severed. Nevertheless, the customary diplomatic civilities were accorded him. Austria laid the blame for the misunderstanding with the United States at the door of Webster. In Berlin, Barnard recognized that a distinct change had occurred in the relationships between the Austrian Minister there and himself. This attitude was assumed because of the deep resentment Austria felt over the character of the reception accorded her subject revolutionists. When news of Fillmore's reaffirmation of Washington's policy reached Prussia, Barnard observed that a better feeling towards the United States unmistakably prevailed. From St. Petersburg too, the Minister wrote of the coldness of the Russian cabinet. The speeches of Kossuth against the Czar had struck home. At any moment, the Minister expected an official complaint over the Kossuth affair. He noticed an animus on the part of the Austrian representative at the court of the Romanoffs.²²

Another angle of the story which indicates the interest of

* General W. S. Scott, a candidate for the Whig nomination for the Presidency, had gone to Richmond to escape the gathering. Poore, B. P., *Perley's Reminiscences*, 404.

²¹ *N. Y. Herald*, 10 Jan. 1852; *Phila. No. Am.*, 10 Jan. 1852; *N. Y. Tribune*, 9, 12 Jan. 1852; *New Orleans Picayune*, 18 Jan. 1852.

²² McCurdy to Webster, 12 Jan. 1852, 2, 27 Mch. 1852, 24 Jl. 1852, 3 Oct. 1852, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Austria, III.

Barnard to Webster, 10 Feb. 1852, 1 Mch. 1852, *Ibid.*, Repts., Prussia, VII. Brown, N. S. to Webster, 28 Jan. 1852, 29 Feb. 1852, *Ibid.*, Repts., Russia, XV.

America in the revolutionists is to be seen in the activities of the government with respect of Kossuth's family in Europe. McCurdy informed Webster that two of Kossuth's sisters had been imprisoned while other relatives suffered for lack of money. He wanted funds sent him that he might aid the unfortunates. Webster showed the letter to Kossuth. The latter requested the Secretary to instruct McCurdy to protect these relatives. Webster agreed to the request with the understanding that the Chargé should have due regard for his official position in any action he might undertake. Kossuth handed Webster a bill on London for \$500 to be used to aid his sisters. Fearing that the letter containing the money might be opened in Austria, Webster transmitted it to Barnard, the Minister at Berlin, who despatched his secretary, Fay, with the letter and the bill to McCurdy. When confirming receipt of the message, McCurdy informed Webster that the sisters remained imprisoned and that nothing could be done to alleviate their condition. With no attempt at concealment from the Austrian government, he proposed to hand the money in small sums directly to Kossuth's mother. After some difficulty and delay, he succeeded in making the necessary arrangements, whereby sixty florins a week were turned over to her. To prevent any erroneous interpretation of his activity, a copy of every note sent her was dispatched to the Austrian government. McCurdy later became the intermediary for the transmission of letters from the sisters to Kossuth. Upon their release from prison they intended to quit Austria and seek the hospitable shores of America.²³

During the remainder of his stay in Washington, Kossuth spent his time in attendance on social functions and in receiving delegations from various parts of the Union. After a tremendous intramural struggle, the Jackson Democratic Association decided to invite him to speak at their big annual celebration. The banquet surpassed in brilliance and decorum the Congres-

²³ McCurdy to Webster, 13 Dec. 1851, 30 Jan. 1852, 2, 27 Mch. 1852, 10 Ap. 1852, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Austria, III.

Webster to McCurdy, 5 Jan. 1852, *Ibid.*, Inst., Austria, I.

Webster to Barnard, 6 Jan. 1852, *Ibid.*, Inst., Prussia, XIV.

sional affair. In his letter of regret to the committee, John Tyler prophesied that the time approached when all oppressed nations would bring their pleas to the American Senate and receive justice even as they had done in ancient Rome. Kossuth sounded the keynote for the other speeches when he pleaded that the Association unite with him in favor of intervention. Speakers, one after another, affirmed their allegiance to the cause. With more vigor than previously, Cass maintained that the despotic powers of Europe had in their destruction of Hungary offended against all recognized laws of nations. "I am willing," said he, "as a member of Congress to pass a declaration tomorrow in the name of the American people" maintaining that every independent nation under heaven has a right to establish just such a government as it pleases. Douglas advocated a more progressive foreign program. "I think it is time America had a foreign policy—a policy predicated upon a true interpretation of the law of nations . . . in accordance with the spirit of the age." In a kindred vein, A. J. Donelson, then editor of the *Washington Union*, trusted that Kossuth might return to Europe bearing glad tidings "as the inspired John when he announced the advent of our Saviour." Opposition papers interpreted the meeting as a further indication of the Democracy's attempt to capture the Kossuth enthusiasm for purposes of the approaching election. On the other hand, important Democratic journals repeated their antagonism to anything savoring of intervention.²⁴

Senators and Congressmen galore called on the distinguished exile. One congressional delegation urged on Kossuth the necessity of ridding himself of Seward and his clique if he expected a welcome in the South. Senator Truman Smith, an administration leader, during his call declared, that the Hungarian was "de jure" if not "de facto" the Governor of Hungary. With Senator Cooper, a Pennsylvania Whig, came a set of resolutions favorable to Kossuth which, when presented, led the recipient

²⁴ Blair, F. P. to Van Buren, 1, 9 Jan. 1852. Van Buren Mss. *Proceedings at the Banquet of the Jackson Democratic Association*, 1852. *N. Y. Tribune*, 9 Jan. 1852; *Richmond Whig*, 8 Jan. 1852; *Richmond Enquirer*, 13 Jan. 1852.

to deliver a panegyric on this State which had become "a splendid star in the dark night" of his course. The Magyar assured an Ohio delegation that he would tour the West before his return to Europe.²⁵

Other public men and individuals of prominence expressed their opinions on the mission and its purport. Clayton, ex-Secretary of State, went "with Kossuth fully." But he represented a minority. Houston savagely denounced the program of aid the Magyar wanted. Senator J. M. Mason regarded the Hungarian as a common impostor. "Kossuth errs," wrote Sumner, "all err who ask any intervention by the government . . . the government cannot act . . . Enthusiast for freedom I am for every thing practical but this is not so." "Cover the Magyar with flowers . . . Serenade him with eloquence and let him go home alone if he will not live here," thought Rufus Choate.²⁶

Undoubtedly of greater importance than that of any other man was the utterance of the feeble yet influential Clay. After several unsuccessful attempts, Kossuth accompanied by Cass secured an interview with the veteran Kentucky legislator. Earlier, Clay had praised Fillmore's reply at the time of the famous reception, and now he re-expressed in unequivocal terms his attitude on the subject of intervention. War, he explained, would probably result from our giving aid to Hungary, and in case of war America could do nothing on land and little on water. Having abandoned non-interference Europe would be justified in turning on the United States and terrible consequences might ensue. Affected by the recent coup d'etat of Louis Napoleon in France, Clay despaired of liberty and independence for Europe. Therefore America's policy should be to keep "our lamp brightly burning on this western shore as a light to all nations" rather than "to hazard its utter extinction amid

²⁵ *N. Y. Tribune*, 3, 5 Jan. 1852; *N. Y. Herald*, 3 Jan. 1852; *Wash. Union*, 10 Jan. 1852.

²⁶ Clayton to Bird, 20 Dec. 1851. Bird Mss.

Crane, S. P., *Life of Samuel Houston*, 210.

Mason, V., *Life of J. M. Mason*, 94.

Bigelow, J., *Retrospections*, I, 123.

Choate to Sumner, 29 Dec. 1851, *Sumner's Works*, III, 3.

Wash. Union, 23 Dec. 1851

the ruins of fallen and falling republics of Europe." Somewhat stunned, Kossuth turned the conversation into general channels and soon after, with great emotion, the celebrated leaders separated. It is difficult to overestimate the influence of this, the last public counsel issuing from Clay's lips.* Later, during a speech at Louisville, Kossuth made an unhappy reference to the position of Clay with respect of intervention which produced a very unfavorable reaction to the Hungarian cause.²⁷

It remains but to note the dispute over payment of the debt created by Kossuth's stay in Washington. Seward advocated that a sum not to exceed \$5,000 be appropriated from the Senate contingent fund. An inspired debate ensued in which some members called for an itemized account of the expenses and others objected to paying for the retainers that accompanied the Hungarian. Fearing that Seward would gain prestige by the passage of the measure, Cass proposed a joint resolution to meet the situation. Eventually the Seward bill passed (31-6) with Cass in the negative. His action marks him as a straddler if not a convert to the opposition camp, said one journal.²⁸

* "One blast upon that bugle horn were worth a thousand men. Let Mr. Clay get to the Senate and intervention will be a dead horse. He will wither it with the fiery breath of his nostrils. He will by the force of his logic and eloquence cut it up by the roots in a thousand localities where it is now free and flourishing." *N. Y. Tribune*, 4 Feb. 1852.

²⁷ Colton, C. C., *Life of Henry Clay*, III, 221.

Blair, F. P. to Van Buren, 11 Jan. 1852. Van Buren Mss.

Phila. No. Am., 5 Jan. 1852; *St. Louis Republican*, 14 Jan. 1852, 4 Feb. 1852; *Wash. Intelligencer*, 20 Mch. 1852; 15 *Am. Rev.*, 375.

²⁸ 32 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, 717-9, 1692. *N. Y. Tribune*, 12 Mch. 1852.

VIII

THE GRAND TOUR

From Washington the Hungarians carried out their projected program and visited the various sections of the country. The opinion of the people, if it may be generalized, appears like this: the West with its large population of recent immigrants favored wholeheartedly the ambitions of the revolutionary exiles; the South, the real conservative element in the nation, heeded not the voice of the tempter, and refused to be swayed by the flamboyant receptions in the Northern metropolis and in the West; New England, shot through and through with antislavery convictions, recognized the striking analogy between the situation of the Hungarians and that of the bondmen in their own country, hence the exiles received here an acclaim which must have pleased them and which at the same time served to stress the unmistakable differences between the North and the South.

First the party crossed into Maryland. Appended to an invitation of welcome by the legislature was a most emphatic disavowal of the doctrine of intervention. After a hurried visit to the Naval Academy, Kossuth met the two branches of the legislature, and espying a picture of Lafayette, declared European revolutionists expected from America some private assistance and an assurance of fair play. The next day, in accordance with the invitation of the Pennsylvania legislature, he left for Harrisburg and immediately upon his arrival visited that body. A tremendous throng surged through the Chamber and created a full-blown riot with which the military had to deal. Consequently no one succeeded in hearing the message of the Governor or the response of the guest. At a banquet engineered by Governor Johnson and ex-Senator Simon Cameron, the speakers pronounced themselves as favoring intervention. It was "intervention and fight" if necessary. The treasure chest showed a

satisfactory gain. Thus the triumphal march of the Magyar to the Mississippi had begun.¹

Despite a blizzard, the party pushed on to Pittsburg, receiving ovations all along the route. The Hungarian leader now pressed more vigorously for the "the sinews of war" and announced his disapproval of the sheer waste of money in parades and banquets. Of \$180,000 already collected only \$30,000 had found its way permanently into the Hungarian coffers.* At his suggestion associations were formed in which each member pledged himself to contribute twenty-five cents monthly through a period of four months. He authorized agents to sell Hungarian bonds at a commission of 8 per cent with an additional 4 per cent if the agent sold in the rural districts. In Pittsburg the visitor received a princely welcome and money came in by the thousands. From here he moved on to Cleveland where he delivered his 156th formal speech. The people were assured that any loan they might make would be secured by the rich salt mines of Hungary. A cordial invitation from the Ohio legislature led Kossuth to turn his steps toward Columbus. The members of the Assembly looked upon him as "the personification of the great principles of 1776." Nor did their conduct belie their convictions, for each legislator presented five dollars to the fund. One member proposed that all the arms in the state be loaned to Hungary to be returned after her independence had been attained. The Governor, Wood, who favored intervention, was elected President of the Hungarian Association in Columbus. The crowds that greeted the refugees in Cincinnati exceeded in numbers those in any other Western city. The excitement coincident with the visit had never before been equalled in this centre of German population. Though ill, Kossuth appeared and amidst the huzzas of thousands pleaded the cause of Hungary and her revolutionary fund. The auditors responded liberally to his appeal. Before his departure, Kossuth got into a serious misunderstanding with

¹ *N. Y. Tribune*, 13-16, 20 Jan. 1852; *N. Y. Herald*, 17 Jan. 1852; *Phila. Ledger*, 15-16 Jan. 1852.

Laws of General Assembly of Penna., 1852, 627, 636.

Penna. Archives, 4th Series, Papers of Govs., VII, 490.

* In spite of Kossuth's use of the word "permanently" on this occasion, he later reported that only \$1000 remained in his possession.

the committee which had promised him \$25,000 but turned over only \$7,000. Too much had been spent on festivities and parades, he claimed. Conservative journals could not be oblivious of the extravagances of these supposedly phlegmatic people in the West. If any considerable portion of the nation were permanently affected with this same contagious folly, thought the *Intelligencer*, the country might with reason be considered on the road to ruin.²

The progress continued. A side excursion to Louisville aroused the German populace and netted a small sum for the treasury, though the Board of Aldermen refused by unanimous vote to welcome Kossuth to the city. In a Louisville speech, he decried the wide dissemination of the views of Clay which were antagonistic to intervention. The implications of Kossuth's statements aroused many enemies. In St. Louis, another centre for the German immigrant, Kossuth ran amuck of a group of Jesuits whom he denounced as Austrians. The *St. Louis Republican*, a Fillmore sheet, bitterly assailed this attempt to stir up differences among the various sects. Senator Benton, who was favorably disposed toward Kossuth personally, hurled thunderbolts at intervention and its defenders, and refused to appear on the platform with Kossuth lest he antagonize the Catholics. Despite this hostility the Germans cordially welcomed the Hungarians and glowing accounts of money receipts filled the papers. Encouragement came from California where the legislature passed resolutions declaring its admiration for liberty's champion and his illustrious companions. Wisconsin named a town after the hero, Iowa, a county.³

En route to New Orleans the expedition halted at Memphis and Vicksburg. No public display or enthusiasm greeted the preacher of intervention. In the Mississippi capital Governor

² *Phila. Ledger*, 23-31 Jan. 1852, 1-16 Feb. 1852; *N. Y. Tribune*, 20-29 Jan. 1852, 2-20 Feb. 1852; *Phila. No. Am.*, 2-13 Feb. 1852; *Wash. Intelligencer*, 17 Feb. 1852, 17 Ap. 1852; *Cincinnati Commercial*, 27 Feb. 1852; *Cincinnati Gazette*, 28 Feb. 1852.

Acts of the General Assembly of Ohio, L, 23.

³ *N. Y. Tribune*, 22 Jan. 1852, 20 Mch. 1852; *Wash. Intelligencer*, 26, 30 Mch. 1852; *N. Y. Herald*, 30 Mch. 1852; *St. Louis Rep.*, 14-15 Mch. 1852, 28 Ap. 1852; *Louisville Courier*, 8 Mch. 1852; *Liberator*, 12 Mch. 1852; 15 *Am. Rev.*, 374.

Foote, so recently a friend of Kossuth in the Senate, extended a hospitable welcome. Before the House of Representatives, Kossuth delivered a long speech which called forth neither great applause nor material aid. The same cold reticence characterized the stay in New Orleans. Kossuth created no extraordinary excitement or commotion; "the pulse was not disturbed in the slightest," chronicled the *New Orleans Bulletin*. In one public speech, the famous orator expressed his surprise that the doctrines enunciated by him should meet with such stern opposition in the states'-right South. At the same time, he took pains to make clear that his remarks in Louisville concerning Clay had been maliciously misinterpreted. This explanation mitigated somewhat the opposition of Clay's disciples. Nevertheless, an inflexible passive antipathy persisted. New Orleans would not be moved by passionate appeals or calls of reason. The *New York Herald* regarded this city as representative of the general feeling throughout the South.⁴

During the remainder of his tour in the Southern states Kossuth found the people indifferent if not openly hostile to his person and his cause. A newswriter, who traveled extensively in the South, questioned whether any Southern man capable of reading and writing favored intervention in any form. Everyone ridiculed the tumultuous exuberance with which the exile had been received in the North. Widely divergent views reached New York as to the character of the welcome Kossuth had received in Mobile, but Mobile journals say little that would lead one to believe that it was enthusiastic and assert that the citizens in no degree accepted the views of the foreigner. In Atlanta, Augusta, Charleston, and Wilmington no huzzas or evidences of financial aid made pleasant the trip northward. Kossuth's visit served as a pretext for Southern journalists to issue panegyrics upon their section as "the conservative element in the Confederacy." Undoubtedly these conveyers and conservers of public opinion recorded the calm reflections of the Southern people who looked with disfavor on any

⁴ *Phila. Ledger*, 23-31 Mch. 1852, 1-3, 16 Ap. 1852; *Wash. Intelligencer*, 6, 12 Ap. 1852; *N. Y. Herald*, 31 Mch. 1852, 9 Ap. 1852; *N. O. Picayune*, 1-5 Ap. 1852; *Yazoo City Whig*, 26 Mch. 1852.

alteration of the traditional foreign policy. The "status quo" in many matters political suited the interests of the South.*⁵

The legislatures of several Southern states voiced their convictions in memorials to Congress. Before Kossuth's arrival, Tennessee held that no European of the nineteenth century was entitled to share more largely its admiration. In the Georgia assembly a member offered a resolution to welcome the oppressed exiles. When the implications of the Hungarian mission and message found lodgement in Southern minds, a different tone prevailed. Alabama warned against the danger of America being drawn into the vortex of European politics. The policy of the United States should be to cultivate amity with all nations, entangling alliances with none, and to practice literally the doctrine of non-intervention. A measure of like substance passed the Georgia assembly. "Why by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, interest or caprice?" Louisiana would receive Kossuth merely as an "advocate of freedom." The Mississippi Whig Convention resolved that the wise maxims of Washington respecting foreign policy ought ever to guide the Federal government. The Richmond City Council rescinded its resolution inviting the Hungarian to enjoy the hospitalities of that cordial city.⁶

By the time the Hungarian leader, disillusioned, returned to Washington, sycophantic adulation had been supplanted in the minds of politicians by a cautious reserve. The nominating conventions approached rapidly and in an unmistakable way the South had revealed its aversion to the Kossuth program. Seward alone repeated his previous cordiality and invited Kossuth with leading Whigs to a dinner. When the Magyar party boarded

*"the analyst . . . may trace the cause (of our opposition to intervention) to our peculiar institution." *Augusta (Ga.) Chronicle*, 22 Jan. 1852.

⁵ *N. Y. Herald*, 6, 10, 13 Ap. 1852; *N. Y. Tribune*, 3 Ap. 1852; *Mobile Register*, 5 Ap. 1852; *Mobile Tribune*, 6 Ap. 1852; *Augusta Chronicle*, 14 Mch. 1852, 10 Ap. 1852; *Savannah Republican*, 6 Ap. 1852; *Charleston Courier*, 12 Ap. 1852; *Wash. Intelligencer*, 26 Jan. 1852, 23, 28 Ap. 1852.

⁶ Acts of the State of Tenn., 29th Gen. Ass., 1 Sess., 731.

Acts of the Gen. Ass. of Georgia (1851-2), 560.

Acts of the Gen. Ass. of Alabama, (1851-2), 532.

Savannah Rep., 29 Nov. 1851; *Liberator*, 9 Ap. 1852; *Wash. Intelligencer*, 31 Jan. 1852, 29 Mch. 1852, 15 May 1852; *Phila. Ledger*, 29 Dec. 1851.

the train to leave Washington, only the Seward family and Mrs. Horace Mann and children appeared to bid it Godspeed. The Hungarians passed through Philadelphia on the way to Trenton "unwept, unhonored, and unsung".⁷

On April 20, northern New Jersey with its large German population reeled under excitement comparable to that earlier experienced in New York. Ex-Governors and an ex-Senator vied with one another in replying to the oratorical bouquets and appeals for aid which fell from the lips of Kossuth. From New Jersey the course wound through the Connecticut valley to Springfield. Kossuth's speeches indicate that he recognised a distinct difference of opinion from that prevalent in the South. New England's climate might be cold, but the hearts of her people were warm. In no state in the Union did the exile have a more hearty reception than in Massachusetts, the seat of the virile abolitionist movement. Boston, the mill towns, the villages with historic associations, all endeavored to outdo previous welcomes. As Governor Boutwell said, "the invitation to Kossuth would be regarded as an expression of the sympathy of Massachusetts for the cause of liberty in Europe." Faneuil Hall thrice reverberated with the applause of crowds of interested sympathizers. Longfellow entertained the guest at dinner. Emerson considered him "a fair offset to the Andes of conventionalism." Henry Wilson, President of the Senate, assured him that though the high hopes of 1848 were "quenched in the blood of subjugated people, all was not lost." Nor did the citizens overlook the efficacy of loaning their money to Hungary. The Boston *Transcript* reported that \$27,000 had been speedily raised and anticipated \$50,000 would be secured altogether.*⁸

After a thorough canvass of Massachusetts, the Kossuth

⁷ *N. Y. Herald*, 15, 27 Ap. 1852; *N. Y. Tribune*, 19 Ap. 1852; *Wash. Union*, 14 Ap. 1852.

Snow, W. W. to Marcy, 17 Ap. 1852. Marcy Mss.

Seward, F. W., *Reminiscences etc.*, 102.

* The *Liberator* later announced the total New England receipts as \$15,099. *Liberator*, 28 May 1852.

⁸ *N. Y. Herald*, 20-24, 27-30 Ap. 1852, 1-8 Je. 1852; *Phila. Ledger*, 23 Ap. 1852; *N. Y. Tribune*, 21, 27 Ap. 1852; *Liberator*, 30 Ap. 1852; *Boston Atlas*, 27 Ap. 1852, 18 May 1852.

Sumner to Wilson, H., 29 Ap. 1852, Pierce, *Life of Chas. Sumner*, II, 271.

Howe, S. G., *Journal*, 370-78.

Emerson, S. E. and Forbes, W. D., *Jols. of R. W. Emerson*, VIII, 277.

party re-entered New York at Albany. The scenes in New York almost equalled those in Massachusetts. Governor Hunt and ex-Governor Marcy felt honored to ride with Kosuth. Straight across the state to Buffalo, then back to New York City via Rome and Utica, Schenectady and Troy, journeyed the party. Everywhere enthusiasm, everywhere material aid, but, said an antagonist, when he got back to New York City, only one person welcomed him. What had become of the thousands who had cheered him half a year earlier?⁸

In striking contrast to measures adopted in the Southern legislatures are the acts of several of the Northern states. New Jersey deplored the Hungarian catastrophe and trusted Kosuth might yet be successful. The armed intervention of one nation to frustrate the attempt to alter the form of government is an infraction of international law, it said. Delaware believed that a law of nations assured every nation the right to manage internal affairs as it chose; therefore, it was convinced that the United States ought not to see the law of non-intervention violated again without deep concern. Pennsylvania gladly welcomed the unsuccessful leader into its legislative assembly. In Kossuth the Rhode Islanders recognized "the undaunted champion . . . of national freedom . . . political equality . . . and . . . civil and religious liberty," and as such they invited him to receive the hospitality of the state. The inaugural address of Governor Boutwell in Massachusetts rang with pleas that the United States assert a right to interfere everywhere in favor of republican or constitutional governments. Approving the position thus taken, the legislature declared it the duty of constitutionally governed nations to cultivate intimate relations so that if an emergency should arise they might easily combine against the despots. Maine proposed that the United States in the future should use her influence to prevent a repetition of interference similar to that carried out by Russia in Hungary. Vermont merely welcomed the exile to a home in the land of the free.⁹

⁸ Laws of Rhode Island, 1852, 55.

Acts of the Gen. Ass. of Vermont, 1851, 71.

Acts and Resolves of the Gen. Court of Mass., 1852, 306, 318.

32 Cong., 1 Sess., *House mis. docs.*, 8, 34.

Soon after his return to New York City, Kossuth set his house in order for the departure to Europe. It was generally believed that ultimately he would come back and reside in the West. To Seward, Cass, and Shields, the Senate reception committee, he sent an account of his stewardship of the money collected. Of \$90,000 raised, all had been spent except \$1,000 then in the chief's possession, although the newspapers were under the impression that Kossuth had nearly \$100,000 in the bank. On June 21, he delivered an address in the Tabernacle to an audience "largely women and antislavery people." He argued along much the same line as previously, vigorously pleading the doctrine of intervention. To Horace Mann it seemed the greatest speech of all. Two days later came the farewell speech to the Germans. Since neither of the national party conventions had adopted a platform which satisfied him, Kossuth suggested that the German citizens might unite with a third party. Thus the Presidential election might be thrown into Congress. The speech produced quite a sensation in political circles.¹⁰

Under the assumed name of Alexander Smith, Kossuth slipped off to Europe on July 14, 1852. The newspapers took the opportunity to express their consummate judgment on the man and his work. "We know not when a truer, a nobler soul has crossed the Atlantic," chanted the *Tribune*. "Had a million dollars gone with him, the clock of Europe might have been speeded on by half a century." Another paper believed that in many ways the sojourn had been fruitful to Americans. On the other hand, the *Herald*, after expatiating on the marked difference between the reception and the departure, commented that the visit would be recorded as a monument to arrogance, vainglory, and absurdity, and should serve in the future to deter any who might with sacrilegious hand venture to alter the "deep-seated reverence in the the American heart for Washington and the fathers."¹¹

¹⁰ Seward to ?, 12 Je. 1852, *Seward at Washington*, I, 185.

Mann to ?, 24 Je. 1852, Mann, *Life of Horace Mann*, I, 371.

N. Y. Tribune, 26 Je. 1852.

¹¹ *N. Y. Tribune*, 15 Jl. 1852; *Phila. Ledger*, 16 Jl. 1852; *N. Y. Herald*, 15, 22 Jl. 1852.

IX

EUROPEAN LIBERTY AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1852

While Kossuth toured the country in an endeavor to awaken an aggressive public opinion favorable to his cause—an opinion which might be transmuted into an avalanche of votes—the national political parties enjoyed their quadrennial conventions. That politicians were aware of the potentialities in the Kossuth movement has already been noted. The foreign vote, particularly that of the Germans, had grown to proportions to conjure with, and aspirants to the White House were skilled in the fine arts of legerdemain. Genuine republican feeling would be utilized as a lever in president-making. What attitude then did each candidate assume? How did the parties react to Kossuth's pleas for assistance?

Leading Whig sectaries attempted to show that the Democratic opposition intended to alter the established foreign policy by supporting intervention in the mid-European whirlpool. For a long time even Daniel Webster feared that a faction in the Democracy might bring that party to espouse the cause of interference. But as usual, the Democrats, divided on the question of European policy, pursued the familiar spirit of compromise.*

In the South the ultra-cordial reception of the Hungarians in the Northern cities had been interpreted as a covert political gesture engineered by radical Democrats or, greater anathema, by the despicable Free-Soilers. Presidential candidates should have been deeply concerned over the serried hostility in the slave states which the Kossuth movement had aroused. The "last of the heroes," Lewis Cass, Democracy's defeated standard-bearer of 1848, and in 1852 in a receptive mood for another nomination, lost prestige in the South because of his activities in

*In connection with this chapter mention should be made of the splendid monograph of Nichols, R. F., *The Democratic Machine, 1850-54*, in Col. Univ. Series, CXI, I.

connection with the Kossuth visit.* On several occasions, he enunciated views that favored the abstract dogma of intervention, though he left the topic of active intervention to be decided when necessary. In addition to alienating influential Southerners, Cass' attitude lost him the adherents of the Catholic church which, by and large, opposed Kossuthism. Henry Wilson prophesied that Cass' policy might win Massachusetts for him but it would cost him the entire South. This conviction proved correct for in the nominating convention the Southern delegates voted almost solidly against Cass. Too late the venerable general realized the error of his way.¹

Buchanan, a logical candidate for the Democratic nomination, and personally anxious to have it, pursued a policy with regard to the Kossuth visit which he believed would gain the support of the South. Obedient to the advice of a shrewd friend, throughout the period of the Hungarian excitement he kept as quiet as possible. His grave, dignified response at the Kossuth dinner in Philadelphia won for him the approval of Henry A. Wise, a recent convert to the Democracy, who assured Buchanan that two-thirds of the people of his state, Virginia, held his views. Buchanan's henchmen unsuccessfully fought the invitation to a banquet extended the Magyar by the Washington Jackson Association. In the event of Buchanan's nomination and election the country might be assured that the traditional, conservative policy of non-intervention would be followed. William L. Marcy, who had so faithfully served his party in minor rôles,

* In 1848, within party ranks, some fear existed lest Cass, if elected, might embroil the United States in the European revolutions. Seddon, J. A. to Hunter, 16 Je. 1848, *Correspondence of R. M. T. Hunter*, A. H. A., Rept., 1916, II, 91.

¹ *Richmond Whig*, 2, 8 Jan. 1852; *N. Y. Tribune*, 11 Feb. 1852; *N. Y. Herald*, 12 Feb. 1852.

Bird to Clayton, 12 Jan. 1852. Clayton Mss.

Hubard to Hunter, 8 May 1852, *Corres. R. M. T. Hunter*, A. H. A. Rept., 1916, II, 140.

Buchanan to Cave Johnson, 30 Mch. 1852. Buchanan Mss.

Webster to Lawrence, 29 Dec. 1851, *Webster's Works*, National Ed., IV, 633.

Munroe to Wilson, H., 10 Jan. 1852. Wilson Mss.

Belmont to Buchanan, 28 Jan. 1852. Buchanan Mss.

Cass to Donelson, 19 J1. 1852. Donelson Mss.

Thomas, J. A. to Marcy, 22 Dec. 1851. Marcy Mss.

Wilson, H. to Sumner, 5 Jan. 1852. Sumner Mss.

Clearland, C. F. to Welles, 13 Jan. 1852. Welles Mss.

wanted to be elevated to the Presidency. As with Buchanan, a sagacious friend warned Marcy of the forces that were hostile to Kossuth and intervention and urged him to take "no more ground on this question than is absolutely necessary." Unwarily, Marcy headed a call for a sympathy meeting for the Hungarians. Speaking on that occasion he advocated European liberty but omitted to outline the policy he favored to achieve the end. The speech hinted at non-intervention in states'-rights—a philosophy which should have been well received in the South. Friends of Marcy were divided as to the effect of the address. Certainly he lost some support by it.²

Presidential aspirants in the more radical element of the Democracy were Robert J. Walker and Stephen A. Douglas. Long before the conventions, in his speeches delivered in Kossuth's presence in England, the former had announced himself heartily in favor of European liberty to be acquired if necessary through a combined military expedition of the United States and England. Could the convention have been held in December, 1851, rather than June, 1852, he would have made a strong bid for first honors. As the Kossuth excitement waned, so did Walker's chances become dim. By common consent, Douglas had been placed at the head of "Young America," a faction which proposed to carry on a more aggressive foreign policy, notably with regard to the strong liberal movements so ably championed by the great Magyar. Fear of the Irish vote led Douglas to cast aspersions on any alliance with Great Britain to further the liberation of Europe. The policy of his friend, George N. Sanders, in linking his name with intervention through the columns of the *Democratic Review* did him irreparable harm. Assuredly an aggressive policy might be anticipated should this fiery young petrel move into the White House. As on most

² Byrdsall, T. to Buchanan, 18 Dec. 1851. Buchanan Mss.

Wise to Buchanan, 25 Jan. 1852. *Ibid.*

Vandyke to Buchanan, 15 Mch. 1852. *Ibid.*

Blair to Van Buren, 1, 2 Jan. 1852. Van Buren Mss.

Thomas, F. A. to Marcy, 22, 29 Dec. 1851. Marcy Mss.

Marcy to Banquet Committee, 6 Dec. 1851. *Ibid.*

Snow, W. W. to Marcy, 27 Dec. 1851. *Ibid.*

Campbell, A. to Marcy, 30 Dec. 1851, 1 May 1852. *Ibid.*

other vexing questions of the hour, the ultimate nominee of the Democracy, General Franklin Pierce, had registered no opinion.³

Amidst the swirl of nomination the Democratic national convention took little interest in the party platform. Southern influence prevented the adoption of any vigorous statement on European liberty. One plank read: "Resolved, that in view of the condition of popular institutions in the Old World, a high and sacred duty is devolved upon the Democracy of this country;" that was all. Greeley sharply criticised the Democratic stand on what he deemed a leading issue of the day. Not a word indicated the presence of the recognized champion of European liberty; nor was there a remonstrance against Russian interference; nothing but a little watery talk. Nevertheless, a potent Catholic editor, Brownson, lived in fear that the Democrats under Pierce would pursue the policy urged by Kossuth.⁴

Among the Whigs only three men sought the nomination in 1852. Of these, Fillmore had in his annual message and in his response on the occasion of the presentation of Kossuth indicated that he opposed any change in our foreign policy. His successful opponent in the convention, a hero of the Mexican War, General W. S. Scott, despite the fact that his chief protagonist, Seward, favored some modification of Washington's foreign policy, opposed the Kossuth pleas. This position strengthened him among the Southern Whigs. An eager searcher could find no "piratical propensities" in Scott's mental constitution. Daniel Webster, never a strong contender for the nomination, likewise opposed intervention.⁵

³ Belmont to Buchanan, 6 Dec. 1851. Buchanan Mss.

Byrdsall to Buchanan, 18 Dec. 1851. *Ibid.*

Wise to Buchanan, 25 Jan. 1852. *Ibid.*

Pickett, J. C. to Breckinridge, 5 Dec. 1851. Breckinridge Mss.

Willis, H. P., *Stephen A. Douglas*, 172.

Johnson, A., *Stephen A. Douglas*, 199.

N. Y. Tribune, 22 Jan. 1852.

⁴ *N. Y. Herald*, 9 Jan. 1852, 2 Feb. 1852; *N. Y. Tribune*, 8, 25 Je. 1852; *Wash. Intelligencer*, 18 Nov. 1851, 31 Jan. 1852; 9 *Brownson's Quarterly Rev.*, 516.

⁵ *N. Y. Herald*, 15, 22, 24 Jan. 1852; *Wash. Union*, 9 Jan. 1852.

Bird to Clayton, 12 Jan. 1852. Clayton Mss.

The Whig convention adopted a resolution in its platform which expressed warmest sympathy for struggling freedom everywhere but reaffirmed its intention to stand fast "to the doctrines of the Father of His Country." The United States should demonstrate by example and not by force the advantages of self-government and free institutions. To the *Tribune*, this plank was a sample of the chronic Whig stupidity which caused the great majority of the foreign-born citizens to unite with the Democrats. New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin would all be lost on account of this meretricious blunder. Since neither the Democratic nor the Whig platform contained Greeley's conviction this influential editor would not support either party. Brownson urged Catholics to support the Whig ticket since it definitely declared against action in Europe, whereas the Democrats remained non-committal.⁶

As neither of the major parties approved the Kossuth doctrines, the *Herald* reiterated its belief that a third party would appear and adopt them. Kossuth told a committee that the Germans were strong enough to secure the election of any party which would give proper attention to the European cause. Certainly, commented the *Herald*, he must mean the abolitionists led by Senator John P. Hale. When the Free-soil Party met in August, it selected Hale and Julian of Indiana to carry the banner in November. Throughout the convention there was much evidence of opinion favorable to definite action to liberate Europe. Article 16 of the platform declared: "every nation has a clear right to alter or change its government and foreign interference with that right is a dangerous violation of the laws of nations. It is the duty of the American government to protest against and, by all proper means to prevent, the intervention of Kings and Emperors against nations seeking to establish for themselves republican or constitutional governments."⁷

⁶ *N. Y. Tribune*, 22, 25 Je. 1852; 9 *Brownson's Quarterly Rev.*, 515-16. Stanwood, E. A., *History of Pres. etc.*, 251.

⁷ *N. Y. Herald*, 31 Jan. 1852, 14, 24 Je. 1852. Pierce, E. L., *Life of Charles Sumner*, III, 269. Stanwood, E. A., *History of Pres. etc.*, 255.

Immediately upon learning of the policy of the two major parties, Kossuth delivered his farewell address to a throng of Germans in New York City. He felt that neither political party had responded to the spirit of the times. In the Democratic position there might yet be hope; if nothing definite developed he advised the Germans to unite with an independent third party. Subsequently a series of resolutions was passed by the meeting in which those present announced that they would attach themselves to the Democratic party with the expectation that the candidate would adopt the policy of intervention. Newspapers of both parties acknowledged that these proceedings would be a serious blow to the Scott nomination. Politicians showed their alarm since the Germans held 500,000 votes which might determine the election. A few days after the speech, Kossuth sent out a secret circular, presumably to individuals of political influence, containing an account of the meeting and emphasizing the fact that the German citizens of America held the deciding votes in the election. Such documents made splendid campaign material for the reviving anti-foreign crusade which reached its climax four years later in the American Party—a national movement in whose development the Kossuth episode played no small rôle.⁸

During the campaign, Pierce's supporters manoeuvred to win the favor of Kossuth so that they might feel confident of getting the German vote. Edmund Burke, a Pierce manager, urged his chief to invite the Hungarian to New Hampshire but cautioned that he should receive nothing but courtesies and civilities. To Burke one of "the grand ideas" bound to be powerful in the campaign was sympathy with the liberals in Europe. Entirely cognizant of the strength of this grand idea, Pierce, in a letter to Philadelphians in reply to a Fourth of July invitation, trusted that America would remember that "in the weakness of our infancy . . . not only words of cheering were sent across the ocean to greet us, but upon its bosom were borne to

⁸ *N. Y. Herald*, 24, 25 Je. 1852, 12 Jl. 1852; *N. Y. Tribune*, 26 Je. 1852; *Wash. Intelligencer*, 28 Je. 1852.

Biography M. Fillmore, (1856), 205-212.

Poore, B. P., *Perley's Reminiscences*, 406.

our shores, hearts to sympathize and arms to strike." The covert implications contained therein Kossuth discerned, but he expected a more explicit avowal with regard to foreign policy. The historian, Stillman,* asserts that Pierce was prepared to go even further to win the Hungarian's support. Kossuth told Stillman that a committee of Democrats had presented itself, and, with the approval of Pierce, had offered him two men-of-war equipped for action and \$500,000 if Kossuth would support their nominee. Kossuth did not indicate whether or not he accepted the offer.⁹

Whiggery remained loyal to its platform pronouncement. Scott's followers circulated the resolutions adopted at the German farewell meeting, hoping thereby to gain votes in the South. In a campaign document one finds this pungent interrogation: "Are the people of the South prepared to take sides with the Democratic Party in fostering and maintaining a policy, the result of which will be to offset the material aid furnished by American sympathizers with material aid to foment insurrections in our Southern States by European Abolitionists?"¹⁰

With the departure of Kossuth the influence of the European liberty cause in the campaign rapidly subsided. It would be difficult to prove that the issue had any influence in the final outcome of the canvass.

* William J. Stillman was an author of some distinction. During Kossuth's visit Stillman became a confidential friend and was commissioned to go to Hungary to fetch the crown jewels which had been hidden by Kossuth during the revolution. 26 *Century Magazine*, 271-76.

⁹ Burke to Pierce, 6, 14 Je. 1852. Pierce Mss.

Hebbe to Burke, 13 Jl. 1852. Pierce Mss.

N. Y. Herald, 8 Jl. 1852.

Stillman, W. J., *Biography of a Journalist*, I, 142.

¹⁰ Memoir of General Scott, Doc. 2, *The Presidential Canvass or Why Southern Whigs Should Support the Whig Convention*.

CONCLUSION

From this study of the contemporary American opinion of the mid-century revolutions in Central Europe, one might proceed to analyze the American mind of 1850 as mirrored in this opinion. Such a task, however valuable, scarcely lies within the province of a historical dissertation. Propriety and scholarship, on the other hand, demand that some further interpretation be laid upon the facts herein presented. Why did Americans respond so cordially to the appeal of revolutionary Europe? How may one account for the activities of the Federal government toward the new states whose appearance, in consequence of the upheaval, seemed imminent? Why did the Kossuth program fail to win unqualified and lasting support in the foremost democracy of the time? What effect did the revolutionary movement and the visit of this "Byzantine logothete" have on American development?

Several factors serve to explain the intense sympathy the American people had for the masses of Europe in their struggle to erect new political organisms. Americans vividly remembered that only three-quarters of a century earlier their forebears had participated in a momentous conflict against authority, and in this central European revolt they discerned a movement of similar intent. Furthermore, many of the people had imbibed that delicious nectar described as Jacksonian Democracy. Exuberant Jacksonianism was a philosophy that suggested aid for any development that contained even a vestige of democracy. Again, the increasing German element in the population and recent immigrants of other nationalities vigorously expressed their devotion to the aspirations of their brothers in Europe. Politicians from German-inhabited districts were not oblivious of the opinion of this faction. Then too, a robust nationalism, stimulated by the recent successes in Mexico, temporarily found an outlet in hostile expressions against European despotism. Through the medium of the press and public gatherings the people expressed unmistakably their common sympathy

with the revolting European masses, and the newspapers served not only as weathervanes to indicate the prevailing opinion of their readers, but as agencies to advance arguments in favor of the revolutionary cause. At the outset, the means whereby the Europeans should attain the desired goal seem not to have entered into the calculations of the American people. Enthusiasm, boisterous or restrained, might strengthen the morale of European political non-conformists but material aid alone would enable them to wrest the sceptre from the hands of monarchy.

Public opinion moves governments to action and nowhere at the mid-century may this overweening phenomenon be observed better than in the United States. Actuated by the tremendous sympathy which struggling Europe engendered in the minds of the American people, the authorities in Washington shaped their policy. To the quixotic government instituted in Germany, was despatched the Minister in Berlin and eventually a complete mission at Frankfort was created. The government sent to Germany a distinguished naval captain who might have assisted in establishing a strong German fleet. The Hungarian revolutionists would have found an American ready to recognize them had their military forces been powerful enough to sever their country from the union with Austria. These government activities indicate beyond cavil the influence that the opinion of the populace wielded.

The fullest expressions of opinion on the revolutionary movement are connected with the visit of Louis Kossuth, "the general representative of liberty in Europe." In this man Americans were pleased to find the virtues they associated with the upheaval. His flight and subsequent confinement in Turkey raised him in the eyes of the people to the position of a martyr. Due to their agitation the government sent a vessel to Turkey to bring the Hungarian to America with the expectation that he would settle here. A tumultuous public reception, unparalleled in the annals of the country, greeted Kossuth in the North and West generally. In marked contrast to the welcome extended by these masses was the attitude assumed by the Federal govern-

ment, by many influential citizens in the North, and by virtually the entire South.

A recital of the reasons for the antagonism towards Kossuth will, save in so far as the opposition rose from idiosyncracies in his own personality, explain why the United States would take no active part in any European revolutionary movement even though a host of people favored some definite aid.

First, foremost, and familiar to those of this latter day, stood the obstacle known as the Washington foreign policy; notably, that portion which enjoined the country to remain aloof from European entanglements. That program suggested absolute non-interference in European struggles; it implied that America should take no action to prevent Russian aid to Austria if the latter were brought into civil conflict with her vassal, Hungary. The bulk of the Whig leaders remained firm in the maintenance of the traditional dogma. Clay and Fillmore blasted any hope of aid Kossuth may have nurtured; for "we would not leave our own land to stand in defence of another." Washington's Farewell Address would be used as a textbook of sound political truth. Up and down the land many Whig journals reaffirmed their adherence to the non-interference idea and their columns were loaded with editorials bearing such captions as "European Designs Against the United States" and "The Folly of the Day".¹

A number of Democratic papers, including the *New York Herald* and the important *Washington Union*, held it to be the American duty "to sacrifice nothing to the dictates of sympathy for a foreign cause which may be incompatible with the safety and prosperity" of the republic. Southern sheets, irrespective of party affiliation, rejoiced that "the new-fangled doctrine" had little vogue in their section. Our mission, many thought, was to teach republican principles by example and not to propagate them in Mohammedan fashion.²

Throughout the period of the Kossuth excitement, other leaders

¹ *Wash. Intelligencer*, 13, 16, 19 Dec. 1851, 9, 21 Feb. 1852; *St. Louis Republican*, 12 Dec. 1851, 10 Jan. 1852; *Phila. No. Am.*, 13 Dec. 1851; *Savannah Republican*, 18, 31 Dec. 1851; *Augusta Chronicle*, 22 Jan. 1852.

² *Rich. Enquirer*, 12 Dec. 1851; *Wash. Union*, 17, 22 Dec. 1851; *Phila. Ledger*, 15 Dec. 1851.

of opinion, with a few exceptions, advocated that the policy of non-interference in European affairs should be continued. From mid-January until early in May, 1852, there continued intermittently in the Senate a discussion on the reaffirmation of the "ancient" principle. Only Soulé, of Louisiana, and Seward favored a change. Military men predicted that a change would make "the army and the navy the only worthwhile trades." The adoption of an intervention policy would be much less likely to result in converting the European monarchies into republics than in eventually changing the happy American republic into a military despotism, thought Edward Everett. Various Southern statesmen made Washington's Birthday in 1852 an occasion for re-emphasizing the diplomatic principles of the country's father. Able speeches by men of the stamp of Alexander Stephens, Robert Toombs, and John J. Crittenden had a great effect. Reason, not passion, became the slogan of many thoughtful leaders. Such universal sentiment among men respected for their intelligence and ability, plus the newspaper opposition, gradually overcame the early urban exuberance. As in 1919-1920, aid to Europe retreated as the apothegms of Washington were advanced.³

In his last annual message, Fillmore rightly summed up the consensus of opinion with respect of intervention:

"It has been the uniform policy of this government from its foundation to the present day to *abstain from all interference in the domestic affairs of other nations*. The consequence has been that while the nations of Europe have been engaged in desolating wars our country has pursued its peaceful course to unexampled prosperity and happiness. . . .

³ Mann to Clayton, 9 Sept. 1849, Mss., Dept. of State, Repts., Spec. Agents to German States and Hungary.

Bayard to Webster, 28 Ap. 1852, *Ibid.*, Repts., Belgium, IV.

Wool, J. E. to a friend, 31 Dec. 1851. *Wash. Intelligencer*, 20 Feb. 1852.

Everett, E. to Ashmun, G., 25 Nov. 1851, 1 Dec. 1851. Everett Mss.

Benton, T. H. to Van Buren, 11 Jan. 1852. Van Buren Mss.

Ripley, R. S. to Breckinridge, 20 Dec. 1851. Breckinridge Mss.

Richardson, *Messages etc. of the Presidents*, V, 179.

Liberator, 23 Jan. 1852.

Coleman, C., *Life of J. J. Crittenden*, II, 27.

Johnston and Browne, *A. H. Stephens*, 266.

Sargent, N. S., *Public Men and Events*, II, 384.

"But it is now said by some that this policy must be changed. Europe is no longer separated from us by a voyage of months, but steam navigation has brought her within a few days' sail of our shores . . . it is said that we ought to interfere between contending sovereigns and their subjects for the purpose of overthrowing the monarchies of Europe and establishing in their place republican institutions . . . We cannot witness the struggle between the oppressed and his oppressor anywhere without the deepest sympathy for the former and the most anxious desire for his triumph. Nevertheless is it prudent or is it wise to involve ourselves in these foreign wars? . . . *Our policy is wisely to govern ourselves* and thereby to set an example of national justice, prosperity, and true glory as shall teach to all nations the blessings of self government and the unparalleled enterprise and success of a free people."³

Granting that the non-intervention policy was the paramount influence which caused America to refuse aid to European liberalism, the second factor in the decision was that issue which obfuscated all American affairs in the middle of the century—the slavery question. In the South the class interested in the continuance of the slave system largely molded the public opinion and this class opposed Kossuth's program. If the United States should aid Hungary to secure its release from Austrian servitude, did not the genesis of logic suggest that similar action might come from abroad and cause America to free those held in bondage? "People who live in glass houses," wrote a Southern correspondent to the Washington *Intelligencer*, "should not throw stones." Non-intervention, demanded by the South so far as its own interests were concerned, very easily carried over into the field of international affairs. Thus the peculiar institution determined the South in its hostility toward active aid for the European revolutionists.⁴

³ *Rich. Whig*, 2 Feb. 1852.

Seward to his home, 2 Dec. 1851, Seward, F. W., *Seward at Wash.*, II, 175.

26 Century Mag., 270.

32 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe, App.*, 1074. Speech of Horace Mann.

Liberator, 30 Ap. 1852; *Savannah Republican*, 25 Mch. 1852; *Wash. Intelligencer*, 26 Jan. 1852; *Augusta Chronicle*, 10 Dec. 1851; *N. Y. Tribune*, 28 Oct. 1851.

Godwin, P., *Commemorative Addresses*, 136.

Mann, H. to May, S. J., 3 Jan. 1852, Mann, *Life of Horace Mann*, I, 356.

Buchanan to Davis, J., 16 Mch. 1850. Buchanan Mss.

The slavery issue, moreover, created many enemies for Kossuth in the North when he refused to announce himself in favor of abolition. Bitter attacks by Garrison, Wendell Phillips, and others were launched against Kossuthism. To them freedom carried the same implication the world over. As a typical verse from the *Liberator* indicates, the Abolitionists expected that definite assistance would be given their cause by the Magyar:

"Strike then for us, with thought and prayer,
 God give thee power most noble heart,
 Nor waste thy words on empty air
 But, flying slave, take the slaves part."

Undoubtedly this voice of freedom from Europe did rivet the idea of freedom more firmly in the minds of the people in the North, but Garrison wanted a concrete expression against negro slavery, and Kossuth balked. The Hungarian's position as America's greatest excitement changed with the appearance of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, commented the indomitable editor of the *Liberator*.^{*5}

Other reasons existed for the positive refusal of the United States to participate in the quarrels for European liberty. When Louis Napoleon, by the coup d'état in 1851, made himself virtually the master of the French, American faith in the democratic and republican ideal for Europe was sadly shaken. If France could not maintain a liberal government, America had little hope for any other continental state. Then too, leaders of the Roman Catholic church indicated their antipathy to the revolutionary movements. Catholicism, invariably conservative,

* An additional source of trouble arose when Gyurman, a companion of Kossuth, associated himself with an outspoken antislavery sheet which proposed to use its influence to abrogate the compromise of 1850. Though he declared his adhesion to the paper had received his chief's approval, the latter promptly denied any connection with the paper or the policy of his comrade. Throughout the South the Gyurman action augmented the hostility against the revolutionary projects. *Savannah Republican*, 16 Jan. 1852; *Augusta Chronicle*, 14 Jan. 1852; *N. Y. Herald*, 6 Jan. 1852.

⁶ Whittier, J. to Sumner, Dec. 1851, Pickard, S. T., *Life and Letters of J. G. Whittier*, I, 363.

Liberator, 19 Dec. 1851, 2, 9 Jan. 1852.
Life of W. L. Garrison by his children, III, 360.

could not forget the effect that the French Revolution had had upon its welfare and its fortunes. Revolutions and revolutionists were anathema to her and the priests lost few opportunities to stigmatize the Hungarian movement and its leader.⁶

In conclusion, the mid-century revolutions and their aftermath had several important effects on American development. Non-intervention in European affairs became more firmly rooted in American diplomatic parlance and policy; the ferment created by Kossuth's pleas for a departure from the established practice led to a reaffirmation of allegiance to Washington's ideals, and, simultaneously, to a revulsion of feeling towards those, particularly foreigners, who advocated a change. That feeling crystallized and played a part in the formation of the anti-foreign social and political phenomenon termed "Know-Nothingism". If the Clay compromise measures temporarily allayed the anti-slavery agitation, that movement received a fresh impetus from the visit of Kossuth, a preacher of freedom—the impersonation of 1848. American thought reverted to the slavery question with a fervor and intensity never before witnessed. But amidst all the bluster and debate, pro and con, Americans delighted in the European movements for liberty and democracy and were eager to welcome new states into the sisterhood of democratic governments. From that position America in the nineteenth century never wavered.

⁶ *N. Y. Tribune*, 13 J1. 1852; *N. Y. Herald*, 26 Dec. 1851.

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Clayton, J. M.	"	L. C.
Corwin, Thos.	"	L. C.
Crittenden, J. J.	"	L. C.
Donelson, A. J.	"	L. C.
Everett, E.	"	L. C.
Hammond, J. H.	"	L. C.
Lieber, F.	"	L. C.
McClellan, G. B.	"	L. C.
Mann, A. D.	"	L. C.
Marcy, W. L.	"	L. C.
Mason, J. M.	"	L. C.
Morse, S. F. B.	"	L. C.
Pierce, F.	"	L. C.
Sumner, C.	"	Library of Harvard University.
Tyler, J.	"	L. C.
Van Buren, M.	"	L. C.
Walker, R. J.	"	L. C.
Webster, D.	"	L. C.
Welles, G.	"	L. C.
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