Judicial oaths : their moral character and effects

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DYMOND
JUDICIAL OATHS,

Cornell University Library
BJ 1006.D99

Judicial oaths :

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No. 48.

Judicial Oaths:

THEIR MOEAL CHARACTER
AND EFFECTS.

BY JONATHAN DYMOND.

PHILADELPHIA:

PUBLISHED BY THE TEACT ASSOCIATION OF FEIENDS.

No. 304 Arch Street.

1889.

JUDICIAL OATHS:

THEIR MOEAL CHAHAOTER AND EFFECTS.

"An Oath is that whereby we call God to witness
the truth of what we say, with a Curse upon ourselves,
either implied or expressed, should it prove false."*

Supposing the Christian scriptures to contain no in-
formation respecting the moral character of oaths, how
far is it reasonable, or prudent, or reverent, for a man
to stake his salvation upon the truth of what he says ?
To bring forward so tremendous an event as " ever-
lasting destruction from the presence of the Lord," in
attestation of the offence perhaps of a poacher, or of
the claim to a field, is surely to make unwarrantably
light ot most awful things. This consideration applies,
even if a man is sure that he speaks the truth : but who
is, beforehand, sure of this ? Oaths in evidence, for
example, are taken before the testimony is given. A
person swears that he will speak the truth. Who, I
ask, is sure that he will do this ? Who is sure that
the embarrassment of a public examination, that the
ensnaring questions of counsel, that the secret influence
of inclination or interest, will not occasion him to utter
one inaccurate expression ? Who, at any rate, is so
sure of this, that it is rational, or justifiable, specifically
to stake his salvation upon his accuracy ? Thousands
of honest men have been mistaken; their allegations
have been sincere but untrue. And it this should be
thought not a legitimate objection, let it be remembered
that few men's minds are so sternly upright, that they
can answer a variety of questions upon subjects on
* Milton : Christian Doctrine, p. 579.

JUDICIAL OATHS. 3

which their feelings, and wishes, and interest are in-
volved, without some little deduction from the truth,
in speaking of matters that are against their cause, or
some little over-coloring of facts in their own favor.
It is a circumstance of constant occurrence, that even
a well-intentioned witness adds to or deducts a little
from the truth. "W^ho then, amidst such temptation,
would make, who ought to make, his hope of heaven
dependent on his strict adherence to accurate veracity?
And if such considerations indicate the impropriety of
swearing upon subjects which affect the lives and liber-
ties, and property of others, how shall we estimate the
impropriety of using these dreadful imprecations to
attest the delivery of a summons for a debt of half a
crown !

These are moral objections to the use of oaths inde-
pendently of any reference to the direct moral law.
Another objection of the same kind is this : To take an
oath is to assume that the Deity will become a party
in the case, — that we can call upon Him, when we
please, to follow up, by the exercise of his almighty
power, the contracts (often the very insignificant con-
tracts) which men make with men. It is not irreverent,
and for that reason immoral, to call upon Him to exer-
cise this power in reference to subjects which are so
insignificant that other men will scarcely listen with
patience to their details?

Upon every subject of questionable rectitude that is
sanctioned by habit and the usages of society, a person
should place himself in the independent situation of an
inquirer. He should not seek for arguments to defend
an existing practice, but should simply inquire what
our practice ought to be. One of the most powerful
causes of the slow amendment of public institutions,
consists in this circumstance, that most men endeavor
rather to justity what exists than to consider whether

4 JUDICIAL OATHS.

it ought to exist or not. This cause operates upon the
question of oaths. We therefore invite the reader in
considering the citation which follows, to suppose him-
self lobe one of the listeners at the mount, — to know
nothing of the customs of the present day, and to have
no desire to justify them.

" Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of
old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt
perform unto the Lord thine oaths. But I say unto
you, Swear not at all : neither by heaven, for it is Grod's
throne; nor by the earthy for it is his footstool; neither
by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King.
Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou
canst not make one hair white or black. But let your
communications be, yea, yea; nay, nay; for whatsoever
is more than these, cometh of evil." *

If a person should take a I^ew Testament, and read
these words to ten intelligent Asiatics who had never
heard of them before, does any man believe that a
single individual of them would think that the words
did not prohibit all oaths? I lay stress upon this con-
sideration: if ten unbiassed persons would, at the first
hearing, say the prohibition was universal, we have no
contemptible argument that that is the real meaning
of the words. For to whom were the words addressed ?
Not to schoolmen, of whom it was known that they
would make nice distinctions and curious investigations;
not to men of learning, who were in the habit of cau-
tiously weighing the import of words; — but to a mul-
titude, — a mixed and unschooled multitude. It was to
such persons that the prohibition w^as addressed; it was
to such apprehensions that its form was adapted.

" It hath been said of old time. Thou shalt not fore-
swear thyself." Why refer to what was said of old
time ? For this reason assuredly ; to point out, that the
*Mat.v. 33-37.

JUDICIAL OATHS. " 5

present requisitions were different from the former; tiiat
what was prohibited now, was different from what was
prohibited before. And what was prohibited before?
Swearing falsely, — Swearing and not performing. What
then could be prohibited now ? Swearing truly, — Swear-
ing, even, and performing : that is, swearing at all ; for
it is manifest that if truth may not be attested by an
oath, no oath may be taken. Of old time it was said,
"Ye shall not swear by my name falsely."* "If a man
swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall
not 6re(7A:.his word."t There could be no intelligible
purpose in contra-distinguishing the new precept from
these, but to point out a chard.cteristic difference; and
there is no intelligible characteristic difference but that
which denounces all oaths. Such were the views of
the early Christians. " The old law," says one of them,
"is satisfied with the honest keeping of the oath; but
Christ cutsoff the opportunity ofperjury."J In acknowl-
edging that this prefactory reference to the former law,
is in my view absolutely conclusive of our Christian
duty, I would remark, as an extraordinary circumstance,
that Dr. Paley, in citing the passage, omits this intro-
duction, and tiakes no notice of it in his argument.

" I say unto you, Swear not at all." The words are
absolute and exclusive.

" Neither by heaven, nor by the earth, nor by Jeru-
salem nor by thy own head." Eespecting this enumer-
ation it is said that it prohibits swearing by certain
objects, but not by all objects. To which a sufficient
answer is found in the parallel passage in James:
" Swear not," he says, " neither by heaven, neither by
the earth, neither by any other oath."§ This mode of
prohibition, by which an absolute and universal rule is
first proposed and then followed by certain examples
of the prohibited things, is elsewhere employed in
*Lev. xix. 12. fNumb. xxx. 2. J Basil. §Jas. v. 12.

6 JUDICIAL OATHS.

Scripture. " Thou shalt have no other gods before
me. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven
image; or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven
above; or that is in the earth beneath; or that is in
the water under the earth."* No man supposes that
this after-enumeration was designed to restrict the
obligation of the law: — Thou shalt have no other gods
before me. Yet it were as reasonable to say that
it was lawful to make idols in the form of imagi-
nary monsters, because they were not mentioned in
the enumeration, as that it is lawful to swear any
given kind c-f oath, because it is not mentioned in the
enumeration. Upon this part of the prohibition it is
curious that two contradictory opinions are advanced
by the defenders of oaths. The first class of reasoners
says, The prohibition allows us to swear by the Deity,
but disallows swearing by inferior things. The second
class says, The prohibition allows swearing by inferior
things, but disallows swearing by the Diety. Of the
first class in Milton. The injunction, he says, " does
not prohibit us from swearing by the name of God, —
we are only commanded not to swear by heaven, &c."t
But here again, the Scripture itself furnishes a conclu-
sive answer. It asserts that to swear by heaven is to
swear by the Diety: "He that shall swear by heaven,
sweareth by the throne of Grod, and by Him that sitteth
thereon." J To prohibit swearing by heaven, is there-
fore to prohibit swearing by Grod. — Amongst the sec-
ond class is Dr. Paley. He says, " On account of the
relation which these things [the heavens, the earth,
&c.] bore to the Supreme Being, to swear by any of
them was in effect and substance to swear by Him;
for which reason our Saviour says, Swear not at all; that
is, neither directly by God, nor indirectly by any thing

*Exod. XX. 3, 4. t Christ; Doct. p. 582.

JMatt. xxiii. 22.

JUDICIAL OATHS. 7

related to Him." * But if we are thus prohibited from
swearing by any thing related to Him, how happens
it that Paley proceeds to justify judicial oaths? Does
not the judicial deponent swear by something related
to God ? Does he not swear by something much more
nearly related than the earth, or our own heads? Is
not our hope ot salvation more nearly related than a
member of our bodies? — But after he had thus taken
pains to show that swearing by the Almighty was
especially forbidden, he enforces his general argument
by saying, that Christ did swear by the Almighty: He
says that the high priest examined our Saviour upon
oath, " by the living God ; " which oath he took. This
is wonderful ; and the more wonderful, because of these
two arguments, the one immediately follows the other.
It is contended, within half a dozen lines, first, that
Christ forbade swearing by God, and next, that he
violated his own command.

" But let your communication be, yea, yea; nay, nay."
This is remarkable ; it is positive superadded to nega-
tive commands. We are told not only what we ought
not, but what we ought to do. It has indeed been said
that the expression " your communication," fixes the
meaning to apply to the ordinary intercourse of life.'
But to this there is a fatal objection : the whole prohi-
bition sets out with a reference not to conversational
language but to solemn declarations on solemn occa-
sions. Oaths, qaths, " to the Lord," are placed at the
head of the passage; and it is too manifest to be insisted
upon, that solemn declarations, and not every-day talk,
were the subject of the prohibition.

" Whatsoever is more than these, cometh of evil."
This is indeed most accurately f rue. Evil is the founda-
tion of oaths, it is because men are bad that it is sup-
posed oaths are needed'; take away the wickedness of
*Mor. & Pol. Phil. b. 3, p. 1, c. 16

8 JUDICIAL OATHS.

mankind, and we shall still have occasion for No and
Y"e8, but we shall need nothing " more than these."
And this consideration furnishes a distinct motive to
a good man to decline to swear. To take an oath is
tacitly to acknowledge that this " evil " exists in his
own mind, — that with him Christianity has not effected
its destined objects.

From this investigation of the passage, it appears
manifest that all swearing upon all occasions is prx)-
hibited. Yet the ordinary opinion, or rather, perhaps,
the ordinary defence is, that the passage has no refer-
ence to judicial oaths. — " We explain our Saviour's
words to relate not to judicial oaths, but to the prac-
tice of vain, wanton, and unauthorized swearing in
common discourse. " To this we have just seen that
there is one conclusive answer : our Saviour distinctly
and specifically mentions, as the subject of his instruc-
tions, solemn oaths. But there is another conclusive
answer even upon our opponents' own showing. They
say first, that Christ described particular forms of oaths
which might be employed, and next, that his precepts
referred to wanton swearing;— that is to say that Christ
described what particular forms of wanton swearino- He
allowed and what He disallowed ! You cannot avoid
this monstrous conclusion. It Christ spoke only of
vain and wanton swearing, and if He described the
modes that were lawful, He sanctioned wanton swear-
ing provided we swear in the prescribed form.

With such distinctness of evidence as to the univer-
sality of the prohibition of oaths by Jesus Christ, it is
not in strictness necessary to refer to those passages in
J;he New Testament which some persons adduce in
favor of their employment. If Christ have prohibited
them, nothing else can prove them to be ri^ht. Our
reference to these passages will accordingly be short.
"I adjure thee by the living God that thou tell us

JUDICIAL OATHS. 9

whether Ihou be the Christ, the Son of God." To
those who allege that Christ, in answering lo this,
" Thou hast said," took an oath, a sufficient answer
has already been intimated. If Christ then took an
oath, he swore by the Deity, and this is precisely the
very kind of oath which it is acknowledged He himself
forbad. But what imaginable reason could there be
for examining him upon oath? Who ever heard of
calling upon a prisoner to swear that he was guilty?
Nothing was wanted but a simple declaration that He
was the Sol^of God. With this view the proceeding
was extremely natural. Finding that, to the less urgent
solicitation he made no reply, the high priest proceeded
to the more urgent. Schleusner expressly remarks
upon the passage, that the words, I adjure, do not here
mean " I make to swear or put upon oath," but, " I
solemnly and in the name of God exhort and enjoin.'
This is evidently the natural, and the' only natural
meaning ; just as it was the natural meaning when the
evil spirit said, " I adjure thee by the living God that
thou torment me not." The evil spirit surely did not
administer an oath.

" God is my witness, that without ceasing I make
mention of you always in my prayer." * That the Al-
mighty was witness to the subject of his prayers, is most
true; but to state this truth is not to swear. Neither
this language nor that which is indicated below, con-
tains the characteristics of an oath according to the
definitions even of those who have the expressions.
None of them contain, according to Milton's definition,
" a curse upon ourselves;" nor according to Paley's, an
'' invocation of God's vengeance." Similar language,
but in a more emphatic form, is employed in writting
to the Corinthian coverts. It appears from 2 Cor. ii.
that Paul had resolved not again to go to Corinth in
heaviness, lest he should make them sorry. And to
assure them lohy he had made this resolution, he says,
" I call God for a record upon my soul that to spare you
* Rom. i. 9. See also 1 Thess. ii. 5, and Gal. i. 20.

10 JUDICIAL OATHS.

I came not as yet unto Corinth."* In order to show
this to be an oath, it will be necessary to show that the
apostle imprecated the vengeance of God if he did not
speak the truth. Who can show this? — The express-
ion appears to me to be only an emphatical mode of
saying, God is witness; or as the expression is some-
times employed in the present day, God knows that
such was my endeavor or desire.

The next and the last argument is of a very excep-
tionable class; it is founded upon silence. " For men
verily swear by the greater, and an oath for confirmation
is to them an end of all strife." f Respecting this it is
said that it " speaks of the custom of swearing judicially
without any mark of censure or disapprobation." Will
it then be contented that whatever an apostle mentions
without reprobating, he approves? The same apostle
speaks just in the same manner of the pagan games;
of running a race for prizes and of " striving for the
mastery." Yet who would admit the argument, that
because Paul did not then censure the games, he thought
them right? The existing customs both of swearing
and of the games, are adduced merely by way of illusira-i
Hon of the writer's subject.

Respecting the lawfulness of oaths then, as deter-
mined by the Christian Scriptures, how does the balance
of evidence stand? On the one side, we have plain
emphatical prohibitions, — prohibitions of which the
distinctness is' more fully proved the "more they are
investigated : on the other we have — counter precepts*!
No — It is not even pretended: but we have examples
of the use of language of which it is saying much to
say, that it is doubtful whether they are oaths or not.
How then would the man of reason and of philosophy
decide? — "Many ptthe Christian fathers," says Grotius,
" condemned aZ^ oaths without exception. "J Grotius was
himself an advocate of oaths. " I say nothing of per-
jury," says Tertullian, " since swearing itself is unlaw-

* 2 Cor. i. 23. f Heb. vi. 16. J Eights of War and Peace.

JUDICIAL OATHS. U

ful to Christians."* Chrysostom says, " Do not say to
me, I swear for a just purpose; it is no longer lawful
for thee to swear either justly or unjustly."f " He
who," says Gregory of Nysse, has precluded murder
by taking away anger, and who has driven away the
pollution of adultery by subduing desire, has expelled
from our life the curse of perjury by forbiddino- us to
swear; for where there is no oath there can be'no in-
fringement of it."f Such is the conviction which the
language of Christ conveyed to the early converts to
his pure religion; and such is the conviction which I
think it would convey to us, if custom had not familiar-
ized us with the evil, and if we did not read the JSTew
Testament rather to find justifications of our practice
than to discover the truth and to apply it to our con-
duct.

INErnOACY OF OATHS.

Of the influence of legal penalties in bindino- to
veracity, little needs to be said. It is obvious that if
they induce men to refrain from theft and violence
they will induce men to refrain from perjury. Jurv-
men swear that they will give a verdict according to
the evidence, and yet it is perfectly well known that
they often assent to a verdict which they believe to be
contrary to that evidence. They do not all coincide
in the verdict which the foreman pronounces; it is in-
deed often impossible that they should coincide. This
perjury is committed by multitudes; yet what juryman
cares for it, or refuses, in consequence of his oath, to
deliver a verdict which he believes to be improper ?
The reason that they do not care, is, that the oath, as
such, does not bind their consciences. It stands alone
The public do not often reprobate the violation of such
oaths; the law does not punish it; jurymen learn to
think that it is no harm to violate them ; and the result-
ing conclusion is, that the form of an oath cannot and

*De Idol. cap. 11. 1 1° Cren. ii. Horn. xv. 1 In Cant. Horn. 13.

12 JUDICIAL OATHS.

does not supply the deficiency ;— it cannot and does;
not apply the religious sanction.

Step a few yards from the jury-bjDX to the witness-
box, and you "see the difference, The public opinioa
interposes its power — there the punishment of perjury
impends — there the religious sanction applied— and
there, consequently, men regard the truth. If the simple
intervention of an oath was that which bound men to
veracity, they would be bound in the jury-box as much
as at ten feet oft : but it is not.

To take an oath in voluntary ignorance of the obligar
tions which it is intended to impose, and to excuse
ourselves for disregarding them because we do not
know what they are, cannot surely be right. Yet it is
often difficult, sometimes impossible, to discover what
an oath requires. The absence of precision in the
meaning of terras, the alteratioa of general usages whilst
the forms of oaths remain the same, and the original
want of explicitness of the forms themselves, throw
sometimes insuperable obstacles in the vv^ay of discover-
ing, when a man takes an oath, what it is that he binds
himself to do.

" The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, touching the matter in question." Is the witness
to understand by this that if he truly answers all ques-
tions that are put to him, he conforms to the requisitions
of the oath? If he is, the terms of the oath are very
exceptionable, for many a witness may give true answers \
to a counsel, and yet not tell " the whole truth." Or
does the oath bind him to give an exact narrative of
every particular connected with the matter in question,
whether asked or not? If it does, multitudes commit
perjury. How, then, shall a witness act ? Shall he
commit perjury by withholding all information butthat
which is asked ? Or shall he be ridiculed and perhapsi
silenced in court for attempting to narrate all that he
has sworn to disclose ? Here again the morality of the
people is injuriously affected. To take an oath to do
a certain prescribed act, and then to do only just that

JUDICIAL OATHS. 13

which custom happens to prescribe, is to ensnare the
B^BBcience and practically to diminish the sanctions of
veracity. The evil may be avoided either by disusing
|llpreviou8 promises to speak the truth or to adapt
^e terms of the promise (if that can be done) to the
3|itie8 which the law or which custom expects. "You
shaU true answer make to all such questions as shall
■be asked of you," is the form when a person is sworn
upon a voir dire; and if this is all that the law expects
when he is giving evidence, why not use the same
form ? If, however, in deference to the reasonings
against the use of any oaths, the oath in evidence were
abolished, no difficulty could remain: for to promise in
any form to speak the truth, is, as wehave seen, absurd.
Whilst the oath in evidence continues to be imposed,
it is not an easy task to determine in what sense the
witness should understand it. If you decide by the
meanings of the legislature which imposed the oath,
it appears manifest that he should tell all he knows
whether asked or not. But what, it may be asked,
is the meaning of a law, but that which the author-
ized expounders of the law determine ? And it they
habitually admit an interpretation at variance with
the terms of the oath, is not their sanction an authori-
tative explanation of the legislature's meaning ? These
are questions which I pretend not with confidence to
determine. The mischiefs which result from the un-
certainty are to be charged upon the legislatures which
do not remove the evil. I would, however, suggest
that the meaning of a form in such cases is to be sought,
not so much in the meaning of the original imposers,
as in that of those who now sanction the form by per-
mitting it to exist. This doubtless opens wide the door
to extreme licentiousness of interpretation. Nor can
that door be closed. There is no other remedial meas-
ure than an alteration of the forms or an abolition of
the oath.

14 JUDICIAL OATHS.

THE EFFECTS OF OATHS.

There is a power and efficacy in our religion which
elevates those who heartily accept it, above that low
moral state in which alone an oath can even be sup-
posed to be of advantage. It is the testimony even of
infidelity, that " wherever men of uncommon energy
and dignity of mind have existed, they have felt the
degradation of binding their assertions with an oath."*
This degradation, this descent from the proper ground
on which amanof integrity should stand, illustrates the
proposition that whatever exceeds affirmation " cometh
of evil." The evil origin is so palpable that j'ou can-
not comply with the custom without feeling that you
sacrifice the dignity of virtue. It is related of Solon
that he said " A good man ought to be,in that estima-
tion that he needs not an oath ; because it is to be
reputed a lessening of his honor if he be forced to
swear."t If to take au oath lessened a pagan's honor,
what must be its effect upon a Christian's purity?

Oaths, at least the system of oaths which obtains in
this country, tend powerfully to deprave the moral
character. We have seen that they are continually
violated, — that men are continually referring to the
most tremendous sanctions of religion with the habitual
belief that those sanctions impose no practical obliga^
tion. Can this have any other tendency than to di-
minish the influence of religious sanctions upon other
things? If a man sets light by the Divine vengeance
in a jury-box to-day, is he likely to give full .weight to
that vengeance before a magistrate to-morrow ? We
cannot prevent the effects of habit. Such things will
infallibly deteriorate the moral character, because they
infallibly diminish the power of those principles upon
which the moral character is founded.

Oaths encourage falsehood. The effect of instituting
oaths is to diminish the practical obligation of simple
affirmation. The law says, You must speak the truth

* Godwin : Politic il Justice, v. 2, p. 633. f Stoboens : Serm. 3.

JUDICIAL OATHS. 15

when you are upon your oath; which is the same thing
as to say that it is less harm to violate truth when you
are not on your oath. The court sometimes reminds a
witness that he is upon oath, which is equivalent to
saying, If you were not, we should think less of your
mendacity. The same lesson is inculcated by the assig-
nation of penalties to perjury and not to falsehood.
What is a man to conclude, but that the law thinks
light of (he crime which "it does not punish; and that
since he may lie with impunity, it is not much harm
to lie? Common language bears testimony to the effect.
The vulgar phrase, I will take ray oath to it, clearly
evinces the prevalent notion that a man may lie with less
guilt when he does not take his oath. No answer can be
made to this remark, unless any one can show that the
extra sanction of an oath is so much added to the obliga-
tion which would otherwise attach to simple affirmation.
And who can show this? Experience proves the con-
trary: " Experience bears ample testimony to the fact,
that the prevalence of oaths among men (Christians
not excepted) has produced a very material and very
general effect in reducing their estiniate of the obliga-
tion of plain truth, in its natural and .simple forms."*
— " There is no cause of insincerity, prevarication, and
falsehood, more powerful, than the practice of adminis-
tering oaths in a court of justice." f

Upon this subject the legislator plays a desperate
game against the morality of a people. He wishes to
make them speak the truth, when they undertake an
office or deliver evidence. Even supposing him to suc-
ceed, what is the cost? That of diminishing the mo-
tives to veracity in all the affairs of life. A man may
not be called upon to take an oath above two or three
times in his life, but he is called upon to speak the
truth every day.

A few, but a few serious, words remain. The investi-
gations of this chapter are not matters to employ specu-
lation, but to inffuence our practice. If it be indeed
'•: *Gurney : Observations, Ac, c. x. t Godwin : v. 2, p. 634.

16 JUDICIAL OATHS.

true that Jesus Christ has imperatively forbidden us
to employ an oath, aduty, an imperative duty, isimposed
upou us. It is worse than merely vain to hear his laws
unless we obey them. Of him, therefore, who is assured
of the prohibition, it is indispensably required that he
should refuse an oath. There is no other means of
maintaining our allegiance to God, Our pretensions
to Christianity are at stake; for he who, knowing the
Christian law will not conform to it, is certainly not a
Christian. How then does it happen, that although
persons frequently acknowledge they think oaths are
forbidden, so few, when they are called upon to swear,
decline to do it? Alas! this offers one evidence amongst
the many, of the want of uncompromising moral princi-
ples in the world, — of such principles as it has been
the endeavor of these pages to enforce, — of such princi-
ples as would prompt us and enable us to sacrifice everij
thing to Christian fidelity. By what means do the
persons of whom we speak, suppose that the will of
God respecting oaths is to be effected ? To whose prac-,
tice do they look for an exemplification of the Christiati
standard? Do they await some miracle by which the
whole world shaH be convinced, and oaths shall be
abolished without the agency of man ? Such are not
the means by which it is the pleasure of the Universal
Lord to act. He efl[ect8 his moral purposes by the
instrumentality of faithful men. Where are these faith-
ful men? — But let it be; if those who are called to this
fidelity refuse, theirs will be the dishonor and the offence.
But the work will eventually be done. Other and bet-t
ter men will assuredly arise to acquire the Christian
honor and to receive the Christian reward.