Essays on the principles of morality & on the private & political rights & obligations of mankind

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ESSAYS

ON THE

Principles of Morality

AND ON THE

private and political
Rights and Obligations of Mankind

BY

JONATHAN DYMOND

AUTHOR OF " AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ACCORDANCY OF WAR
WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIANITY,'' BTC.

"As the will of God is our rule ; to enquire what is our duty or what
we are obliged to do, in any instance, is, in effect, to enquire what is the
will of God in that instance ? zvhich consequently becomes the whole business
of morality.''''— Paley.

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THE GREAT DUTY

OF CONFORMING TO THE

LAWS OP CHRISTIAN MORALITY

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PREFACE.

To thk First Edition.

The author of this work died in the spring of 1828,
leaving in manuscript the three essays of which it con-
sists. We learn from himself that the undertaking
originated in a belief (in which he probably is far from
being alone) that the existing treatises on moral phil-
osophy did not exhibit the principles nor enforce the
obligations of morality in all their perfection and pur-
ity ; that a work was yet wanted which should present
a true and authoritative standard of rectitude — one by
an appeal to which the moral character of human ac-
tions might be rightly estimated. This he here en-
deavors to supply.

Rejecting what he considered the false grounds of
duty, and erroneous principles of action which are pro-
posed in the most prominent and most generally re-
ceived of our extant theories of moral obligation, he
preceeds to erect a system of morality upon what he
regards as the only true and legitimate basis — the
will of God. He makes, therefore, the authority
of the Deity the sole ground of duty, and His com-
municated will the only ultimate standard of right and
wrong; and assumes, "that wheresoever this will is
made known, human duty is determined ; and that
neither the conclusions of philosophers, nor advant-

VI. PREFACE.

ages, nor dangers, nor pleasures, nor sufferings, ought
to have any opposing influence in regulating our con-
duct."

The attempt to establish a system of such uncom-
promising morality, must necessarily bring the writer
into direct collision with the advocates of the utilitarian
scheme, particularly with Dr. Paley ; and accordingly
it will be found that he frequently enters the lists with
this great champion of expediency. With what suc-
cess— how well he exposes the fallacies of that specious
but dangerous doctrine — how far he succeeds in refut-
ing the arguments by which it is sought to be main-
tained, and in establishing another system of obliga-
tions and duties and rights upon a more stable founda-
tion, must be left to the reader to determine.

In thus attempting to convert a system of moral
philosophy, dubious, fluctuating, and inconsistent with
itself, into a definite and harmonious code of Scripture
Ethics, the author undertook a task for which, by the
original structure of his mind and his prevailing habits
of reflection, he was, perhaps, peculiarly fitted. He
had sought for himself, and he endeavors to convey to
others, clear perceptions of the true and the right ; and
in maintaining what he regarded as truth and rectitude,
he shows everywhere an unshackled independence of
mind, and a fearless, unflinching spirit. The work
will be found, moreover, if we mistake not, to be the
result of a careful study of the writings of moralists, of
much thought, of an intimate acquaintance with the
genius of the Christian religion, and an extensive ob-
servation of human life in those spheres of action which
are seldom apt to attract the notice of the meditative
philosopher.

In proceeding to illustrate his principles, the author
has evidently sought, as far as might be, to simplify
the subject, to disencumber it of abstruse and

PREFACE. Vll.

metaphysical appendages, and, rejecting subtleties
and needless distinctions, to exhibit a standard of
morals that should be plain, perspicuous and practicable.
Premising thus much, the work must be left to its
own merits. It is the last labor of a man laudably
desirous of benefiting his fellow men ; and it will fulfil
the author's wish, if its effect be to raise the general
tone of morals, to give distinctness to our perceptions
of rectitude, and to add strength to our resolutions to
virtue.

A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF
JONATHAN DYMOND.

In attempting to compile a biographical sketch of
Jonathan Dymond, to accompany the present edition of
his " Essays on the Principles of Morality, and on the
Private and Political Rights and Obligations of Man-
kind," it has been a matter of some surprise that the
material for such a memorial has proved to be very
meager. The explanation is probably to be found in
the retiring character of this gifted man, the close
application to business which he found needful in main-
taining his little family, and the brief period of life
allotted him. While therefore, his may be termed an
uneventful life, and one devoid of striking incident, it
was marked by rare fidelity to duty, the diligent occu-
pation of talents of no common order, combined with
a clearness of perception, and maturity of judgment
seldom met with in early years.

The thoughtful cast of his mind readily turned
toward questions involving some of the highest in-
terests of humanity, and the promotion of the Re-
deemer's kingdom, while in the eminently wise and
just conclusions which are reached in his writings, we
cannot doubt his intellectual powers were quickened and
sanctified by Divine grace, and his course of reasoning
guided by that "Spirit of truth" which our Lord

BIOGRAPHY OF JONATHAN DYMOND. ix.

promised his willing disciples should ' ' guide them into
all truth ; ' ; should take of the things of Christ and
show them unto them.

It has been long felt that an abridged edition of the
valuable treatise above referred to would prove of
especial service to schools in the United States, and be
the better adapted to the average American reader.
With this end in view, there have been omitted chap-
ters which treat of the national Constitution of Great
Britain, the system of Ecclesiastical Tythes, and some
views relating specifically to English law or usage.

It has also been thought best to omit chapters on
Slavery, as well as some other subjects, and a few
chapters have been simply abridged. It may be here
proper to state that when any alteration has been made
from the original text, it consists in omissions only.
This course has resulted in the production of a much
smaller volume which, while carefully preserving the
line of argument on which the author rests his conclu-
sions, it is believed does full justice to his exhaustive
and forcible method of dealing with the subject in
hand.

Jonathan Dymond was born in the year 1796 at
Exeter, England, where he generally resided until the
close of his life. His parents, John and Olive Dymond,
were highly esteemed members, and recognized Minis-
ters in the Religious Society of Friends. They
sought early to imbue the hearts of their children
with a deep love for their Heavenly Father, and a
reverence for the truths of the gospel of Jesus Christ,
their Saviour.

The bent of their son Jonathan's mind was soon dis-
played in a disposition for quiet reverie, so that, from
his contemplative habits, and the sagacious observa-
tions which he frequently dropped, his brothers play-

X. BIOGRAPHY OF JONATHAN DYMOND.

fully termed him ' ' the philosopher. ' ' They, as well
as he, possessed strong literary tastes, with good conver-
sational powers, while a fondness for discussing subjects
of general interest, and often those of graver import,
served to train their minds for taking broader views on
the leading topics of the day than were generally
accepted. In these discussions Jonathan took an
earnest part, exhibiting in his boyhood a marked talent
for debate.

In person he was slight, and in stature tall, being
somewhat above six feet in height. His countenance,
which was habitually pale, was brightened by a highly
intellectual and winning expression. In manner he was
unassuming, his habits were simple and inexpensive.
The business in which he engaged on reaching manhood,
was that of a " linen draper, ' ' and throughout the period
of financial depression which prevailed in England dur-
ing the latter part of his life, his dealings were marked by
strict integrity. In the settlement of disputed claims,
he was from time to time appealed to by his fellow-
citizens, and his mature judgment, as well as nice sense
of justice, especially fitted him for the service of an
arbitrator, in which he was not unfrequently employed.
It was at the conclusion of a wearisome and harassing
case of this kind, which had long and closely occupied
him, that the disease which eventually proved fatal
first made its appearance.

In 1822 he married a member of his own religious
persuasion, residing in Plymouth. The tender union
thus consummated was however but of brief duration.
A daughter and son completed their little family group.
The latter was a child of remarkable precocity, but
was removed by death when about seven years old.
Anna Dymond survived her husband nearly twenty-one
years. From a brief memorial written in 1850, the
following testimony to her character and worth, will

BIOGRAPHY OF JONATHAN DYMOND. xi.

prove of interest. Referring to the period following
the death of her beloved companion, it is stated ' ' her
consistent Christian deportment entitled her to be
ranked among those ' honorable women ' whom the
apostle styled ' widows indeed.' A series of domestic
afflictions marked her progress ; but, mournful as she
often was, her humble, silent acquiescence with the dis-
pensations of Divine Providence, and her efforts not to
allow her sorrows to interrupt the active duties of her
every-day life, were deeply instructive. Her removal
at a period when her ripened judgment and experience
rendered her influence and example very valuable, not
only in the social circle, but in the church, is felt to be
a great loss. She filled the stations both of ' elder
and overseer ' in the meeting to which she belonged,
and she discharged the duties of these important offices
with uprightness and integrity.

' ■ Her health for many years was delicate. Her last ill-
ness, wThich confined her to the house about four months
was of such a character as to leave little ground to hope
for her recovery, and she soon became aware that it
would probably terminate fatally. The resignation,
and even cheerfulness which she manifested, and, above
all, the Divine support with which she was sustained,
were deeply instructive to those whose privilege it was
to be her attendants.

" The progress of the disease was very gradual; but
becoming considerably weaker, and suffering much
from oppression, she said to those about her, ' I hope
you will be enabled to pray for me, that I may be speedily
released.' Later she petitioned, 'Oh gracious Iyord! be
pleased to take me home,' and soon after, on a beloved
relative calling to see her, she said, ' I trust all will be
well ! The language ' ' Be of good cheer, I have over-
came the world ' ' has occurred to my mind, and I can
take comfort from it.' On a hope being expressed

xil. BIOGRAPHY OP JONATHAN DYMOND.

that she was sensible of feeling the Holy one near, she
said that at times such was her blessed experience.

' • Her mental faculties continued clear, and the deep
quietness of her spirit was undisturbed, until at the
hour of midnight, the 20th of First month, 1849, her
redeemed and purified spirit passed away."

The first work by Jonathan Dymond which appeared
in print was entitled ' ' An Inquiry into the Accordancy
of War with the Principles of Christianity," and this
was ready for the press, before any of his nearest rela-
tives, with the exception of his wife and brother
William, were aware that he had been preparing it, the
former aiding him in correcting the proof-sheets. The
origin of this treatise was briefly as follows : The
author was a member of a small literary society, con-
sisting of himself, his brothers and a few other young
persons, whose contributions were styled the - ' Iscan
Budget," (Isca being the ancient Roman name of
Exeter). Its meetings were held once a month, when
the essays of the members were read and discussed.
Among others, some papers on the subject of War were
contributed by Jonathan Dymond, and these, when the
Association had ceased to exist, were deemed worthy
of more permanent preservation. After revision and
some modification, they were given to the public in
1823, under the above title.

During the printing and publishing of this work,
the active mind of our author had been strongly turned
toward the preparation of another, of still broader
scope, and designed to meet what he conceived to be a
pressing need of his fellow-men of every race and
condition. Henceforth he became deeply absorbed in
the effort to present to the world an authoritative
standard of moral rectitude, based upon the teachings
of Christianity as they had been proclaimed by its
Divine Founder. By an appeal to such a standard, he

BIOGRAPHY OF JONATHAN DYMOND. Xlll.

was persuaded the character of human actions
should be tested, rather than by the shifting rules
and maxims which had resulted, too often, from
the lower aims, false reasoning, and selfish instincts
of men who essayed to be teachers of morality and
virtue.

Although he did not live to complete this work to
his own satisfaction, nor was he able to revise the latter
part of it for printing, sufficient was accomplished to
comprise a treatise on Christian Ethics, which has
scarcely an equal for the clearness and courage with
which it has carried to their legitimate conclusions the
plain precepts of the Gospel, whether as regards their
practical application to every-day life, the internal
government of communities, or the relation of States
and Nations. In confirmation of the soundness of its
positions it is very observable, that though produced
more than half a century ago, views then advanced by
Dymond, but rejected as little more than Utopian,
have come to be accepted by not a few of the most
clear and thoughtful writers of the present day ; many
of his suggestions have been carried into successful
practice ; while steady advances are being continually
made toward those high ideals of Christian faith and
conduct wrhich are set forth in the ' ' Essays on the
Principles of Morality."

The disorder, already referred to, was now developing
into a chronic bronchial affection which prevented the
ordinary use of the voice, almost any effort to speak
bringing on paroxysms of coughing, so painful, that
he found it best to cease speaking altogether, using a
slate and pencil which he carried with him, as a sub-
stitute. Though in the habit of visiting London
periodically in connection with affairs of business, he
had never travelled extensively, but now, under the
advice of his physician, he sought relief by a change

XIV. BIOGRAPHY OF JONATHAN DYMOND.

of air and scene at various places in Devonshire recom-
mended for their salubrity.

Early in 1827 he went to London for consultation
with some of the most eminent medical men in that
city. Among others, he thus met Dr. Thos. Hancock,
who became deeply interested in his patient. In a
letter to a friend, Dr. Hancock remarked, " I enjoyed
but a short and melancholy portion of his society and
acquaintance, for it was under peculiar and trying
circumstances that I last saw him ; yet an impression
has been left on my mind that can never I think be
removed. " " His mind was then remarkably clear and
vigorous, and he appeared to be quite free from de-
pressing anticipations with regard to the result of
his malady. This proved in the end to be pulmonary
consumption. ' '

After his return from London, thirteen weeks were
passed at a farmhouse in the neighborhood of Exeter.
This was a retired and picturesque spot near the village
of Whitestone, and here he was soon diligently em-
ployed in preparing for the press the treatise contained
in this volume. In the shady lanes around his peaceful
retreat, he was wont to seek relaxation from the
sedentary labors of composition, a gentle pony carrying
him from one favorite rural scene to another. On these
rambles, he seldom started, without a copy in his
pocket of that sacred volume whose precepts he so
highly valued, and to whose inspired pages he was in
the habit of constantly referring. For twenty months
however, he was obliged to resort to his slate and
pencil for the expression of his thoughts or wishes,
which, to one of his conversational abilities, must have
proved no common trial.

From Whitestone, he thus wrote to a friend in the
summer of 1827 : " There is a time for all things — and
what I add, I add with seriousness ; that to feel quiet,

BIOGRAPHY OF JONATHAN DYMOND. XV.

and capable of enjoyment amidst trying circumstances,
is one amongst the great items of goodness for which
we are indebted to our Creator. Although I am not
always cheery, yet I have a happy share of that
chastened comfort which is perhaps as good for us as
more brilliant things." In a letter to his wife in 1828,
he writes : "I would not have thee cast down, for I
do not think there is cause for being so. Not that
there are no fears and no sorrows, but none that are
allowed to agitate and alarm me, for myself or for thee.
As to the matters of this world, I sometimes try to
leave them. To live a day at a time, seems our present
business ; without over anxiety for greater enjoyment
or brighter prospects, in temporals or spirituals either."

On returning to his home at Exeter, he assiduously
continued the preparation of his "Essays," a great
part of which, as well as his " Inquiry into the accord-
ancy of War with the Principles of Christianity," were
written in a little room adjoining his shop, subject to
frequent interruptions from customers, in the midst of
his most profound and engrossing thoughts.

Of the closing days of Jonathan Dymond, whose de-
cease occurred on the 6th of Fifth month, 1828, at
the age of thirty-one, his father, in a letter to Dr.
Hancock, writes : ' ' Through the merciful regard of
our Holy Head and High Priest, I believe I may
venture to say that his mind was kept in perfect peace,
and that he was favored while living to experience a
foretaste of that state of blessedness into which I dare
not doubt his being entered."

The year 1828 proved one of sore bereavement to the
family of John Dymond. The letter from him, above
referred to, records the death of his daughter, the 8th
of Third mo.; his son George, the 24th of Fourth mo.;
and Jonathan Dymond, as already stated, the 6th of
Fifth mo. ' ' So, ' ' the stricken father continues,, ' ' in

XVI. BIOGRAPHY OF JONATHAN DYMOND.

rather less than two months, I have had to experience
the loss of three of my children, near and dear to me,
not only by the ties of nature, but additionally so, as
they were all of them eminently favored with the prec-
ious influence of Heavenly love, and concerned in no
ordinary degree to live in the fear of Him who called
them to virtue, and who, I humbly trust, has received
them into glory."

To the close of his well-spent life, Jonathan Dymond
bore with remarkable patience and serenity the suffer-
ings and privations attending his failing health. He
displayed an entire resignation to the Divine will and
a childlike trust in his Heavenly Father, while he was
by no means a stranger to that spiritual communion
with God, which is the sacred privilege of the true
Christian. His estimate of his own religious attain-
ments was exceedingly humble, and on his death-bed
he evidenced a deep conviction of that great truth re-
ferred to in the concluding words of his " Essays,"
namely, that the only foundation of our hope for eter-
nity is the mercy of God, "through the redemption
that is in Christ Jesus. ' '

Note. — In preparing the foregoing sketch the compiler has
drawn largely upon, and used freely, a brief biography of Jona-
than Dymond which precedes the American edition of his
Essays, published in New York, in 1834. The passing refer-
ence to his wife, Anna Dymond, is taken from a short memo-
rial contained in the " Annual Monitor," for 1850.

CONTENTS.

ESSAY I.
PART I.— PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY.

PAGE

CHAP. I. MORAL OBLIGATION i

Foundation of moral obligation.

CHAP. II. STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG 2

The will of God— Notices of theories— The communication of
the will of God — The supreme authority of the expressed
will of God— Causes of its practical rejection— The principles
of expediency fluctuating and inconsistent— Application of
the principles of expediency — Difficulties— Liability to abuse
— Pagans.

The will 'of God 3

The communication of the will of God 6

CHAP. III. SUBORDINATE STANDARDS OF RIGHT AND WRONG 21
Foundation and limits of the authority of subordinate moral
rules.

CHAP. IV. COLLATERAL OBSERVATIONS 23

Identical authority of moral and religious obligations... 23
Identical authority of moral and religious obligations — The
Divine attributes— Of deducing rules of human duty from a con-
sideration of the attributes of God — Virtue: " Virtue is confor-
mity with the standard of rectitude "—Motives of action.

The Divine attributes 25

Virtue 27

CHAP. V. SCRIPTURE 29

The morality of the Patriarchal, Mosaic and Christian dispensa-
tions— Their moral requisitions not always coincident — Supre-
macy of the Christian morality— Of variations in the moral
law — Mode of applying the precepts of Scripture to questions
of duty— No formal moral system in Scripture— Criticism of
Biblical morality — Of particular precepts and general rules.
Matt. vii. 12.— 1 Cor x. 31. — Rom. lii. 8.— Benevolence, as it is
proposed in the Christian Scriptures.

The morality of the Patriarchal, Mosaic and Christian

dispensations 29

Mode of applying the precepts of Scripture to questions

OF DUTY 37

Benevolence, as it is proposed in the Christian Scrip-
tures 49

CONTENTS.

PAGE

CHAP. VI. THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL

OF GOD , 52

Conscience — Its nature — Its authority— Review of opinions re-
specting a moral sense— Bishop Butler — Lord Bacon— Locke —
Southey— Adam Smith— Paley— Milton— Judge Hale— Marcus
Antoninus— Epictetus — Seneca— Paul— That every human being
possesses a moral law— Pagans— Gradations of light— Prophecy
— The immediate communication of the Divine will perpetual
— Of national vices : Infanticide : Duelling— Of savage life.

Section I. Conscience, its nature and authority 54

Review of opinions respecting a moral sense 61

The immediate communication of the will of God 68

ESSAY I.

PART II.— SUBORDINATE MEANS OF DISCOVERING
THE DIVINE WILL.

CHAP. I. THE LAW OF THE LAND 82

Its authority— Limits to its authority— Morality sometimes pro-
hibits what the law permits.

CHAP. II. THE LAW OF NATURE 89

Its authority— Limits to its authority— Obligations resulting from
the rights of nature — Incorrect ideas attached to the word
nature.

CHAP. III. UTILITY 96

Obligations resulting from expediency— Limits to these obliga-
tions.

CHAP. IV. THE LAW OF NATIONS.— THE LAW OF HONOR 102

Section I. The law of nations 102

Obligations and authority of the law of nations— Its abuses, and
the limits of its authority — Treaties.

Section II. The law of honor 108

Authority of the law of honor— Its character.

ESSAY II.
PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.

CHAP. I. RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS in

Factitious semblances of devotion— Religious conversation : Sab-
batical institutions— Non-sanctity of days— Of temporal em-
ployments : traveling : stage-coaches : " Sunday papers : "

CONTENTS.

PAGE

amusements — Holy days— Ceremonial institutions and devo-
tional formularies — Utility of forms— Forms of prayer — Extem-
pore prayer — Scepticism — Motives to scepticism.

Sabbatical institutions 117

Ceremonial institutions and devotional formularies 123

CHAP. II. PROPERTY 133

Foundation of the right to property— Insolvency : perpetual obli-
gation to pay debts : reform of public opinion : examples of
integrity— Wills, legatees, heirs : informal wills : intestates-
Minor's debts— A wife's debts— Bills of exchange— Unjust de-
fendants—Privateers—Confiscations—Insurance—Settlements—
Houses of infamy — Literary property — Rewards.

CHAP. III. INEQUALITY OF PROPERTY 156

Accumulation of wealth: its proper limits— Provision for child-
ren : " keeping up the family."

CHAP. IV. LITIGATION— ARBITRATION 164

Practice of early Christians — Evils of litigation— Efficiency of
arbitration.

CHAP. V. THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE 170

Complexity of law— Professional untruths— Defences of legal
practice— Effects of legal practice : seduction : theft : pecula-
tion—Pleading—The duties of the profession— Effects of legal
practice on the profession, and on the public.

CHAP. VI. PROMISES— LIES 188

Promises — Definition of a promise — Parole — Extorted promises

— John Fletcher.
Lies— Milton's definition— Lies in war : to robbers : to lunatics :

to the sick — Hyperbole— Irony— Complimentary untruths—

"Not at home."

CHAP. VII OATHS 201

Their Moral Character— Their Efficacy as Securities of

Veracity— Their Effects 211

A Curse— Immorality of oaths— Oaths of the ancient Jews— Milton
— Paley— The High Priest's adjuration— Early Christians— In-
efficacy of oaths — Motives to veracity — Religious sanctions : .
public opinion — Legal penalties— Oaths in evidence : parlia-
mentary evidence : courts martial— The United States— Effects
of oaths : falsehood — General obligations.

CHAP. VIII. IMMORAL AGENCY 223

Publication and circulation of books — Seneca — Circulating libra-
ries—Prosecutions— Political affairs.

CHAP. IX. THE INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALS UPON PUBLIC

NOTIONS OF MORALITY 231

Public notions of morality — Errors of public opinion : their
effects— Duelling — Glory — Military virtues — Military talent —
Bravery — Courage — Patriotism not the soldier's motive — Mili-
tary fame — Public opinion of unchastity : in women : in men —
Power of character— Character— Character in legal men— Fame
—Faults of great men— The press— Newspapers— History : its
defects : its power.

CHAP. X. MORAL EDUCATION 262

Union of moral principle with the affections— Society— Morality
of the ancient classics— The supply of motives to virtue — Con-
science— Subjugation of the will— Knowledge of our own minds
— Offices of public worship.

CHAP. XL EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE 277

Advantages of extended education — Infant schools — Habits of
enquiry.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

CHAP. XII. AMUSEMENTS 283

The Stage — Religious amusements — Masquerades — Field-sports —
The turf— Boxing— Wrestling— -Opinions of posterity — Popular
amusements needless.

CHAP. XIII. SUICIDE 291

Unmanliness of suicide— Forbidden in the New Testament— Its
folly.

CHAP. XIV. RIGHTS OF SELF-DEFENCE 295

These rights not absolute— Their limits— Personal attack— Pre-
servation of property — Much resistance lawful— Effects of for-
bearance— Sharpe — Barclay — Ellwood.

ESSAY III.
POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.

CHAP. I. PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL TRUTH, AND OF POLIT-
ICAL RECTITUDE 308

I. " Political power is rightly exercised only when it is possessed
by consent of the community " — Governors, officers of the pub-
lic— Transfer of their rights by a whole people — The people
hold the sovereign power— Right of Governors— A conciliating
system.

II. "Political power is rightly exercised only when it subserves
the welfare of the community" — Interference with other na-
tions—Present expedients for present occasions — Proper busi-
ness of governments.

III. 'Political power is rightly exercised only when it sub-
serves the welfare of the community by means which the moral
law permits" — The moral law alike binding on nations and
individuals — Deviation from rectitude impolitic.

I. "Political power is rightly possessed only when it

IS POSSESSED BY CONSENT OF THE COMMUNITY " v.. 309

II. "Political power is rightly exercised only when

IT SUBSERVES THE WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY" 314

III. " Political power is rightly exercised only when

IT SUBSERVES THE WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY BY MEANS
WHICH THE MORAL LAW PERMITS" 3l8

CHAP. II. CIVIL LIBERTY 324

Loss of liberty — War — Useless laws.

CHAP. III. CIVIL OBEDIENCE 327

Expediency of obedience — Obligations to obedience — Extent of
the duty — Resistance to the civil power — Obedience may be
withdrawn — King James — America — Non-compliance — Inter-
ference of the Magistrate.

CHAP. IV. POLITICAL INFLUENCE 338

Effects of influence— Incongruity of public notions— Patronage-
Dependency on the mother country.

CHAP. V. MORAL LEGISLATION 342

Duties of a ruler— The two objects of moral legislation— Educa-
tion of the people— Abrogation of bad laws.

CONTENTS. XXI.

PAGE

CHAP. VI. OF THE PROPER ENDS OF PUNISHMENT 346

The three objects of punishment:— Reformation of the offender; —
Example:— Restitution— Punishment may be increased as well
as diminished.

CHAP. VII. PUNISHMENT OF DEATH 351

Of the three objects of punishment the punishment of death re-
gards but one — Reformation of minor offenders : greater crimi-
nals neglected — Capital punishments not efficient as examples
— Public executions — Paul — Grotius — Murder — The punishment
of death irrevocable — Rousseau — Recapitulation.

CHAP. VIII. RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS 365

The primitive church — The established church of Ireland — Amer-
ica— Advantages and disadvantages of established churches —
Alliance of a church with the state — Persecution generally the
growth of religious establishments— State religions injurious to
the civil welfare of a people— Voluntary payment.

CHAP. IX. PATRIOTISM 387

Patriotism as it is viewed by Christianity — A patriotism which is
opposed to general benignity— Patriotism not the soldier's
motive.

CHAP. X. WAR 392

Causes of war 395

Want of enquiry : indifference to human misery : national irrita-
bility : interest : secret motives of cabinets : ideas of glory-
Foundation of military glory.

Consequences of war 406

Destruction of human life : taxation : moral depravity : familiar-
ity with plunder: implicit submission to superiors : resignation
of moral agency : Bondage and degradation — Loan of armies —
Effects on the community.

LAWFULNESS OF WAR 420

Influence of habit— Of appealing to antiquity— The Christian
Scriptures — Subjects of Christ's benediction — Matt. xxvi. 52 —
The apostles and evangelists — The centurion — Cornelius — Si-
lence not a proof of approbation — Luke xxii. 36 — John the Bap-
tist—Negative evidence— Prophecies of the Old Testament—
The requisitions of Christianity of present obligation— Primi-
tive Christians — Example and testimony of early Christians —
Christian soldiers — Wars of the Jews — Duties of individuals and
nations — Offensive and defensive war — Wars always aggressive
— Paley — War wholly forbidden.

OF THE PROBABLE AND PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF ADHERING TO

THE MORAL LAW IN RESPECT TO WAR 458

Quakers in America and Ireland — Colonization of Pennsylvania-
Unconditional reliance on Providence — Recapitulation— Gen-
eral observations.

CONCLUSION 47c

INTRODUCTORY NOTICES.

Of the two causes of our deviations from rectitude —
want of knowledge and want of virtue — the latter is un-
doubtedly the more operative. Want of knowledge is,
however, sometimes a cause ; nor can this be any subject
of wonder when it is recollected in what manner many of
our notions of right and wrong are acquired. From in-
fancy, every one is placed in a sort of moral school, in
which those with whom he associates, or of whom he
hears, are the teachers. That the learner in such a school
will often be taught amiss, is plain. — So that we want in-
formation respecting our duties. To supply this informa-
tion is an object of moral philosophy, and is attempted in
the present work.

When it is considered by what excellences the existing
treatises on moral philosophy are recommended, there can
remain but one reasonable motive for adding yet another
— the belief that these treatises have not exhibited the
principles and enforced the obligations of morality in all
their perfection and purity. Perhaps the frank expression
of this belief is not inconsistent with that deference which
it becomes every man to feel when he addresses the pub-
lic ; because, not to have entertained such a belief, were
to have possessed no reason for writing. The desire of
supplying the deficiency, if deficiency there be ; of exhib-
iting a true and authoritative standard of rectitude, and
of estimating the moral character of human actions by an
appeal to that standard, is the motive which has induced
the composition of these essays.

In the First Essay the writer has attempted to investi-
gate the principles of morality. In which term is here
included, first, the ultimate standard of right and wrong;
and, secondly, those subordinate rules to which we are
authorized to apply for the direction of our conduct in
life. In these investigations he has been solicitous to

INTRODUCTORY NOTICES. XX111.

avoid any approach to curious or metaphysical enquiry.
He has endeavored to act upon the advice given by Tindal
the Reformer, to his friend John Frith : ' ' Pronounce not
or define of hid secrets, or things that neither help nor
hinder whether it be so or no ; but stick you stiffly and
stubbornly in earnest and necessary things. "

In the Second Essay these principles of morality are
applied in the determination of various questions of per-
sonal and relative duty. In making this application, it
has been far from the writer's desire to deliver a system of
morality. Of the unnumbered particulars to which this
essay might have been extended, he has therefore made a
selection ; and in making it, has chosen those subjects
which appear peculiarly to need the enquiry, either be-
cause the popular or philosophical opinions respecting
them appeared to be unsound, or because they were com-
monly little adverted to in the practice of life. Form has
been sacrificed to utility. Many great duties have been
passed over, since no one questions their obligation ; nor
has the author so little consulted the pleasure of the
reader as to expatiate upon duties simply because they
are great. The reader will also regard the subjects that
have been chosen as selected, not only for the purpose of
elucidating the subjects themselves, but as furnishing
illustration of the general principles — as the compiler of a
book of mathematics proposes a variety of examples, not
merely to discover the solution of the particular problem,
but to familiarize the application of his general rule.

Of the Third Essay, in which some of the great ques-
tions of political rectitude have been examined, the sub-
jects are in themselves sufficiently important. The appli-
cation of sound and pure moral principles to questions of
government, of legislation, of the administration of jus-
tice, or of religious establishments, is manifestly of great
interest ; and the interest is so much the greater, because
these subjects have usually been examined, as the writer
conceives, by other and very different standards.

The reader will probably find, in each of these essays,
some principles or some conclusions respecting human
duties to which he has not been accustomed — some opin-
ions called in question which he has habitually regarded
as being indisputably true, and some actions exhibited as
forbidden by morality which he has supposed to be lawful
and right. In such cases I must hope for his candid in-
vestigation of the truth, and that he will not reject con-
clusions but by the detection of inaccuracy in the reason-

XXIV. INTRODUCTORY NOTICES.

ings from which they are deduced. I hope he will not
find himself invited to alter his opinions or his conduct
without being shown why ; and if he is conclusively
shown this, that he will not reject truth because it is new
or unwelcome.

With respect to the present influence of the principles
which these essays illustrate, the author will feel no dis-
appointment if it is not great. It is not upon the expec-
tation of such influence that his motive is founded or his
hope rests. His motive is, to advocate truth without ref-
erence to its popularity ; and his hope is, to promote by
these feeble exertions, an approximation to that state of
purity, which he believes it is the design of God shall
eventually beautify and dignify the condition of mankind.

ESSAY I.

PART I.

Principles of Morality.

CHAPTER I.

MORAL OBLIGATION.
Foundation of Moral Obligation.

ThkrK is little hope of proposing a definition of
moral obligation which shall be satisfactory to every
reader ; partly because the phrase is the representative
of different notions in individual minds. No single
definition can, it is evident, represent various notions ;
and there are probably no means by which the notions
of individuals respecting moral obligation can be ad-
justed to one standard. Accordingly, whilst attempts
to define it have been very numerous, all probably have
been unsatisfactory to the majority of mankind.

Happily this question, like many others upon which
the world is unable to agree, is of little practical im-
portance. Many who dispute about the definition,
coincide in their judgments of what we are obliged to
do and to forbear ; and so long as the individual knows
that he is actually the subject of moral obligation, and
actually responsible to a superior power, it is not of much
consequence whether he can critically explain in what
moral obligation consists.

The writer of these pages, therefore, makes no attempts
at strictness of definition. It is sufficient for his pur-
pose that man is under an obligation to obey his Creator;

2 STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. [ESSAY I.

and if any one curiously asks " Why?" — he answers,
that o?ie reason at least is, that the Deity possesses the
power, and evinces the intention, to call the human
species to account for their actions, and to punish or
reward them.

There may be, and I believe there are, higher grounds
upon which a sense of moral obligation may be founded;
such as the love of goodness for its own sake, or love
and gratitude to God for his beneficence : nor is it un-
reasonable to suppose that such grounds of obligation
are especially approved by the universal Parent of
mankind.

CHAPTER II.
STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

The Will of God — Notices of Theories —The communication of
the Will of God — The supreme authority of the expressed
Will of God — Causes of its practical rejection — The principles
of expediency fluctuating and inconsistent — Application of
the principles of expediency — Difficulties — Liability to abuse —
Pagans.

It is obvious that to him who seeks the knowledge
of his duty, the first inquiry is, What is the rule of
duty? What is the standard of right and wrong?
Most men, or most of those with whom we are con-
cerned, agree that this standard consists in the will of
God. But here the coincidence of opinion stops. Various
and very dissimilar answers are given to the question,
How is the will of God to be discovered ? These dif-
ferences lead to differing conclusions respecting human
duty. All the proposed modes of discovering his will
cannot be the best nor the right ; and those which are
not right are likely to lead to erroneous conclusions
respecting what his will is.

CHAP. IlJ. STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. 3

It becomes therefore a question of very great inter-
est— How is the will of God to be discovered ? and if
there should appear to be more sources than one from
which it may be deduced — What is that source which,
in our investigatipns, we are to regard as paramount to
every other ?

THE WILL OF GOD.

When we say that most men agree in referring to the
will of God as the standard of rectitude, we do not
mean that all those who have framed systems of moral
philosophy have set out wTith this proposition as their
fundamental rule; but we mean that the majority of man-
kind do really believe (with whatever indistinctness)
that they ought to obey the will of God ; and that, as
it respects the systems of philosophical men, they will
commonly be found to involve, directly or indirectly,
the same belief. He who says that the ' ' Understand-
ing "* is to be our moral guide, is not far from saying
that we are to be guided by the Divine will ; because
the understanding, however we define it, is the offspring
of the Divine counsels and power. When Adam Smith
resolves moral obligation into propriety arising from
feelings of " Sympathy, "f the conclusion is not very
different ; for these feelings are manifestly the result of
that constitution which God gave to man. When
Bishop Butler says that we ought to live according to
nature, and make conscience the judge whether we do
so live or not, a kindred observation arises ; for the
existence and nature of conscience must be referred
ultimately to the Divine will. Dr. Samuel Clarke's
philosophy is, that moral obligation is to be referred to
the eternal and necessary differences of things. This
might appear less obviously to have respect to the Divine

* Dr. Price : Review of Principal Questions in Morals.
| Theory of Moral Sentiments.

4 STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. [ESSAY I.

will, yet Dr. Clarke himself subsequently says, that
the duties which these eternal differences of things im-
pose, " are also the express and unalterable will, com-
mand and law of God to his creatures, which he cannot
but expect should be observed by them in obedience to
his supreme authority."! Very similar is the practical
doctrine of Wollaston. His theory is, that moral good
and evil consist in a conformity or disagreement with
truth — "in treating every thing as being what it is."
But then he says, that to act by this rule ' ' must be
agreeable to the will of God, and if so, the contrary
must be disagreeable to it, and, since there must be
perfect rectitude in his will, certainly wrong. "§ It is
the same with Dr. Paley in his far-famed doctrine of
Expediency. "It is the utility of any action alone
which constitutes the obligation of it ; " but this very
obligation is deduced from the Divine Benevolence ;
from which it is attempted to show, that a regard to
utility is enforced by the will of God. Nay, he says
expressly, " Every duty is a duty towards God, since
it is his will which makes it a duty."||

Now there is much value in these testimonies,
direct or indirect, to the truth — that the will of God is
the standard of right and wrong. The indirect tes-
timonies are perhaps the more valuable of the two. He
who gives undesigned evidence in favor of a proposition,
is less liable to suspicion in his motives.

But, whilst we regard these testimonies, and such as
these, as containing satisfactory evidence that the will
of God is our moral law, the intelligent enquirer will
perceive that many of the proposed theories are likely
to lead to uncertain and unsatisfactory conclusions
respecting what that will requires. They prove that

% Evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion.
I Religion of Nature Delineated.
|| Moral and Political Philosophy.

CHAP. II.] STANDARD, OF RIGHT AND WRONG. 5

His will is the standard, but they do not clearly in-
form us how we shall bring our actions into juxtaposi-
tion with it.

One proposes the Understanding as the means ; but
every observer perceives that the understandings of
men are often contradictory in their decisions. Indeed
many of those who now think their understandings
dictate the rectitude of a given action, will find that
the understandings of the intelligent pagans of anti-
quity came to very different conclusions.

A second proposes Sympathy, regulated indeed and
restrained, but still sympathy. However ingenious a
philosophical system may be, I believe that good men
find, in the practice of life, that these emotions are fre-
quently unsafe, and sometimes erroneous guides of
their conduct. Besides, the emotions are to be regu-
lated and restrained ; which of itself intimates the
necessity of a regulating and restraining, that is, of a
superior power.

To say we should act according to the ' ' eternal and
necessary differences of things, " is to advance a propo-
sition which nine persons out of ten do not understand,
and of course cannot' adopt in practice ; and of those
who do understand it, perhaps an equal majority can-
not apply it, with even tolerable facility, to the con-
cerns of life. Why indeed should a writer propose
these eternal differences, if he acknowledges that the
rules of conduct which result from them are ' ' the ex-
press will and command of God ? ' '

To the system of a fourth, which says that virtue
consists in a " conformity of our actions with truth,"
the objection presents itself — what is truth ? or how, in
the complicated affairs of life, and in the moment per-
haps of sudden temptation, shall the individual discover
what truth is ?

Similar difficulties arise in applying the doctrine of

y***V^ R A?PS*V

J OF THK ^^

f UNIVERSITY J

6 STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. [ESSAY I.

utility in "adjusting our actions so as to promote, in
the greatest degree, the happiness of mankind." It is
obviously difficult to apply this doctrine in practice.
The welfare of mankind depends upon circumstances
which, if it were possible, it is not easy to foresee. In-
deed in many of those conjunctures in which important
decisions must instantly be made, the computation of
tendencies to general happiness is wholly impracticable.

Besides these objections which apply to the systems
separately, there is one which applies to them all —
That they do not refer us directly to the will of God.
They interpose a medium ; and it is the inevitable ten-
dency of all such mediums to render the truth un-
certain. They depend not indeed upon hearsay
evidence, but upon something of which the tendency
is the same. They seek the will of God not from
positive evidence but by implication ; and we repeat
the truth, that every medium that is interposed between
the Divine will and our estimates of it, diminishes the
probability that we shall estimate it rightly.

These are considerations which, antecedently to all
others, would prompt us to seek the will of God di-
rectly and immediately ; and it is evident that this
direct and immediate knowledge of the Divine will,
can in no other manner be possessed than by his own
communication of it.

THE COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL OF GOD.

That a direct communication of the will of the
Deity respecting the conduct which mankind shall pur-
sue, must be very useful to them, can need little proof.
It is sufficiently obvious that they who have had no
access to the written revelations, have commonly enter-
tained very imperfect views of right and wrong. What
Dr. Johnson says of the ancient epic poets, will apply
generally to pagan philosophers : They ' ' were very

CHAP. II.] STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. 7

unskilful teachers of virtue, ' ' because ' ' they wanted
the light of revelation." Yet these men were inquis-
itive and acute, and it may be supposed they would
have discovered moral truth if sagacity and inquisitive-
ness had been sufficient for the task. But it is
unquestionable, that there are many plowmen in this
country who possess more accurate knowledge of mor-
ality than all the sages of antiquity. We do not indeed
sufficiently consider for how much knowledge respecting
the Divine will we are indebted to his own commun-
ication of it. " Many arguments, many truths, both
moral and religious, which appear to us the products of
our understandings and the fruits of ratiocination, are
in reality nothing more than emanations from Scripture;
rays of the gospel imperceptibly transmitted, and as it
were conveyed to our minds in a side light.* Of L,ord
Herbert's book, De Veritate, which was designed to
disprove the validity of revelation, it is observed by
the editor of his " L,ife," that it is "a book so strongly
embued with the light of revelation relative to the
moral virtues and a future life, that no man ignorant of
the Scriptures or of the knowledge derived from them,
could have written it."f A modern system of moral
philosophy is founded upon the duty of doing good to
man, because it appears, from benevolence of God him-
self, that such is His will. Did those philosophers then,
who had no access to the written expression of his will,
discover with any distinctness this seemingly obvious
benevolence of God? No. "The heathens failed of
drawing that deduction relating to morality, to which,
as we should now judge, the most obvious parts of
natural knowledge, and such as certaintly obtained
among them, were sufficient to lead them, namely, the

*Balguy. Tracts Moral and Theological : — Second letter to
a Deist.

f 4th Ed., p. 336.

8 STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. [ESSAY I.

the goodness of God" \ — We are, I say, much more
indebted to revelation for moral light, than we com-
monly acknowledge or indeed commonly perceive.

But if in fact we obtain from the communication of
the will of God, knowledge of wider extent and of a
higher order than was otherwise attainable, is it not an
argument that the communicated will should be our
supreme law, and that, if any of the inferior means
of acquiring moral knowledge lead to conclusions
in opposition to that will, they ought to give way to
its higher authority?

Indeed the single circumstance that an Omniscient
Being, and who also is the Judge of mankind, has ex-
pressed his will respecting their conduct, appears a
sufficient evidence that they should regard that expres-
sion as their paramount rule. They cannot elsewhere
refer to so high an authority. If the expression of his
will is not the ultimate standard of right and wrong,
it can only be on the supposition that his will itself is
not the ultimate standard ; for no other means of
ascertaining that will can be equally perfect and
authoritative.

Another consideration is this, that if we examine
those sacred volumes in which the written expression
of the Divine will is contained, we find that they
habitually proceed upon the supposition that the will
of God being expressed, is for that reason our final law.
They do not set about formal proofs that we ought to
sacrifice inferior rules to it, but conclude, as of course,
that if the will of God is made known, human duty is
ascertained. It is not to be imagined that the Scrip-
tures would' refer to any other foundation of virtue than
the true one, and certain it is that the foundation to
which they constantly do refer is the will of God." %

f Pearson : Remarks on the Theory of Morals.
% Pearson : Theory of Mor. c. I.

CHAP. II.] STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. 9

Nor is this all : they refer to the expression of the will
of God. We hear nothing of any other ultimate au-
thority— nothing of " sympathy " — nothing of the
" eternal fitness of things " — nothing of the "produc-
tion of the greatest sum of enjoyment;' ' — but we hear,
repeatedly, constantly, of the will of God ; of the
voice of God ; of the commands of God. To be obe-
dient unto his voice,"* is the condition of favor. To
hear the "sayings of Christ and do them,"f is the
means of obtaining his approbation. To ' 'fear God
and keep his commandments, is the whole duty of
man." % Even superior intelligences are described as
" doing his commandments, hearkening unto the voice
of Uis word."% In short, the whole system of moral
legislation, as it is exhibited in Scripture, is a system
founded upon authority. The propriety, the utility
of the requisitions are not made of importance. That
which is made of importance is, the authority of the
Being who legislates. "Thussaith the Iyord," is re-
garded as constituting a sufficient and a final law. So
also it is with the moral instructions of Christ. ' ' He
put the truth of what he taught upon authority." ||
In the sermon on the mount, I say unto you, is proposed
as the sole, and sufficient, and ultimate ground of obli-
gation. He does not say, My precepts will promote
human happiness, therefore you are to obey them : but
he says, They are my precepts, therefore you are to
obey them. So habitually is this principle borne in
mind, if we may so speak, by those who were com-
missioned to communicate the Divine will, that the
reason of a precept is not often assigned. The assump-
tion evidently was, that the Divine will was all that
it was necessary for us to know. This is not the mode
of enforcing duties which one man usually adopts in

*Deut. iv. 30. fMatt. vii. 24. JEccl. xii. 13.

£Pa. ciii. 20. ||Paley : Evid. of Chris, p. 2, c. 2.

IO STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. [ESSAY I.

addressing another. He discusses the reasonableness
of his advices and the advantages of following them,
as well as, perhaps, the authority from which he de-
rives them. The difference that exists between such a
mode and that which is actually adopted in Scripture,
is analogous to that which exists between the mode in
which a parent communicates his instructions to a
young child, and that which is employed by a tutor to
an intelligent youth. The tutor recommends his in-
structions by their reasonableness and propriety : the
father founds his upon his own authority. Not that
the father's instructions are not also founded in pro-
priety, but that this, in respect of young children, is
not the ground upon which he expects their obe-
dience. It is not the ground upon which God expects
the obedience of man. We can, undoubtedly, in gen-
eral perceive the wisdom of his laws, and it is doubtless
right to seek out that wisdom- ; but whether we dis-
cover it or not, does not lessen their authority nor alter
our duties.

In deference to these reasonings, then, we conclude
that the communicated will of God is the Final Stan-
dard of Right and Wrong — that wheresoever this will
is made known, human duty is determined — and that
neither the conclusions of philosophers, nor advantages,
nor dangers, nor pleasures, nor sufferings, ought to
have any opposing influence in regulating our conduct.
Let it be remembered that in morals there can be no
equilibrium of authority. If the expressed will of the
Deity is not our supreme rule, some other is superior.
This fatal consequence is inseparable from the adoption
of any other ultimate rule of conduct. The Divine law
becomes the decision of a certain tribunal — the adopted
rule, the decision of a superior tribunal — for that must
needs be the superior which can reverse the decisions of
the other. It is a consideration, too, which may reason-

CHAP. II.] STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. II

ably alarm the enquirer, that if once we assume this
power of dispensing with the Divine law, there is no
limit to its exercise. If we may supersede one precept
of the Deity upon one occasion, we may supersede
every precept upon all occasions. Man becomes the
greater authority, and God the less.

If a proposition is proved to be true, no contrary
reasonings can show it to be false ; and yet it is neces-
sary to refer to such reasonings, not indeed for the sake
of the truth, but for the sake of those whose conduct
it should regulate. Their confidence in truth may be
increased if they discover that the reasonings which as-
sail it are fallacious. To a considerate man it will be
no subject of wonder that the supremacy of the ex-
pressed will of God is often not recognized in the writ-
ings of moralists or in the practice of life. The specula-
tive enquirer finds, that of some of the questions which
come before him, Scripture furnishes no solution, and
he seeks for some principle by which all may be solved.
This indeed is the ordinary course of those who erect
systems, whether in morals or in physics. The moralist
acknowledges, perhaps, the authority of revelation ; but
in his investigations he passes away from the precepts of
revelation to some of those subordinate means by which
human duties may be discovered, — means which,
however authorized by the Deity as subservient to his
great purpose of human instruction, are wholly un-
authorized as ultimate standards of right and wrong.
Having fixed his attention upon these subsidiary
means, he practically loses sight of the Divine law
which he acknowledges : and thus without any formal,
perhaps without any conscious, rejection of the ex-
pressed will of God, he really makes it subordinate to
inferior rules. Another influential motive to pass by
the Divine precepts, operates both upon writers and
upon the public: — the rein which they hold upon the de-

12 STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. [ESSAY I.

sires and passions of mankind, is more tight than they
are willing to bear. Respecting some of these pre-
cepts we feel as the rich man of old felt : we hear the
injunction and go away, if not with sorrow yet with-
out obedience. Here again is an obvious motive to the
writer to endeavor to substitute some less rigid rule of
conduct, and an obvious motive to the reader to ac-
quiesce in it as true without a very rigid scrutiny into
its foundation. To adhere with fidelity to the expressed
will of heaven, requires greater confidence in God
than most men are willing to repose, or than most mor-
alists are willing to recommend.

But whatever have been the causes, the fact is indis-
putable, that few or none of the systems of morality
which have been offered to the world, have uniformly
and consistently applied the communicated will of God
in determination of those questions to which it is appli-
cable. Some insist upon its supreme authority in
general terms ; others apply it in determining some
questions of rectitude : but where is the work that ap-
plies it always? Where is the moralist who holds
everything, ease, interest, reputation, expediency,
"honor," — personal and national, — in subordination
to this moral law ?

One source of ambiguity and of error in moral phil-
osophy, has consisted in the indeterminate use of the
term, "the will of God." It is used without refer-
ence to the mode by which that will is to be discovered
— and it is in this mode that the essence of the contro-
versy lies. We are agreed that the will of God is to
be our rule": the question at issue is, What mode of dis-
covering it should be primarily adopted ? Now the term,
the "will of God," has been applied, interchange-
ably, to the precepts of Scripture, and to the deductions
which have been made from other principles. The
consequence has been that the imposing sanction, " the

CHAP. II. J • STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. 13

will of God," has been applied to propositions of very
different authority.

To inquire into the validity of all those principles
which have been proposed as the standard of rectitude,
would be foreign to the purpose of this essay. That
principle which appears to be most recommended by its
own excellence and beauty, and which obtains the
greatest share of approbation in the world, is the prin-
ciple of directing ' ' every action so as to produce the
greatest happiness and the least misery in our. power. ' '
The particular forms of defining the doctrine are var-
ious, but they may be conveniently included in the one
general term — Expediency.

We say that the apparent beauty and excellence of
this rule of action are so captivating, its actual accept-
ance in the world is so great, and the reasonings by
which it is supported are so acute, that if it can be shown
that this rule is not the ultimate standard of right and
wrong, we may safely conclude that none other which
philosophy has proposed can make pretentions to such
authority. The truth indeed is, that the objections to
the doctrine of expediency will generally be found to
apply to every doctrine which lays claim to moral
supremacy — which application the reader is requested
to make for himself as he passes along.

Respecting the principle of expediency — the doctrine
that we should, in every action, endeavor to produce
the greatest sum of human happiness — let it always be
remembered that the only question is, whether it ought
to be the paramount rule of human conduct. No one
doubts whether it ought to influence us, or whether it
is of great importance in estimating the duties of mor-
ality. The sole question is this : — When an expression
of the will of God, and our calculations respecting
human happiness, lead to different conclusions respect-
ing the rectitude of an action — whether of the two
shall we prefer and obey ?

14 STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. [ESSAY I.

We are concerned only with Christian writers.
Now, when we come to analyze the principles of the
Christian advocates of expediency, we find precisely
the result which we should expect — a perpetual vacil-
lation between two irreconcilable doctrines. As Christ-
ians, they necessarily acknowledge the authority, and
in words at least, the supreme authority of the Divine
law : as advocates of the universal application of the
law of expediency, they necessarily sometimes set
aside the Divine law, because they sometimes cannot
deduce, from both laws, the same rule of action.
Thus there is induced a continual fluctuation and un-
certainty both in principles and in practical rules : a
continual endeavor to ' ' serve two masters. ' '

The high language of Dr. Paley respecting expedi-
ency as a paramount law, is well known : — " Whatever
is expedient is right."* — " The obligation of every law
depends upon its ultimate utility, "f — " It is the utility
of any moral rule alone which constitutes the obligation
of it. ' ' J Perjury, robbery and murder, ' 'are not useful,
and for that reason, and that reason only, are not
right. "§ It is obvious that this language affirms that
utility is a higher authority than the expressed will of
God. If the utility of a moral rule alone constitutes
the obligation of it, then is its obligation not consti-
tuted by the divine command. If murder is wrong
only because it is not useful, it is not wrong because
God has said, " Thou shalt not kill."

But Paley was a Christian, and therefore could
neither formally displace the Scripture precepts from
their station of supremacy, nor avoid for mally acknowl-
edging that they were supreme. Accordingly he says,
' ' There are two methods of coming at the will of God
on any point : First — By his express declarations, when

* Mor. and Pol. Phil. B. 2, c. 6. f B. 6, c. 12. % B. 2, c. 6.
I B. 2. c. 6.

CHAP. II. J STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. 15

they are to be had, and which must be sought for in
Scripture."* Secondly — by Expediency. And again,
when Scripture precepts ' ' are clear and positive, there
is an end to all further deliberation.' f This makes
the expressed will of God the final standard of right
and wrong. And here is the vacillation, the attempt
to serve two masters of which we speak : for this ele-
vation of the express declarations of God to the supre-
macy, is also absolutely incompatible with the doctrines
that are quoted in the preceding paragraph.

Perhaps the reader will say that these inconsisten-
cies, however they may impeach the skilfulness of the
writer, do not prove that his system is unsound, or that
Utility is not still the ultimate standard of rectitude.
We answer, that to a Christian writer such inconsisten-
cies are unavoidable. He is obliged, 'in conformity
with the principles of his religion, to acknowledge the
divine, and therefore the supreme authority of Scripture;
and if, in addition to this, he assumes that any other
is supreme, inconsistency must ensue. For the same
consequence follows the adoption of any other ultimate
standard — whether sympathy, or right reason, or eter-
nal fitness, or nature. If the writer is a Christian he
cannot, without falling into inconsistencies, assert the
supremacy of any of these principles : that is to say,
when the precepts of Scripture dictate one action, and
a reasoning from his principle dictates another, he
must make his election : If he prefers his principle,
Christianity is abandoned : if he prefers Scripture, his
principle is subordinate : if he alternately prefers the
one and the other, he falls into the vacillation and in-
consistency of which we speak.

Bearing still in mind that the rule ' ' to endeavor to
produce the greatest happiness in our power," is objec-
tionable only when it is made an ultimate rule, the
*B. 2, c. 4. f B. 2, c. 4 : Note.

l6 STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. [ ESSAY I.

reader is invited to atteud to these short considerations.

I. In computing human happiness, the advocate of
expediency does not sufficiently take into the account
our happiness in futurity. Nor indeed does he always
take it into account at all. One definition says, " The
test of the morality of an act is its tendency to promote
the temporal advantage of the greatest number in the
society to which we belong." Now many things may
be very expedient if death were annihilation, which
may be very inexpedient now : and therefore it is not
unreasonable to expect, nor an unreasonable exercise
of humility to act upon the expectation, that the divine
laws may sometimes impose obligations of which we
do not perceive the expediency or the use. "It may
so fall out," says Hooker, " that the reason why some
laws of God were given, is neither opened nor possible
to be gathered by the wit of man."* And Pearson
says, ' ' There are many parts of morality, as taught by
revelation, which are entirely independent of an accur-
ate knowledge of nature. "f And Gisborne, "Our
experience of God's dispensations by no means permits
us to affirm, that he always thinks fit to act in such a
manner as is productive of particular expediency ; much
less to conclude that he wills us always to act in such
a manner as we suppose would be productive of it. "J
All this sufficiently indicates that expediency is wholly
inadmissible as an ultimate rule.

II. The doctrine is altogether unconnected with the
Christian revelation, or with any revelation from
heaven. It was just as true, and the deductions from
it just as obligatory, two or five thousand years ago as
now. The alleged supreme law of morality — ' ! What-
ever is expedient is right " — might have been taught
by Epictetus as well as by a modern Christian. But

* Eccles. Polity, B. 3, s. 10. f Theory of Morals : c. 3.
% Principles of Mor. Phil.

CHAP. II.] STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. 1 7

are we then to be told that the revelations from the
Deity have conveyed no moral knowledge to man?
that they make no act obligatory which was not oblig-
atory before ? that he who had the fortune to discover
that "whatever is expedient is right," possessed a
moral law just as perfect as that which God has ush-
ered into the world, and much more comprehensive ?

III. If some subordinate rule of conduct were pro-
posed— some principle which served as an auxiliary
moral guide — I should not think it a valid objection to
its truth, to be told that no sanction of the principle
was to be found in the written revelation : but if some
rule of conduct were proposed as being of tmiversal
obligation, some moral principle which was paramount
to every other — and I discovered that this principle
was unsanctioned by the written revelation, I should
think this want of sanction was conclusive evidence
against it : because it is not credible that a revelation
from God, of which one great object was to teach man-
kind the moral law of God, would have been silent
respecting a rule of conduct which was to be an univer-
sal guide to man. We apply these considerations to
the doctrine of expediency : Scripture contains not a
word upon the subject.

IV. The principles of expediency necessarily pro-
ceed upon the supposition that we are to investigate
the future, and this investigation is, as every one
knows, peculiarly without the limits of human sagacity:
an objection which derives additional force from the
circumstance that an action, in order to be expedient,
"must be expedient on the whole, at the long run, in
all its effects, collateral and remote."* I do not know
whether, if a man should sit down expressly to devise
a moral principle which should be uncertain and diffi-
cult in its application, he could devise one that would

* Mor. and Pol. Phil. B. 2, c. 8.

l8 STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. [ESSAY I.

be more difficult and uncertain than this. So that, as
Dr. Paley himself acknowledges, "It is impossible to
ascertain every duty by an immediate reference to pub-
lic utility."* The reader may therefore conclude with
Dr. Johnson, that " by presuming to determine what
is fit and what is beneficial, they presuppose more
knowledge of the universal system than man has at-
tained, and therefore depend upon principles too com-
plicated and extensive for our comprehension : and there
ca?i be no security in the corisequence when the premises
are not understood, "f

V. But whatever may be the propriety of investigat-
ing all consequences " collateral and remote," it is cer-
tain that such an investigation is possible only in that
class of moral questions which allows a man time to sit
down and deliberately to think and compute. As it
respects that large class of cases in which a person
must decide and act in a moment, it is wholly useless.
There are thousands of conjunctures in life in which
a man can no more stop to calculate effects collateral
and remote, than he can stop to cross the Atlantic :
and it is difficult to conceive that any rule of morality
can be absolute and universal, which is totally inappli-
cable to so large a portion of human affairs.

VI. Lastly, the rule of expediency is deficient in
one of the first requisites of a moral law — obviousness
and palpability of sanction. What is the process by
which the sanction is applied ? Its advocates say, the
Deity is a benevolent Being : as he is benevolent him-
self, it is reasonable to conclude he wills that his
creatures should be benevolent to one another : this
benevolence is to be exercised by adapting every action
to the promotion of the ' ' universal interest ' ' of man :
1 ' Whatever is expedient is right : " or, God wills that
we should consult expediency. — Now we say that

t B. 6, c. 12. f Western Isles.

CHAP. II.] STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. 19

there are so many considerations placed between the rule
and the act, that the practical authority of the rule is
greatly diminished. It is easy to perceive that the
authority of a rule will not come home to that man's
mind, who is told, respecting a given action, that its
effects upon the universal interest is the only thing
that makes it right or wrong. All the doubts that
arise as to this effect are so many diminutions of the
sanction. It is like putting half a dozen new contin-
gencies between the act of thieving and the conviction
of a jury ; and every one knows that the want of cer-
tainty of penalty is a great encouragement to offences.
The principle too is liable to the most extravagant
abuse — or rather extravagant abuse is, in the present
condition of mankind, inseperable from its general
adoption. " Whatever is expedient is right," solilo-
quizes the moonlight adventurer into the poultry-yard:
4 ' It will tend more to the sum of human happiness
that my wife and I should dine on a capon, than that
the farmer should feel the satisfaction of possessing
it ;" — and so he mounts the hen-roost. I do not say
that this hungry moralist would reason soundly, but I
say that he would not listen to the philosophy which
replied, " Oh, your reasoning is incomplete : you must
take into account all consequences collateral and re-
mote ; and then you will find that it is more expedient,
upon the whole and at the long run, that you and your
wife should be hungry, than that hen-roosts should be
insecure. ' ■

It is happy, however, that this principle never can
be generally applied to the private duties of man. Its
abuses would be so enormous that the laws would take,
as they do in fact take, better measures for regulating
men's conduct than this doctrine supplies. And hap-
pily too, the Universal Lawgiver has not left mankind
without more distinct and more influential perceptions

20 STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. [ESSAY I.

of his will and his authority, than they could ever de-
rive from the principles of expediency.

But an objection has probably presented itself to the
reader, that the greater part of mankind have no access
to the written expression of the will of God : and how,
it may be asked, can that be the final standard of right
and wrong for the human race, of which the majority
of the race have never heard ? The question is reason-
able and fair.

We answer then, first, that supposing most men to
be destitute of a communication of the Divine will, it
does not affect the obligations of those who do possess
it. That communication is the final law to me,
whether my African brother enjoys it or not. Every
reason by which the supreme authority of the law is
proved, is just as applicable to those who do enjoy the
communication of it, whether that communication is
enjoyed by many or by few ; and this, so far as the
argument is concerned, appears to be a sufficient
answer. If any man has no direct access to his
Creator's will, let him have recourse to " eternal fit-
nesses," or to "expediency;" but his condition does
not affect that of another man who does possess this
access.

But our real reply to the objection is, that they who
are destitute of Scripture, are not destitute of a direct
communication of the will of God. The proof of this
position must be deferred to a subsequent chapter ; and
the reader is solicited for the present, to allow us to
assume its truth. This direct communication may be
limited, it may be incomplete, but some communication
exists ; enough to assure them that some things are
acceptable to the Supreme Power, and that some are
not ; enough to indicate a distinction between right
and wrong ; enough to make them moral agents, and

CHAP. III.] SUBORDINATE STANDARDS, ETC. 21

reasonably accountable to our common Judge. If
these principles are true, and especially if the amount
of the communication is in many cases considerable, it
is obvious that it will be of great value in the direction
of individual conduct. We say of i?idividual conduct,
because it is easy to perceive that it would not often
subserve the purposes of him who frames public rules
of morality. A person may possess a satisfactory as-
surance in his own mind, that a given action is incon-
sistent with the Divine will, but that assurance is not
conveyed to another, unless he participates in the evi-
dence upon which it is founded. That which is wanted
in order to supply public rules for human conduct, is a
publicly avouched authority ; so that a writer, in de-
ducing those rules, has to apply, ultimately, to that
standard which God has publicly sanctioned.

CHAPTER III.

SUBORDINATE STANDARDS OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

Foundation and limits of the authority of subordinate
moral rules.

The written expression of the Divine will does not
contain, and no writings can contain, directions for our
conduct in every circumstance of life. If the precepts
of Scripture were multiplied a hundred or a thousand
fold, there would still arise a multiplicity of questions
to which none of them would specifically apply.
Accordingly, there are some subordinate authorities, to
which, as can be satisfactorily shown, it is the will of
God that we should refer. He who does refer to them
and regulate his conduct by them, conforms to the
will of God.

To a son who is obliged to regulate all his actions by

22 SUBORDINATE STANDARDS, ETC. [ESSAY I.

his father's will, there are two ways in which he may
practice obedience — one, by receiving, upon each sub-
ject, his father's direct instructions ; and the other by
receiving instructions from those whom his father com-
missions to teach him. The parent may appoint a
governor, and enjoin, that upon all questions of a cer-
tain kind the son shall conform to his instructions ; and
if the son does this, he as truly and really performs his
father's will, and as strictly makes that will the guide
of his conduct, as if he received the instructions imme-
diately from his parent. But if the father have laid
down certain general rules for his son's observance, as
that he shall devote ten hours a day to study, and not
less — although the governor should recommend or even
command him to devote fewer hours, he may not com-
ply ; for if he does, the governor, and not his father,
is his supreme guide. The subordination is destroyed.

This case illustrates, perhaps, with sufficient precis-
ion, the situation of mankind with respect to moral
rules. Our Creator has given direct laws, some gen-
eral and some specific. These are of final authority.
But he has also sanctioned, or permitted an application
to, other rules ; and in conforming to these, so long as
we hold them in subordination to his laws we perform
his will.

Of these subordinate rules it were possible to enum-
erate many. Perhaps, indeed, few principles have
been proposed as "The fundamental Rules of Virtue,"
which may not rightly be brought into use by the
Christian in regulating his conduct in life : for the ob-
jection to many of these principles is, not so much that
they are useless, as that they are unwarranted as para-
mount laws. ■ ' Sympathy ' ' may be of use, and
"Nature" may be of use, and "Self-love," and
"Benevolence;" and to those who know what it
means, ' ' Eternal fitnesses too. ' '

CHAP. IV.] IDENTICAL AUTHORITY OF, ETC. 23

Some of the subordinate rules of conduct it will be
proper hereafter to notice, in order to discover, if we
can, how far their authority extends, and where it
ceases. The observations that we shall have to offer
upon them may conveniently be made under these
heads : The Law of the Land, The Law of Nature,
The Promotion of Human Happiness or Expediency,
The Law of Nations, The Law of Honor.

These observations will, however, necessarily be pre-
ceded by an enquiry into the great principles of human
duty as they are delivered in Scripture, and into the
reality of that communication of the Divine will to the
mind, which the reader has been requested to allow us
to assume.

CHAPTER IV.

COLLATERAL OBSERVATIONS.

The reader is requested to regard the present chapter as
parenthetical. The parenthesis is inserted here, because the
writer does not know where more appropriately to place it.

IDENTICAL AUTHORITY OF MORAL AND RELIGIOUS
OBLIGATIONS.

Identical authority of moral and religious obligations — The
Divine attributes — Of deducing rules of human duty from a
consideration of the attributes of God — Virtue : " Virtue is
conformity with the standard of rectitude ' ' — Motives of
action.

This identity is a truth to which we do not suffici-
ently advert either in our habitual sentiments or in our
practice. There are many persons who speak of

24 IDENTICAL AUTHORITY OF [ESSAY I.

religious duties, as if there was something sacred or
imperative in their obligation that does not belong to
duties of morality — many, who would perhaps offer up
their lives rather than profess a belief in a false relig-
ious dogma, but who would scarcely sacrifice an hour's
gratification rather than violate the moral law of love.
It is therefore of importance to remember that the
authority which imposes moral obligations and religious
obligations is one and the same — the will of God.
Fidelity to God is just as truly violated by a neglect of
his moral laws, as by a compromise of religious prin-
ciples. Religion and Morality are abstract terms, em-
ployed to indicate different classes of those duties
which the Deity has imposed upon mankind ; but they
are all imposed by Him, and all are enforced by equal
authority. Not indeed that the violation of every par-
ticular portion of the Divine will involves equal guilt,
but that each violation is equally a disregard of the
Divine authority. Whether, therefore, fidelity be
required to a point of doctrine or practice, to theol-
ogy or to morals, the obligation is the same. It is the
Divine requisition which constitutes this obligation,
and not the nature of the duty required ; so that,
whilst I think a Protestant does no more than his duty
when he prefers death to a profession of the Roman
Catholic faith, I think also that every Christian who
believes that Christ has prohibited swearing, does no
more than his duty when he prefers death to taking an
oath.

I would especially solicit the reader to bear in mind
this principle of the identity of the authority of moral
and religious obligations, because he may otherwise
imagine that, in some of the subsequent pages, the ob-
ligation of a moral law is too strenuously insisted on,
and that fidelity to it is to be purchased at ' ' too great
a sacrifice " of ease and enjoyment.

CHAP. IV.] MORAI, AND RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. 25

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

The purpose for which a reference is here made to
these sacred subjects, is to remark upon the unfitness
of attempting to deduce human duties from the attri-
butes of God. It is not indeed to be affirmed that no
illustration of those duties can be derived from them,
but i that they are too imperfectly cognizable by our
perceptions to enable us to refer to them for specific
moral rules. The truth indeed is, that we do not ac-
curately and distinctly know what the Divine attributes
are. We say that God is merciful ; but if we attempt
to define, with strictness, what the term merciful
means, we shall find it a difficult, perhaps an impracti-
cable task ; and especially we shall have a difficult
task if, after the definition, we attempt to reconcile
every appearance which presents itself in the world,
with our notions of the attribute of mercy. I would
vSpeak with reverence when I say that we cannot always
perceive the mercifulness of the Deity in his adminis-
trations, either towards his rational or his irrational
creation. So, again, in respect of the attribute of
Justice, who can determinately define in what this
attribute consists? Who, especially, can prove that
the Almighty designs that we should always be able to
trace his justice in his government? We believe that
he is unchangeable ; but what is the sense in which
we understand the term ? De we mean that the attri-
bute involves the necessity of an unchanging system of
moral government, or that the Deity cannot make al-
terations in, or additions to, his laws for mankind?
We cannot mean this, for the evidence of revelation
disproves it.

Now, if it be true that the Divine attributes, and the
uniform accordancy of the Divine dispensations with
our notions of those attributes, are not sufficiently
within our powers of investigation to enable us to

26 IDENTICAL AUTHORITY OF [ESSAY I.

frame accurate premises for our reasoning, it is plain
that we cannot always trust with safety to our conclu-
sions. We cannot deduce rules for our conduct from
the Divine attributes without being very liable to error ;
and the liability will increase in proportion as the de-
duction attempts critical accuracy.

Yet this is a rock upon which the judgments of
many have suffered wreck, a quicksand where many
have been involved in inextricable difficulties. One,
because he cannot reconcile the commands to extermi-
nate a people with his notions of the attribute of mercy,
questions the truth of the Mosaic writings. One, be-
cause he finds wars permitted by the Almighty of old,
concludes that, as he is unchangeable, they cannot be
incompatible with his present or his future will. One,
on the supposition of this uuchangeableness, perplexes
himself because the dispensations of God and his laws
have been changed ; and vainly labors, by classifying
these laws into those which result from his attributes,
and those which do not, to vindicate the immutability
of God. We have no business with these things, and
I will venture to affirm that he who will take nothing
upon trust — who will exercise no faith — who will be-
lieve in the divine authority of no rule, and in the
truth of no record, which he is unable to reconcile with
the Divine attributes — must be consigned to hopeless
Pyrrhonism.

The lesson which such considerations teach is a sim-
ple but an important one : That our exclusive business
is to discover the actual present will of God, without
enquiring why his will is such as it is, or why it has
ever been different ; and without seeking to deduce,
from our notions of the Divine attributes, rules of con-
duct which are more safely and more certainly discov-
ered by other means.

CHAP. IV.] MORAL AND REUGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. 27

VIRTUE.

The* definitions which have been proposed of virtue
have necessarily been both numerous and various, be-
cause many and discordant standards of rectitude have
been advanced ; and virtue must, in every man's sys-
tem, essentially consist in conforming the conduct to
the standard which he thinks is the true one. This
must be true of those systems, at least, which make
virtue consist in doing right. — Adam Smith indeed
says, that ' ' Virtue is excellence ; something uncom-
monly great and beautiful, which rises far above what
is vulgar and ordinary."* By which it would appear
that virtue is a relative quality, depending not upon
some perfect or permanent standard, but upon the ex-
isting practice of mankind. Thus the action which
possessed no virtue amongst a good community, might
possess much in a bad one. The practice which " rose
far above " the ordinary practice of one nation, might
be quite common in another : and if mankind should
become much worse than they are now, that conduct
would be eminently virtuous amongst them which now
is not virtuous at all. That such a definition of virtue
is likely to lead to very imperfect practice is plain ; for
what is the probability that a man will attain to that
standard which God proposes, if his utmost estimate of
' virtue rises no higher than to an indeterminate super-
iority over other men ?

Our definition of virtue necessarily accords with the
principles of morality which have been advanced in the
preceding chapter : Virtue is conformity with the Stand-
ard of Rectitude ; which standard consists, primarily,
in the expressed will of God.

Virtue, as it respects the meritoriousness of the
agent, is another consideration. The quality of an

*Theo. Mor. Sent.

28 IDENTICAL AUTHORITY OF [ESSAY I.

action is one thing, the desert of the agent is another.
The business of him who illustrates moral rules, is not
with the agent, but with the act. He must state what
the moral law pronounces to be right and wrong : but
it is very possible that an individual may do what is
right without any virtue, because there may be no rec-
titude in his motives and intentions. He does a virtu-
ous act, but he is not a virtuous agent.

Although the concern of a work like the present is
evidently with the moral character of actions, without
reference to the motives of the agent ; yet the remark
may be allowed, that there is frequently a sort of in-
accuracy and unreasonableness in the judgments which
we form of the deserts of other men. We regard the
act too much, and the intention too little. The foot-
pad who discharges a pistol at a traveller and fails in
his aim, is just as wicked as if he had killed him ; yet
we do not feel the same degree of indignation at his
crime. So, too, of a person who does good. A man
who plunges into a river and saves a child from drown-
ing, impresses the parents with a stronger sense of his
deserts than if, with the same exertions, he had failed.
— We should endeavor to correct this inequality of
judgment, and in forming our estimates of human con-
duct, should refer, much more than we commonly do,
to what the agent inte?ids. It should habitually be
borne in mind, and especially with reference to our
own conduct, that to have been unable to execute an
ill intention deducts nothing from our guilt ; and that
at that tribunal where intention and action will be
both regarded, it will avail little if we can only say
that we have done no evil. Nor let it be less remem-
bered, with respect to those who desire to do good but
have not the power, that their virtue is not diminished
by their want of ability. I ought, perhaps, to be as
grateful to the man who feelingly commiserates my

CHAP. V.] PATRIARCHAL, MOSAIC, ETC. 29

sufferings but cannot relieve them, as to him who sends
me money or a physician. The mite of the widow of
old was estimated even more highly than the greater
offerings of the rich.

CHAPTER V.

SCRIPTURE.

The morality of the Patriarchal, Mosaic, and Christian dispen-
sations— Their moral requisitions not always coincident —
Supremacy of the Christian morality — Of variations in the
Moral Law — Mode of applying the precepts of Scripture to
the questions of duty — No formal moral system in Scripture —
Criticism of Biblical morality — Of particular precepts and
general rules — Matt. vii. 12. — 1 Cor. x. 31. — Rom. iii. 8. —
Benevolence, as it is proposed in the Christian Scriptures.

THE MORALITY OF THE PATRIARCHAL, MOSAIC
AND CHRISTIAN DISPENSATIONS.

One of the very interesting considerations which are
presented to an enquirer in perusing the volume of
Scripture, consists in the variations in its morality.
There are three distinctly defined periods, in which
the moral government and laws of the Deity assume,
in some respects, a different character. In the first,
without any system of external instruction, he com-
municated his will to some of our race, either immedi-
ately or through a superhuman messenger. In the
second, he promulgated, through Moses, a distinct and
extended code of laws, addressed peculiarly to a se-
lected people. In the third, Jesus Christ and his com-
missioned ministers, delivered precepts, of which the
general character was that of greater purity or perfec-
tion, and of which the obligation was universal upon
mankind.

30 PATRIARCHAL, MOSAIC, AND [KSSAY I.

That the records of all these dispensations contain
declarations of the will of God, is certain : that their
moral requisitions are not always coincident, is also
certain ; and hence the conclusion becomes inevitable,
that to us, one is of primary authority ; — that when all
do not coincide, one is paramount to the others. That
a coincidence does not always exist, may easily be
shown. It is manifest, not only by a comparison of
precepts and of the general tenor of the respective
records, but from the express declarations of Christian-
ity itself.

One example, referring to the Christian and Jewish
dispensations, may be found in the extension of the
law of L,ove. Christianity, in extending the application
of this law, requires us to abstain from that which the
law of Moses permitted us to do. Thus it is in the
instance of duties to our ' ' neighbor, ' ' as they are illus-
trated in the parable of the Samaritan.* Thus too, in
the sermon on the mount : "It hath been said by them
of old time. Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate
thine enemy: but /say unto you, Love your enemies, "f
It is indeed sometimes urged that the words "hate
thine enemy," were only a gloss of the expounders of
the law : but Grotius writes thus — "What is there re-
peated as said to those of old, are not the words of the
teachers of the law, but of Moses ; either literally or
in their meaning. They are cited by our Saviour as
his express words, not as interpretations of them."|
If the authority of Grotius should not satisfy the reader,
let him consider such passages as this : " ^.n Ammon-
ite or a Moabite shall not enter into the congregation
of the Lord. Because they met you not with bread
and with water in the way, when ye came forth out of
Egypt. Thou shall not seek their peace nor their pros-
perity all thy days for ever."§ This is not coincident

* Luke x. 30. t Matt. v. 43.

X Rights of War and Peace. g Deut. xxiii. 3, 4, 6.

CHAP. V.] CHRISTIAN DISPENSATIONS. 31

with, "Love your enemies;" or with, "Do good to
them that hate you;" or with that temper which is
recommended by the wTords, " to him that smiteth thee
on one cheek, turn the other also."*

' ' Pour out thy fury upon the heathen that know
thee not, and upon the families that call not on thy
name, "I — is not coincident with the reproof of Christ
to those who, upon similar grounds, would have called
down fire from heaven. || ''The Lord look upon it
and require it," f — is not coincident writh, "Lord, lay
not this sin to their charge. "§ ' ' Let me see thy ven-
geance on them,"§§ — "Bring upon them the day of
evil, and destroy them with double destruction," ^f —
is not coincident with " Forgive them, for they know
not what they do."**

Similar observations apply to swearing, to polygamy,
to retaliation, to the motives of murder and adultery.

And as to the express assertion of the want of coin-
cidence : — "The law made nothing perfect, but the
bringing in of a better hope did. "ft ' ' There is verily
a disannulling of the commandment going before, for
the weakness and unprofitableness thereof. "JJ If the
commandment now existing is not weak and unprofit-
able, it must be because it is superior to that which
existed before.

But although this appears to be thus clear with re-
spect to the Jewish dispensation, there are some who
regard the moral precepts which were delivered before
the period of that dispensation, as imposing permanent
obligations : they were delivered, it is said, not to one
peculiar people, but to individuals of many ; and, in
the persons of the immediate survivors of the deluge,

* Matt. v. 39. % Jer. x. 25. || Luke, ix. 54.

| 2 Chron. xxiv. 22. $ Acts, vii. 60. \ Jer. xvii. 18.

XX Heb. vii. 18. \\ Jer. xx. 12. ff Heb. vii. 19.
** Luke, xxiii. 34.

32 PATRIARCHAL, MOSAIC, AND [KSSAY I.

to the whole human race. This argument assumes
a ground paramount to all questions of subsequent
abrogation. Now it would appear a sufficient answer
to say — If the precepts of the Patriarchal and Christian
dispensations are coincident, no question needs to be
discussed ; if they are not, we must make an election ;
and surely the Christian cannot doubt what election he
should make. Could a Jew have justified himself for
violating the Mosaic law, by urging the precepts deliv-
ered to the patriarchs? No. Neither then can we
justify ourselves for violating the Christian law, by
urging the precepts delivered to Moses.

We indeed have, if it be possible, still stronger mo-
tives. The moral law of Christianity binds us, not
merely because it is the present expression of the will
of God, but because it is a portion of his last dispen-
sation to man — of that which is avowedly not only the
last, but the highest and the best. We do not find in
the records of Christianity that which we find in the
other Scriptures, a reference to a greater and purer
dispensation yet to come. It is as true of the Patriarchal
as of the Mosaic institution, that "it made nothing
perfect," and that it referred us from the first, to "the
bringing in of that better hope which did." If then
the question of supremacy is between a perfect and an
imperfect system, who will hesitate in his decision ?

There are motives of gratitude, too, and of affection,
as well as of reason. The clearer exhibition which
Christianity gives of the attributes of God ; its distinct
disclosure of our immortal destinies ; and above all, its
wonderful discovery of the love of our Universal Father,
may well give to the moral law with which they are
connected, an authority which may supersede every
other.

These considerations are of practical importance ; for
it may be observed of those who do not advert to them,

CHAP. V.] CHRISTIAN DISPENSATIONS. 33

that they sometimes refer indiscriminately to the Old
Testament or the New, without any other guide than
the apparent greater applicability of a precept in the
one or the other, to their present need : and thus it
happens that a rule is sometimes acted upon, less per-
fect than that by which it is the good pleasure of God
we should now regulate our conduct. — It is a fact which
the reader should especially notice, that an appeal to
the Hebrew Scriptures is frequently made when the pre-
cepts of Christianity would be too rigid for our purpose.
He who insists upon a pure morality, applies to the
New Testament, he who desires a little more indulg-
ence defends himself by arguments from the Old.

Of this indiscriminate reference to all the dispensations
there is an extraordinary example in the newly discov-
ered work of Milton. He appeals, I believe, almost
uniformly to the precepts of all, as of equal present
obligation. The consequence is what might be expected
— his moral system is not consistent. Nor is it to be
forgotten, that in defending what may be regarded as
less pure doctrines, he refers mostly, or exclusively, to
the Hebrew Scriptures. In all his disquisitions to prove
the lawfulness of untruths, he does not once refer to
the New Testament.* Those who have observed the
prodigious multiplicity of texts which he cites in this
work, will peculiary appreciate the importance of the
fact. — Again: " Hatred," he says, " is in some cases a
religious duty. " f A proposition at which the Christian
may reasonably wonder. And how does Milton prove
its truth ? He cites from Scripture te?i passages ;
of which eight, are from the Old Testament and two
from the New. The reader will be curious to know
what these two are: — "If any man come to me and
hate not his father and mother — he cannot be my dis-
ciple. ' ' % And the rebuke to Peter : ' ' Get thee behind

* Christian Doctrine, p. 660. f P. 641.

X L,uke xiv. 26.

34 PATRIARCHAL, MOSAIC, AND [ESSAY I.

me, Satan."* The citation of such passages shows that
no passages to the purpose could be found.

It may be regarded therefore as a general rule, that
none of the injunctions or permissions which formed
a part of the former dispensations can be referred to as
of authority to us, except so far as they are coincident
with the Christian law. To our own Master we stand
or fall ; and our Master is Christ. — And in estimating
this coincidence, it is not requisite to show that a given
rule or permission of the former dispensations is speci-
fically superseded in the New Testament. It is sufficient
if it is not accordant with the general spirit ; and this
consideration assumes greater weight when it is con-
nected with another which is hereafter to be noticed —
that it is by the general spirit of the Christian morality
that many of the duties of man are to be discovered.

Yet it is always to be remembered, that the laws
which are thus superseded were, nevertheless, the laws
of God. L,et not the reader suppose that we would
speak or feel respecting them otherwise than with that
reverence which their origin demands — or that we
would take any thing from their present obligation but
that which is taken by the Lawgiver himself. It may
indeed be observed, that in all his dispensations there
is a harmony, a one pervading principle, which, with-
out other evidence, indicates that they proceeded from
the same authority. The variations are circumstantial
rather than fundamental ; and, after all, the great
principles in which they accord, far outweigh the par-
ticular applications in which they differ. The Mosaic
Dispensation was ' ' a schoolmaster ' ' to bring us, not
merely through the medium of types and prophecies,
but through its moral law, to Christ. Both the one
and the other were designed as preparatives ; and it
was probably as true of these moral laws as of the

* Mark viii. 33.

CHAP. V-] CHRISTIAN DISPENSATIONS. 35

prophecies, that the Jews did not perceive their rela-
tionship to Christianity as it was actually introduced
into the world.

Respecting the variations of the moral law, some
persons greatly and very needlessly perplex themselves
by indulging in such questions as these. — "If," say
they, " God be perfect and if all the dispensations are
communications of His will, how happens it that they
are not uniform in their requisitions ? How happens
it that that which was required by Infinite Knowledge
at one time, was not required by Infinite Knowledge
at another?" I answer — I cannot tell. And what
then ? Does the enquirer think this a sufficient reason
for rejecting the authority of the Christian law? If
inability to discover the reasons of the moral govern-
ment of God be a good 'motive to doubt its authority,
we may involve .ourselves in doubts without end. —
Why does a Being who is infinitely pure, permit moral
evil in the world ? Why does he who is perfectly be-
nevolent permit physical suffering ? Why did he suffer
our first parents to fall? Why, after they had fallen,
did he not immediately repair the loss ? Why was the
Messiah's appearance deferred for four thousand years?
Why is not the religion of the Messiah universally
known and universally operative at the present day ?
To all these questions and to many others, no answrer
can be given ; and the difficulty arising from them is
as great, if we choose to make difficulties for ourselves,
as that which arises from variations In his moral laws.
Even in infidelity we shall find no rest ; the objections
lead us onward to atheism. He who will not believe
in a Deity unless he can reconcile all the facts before
his eyes with his notions of the divine attributes, must
deny that a Deity exists. I talked of rest : — Alas !
there is no rest in infidelity or in atheism. To disbe-

36 PATRIARCHAL, MOSAIC, AND [ESSAY I.

lieve in revelation or in God, is not to escape from a
belief in things which you do not comprehend, but to
transfer your belief to a new class of such things. Un-
belief is credulity. The infidel is more credulous than
the Christian, and the atheist is the most credulous of
mankind : that is, he believes important propositions
upon less evidence than any other man, and in opposi-
tion to greater.

It is curious to observe the anxiety of some writers
to reconcile some of the facts before us with the
" moral perfections ' ' of the Deity; and it is instructive
to observe into what doctrines they are led. They
tell us that all the evil and all the pain in the
world, are parts of a great system of Benevolence.
' ' The moral and physical evil observable in the system,
according to men's limited views of it, are necessary
parts of the great plan ; all tending ultimately to pro-
duce the greatest sum of happiness upon the whole,
not only with respect to the system in general, but to
each individual, according to the station he occupies in
it."* They affirm that God is an " allwise Being,
who directs all the movements of nature, and who is
determined, by his own unalterable perfections, to
maintain in it at all times, the greatest possible quan-
tity of happiness, "f The Creator found, therefore,
that to inflict the misery which now exists, was the
best means of promoting this happiness — that to have
abated the evil, the suffering, or the misery, would be
to have diminished the sum of felicity — and that men
could not have •been better or more at ease than they

* This is given as the belief of Dr. Priestly. See Memoirs :
Ap. No. 5.

f Adam Smith : Theory of Moral Sentiments. See also T.
Southwood Smith's Illustrations of the Divine Government, in
which unbridled license of speculation has led the writer into
some instructive absurdities.

CHAP, V.] CHRISTIAN DISPENSATIONS. 37

are, without making them on the whole more vicious
or unhappy! — These things are beacons which should
warn us. These speculations show that not only re-
ligion, but reason, dictates the propriety of acquiesc-
ing in that degree of ignorance in which it has pleased
God to leave us ; because they show, that attempts to
acquire knowledge may conduct us to folly. These are
subjects upon which he acts most rationally, who says
to his reason — be still.

MODE OF APPLYING THE PRECEPTS OF SCRIPTURE
TO QUESTIONS OF DUTY.

It is remarkable that many of these precepts, and es-
pecially those of the Christian Scriptures, are delivered,
not systematically but occasionally. They are distrib-
uted through occasional discourses and occasional let-
ters. Except in the instance of the law of Moses, the
speaker or wTriter rarely set about a formal exposition
of moral truth. The precepts wTere delivered as circum-
stances called them forth or made them needful.
There is nothing like a system of morality ; nor, con-
sequently, does there exist that completeness, that dis-
tinctness in defining and accuracy in limiting, which,
in a system of morality, we expect to find. Many rules
are advanced in short absolute prohibitions or injunc-
tions, without assigning any of those exceptions to their
practical application, which the majority of such rules
require. — The enquiry, in passing, may be permitted —
Why are these things so ? When it is considered what
the Christian dispensation is, and what it is designed
to effect upon the conduct of man, it cannot be sup-
posed that the incompleteness of its moral precepts
happened by inadvertence. The precepts of the for-
mer dispensation are much more precise ; and it is
scarcely to be supposed that the more perfect dispensa-
tion would have had a less precise law, unless the de-

38 PATRIARCHAL. MOSAIC, AND [ESSAY I.

ficiency were to be compensated from some other
authoritative source : — which remark is offered as a
reason, a priori, for expecting that, in the present dis-
pensation, God would extend the operation of his law
written in the heart.

But whatever may be thought of this, it is manifest
that considerable care is requisite in the application of
precepts, so delivered, to the conduct of life. To
apply them in all cases literally, were to act neither
reasonably nor consistently with the designs of the
Lawgiver : to regard them in all cases as mere general
directions, and to subject them to the unauthorized re-
vision of man, were to deprive them of their proper
character and authority as divine laws. In proposing
some grounds for estimating the practical obligation of
these precepts, I would be first allowed to express the
conviction, that the simple fact that such a disquisition
is needed, and that the moral duties are to be gathered
rather by implication or general tenor than from spe-
cific and formal rules, is one indication amongst the
many, that the dispensation of which these precepts
form a part, stands not in words but in power : and I
hope to be forgiven, even in a book of morality, if I ex-
press the conviction that none can fulfil their requisi-
tions— that none indeed can appreciate them — without
some participation in this ' ' power. ' ' I say he cannot
appreciate them. Neither the morals nor the religion
of Christianity can be adequately estimated by the
man who sits down to the New Testament, with no
other prepartion than that which is necessary in sitting
down to Euclid or Newton. There must be some pre-
paration of heart as well as integrity of understanding
— or, as the appropriate language of the volume itself
would express it, it is necessary that we should become
in some degree, the " sheep" of Christ before we can
accurately ' ' know his voice. ' '

CHAP. V.] CHRISTIAN DISPENSATIONS. 39

There is one clear and distinct ground upon which
we may limit the application of a precept that is couched
in absolute language — the unlawfulness, in any
given conjuncture, of obeying it. ' ' Submit yourselves
to every ordinance of man."* This, literally, is an
unconditional command. But if we were to obey it
unconditionally, we should sometimes comply with
human, in opposition to divine laws. In such cases
then, the obligation is clearly suspended ; and this dis-
tinction, the first teachers of Christianity recognized in
their own practice. When an " ordinance of man"
required them to forbear the promulgation of the new
religion, they refused obedience ; and urged the befit-
ting expostulation — "Whether it be right in the sight
of God to hearken unto you more than unto God,
judge ye."f So, too, with the filial relationship:
' ■ Children obey your parents in all things. ' ' J But a
parent may require his child to lie or steal ; and there-
fore when a parent requires obedience in such things
his authority ceases, and the obligation to obedience is
taken away by the moral law itself. The precept, so
far as the present ground of exception applies, is virtu-
ally this : Obey your parents in all things, unless diso-
bedience is required by the will of God. Or the sub-
ject might be illustrated thus : The Author of Christi-
anity reprobates those who love father or mother more
than himself. The paramount love to God is to be
manifested by obedience. § So, then, we are to obey
the commands of God in preference to those of our
parents. ' ' All human authority ceases at the point
where obedience becomes criminal. "||

Of some precepts, it is evident that they were de-
signed to be understood conditionally. " When thou

* i Pet. ii. 13. f Acts, iv. 19. J Col. iii. 20.

g If ye love me, keep my commandments — John xiv. 15.
II Mor. and Pol. Phil.

4Q PATRIARCHAL, MOSAIC, AND . [ESSAY I.

pray est, enter into thy closet, and when thou hast
shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret."^}
This precept is conditional. I doubt not that it is con-
sistent with his will that the greater number of the
supplications which man offers at his throne shall be
offered in secret ; yet, that the precept does not ex-
clude the exercise of public prayer, is evident from
this consideration, if from no other, that Christ and his
apostles themselves practiced it.

Some precepts are figurative, and describe the spirit
and temper that should govern us, rather than the par-
ticular actions that we should perform. Of this there
is an example in, " Whosoever shall compel thee to go
a mile, go with him twain."* In promulgating some
precepts a principle object appears to have been, to sup-
ply sanctions. Thus is the case of Civil Obedience: we
are to obey because the Deity authorizes the institution
of Civil Government — because the magistrate is the
minister of God for good ; and, accordingly, we are to
obey not from considerations of necessity only, but of
duty ; "not only for wrath, but for conscience sake."f
One precept, if we accept it literally, would enjoin us
to "hate" our parents; and this acceptation, Milton
appears actually to have adopted. One would enjoin
us to accumulate no property : \ ' Lay not up for your-
selves treasures upon earth. "J Such rules are seldom
mistaken in practice ; and, it may be observed, that
this is an indication of their practical wisdom, and their
practical adaptation to the needs of man. It is not an
easy thing to pronounce, as occasions arise, a large
number of moral precepts in unconditional language and
yet to secure them from the probability of even great
misconstructions. Let the reader make the experiment.
— Occasionally, but it is only occasionally, a sincere
Christian, in his anxiety to conform to the moral law,
\ Matt. vi. 6. * Matt. v. 41. f Rom. xiii. 5. J Matt. vi. 19.

CHAP. V.] CHRISTIAN DISPENSATIONS. 41

accepts such precepts in a more literal sense than that
in which they appear to have been designed to be
applied. I once saw a book that endeavored to prove
the unlawfulness of accumulating any property ; upon
the authority, primarily, of this last quoted precept.
The principle upon which the writer proceeded was just
and right — that it is necessary to conform uncondi-
tionally, to the expressed will of God. The defect was
in the criticism ; that is to say, in ascertaining what
that will did actually require.

Another obviously legitimate ground of limiting the
application of absolute precepts, is afforded us in just
biblical criticism. Not that critical disquisitions are
often necessary to the upright man who seeks for the
knowledge of his duties. God has not left the know-
ledge of his moral law so remote from the sincere
seekers of his will. But in deducing public rules as
authoritative upon mankind, it is needful to take into
account those considerations which criticism supplies.
The construction of the original languages and their
peculiar phraseology, the habits, manners, and prevail-
ing opinions of the times, and the circumstances under
which a precept was delivered, are evidently amongst
these considerations. And literary criticism is so much
the more needed, because the great majority of man-
kind have access to Scripture only through the medium
of translations.

But in applying all these limitations to the absolute
precepts of Scripture, it is to be remembered that we
are not subjecting their authority to inferior principles.
We are not violating the principle upon which these
essays proceed, that the expression of the Divine will
is our ultimate law. We are only ascertaining what
that expression is. If, after just and authorized exam-
ination, any precept should still appear to stand imper-
ative in its absolute fprm, we accept it as obligatory in

42 PATRIARCHAL, MOSAIC, AND [ESSAY I.

that form. Many such precepts there are ; and being
such, we allow no considerations of convenience, nor of
expediency, nor considerations of any other kind, to
dispense with their authority.

One great use of such inquiries as these, is to vindi-
cate to the apprehensions of men the authority of the
precepts themselves. It is very likely to happen, and
to some negligent enquirers it does happen, that seeing
a precept couched in unconditional language, which yet
cannot be unconditionally obeyed, they call in question
its general obligation. Their minds fix upon the idea
of some consequences which would result from a literal
obedience, and feeling assured that those consequences
ought not to be undertaken, they set aside the precept
itself. They are at little pains to enquire what the
proper requisitions of the precept are — glad, perhaps,
of a specious excuse for not regarding it at all. The
careless reader, perceiving that a literal compliance with
the precept to give the cloak to him who takes a coat,
would be neither proper nor right, rejects the whole pre-
cept of which it forms an illustration ; and in doing
this, rejects one of the most beautiful, and important,
and sacred requisitions of the Christian law.*

There. are two modes in which moral obligations are
imposed in Scripture — by particular precepts, and by
general rules. The one prescribes a duty upon one
subject, the other upon very many. The applicability
of general rules is nearly similar to that of what is
usually called the spirit of the gospel, the spirit of the
moral law; which spirit is of very wide embrace in its ap-
plication to the purposes of life. ' 'In estimating the value
of a moral rule, we are to have regard not only to the
particular duty but the general spirit; not only to what
it directs us to do, but to the character which a com-

* Matt. v. 38.

CHAP. V.] CHHRISTIAN DISPENSATIONS. 43

pliance with its direction is likely to form in us."*
In this manner, some particular precepts become, in
. fact, general rules ; and the duty that results from
these rules, from this spirit, is as obligatory as that
which is imposed by a specific injunction. Christianity
requires us to maintain universal benevolence towards
mankind ; aud he who, in his conduct towards another,
disregards this benevolence, is as truly and sometimes
as flagrantly a violator of the moral law, as if he had
transgressed the command, "Thou shalt not steal."
This doctrine is indeed recommended by a degree of
utility that makes its adoption almost a necessity ; be-
cause no number of specific precepts would be sufficient
for the purposes of moral instruction : so that, if we
were destitute of this species of general rules, we should
frequently be destitute, so far as external precepts are
concerned, of any. It appears by a note to the work
which has just been cited, that in the Mussulman code,
which proceeds upon the system of a precise rule for a
precise question, there have been promulgated seventy -
five, thousand precepts. I regard the wide practical
applicability of some of the Christian precepts as an
argument of great wisdom. They impose many duties
in few words ; or rather, they convey a great mass of
moral instruction within a sentence that all .may re-
member and that few can mistake. ' 'All things what-
soever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even
so to them,"f is of greater utility in the practice of life,
and is applicable to more circumstances, than a hundred
rules which presented the exact decree of kindness
or assistance that should be afforded in prescribed
cases. The Mosaic law, rightly regarded, conveyed
many clear expositions of human duty ; yet the quib-
bling and captious scribes of old found, in the literalities

* Evidences of Christianity : p. 2, c. 2. f Matt. vii. 12.

44 PATRIARCHAL, MOSAIC, AND [ESSAY I.

of that law, more plausible grounds for evading its
duties, than can be found in the precepts of the Chris-
tian Scriptures.

There are a few precepts of which the application is
so extensive in human affairs, that I would, in con-
formity with some of the preceding remarks, briefly en-
quire into their practical obligation. Of these, that
which has just been quoted for another purpose, " All
things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you,
do ye even so to them,"* is perhaps cited and recom-
mended more frequently than any other. The diffi-
culty of applying this precept has induced some to
reject it as containing a moral maxim which is not
sound : but perhaps it will be found, that the deficiency
is not in the rule but in the non-applicability of the
cases to which it has often been applied. It is not ap-
plicable when the act which another would that we
should do to him, is in itself unlawful or adverse to some
other portion of the moral law. If I seize a thief in
the act of picking a pocket, he undoubtedly "would"
that I should let him go ; and I, if our situations were
exchanged, should wish it too. But I am not therefore to
release him ; because, since it is a Christian obligation
upon the magistrate to punish offenders, the obligation
descends to me to secure them .for punishment. Be-
sides, in every such case I must do as I would be done
unto with respect to all parties concerned — the public
as well as the thief. The precept, again, is not appli-
cable when the desire of the second party is such as a
Christian cannot lawfully indulge. An idle and profli-
gate man asks me to give him money. It would be
wrong to indulge such a man's desire, and therefore
the precept does not apply.

The reader will perhaps say ; that a person's duties
* Matt. vii. 12.

CHAP. V.] CHRISTIAN DISPENSATIONS. 45

in such cases are sufficiently obvious without the grav-
ity of illustration. Well — but are the principles upon
which the duties are ascertained thus obvious ? This
is the important point. In the affairs of life, many
cases arise in which a person has to refer to such prin-
ciples as these, and in which, if he does not apply the
right principles, he will transgress the Christian law.
The law appears to be in effect this, Do as you would
be done unto, except in those instances in which to act
otherwise is permitted by Christianity. Inferior grounds
of limitation are often applied ; and they are alwrays
wrong , because they always subject the moral law to
suspension by inferior authorities. To do this, is to
reject the authority of the Divine will, and to place
this beautiful expression of that will at the mercy of
every man's inclination.

" Whether ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do
all to the glory of God."* I have heard of the mem-
bers of some dinner club who had been recommended
to consider this precept, and who, in their discussions
over the bottle, thought perhaps that they were argu-
ing soundly when they held language like this : ' ' Am
I, in lifting this glass to my mouth, to do it for the
purpose of bringing glory to God ? Is that to be my
motive in buying a horse or shooting a pheasant?"
From such moralists much sagacity of discrimination
was not to be expected : and these questions delighted
and probably convinced the club. The mistake of
these persons, and perhaps of some others, is, that they
misunderstand the rule. The promotion of the Divine
glory is not to be the motive and purpose of all our
actions, but, having actions to perform, we are so to
perform them that this glory shall be advanced. The
precept is in effect, Let your actions and the motives
of them be such, that others shall have reason to honor
* i Cor. x. 31.

46 PATRIARCHAL, MOSAIC, AND [ESSAY I.

God :* — and a precept like this is a very sensitive test of
the purity of our conduct. I know not whether there
is a single rule of Christianity of which the use is so
constant and the application so universal. To do as
we would be done by, refers »to relative duties ; Not to
do evil that good may come, refers to particular circum-
stances : but, To do all things so that the Deity may
be honored, refers to almost every action of a man's
life. Happily the Divine glory is thus promoted by
some men even in trifling affairs — almost whether they
eat or drink, or whatsoever thing they do. There is,
in truth, scarcely a more efficacious means of honoring
the Deity, than by observing a constant Christian man-
ner of conducting our intercourse with men. He who
habitually maintains his allegiance to religion and to
purity, who is moderate and chaste in all his pursuits,
and who always makes the prospects of the future pre-
dominate over the temptations of the present, is one of
the most efficacious recommenders of goodness — one of
the most impressive " preachers of righteousness, ' ' — and
by consequence, one of the most efficient promoters of
the glory of God.

By a part of Paul's Epistle to the Romans, it appears
that he and his coadjutors had been reported to hold
the doctrine, that it is lawful "to do evil that good
maycome."f. This report he declares is slanderous;
and expresses his reprobation of those who act upon
the doctrine, by the short and emphatic declaration —
their condemnation is just. This is not critically a pro-
hibition, but it is a prohibition in effect ; and the man-
ner in which the doctrine is reprobated, induces the
belief that it was so flagitious that it needed very little

* ' ' I,et your light so shine before men that they may see your
good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven" — Matt,
v. 16.

f Rom. iii. 8.

CHAP. V.] CHRISTIAN DISPENSATIONS. 47

enquiry or thought : in the writer's mind the transition
is immediate, from the idea of the doctrine to the pun-
ishment of those who adopt it.

Now the "evil" which is thus prohibited, is, any
thing and all things discordant with the Divine will ;
so that the unsophisticated meaning of the rule is,
that nothing which is contrary to the Christian law
may be done for the sake of attaining a beneficial end.
Perhaps the breach of no moral rule is productive of
more mischief than of this. That "the end justifies
the means," is a maxim which many, who condemn it as
a maxim, adopt in their practice : and in political affairs
it is not only habitually adopted, but is indirectly, if
not openly, defended as right. If a senator were to
object to some measure of apparent public expediency,
that it was not consistent with the moral law, he would
probably be laughed at as a fanatic or a fool ; yet per-
haps some who are flippant with this charge of fanati-
cism and folly may be in perplexity for a proof. If the
expressed will of God is our paramount law, no proof
can be brought ; and in truth it is not often that it is
candidly attempted. I have not been amongst the least
diligent enquirers into the moral reasonings of men, but
honest and manly reasoning against this portion of
Scripture I have never found.

Of the rule, " not to do evil that good may come,"
Dr. Paley says, that it "is, for the most part, a salutary
caution." A person might as well say that the rule
1 ' not to commit murder " is a salutary caution. There
is no caution in the matter, but an imperative law.
But he proceeds : — " Strictly speaking, that cannot be
evil from which good comes."* Now let the reader
consider : — Paul says, ' ' You may not do evil that good
may come .-" Ay, but, says the philosopher, if good does
come, the acts that bring it about are NOT evil. What
* Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 2. c. 8.

48 PATRIARCHAL, MOSAIC, AND [ESSAY I.

the apostle would have said of such a reasoner, I will
not trust my pen to suppose. The reader will perceive
the foundation of this reasoning. It assumes that good
and evil are not to be estimated by the expressions of
the. will of God, but by the effects of actions. The
question is clearly fundamental. If expediency be
the ultimate test of rectitude, Dr. Paley is right ; if
the expressions of the Divine will are the ultimate test,
he is wrong. You must sacrifice the one authority or
the other. If this will is the greater, consequences are
not : if consequences are the greater, this will is not.
But this question is not now to be discussed : it may
however be observed that the interpretation which the
rule has been thus made to bear, appears to be contra-
dicted by the terms of the rule itself. The rule of
Christianity is, evil may not be committed for the pur-
pose of good : the rule of the philosophy is, evil may
not be committed, except for the purpose of good. Are
these precepts identical ? Is there not a fundamental
variance, an absolute contrariety between them ? Chris-
tianity does not speak of evil and good as contingent, but
as fixed qualities. You cannot convert the one into the
other by disquisitions about expediency. In morals,
there is no philosopher's stone that can convert evil
into good with a touch. Our labors, so long as the au-
thority of the moral law is acknowledged, will end like
those of the physical alchymist : after all our efforts at
transmutation, lead will not become gold — evil will not
become good. However there is one subject of satis-
faction in considering such reasonings as these. They
prove, negatively, the truth which they assail ; for that
against which nothing but sophistry can be urged, is
undoubtly true. The simple truth is, that if evil may
be done for the sake of good, all the precepts of Scrip-
ture which define or prohibit evil are laws no longer ;
for that cannot in any rational use of language be

CHAP. V.] CHRISTIAN DISPENSATIONS. 49

called a law in respect of those to whom it is directed,
if they are at liberty to neglect it when they think fit.
These precepts may be advices, recommendations,
1 ■ salutary cautions ' ' but th§y are not laws. They
may suggest hints, but they do not impose duties.

With respect to the legitimate grounds of exceptions
or limitation in the application of this rule, there
appear to be few or none. The only question is, What
actions are evil? Which question is to be determined,
ultimately, by the will of God.

BENEVOLENCE AS IT IS PROPOSED IN THE CHRIS-
TIAN SCRIPTURES.

In enquiring into the great principles of that moral
system which the Christian revelation institutes, we
discover one remarkable characteristic, one pervading
peculiarity by which it is distinguished from every
other — the paramount emphasis which it lays upon the
exercise of pure Benevolence. It will be found that
this preference of ' ' L,ove ' ' is wise as it is unexampled,
and that no other general principle would effect, with
any approach to the same completeness, the best and
highest purposes of morality. How easy soever it be
for us, to whom the character and obligations of this
benevolence are comparatively familiar, to perceive the
wisdom of placing it at the foundation of the moral
law, we are indebted for the capacity not to our own
sagaciousness, but to light which has been communi-
cated from heaven. That schoolmaster the law of
Moses never taught, and the speculations of philosophy
never discovered, that love was the fulfilment of the
moral law. Eighteen hundred years ago this doctrine
was a new commandment.

Iyove is made the test of the validity of our claims to
the Christian character — " By this shall all men know

50 PATRIARCHAL, MOSAIC, AND [ESSAY I.

that ye are my disciples."* Again, "Love one another.
He that loveth another hath fulfilled the law. For
this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill,
Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witnesss,
Thou shalt not covet ; and if there be any other command-
ment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely,
Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. Love worketh
no ill to his neighbor ; therefore love is the fulfilling of
the law."t It is not therefore surprising that after
an enumeration, in another place, of various duties,
the same dignified apostle says, "Above all these things
put on charity, which is the bond oiperfectness. ' ' % The
inculcation of this benevolence is as frequent in the
Christian Scriptures as its practical utility is great. He
who would look through the volume will find that no
topic is so frequently introduced, no obligations so em-
phatically enforced, no virtue to which the approbation
of God is so specially promised. It is the theme of all
the ' ' apostolic exhortations, that with which their
morality begins and ends, from which all their details
and enumerations set out and into which they return. "§
"He that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God
in him." || More emphatical language cannot be em-
ployed. It exalts to the utmost the character of the
virtue, and, in effect, promises its possessor the utmost
favor and felicity. If then, of faith, hope and love,
love be the greatest ; if it be by the test of love that
our pretentions to Christianity are to be tried ; if all
the relative duties of morality are embraced in one
word, and that word is love ; it is obviously needful
that, in a book like this, the requisitions of benevolence
should be habitually regarded in the prosecution of its
enquiries. And accordingly the reader will sometimes
be invited to sacrifice inferior considerations to these

* John xiii. 35. f Rom. xiii. 9. t Col. "*• T4-

\ Evid. Christianity, p. 2. c. 2. II 1 John iv. 16.

CHAP. V.] CHRISTIAN DISPENSATIONS. 5*

requisitions, and to give to the law of love that para-
mount station in which it has been placed by the
authority of God.

It is certain that almost every offence against the rel-
ative duties, has its origin, if not in the malevolent
propensities, at least in those propensities which are
incongruous with love. I know not whether it is pos-
sible to disregard any one obligation that respects the
intercourse of man with man, without violating this
great Christian law. This universal applicability may
easily be illustrated by referring to the obligations of
Justice, obligations which, in civilized communities, are
called into operation more frequently than almost any
other. nHe who estimates the obligations of justice by
a reference to that benevolence which Christianity pre-
scribes, will form -to himself a much more pure and per-
fect standard than he who refers to the law of the
land, to the apprehension of exposure, or to the desire
of reputation. J There are many ways in which a man
can be urljust without censure from the public, and
without violating the laws ; but there is no way in
which he can be unjust without disregarding Christian
benevolence. It is an universal and very sensitive
test. He who does regard it, who uniformly considers
whether his conduct towards another is consonant with
pure good will, cannot be voluntarily unjust ; nor can
he who commits injustice do it without the conscious-
ness, if he will reflect, that he is violating the law of
love. That integrity which is founded upon love,
when compared with that which has any other basis, is
recommended by its honor and dignity as well as by
its rectitude. It is more worthy the man as well as
the Christian, more beautiful in the eye of infidelity as
well as of religion.

It were easy, if it were necessary, to show in what
manner the law of benevolence applies to other relative

52 THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION [ESSAY I.

duties, and in what manner, when applied, it purifies
and exalts the fulfilment of them. But our present
business is with principles rather than with their spe-
cific application.

It is obvious that the obligations of this benevolence
are not merely prohibitory — directing us to avoid
" working ill " to another, but mandatory — requiring
us to do him good. That benevolence which is mani-
fested only by doing no evil, is indeed of a very ques-
tionable kind. To abstain from injustice, to abstain
from violence, to abstain from slander, is compatible
with an extreme deficiency of love. There are many
who are neither slanderous, nor ferocious, nor unjust,
who have yet very little regard for the benevolence of
the gospel. In the illustrations therefore of the obli-
gations of morality, whether private or political, it will
sometimes become our business to state, what this
benevolence requires as well as what it forbids. The
legislator whose laws are contrived only for the detec-
tion and punishment of offenders, fulfils but half his
duty : if he would conform to the Christian standard,
he must provide also for their reformation.

CHAPTER VI.

THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL
. OF GOD.

Conscience — Its nature— Its authority — Review of opinions re-
specting a moral sense — Bishop Butler — Lord Bacon — Locke —
Southey— Adam Smith— Paley — Milton— Judge Hale— Mar-
cus Antoninus— Epictetus — Seneca — Paul— That every human
being possesses a moral law — Pagans — Gradations of light —
Prophecy — The immediate communication of the Divine will
perpetual— Of national vices : Infanticide : Duelling— Of sav-
age life.
The reader is solicited to approach this subject with

that mental seriousness which its nature requires.

UNIVERSITY

CHAP. VI.] OF THE WIW, OF GOD. 53

Whatever be his opinions upon the subject, whether he
believes in the reality of such communication or not, he
ought not even to think respecting it but with feelings
of seriousness.

In endeavoring to investigate this reality, it becomes
especially needful to distinguish the communication of
the will of God from those mental phenomena with
which it has very commonly been intermingled and
confounded. The want of this distinction has occa-
sioned a confusion which has been greatly injurious to
the cause of truth. It has occasioned great obscurity of
opinion respecting Divine instruction ; and by associat-
ing error with truth, has frequently induced scepticism
respecting the truth itself. — When an intelligent person
perceives that infallible truth or Divine authority is
described as belonging to the dictates of ' ' Conscience, ' '
and when he perceives, as he must perceive, that these
dictates are various and sometimes contradictory ; he
is in danger of concluding that no unerring and no Di-
vine guidance is accorded to man.

Upon this serious subject it is therefore peculiarly
necessary to endeavor to attain distinct ideas, and to
employ those words only which convey distinct ideas
to other men. The first section of the present chapter
will accordingly be devoted to some brief observations
respecting the conscience, its nature, and its authority;
by which it is hoped the reader will see sufficient reason
to distinguish its dictates from that higher guidance,
respecting which it is the object of the present chapter
to enquire.

For a kindred purpose, it appears requisite to offer a
short review of popular and philosophical opinions re-
specting a Moral Sense. These opinions will be found
to have been frequently expressed in great indistinct-
ness and ambiguity of language. The purpose of the
writer in referring to these opinions, is to enquire

54 THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION [ESSAY I

whether they do not generally involve a recognition —
obscurely perhaps, but still a recognition — of the prin-
ciple, that God communicates his will to the mind. If
they do this, and if they do it without design or con-
sciousness, no trifling testimony is afforded to the truth
of the principle : for how should this principle thus
secretly recommended itself to the minds of men, ex-
cept by the influence of its own evidence ?

SECTION I.
CONSCIENCE, ITS NATURE AND AUTHORITY.

In the attempt to attach distinct notions to the term
" Conscience," we have to request the reader not to
estimate the accuracy of our observations by the notions
which he may have habitually connected with the word.
Our disquisition is not about terms but truths. If the
observations are in themselves just, our principal object
is attained. The secondary object, that of connecting
truth with appropriate terms, is only so far attain-
able by a writer, as shall be attained by an uniform
employment of words in determinate senses in his own
practice.

Men possess notions of right and wrong: they possess
a belief that, under given circumstances, they ought to
do one thing or to forbear another. This belief I would
call a conscientious belief. And when such a belief
exists in a man's mind in reference to a number of ac-
tions, I would call the sum or aggregate of his notions
respecting what is right and wrong, his Conscience.

To possess notions of right and wrong in human con-
duct— to be convinced that we ought to do or to forbear
an action — implies and supposes a sense of obligation
existent in the mind. A man who feels that it is wrong

CHAP. VI. J OF THE WIU, OF GOD. 55

for him to do a thing, possesses a sense of obligation to
refrain. Into the origin of this sense of obligation, or
how it is induced into the mind, we do not enquire : it
is sufficient for our purpose that it exists ; and there is
no reason to doubt that its existence is consequent of
the will of God.

In most men — perhaps in all — this sense of obligation
refers with greater or less distinctness, to the will of a
superior being. The impression, however obscure, is,
in general, fundamentally this : I must do so or so, be-
cause God requires it.

It is found that this sense of obligation is sometimes
connected, in the minds of separate individuals, with
different actions. One man thinks he ought to do a
thing from which another thinks he ought to forbear.
Upon the great questions of morality there is indeed,
in general, a congruity of human judgment ; yet sub-
jects do arise respecting which one man's conscience
dictates an act different from that which is dictated by
another's. It is not therefore essential to a conscien-
tious judgment of right and wrong, that that judgment
should be in strict accordance with the moral law.
Some men's consciences dictate that which the moral
law does not enjoin ; and this law enjoins some points
which are not enforced by every man's conscience.
This is precisely the result which, from the nature of
the case, it is reasonable to expect. Of these judgments
respecting what is right, with which the sense of obli-
gation becomes from time to time connected, some are
induced by the instructions or example of others ; some
by our own reflection or enquiry ; some perhaps from
the written law of revelation ; and some, as we have
cause to conclude, from the direct intimations of the Di-
vine will.

It is manifest that if the sense of obligation is some-
times connected with subjects that are proposed to us

56 THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION [ESSAY I.

merely by the instruction of others, or if the connec-
tion results from the power of association and habit, or
from the fallible investigations of our own minds — that
sense of obligation will be connected, in different indi-
viduals, with different subjects. So that it may some-
times happen that a man can say, I conscientiously
think I ought to do a certain action, and yet that his
neighbor can say, I conscientiously think the contrary.

Such considerations enable us to account for the di-
versity of the dictates of the conscience in individuals
respectively. A person is brought up amongst Catholics,
and is taught from his childhood that flesh ought
not to be eaten in L,ent. The arguments of those around
him, or perhaps their authority, satisfy him that what he
is taught is truth. The sense of obligation thus becomes
connected with a refusal to eat flesh in I^ent ; and
thenceforth he says that the abstinence is dictated by
his conscience. A Protestant youth is taught the con-
trary. Argument or authority satisfies him that flesh
may lawfully be eaten every day in the year. His
sense of obligation therefore is not connected with the
abstinence ; and thenceforth he says that eating flesh
in Lent does not violate his conscience. And so of a
multitude of other questions.

When therefore a person says, my conscience dictates
to me that I ought to perform such an action, he means
— or in the use of such language he ought to mean —
that the sense of obligation which subsists in his mind
is connected with that action ; that, so far as his judg-
ment is enlightened, it is a requisition of the law of
God.

But not all our opinions respecting morality and re-
ligion are derived from education or reasoning. He
who finds in Scripture the precept, " Thou shalt love
thy neighbor as thyself," derives an opinion respecting
the duty of loving others from the discovery of this

CHAP. VI.] OF THE WII.I, OF GOD. 57

expression of the will of God. His sense of obligation
is connected with benevolence towards others in conse-
quence of this discovery ; or, in other words, his under-
standing has been informed by the moral law, and a
new duty is added to those which are dictated by his
conscience. Thus it is that Scripture, by informing
the judgment, extends the jurisdiction of conscience ;
and it is hence, in part, that in those who seriously
study the Scriptures, the conscience appears so much
more vigilant and operative than in many who do not
possess, or do not regard them. Many of the mistakes
which education introduces, many of the fallacies to
which our own speculatious lead us, are corrected by
this law. In the case of our Catholic, if a reference
to Scripture should convince him that the judgment he
has formed respecting abstinence from flesh is not
founded on the law of God, the sense of obligation
becomes detached from its subject ; and thenceforth his
conscience ceases to dictate that he should abstain from
flesh in Lent. Yet Scripture does not decide every
question respecting human duty, and in some instances
individuals judge differently of the decisions which
Scripture gives. This, again, occasions some diversity
in the dictates of the conscience ; it occasions the sense
of obligation to become connected with dissimilar, and
possibly incompatible, actions.

But another portion of men's judgments respecting
moral affairs is derived from immediate intimations of
the Divine will. (This we must be allowed for the present
to assume. ) These intimations inform sometimes the
judgment ; correct its mistakes ; and increase and give
distinctness to our knowledge — thus operating, as the
Scriptures operate, to connect the sense of obliga-
tion more accurately with those actions which are con-
formable with the will of God. It does not, however,
follow, by any sort of necessity, that this higher in-

58 THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION [ESSAY I.

struction must correct all the mistakes of the judgment;
that because it imparts some light, that light must be
perfect day ; that because it communicates some
moral or religious truth, it must communicate all the
truths of religion and morality. Nor, again, does it
follow that individuals must each receive the same
access of knowledge. It is evidently as possible that
it should be communicated in different degrees to differ-
ent individuals, as that it should be communicated
at all. For which plain reasons we are still to expect,
what in fact we find, that although the judgment re-
ceives light from a superhuman intelligence, the degree
of that light varies in individuals ; and that the sense
of obligation is connected with fewer subjects, and
attended with less accuracy, in the minds of some men
than of others.

With respect to the authority which properly belongs
to conscience as a director of individual conduct, it
appears manifest, alike from reason and from Scripture,
that it is great. Dr. Furneaux says, ' 'To secure the favor
of God and the rewards of true religion, we must follow
our own consciences and judgments according to the best
light we can attain."* And I am especially disposed
to add the testimony of Sir William Temple, because
he recognizes the doctrine which has just been ad-
vanced, that our judgments are enlightened by super-
human agency. ' ' The way to our future happiness
must be left, at last, to the impressions made upon every
man' s belief and conscience either by natural or super-
natural arguments and means, "f- Accordingly there
appears no reason to doubt that some will stand con-
victed in the sight of the Omniscient Judge, for actions
which his moral law has not forbidden ; and that some
may be uncondemned for actions which that law does not
allow. The distinction here is the same as that to

* Essay on Toleration, p 8. f Works : v. I. p 55- f- x740.

CHAP. VI.] OF THE Wlljy OF GOD. 59

which we have before had occasion to allude, between
the desert of the agent and the quality of the act. Of
this distinction an illustration is contained in Isaiah x.
It was the Divine will that a certain specific course of
action should be pursued in punishing the Israelites.
For the performance of this, the king of Assyria was
employed : — ' ' I will give him a charge to take the spoil,
and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the
mire of the streets." This charge the Assyrian mon-
arch fulfilled ; he did the will of God ; but then his
intention was criminal ; he " meant not so:" and there-
fore, when the ' ' whole work ' ' is performed, ' ' I will
punish,'" says the Almighty, "the fruit of the stout
heart of the king of Assyria, and the glory of his high
looks."

But it was said that these principles respecting the
authority of conscience were recognized in Scripture.
1 ' One believeth that he may eat all things : another
who is weak eateth herbs. One man esteemeth one
day above another : another esteemeth every day alike."
Here, then, are differences, nay, contrarieties of con-
scientious judgments. And what are the parties di-
rected severally to do? — "Let every man be fully
persuaded in his own mind ;" that is, let the full per-
suasion of his own mind be every man's rule of action.
The situation of these parties was, that one perceived
the truth upon the subject, and the other did not ; that
in one the sense of obligation was connected with an
accurate, in the other with an inaccurate, opinion.
Thus, again : — ' ' / know, and am persuaded by the
Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of itself;"
therefore, absolutely speaking, it is lawful to eat all
things ; "but to him that esteemeth any thing to be un-
clean , to him it is unclean . ' ' The question is not whether
his judgment was correct, but what that judgment act-
ually was. To the doubter, the uncleanness, that is,

60 THE) IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION [ESSAY I.

the sin of eating, was certain, though the act was right.
Again : " All things indeed are pure ; but it is evil/or
that man who eateth with offence." And, again, as a
general rule : "He that doubteth is condemned if he
eat, because he eateth not of faith ; for whatsoever is
not of faith is sin."*

One observation remains ; that although a man
ought to make his conduct conform to his conscience,
yet he may sometimes justly be held criminal for the
errors of his opinion. Men often judge amiss respect-
ing their duties in consequence of their own faults :
some take little pains to ascertain the truth ; some vol-
untarily exclude knowledge ; and most men would
possess more accurate perceptions of the moral law if
they sufficiently endeavored to obtain them. And,
therefore, although a man may not be punished for a
given act which he ignorantly supposes to be lawful,
he may be punished for that ignorance in which his
supposition orginates. Which consideration may per-
haps account for the expression, that he who ignor-
antly failed to do his master's will " shall be beaten
with few stripes. ' ' There is a degree of wickedness,
to the agents of which God at length ' ' sends strong
delusion" that they may "believe a lie." In this
state of strong delusion they perhaps may, without
violating any sense of obligation, do many wicked act-
ions. The principles which have been here delivered
would lead us to suppose that tfie punishment which
awaits such men will have respect rather to that in-
tensity of wickedness of which delusion was the conse-
quence, than to those particular acts which they might
ignorantly commit under the influence of the delusion
itself. This observation is offered to the reader be-
cause some writers have obscured the present subject
by speculating upon the moral deserts of those desper-
* Rom. xiv.

CHAP. VI.] OF THE WII.I, OF GOD. 6l

ately bad men, who occasionally have committed atro-
cious acts under the notion that they were doing right.
Let us then, when we direct our serious enquiry to
the immediate communication of the Divine will, care-
fully distinguish that communication from the dictates
of the conscience. They are separate and distinct con-
siderations. It is obvious that those positions which
some persons advance ; — " Conscience is our infallible
guide, — "Conscience is the voice of the" Deity," etc.,
are wholly improper and inadmissible. The term may
indeed have been employed syno?iymously for the voice
of God : but this ought never to be done. It is to in-
duce confusion of language respecting a subject which
ought always to be distinctly exhibited ; and the ne-
cessity for. avoiding ambiguity is so much the greater,
as the consequences of that ambiguity are more serious:
it is obvious that, on these subjects, inaccuracy of
language gives rise to serious error of opinion.

REVIEW OF OPINIONS RESPECTING A MORAL SENSE.

The purpose for which this brief review is offered to
the reader, is explained in very few words. It is to
enquire, by a reference to the written opinions of many
persons, whether they do not agree in asserting that
our Creator communicates some portions of his moral
law immediately to the human mind. These opinions
are frequently delivered, as the reader will presently
discover, in great ambiguity of language ; but in the
midst of this ambiguity there appears to exist one per-
vading truth — a truth in testimony to which these
opinions are not the less satisfactory because, in some
instances, the testimony is undesigned. The reader is
requested to observe, as he passes on, whether many of
the difficulties which enquirers have found or made,
are not solved by the supposition of a Divine communi-

62 THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION [ESSAY I.

cation, and whether they can be solved by any other.

■ ' The Author of nature has much better furnished
us for a virtuous conduct than our moralists seem to
imagine, by almost as quick and powerful instructions
as we have for the preservation of our bodies."*

Bishop Butler says again of conscience, ' ' To pre-
side and govern, from the very economy and constitu-
tion of man, belongs to it. This faculty was placed
within to be our proper governor, to direct and regu-
late all undue principles, passions, and motives of
action. — It carries its own authority with it, that it is
our natural guide, the guide assigned us by the Author
of our nature." Would it have been unreasonable to
conclude, that there was at least some connection be-
tween this reprover of ' ' all undue principles, passions,
and motives," and that law of which the New Testa-
ment speaks, ' ' All things that are reproved are made
manifest by the light ?"f

Blair says, ' ' Conscience is felt to act as the delegate
of an invisible Ruler ;" — " Conscience is the guide, or
the enlightening or directing principle of our con-
duct."! In this instance, as in many others, consci-
ence appears to be used in an indeterminate sense.
Conscience is not an enlightening principle, but a prin-
ciple which is enlightened. It is not a legislator, but
a repository of statutes. Yet the reader will perceive
the fundamental truth, that man is in fact illuminated,
and illuminated by an invisible Ruler. In the thir-
teenth sermon there is an expression more distinct :
' ' God has invested conscience with authority to pro-
mulgate his laws." It is obvious that the Divine
Being must have communicated his laws, before they
could have been promulgated by conscience. In accord-
ance with which the author says in another place

* Dr. Hutcheson: Enquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil,
f Eph. v. 15. % Sermons.

CHAP. VI.] OF THE WIUv OF GOD. 63

" Under the tuition of God let us put ourselves." — "A
Heavenly Conductor vouchsafes his aid." — " Divine
light descends to guide our steps."*

Lord Bacon says, ■ ' The light of nature not only shines
upon the human mind through the medium of a rational
faculty, but by an internal instinct according to the law
of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of
man's first estate."

1 ' The first principles of morals are the immediate
dictates of the moral faculty." — "By the moral faculty,
or conscience, solely, we have the original conception
of right and wrong. " — "It is evident that this prin-
ciple has, from its nature, authority to direct and de-
termine with regard to our conduct : to judge, to
acquit or condemn, and even to punish ; an authority
which belongs to no other principle of the human mind."
' ' The Supreme Being has given us this light within to
direct our moral conduct." — "It is the candle of the
Lord, set up within us to guide our steps. "f This is
almost the language of Christianity, ■ ' That was the
true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into
the world. "J I do not mean to affirm that the author
of the essays speaks exclusively of the same Divine
guidance as the apostle ; but surely, if conscience
operates as such a " light within," as "the candle of
the Lord," it can require no reasoning to convince us
that it is illuminated from heaven. The indistinctness
of notions which such language exhibits, appears to
arise from inaccurate views of the nature of conscience.
The writer does not distinguish between the recipient
and the source ; between the enlightened principle and
the enlightening beam. The apostle speaks only of the

* Sermon 7.

t Dr. Reid : Essay on the Powers of the Human Mind, Essay
3 c. 8. &c.
% John i. 9.

64 THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION [ESSAY I.

last ; the uninspired enquirer speaks, without discrim-
ination, of both ; — and hence the ambiguity.

1 'And this law is that innate sense of right and
wrong, of virtue and vice, which every man carries in
his own bosom." — "These impressions, operating on
the mind of man, bespeak a law written on his heart."
— "This secret sense of right and wrong, for wise
purposes so deeply implanted by our Creator on the
human mind, has the nature, force, and effect of a
law."*

IyOcke : " The Divine law, that law which God has
set to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them
by the light of nature or the voice of revelation, is the
measure of sin and duty. That God has given a rule
whereby men should govern themselves, I think there
is nobody so brutish as to deny."f The reader should
remark, that revelation and " the light of nature " are
here represented as being jointly and equally the law
of God.

Adam Smith : ' ' It is altogether absurd and unintel-
ligible, to suppose that the first perceptions of right
and wrong can be derived from reason. These first
perceptions cannot be the object of reason, but of im-
mediate sense and feeling." — "Though man has been
rendered the immediate judge of mankind, an appeal
lies from his sentence to a much higher tribunal, to
the tribunal of their own consciences, to that of the
man within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of
their conduct." In some cases in which censure is
violently poured upon us, the judgments of the man
within, are, however, much shaken in the steadiness
and firmness of their decision. " In such cases, this
demigod within the breast appears, like the demigods
of the poets, though partly of immortal, yet, partly,

* Dr. Shepherd's Discourse on Future Existence.

f Essay, b. 2. c. 28.

CHAP. VI.] OF THE WIU, OF GOD. 65

too, of mortal extraction." Our moral faculties "were
set up within us to be the supreme arbiters of all our
actions." • "The rules which they prescribe are to be
regarded as the commands and laws of the Deity, pro-
mulgated by those vicegerents which he has thus set
up within us." "Some questions must be left alto-
gether to the decision of the man within the breast."
And let the reader mark what follows : " If we listen
with diligent and reverential attention to what he sug-
gests to us, his voice will never deceive us. We shall
stand in no need of casuistic rules to direct our con-
duct." How wonderful that such a man, who uses
almost the language of Scripture, appears not even to
have thought of the truth — " the Anointing which 3^e
have received of him abideth in you, and ye need not
that any man teach you!" for he does not appear to
have thought of it. He intimates that this vicegerent
of God, this undeceiving teacher to whom we are to
listen with reverential attention, is some ' ' contrivance
or mechanism within';" and says that to examine what
contrivance or mechanism it is, " is a mere matter of
philosophical curiosity . " *

A matter of philosophical curiosity, Dr. Paley seems
to have thought a kindred enquiry to be. He discus-
ses the question, whether there is such a thing as a
moral sense or not ; and thus sums up the argument :
1 ' Upon the whole it seems to me, either that there
exist no such instincts as compose what is called the
moral sense, or that they are not now to be dis-
tinguished from prejudices and habits." — " This
celebrated question therefore becomes, in our system, a
question of pure curiosity ; and as such, we dismiss it
to the determination of those who are more inquisitive
than we are concerned to be, about the natural history
and constitution of the human species, "f But in an-

* Theory of Mor. Sent. | Mor- and Pol. Phil, b 1, c. 5.

66 THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION [ESSAY I.

other work, a work in which he did not bind himself
to the support of a philosophical system, he holds other
language : '■*■ Conscience, our own conscience; is to be
our guide in all things. " ' ' It is through the whisper-
ings of conscience that the Spirit speaks. If men are
wilfully deaf to their consciences they cannot hear the
Spirit. If, hearing, if being compelled to hear the
remonstrances of conscience, they nevertheless decide
and resolve and determine to go against them, then
they grieve, then they defy, then they do despite to,
the Spirit of God . " ' ' Is it superstition ? Is it not
on the contrary a just and reasonable piety to implore
of God the guidance of his Holy Spirit, when we have
any thing of great importance to decide upon or under-
take?"— "It being confessed that we cannot ordinarily
distinguish, at the time, the suggestions of the Spirit
from the operations of our minds, it may be asked,
How are we to listen to them ? The answer is, by at-
tending, universally, to the admonitions within us."*
The tendency of these quotations to enforce our gen-
eral argument, is plain and powerful.

" And I will place within them as a guide,
My umpire, Conscience ; whom if they will hear
Light after light, well used, they shall attain, "f

This is the language of Milton ; and we have thus
his testimony added to the many, that God has placed
within us an umpire which shall pronounce, His own
laws in our hearts. Thus in his "Christian Doctrine"
more clearly ; ' ' They can lay claim to nothing more
than human powers, assisted by that spiritual illumina-
tion which is common to all. ' ' %

Judge Hale : ' ' Any man that sincerely and truly
fears Almighty God, and calls and relies upon him for
his direction, has it as really as a son has the counsel
and direction of his father ; and though the voice be

* Sermons. f Par. Lost, iii. 194. % P. 81.

CHAP. VI.] OF THF, WIU, OF GOD. 67

not audible nor discernible by sense, yet is equally
as real as if a man heard a voice saying, ' This is the
way, walk in it.' "

The sentiments of the ancient philosophers, etc.,
should not be forgotten, and the rather because their
language is frequently much more distinct and satis-
factory than that of the refined enquirers of the present
day.

Marcus Antoninus : ' ' He who is well disposed will
do every thing dictated by the divinity — a particle or
portion of Himself % which God has given to each as a
guide and a leader."* — Aristotle : " The mind of man
hath a near affinity to God : there is a divine ruler in
him" — Plutarch: "The light of truth is a law, not
written in tables or books but dwelling in the mind,
always as a living rule which never permits the soul to
be destitute of an interior guide." — Hieron says that
the universal light, shining in the conscience, is "a
domestic God, a God within the hearts and souls of
men." — Epictetus : "God has assigned to each man
a director, his own good genius, a guardian whose vig-
ilance no slumbers interrupt, and whom no false rea-
sonings can deceive. So that when you have shut
your door, say not that you are alone, for your God
is within. — What need have you of outward light to
discover what is done, or to light to good actions, who
have God or that genius or divine principle for your
light ?"f Such citations might be greatly multiplied ;
but one more must suffice. Seneca says, ' ' We find
felicity — in a pure and untainted mind, which if it were
not holy were not fit to entertain the Deity. ' ' How like
the words of an apostle ! — " If any man defile the tem-
ple of God, him shall God destroy ; for the temple of
God is holy, which temple ye are. "J The philosopher
again : " There is a holy spirit in us ;"§ and again the
* Lib. 5, Sect. 27. t Lib. 1, c. 14.

\ 1 Cor. iii. 17. \ De Benef. c. 17, etc.

68 THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION [ESSAY I.

apostle : ' ' Know ye not that ' ' the ' ' Spirit of God
dwelleth in you ?' '*

Now respecting the various opinions which have been
laid before the reader, there is one observation that will
generally apply — that they unite in assigning certain
important attributes or operations to some principle or
power existent in the human mind. They affirm that
this principle or power possessess wisdom to direct us
aright — that its directions are given instantaneously as
the individual needs them — that it is inseparably atten-
ded with unquestionable authority to command. That
such a principle or power does, therefore, actually exist,
can need little further proof ; for a concurrent judgment
upon a question of personal experience cannot surely be
incorrect. To say that individuals express their notions
of this principle or power by various phraseology, that
they attribute to it different degrees of superhuman
intelligence, or that they refer for its origin to contra-
dictory causes, does not affect the general argument.
The great point for our attention, is, not the designation
or the supposed origin of this guide, but the attributes;
and these attributes appear to be divine.

THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION OF THE
WILX OF GOD.

I. That every reasonable human being is a moral
agent — that is, that every such human being is respon-
sible to God, no one perhaps denies. There can be no
responsibility where there is no knowledge : ' ' Where
there is no law there is no transgression." So then
every human being possessess, or is furnished with,
moral knowledge and a moral law. " If we admit that
mankind, without an outward revelation, are neverthe-
less sinners, we must also admit that mankind, without
* i Cor. iii. 16.

CHAP. VI.] OF THE WII.I, OF GOD. 69

such a revelation, are nevertheless in possession of the
law of God."*

Whence then do they obtain it ? — a question to which
but one answer can be given ; from the Creator him-
self. It appears therefore to be almost demonstratively
shown, that God does communicate his will immediately
to the minds of those who have no access to the external
expression of it. It is always to be rememberedt hat, as
the majority of mankind do not possess the written
communication of the will of God, the question, as it
respects them, is between an Immediate communication
and none; between such a communication, and the denial
of their responsibility in a future state ; between such
a communication, and the reducing them to the condi-
tion of the beasts that perish.

II. No one perhaps will imagine that this argument
is confined to countries which the external light of
Christianity has not reached. ■ ' Whoever expects to
find in the Scriptures a specific direction for every morat
doubt that arises, looks for more than he will mees
with ;"f so that even in Christian countries there exist,
some portion of that necessity for other guidance,
which has been seen to exist in respect to pagans.
Thus Adam Smith says that there are some ques-
tions which it ' ' is perhaps altogether impossible to de-
termine by any precise rules," and that they "must be
left altogether to the decision of the man within the
breast." — But, indeed, when we speak of living in
Christian countries, and of having access to the external
revelation, we are likely to mislead ourselves with re-
spect to the actual condition of ' ' Christian ' ' people.
Persons talk of possessing the Bible, as if every one
who lived in a Protestant country had a Bible in his
pocket and could read it. But there are thousands,

* Gurney : Essays on Christianity, p. 516.
f Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 1, c. 4.

70 THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION [ESSAY I.

perhaps millions, in Christian and in Protestant coun-
tries, who know very little of what Christianity enjoins.
They probably do not possess the Scriptures, or if they
do, probably cannot read them. What they do know
they learn from others — from others who may be little
solicitous to teach them, or to teach them aright. Such
persons therefore are, to a considerable extent, practi-
cally in the same situation as those who have not heard
of Christianity, and there is therefore to them a corre-
sponding need of a direct communication of knowledge
from heaven. But if we see the need of such knowledge
extending itself thus far, who will call in question the
doctrine, that it is imparted to the whole human race ?

These are offered as considerations involving an an-
tecedent probability of the truth of our argument.
The reader is not required to give his assent to it as to a
dogma of which he can discover neither the reason nor
the object. Here is probability very strong ; here is
usefulness very manifest, and very great : — so that the
mind may reasonably be open to the reception of evi-
dence, whatever Truth that evidence shall establish.

If the written revelation were silent respecting the
immediate communication of the Divine will, that sil-
ence might perhaps rightly be regarded as conclusive
evidence that it is not conveyed ; because it is so
intimately connected with the purposes to which that
revelation is directed, that scarcely any other explana-
tion could be given of its silence than that the com-
munication did not exist. That the Scriptures declare
that God has communicated light and knowledge to
some men by the immediate exertion of his own agency,
admits not of dispute : but this it is obvious is not
sufficient for our purpose ; and it is in the belief that
they declare that God imparts some knowledge to all
men, that we thus appeal to their testimony.

Now here the reader should especially observe, that

CHAP. VI.] OF THE WIU, OF GOD. 7 1

where the Christian Scriptures speak of the existence
and influence of the Divine Spirit on- the mind, they
commonly speak of its higher operations ; not of its
office as a moral guide, but as a purifier, and sanctifier,
and comforter of the soul. They speak of it in refer-
ence to its sacred and awful operations in connection
with human salvation : and thus it happens that very
many citations which, if we were writing an essay on
religion, would be perfectly appropriate, do not possess
that distinct and palpable application to an argument,
which goes no further than to affirm that it is a moral
guide. And yet it may most reasonably be remarked,
that if it has pleased the Universal Parent thus, and
for these awful purposes, to visit the minds of those
who are obedient to his power — he will not suffer them
to be destitute of a moral guidance. The less must be
supposed to be involved in the greater.

Our argument does not respect the degrees of illumi-
nation which may be possessed, respectively, by indi-
viduals,* or in different ages of the world. There
were motives, easily conceived, for imparting a greater
degree of light and of power at the introduction of Chris-
tianity than in the present day ; accordingly there are
many expressions in the New Testament which speak of
high degrees of light and power, and which, however they
may affirm the general existence of a Divine guidance,
are not descriptive of the general nor of the present
condition of mankind. Nevertheless if the records of
Christianity, in describing these greater "gifts," inform

* I am disposed to offer a simple testimony to what I believe
to be a truth ; that even in the present day, the Divine illumin-
ation and power is sometimes imparted to individuals in a degree
much greater than is necessary for the purposes of mere moral
direction ; that on subjects connected with their own personal
condition or that of others, light is sometimes imparted in greater
brightness and splendor than is ordinarily enjoyed by mankind,
or than is necessary for our ordinary direction in life.

72 THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION [ESSAY I.

us that a gift, similar in its nature but without specifi-
cation of its amount, is imparted to all men, it is suf-
ficient. Although it is one thing for the Creator to
impart a general capacity to distinguish right from
wrong, and another to impart miraculous power ; one
thing to inform his accountable creature that lying is
evil, and another to enable him to cure a leprosy ; yet
this affords no reason to deny that the nature of the
gift is not the same, or that both are not Divine.
' ' The degree of light may vary according as one man
has a greater measure than another. But the light of
an apostle is not one thing and the light of the heathen
another thing, distinct in principle. They differ only in
degree of power, distinctness, and splendor of mani-
festation. ' ' *

So early as Gen. vi. there is a distinct declaration of
the moral operation of the Deity on the human mind ;
not upon the pious and the good, but upon those
who were desperately wicked, so that even " every
imagination of the thoughts of their heart was only
evil continually." — "My spirit shall not always strive
with man." Upon this passage a good and intelligent
man writes thus; "Surely, if His spirit has striven
with them until that time, until they were so desper-
ately wicked, and wholly corrupted, that not only some,
but every imagination of their hearts was evil, yes,
only evil, and that continually, we may well believe the
express Scripture assertion that 'a manifestation of the
Spirit is given to every man to profit withal.' "t

Respecting some of the prophetical passages in the
Hebrew Scriptures, it may be observed that there ap-

* Hancock : Essay on Instinct, etc., p. 2, c. 7, s. 1. I take
this opportunity of acknowledging the obligations I am under
to this work, for many of the " Opinions" which are cited in
the last section.

f Job Scott's Journal, c. 1.

CHAP. VI.] OF THE WIU, OF GOD. 73

pears a want of complete adaptation to the immediate
purpose of our argument, because they speak of that,
prospectively, which our argument assumes to be true
retrospectively also. "After those days, saith the Lord,
I will put my law in their inward parts and write it in
their hearts;"* from which the reader may possibly
conclude that before those days no such internal law
was imparted. Yet the preceding paragraph might
assure him of the contrary, and that the prophet indi-
cated an increase rather than a commencement of
internal guidance. Under any supposition it does not
affect the argument as it respects the present condition
of the human race ; for the prophecy is twice quoted
in the Christian Scriptures, and is expressly stated to
be fulfilled. Once the prophecy is quoted almost at
length, and in the other instance the important clause
is retained, " I will put my laws into their hearts, and
in their minds will I write them."f

"And all thy children," says Isaiah, "shall be
taught of the I^ord. ' ' Christ himself quotes this pass-
age in illustrating the nature of his own religion : " It
is written in the prophets, And they shall be all taught
of God. "|

1 ' Thine eyes shall see thy teachers : and thine ears
shall hear a word behind thee, saying, This is the way,
walk ye in it ; when ye turn to the right hand, and
when ye turn to the left."§

The Christian Scriptures, if they be not more ex-
plicit, are more abundant in their testimony. Paul
addresses the ' 'foolish Galaiians. ' ' The reader should
observe their character ; for some Christians who ack-
nowledge the Divine influence on the minds of emi-
nently good men, are disposed to question it in refer-
ence to others. These foolish Galatians had turned

* Jer. xxxi. 33. f Heb. viii. 10 ; and x. 16.

\ John vi. 45. \ Isa. xxx. 20, 21.

74 The immediate communication [essay i.

again to "weak and beggarly elements," and their
dignified instructor was afraid of them, lest he had
bestowed upon them labor in vain. Nevertheless, to
them he makes the solemn declaration, ' ■ God hath
sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts ' ' *

John writes a General Epistle, an epistle which was
addressed, of course, to a great variety of characters,
of whom some, it is probable, possessed little more of
the new religion than the name. The apostle writes —
' ' Hereby we know that he abideth in us by the Spirit
which he hath given us."f

The solemn declarations which follow are addressed
to large numbers of recent converts, of converts whom
the writer had been severely reproving for improprie-
ties of conduct, for unchristian contentions, and even
for the greater faults : "Ye are the temple of the liv-
ing God, as God hath said, I will dwell in them and
walk in them." — " What, know ye not that your body
is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you?" %
" Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that
the Spirit of God dwelleth in you ? If any man defile
the temple of God, him shall God destroy ; for the
temple of God is holy, which temple ye are."§

And with respect to the moral operations of this
sacred power : — " As touching brotherly love, ye need
not that I write unto you : for ye yourselves are taught
of God to love one another ;"|| that is, taught a duty
of morality.

Thus also : — "The grace of God that bringeth sal-
vation hath appeared to all men, teaching us that,
denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live
soberly, righteously, and godly, in this present world. ' '^f
or in other words, teaching all men moral laws — laws

* Gal. iv. 6. f i John iii. 24.

% 1 Cor. vi. 19. \ 1 Cor. iii. 16.

|| 1 Thess. iv. 9. \ Tit. ii. n, 12.

CHAP. VI.] OF THE WIU, OF GOD. 75

both mandatory and prohibitory, teaching both what
to do and what to avoid.

And very distinctly: — ''The manifestation of the
Spirit is given to every man to profit withal."* A
light to lighten the Gentiles, "f "lam the Light of
the world. "J " The true light which lighteth every
man that cometh into the world. "§

" When the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by
nature the things contained in the law, these having
not the law are a law unto themselves, which show the
work of the law written in their hearts." || — written,
it may be asked by whom but by that Being who said,
' f I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it
in their hearts ?"^[

To such evidence from the written revelation, I know
of no other objection which can be urged than the sup-
position that this Divine instruction, though existing
eighteen hundred years ago, does not exist now. To
which it appears sufficient to reply, that it existed not
only eighteen hundred years ago, but before the period
of the Deluge ; and that the terms in which the Scrip-
tures speak of it are incompatible with the supposition
of a temporary duration : "all taught of God:" "in
you all .•" ' ' hath appeared unto all men : " ' ' given to
every man :" "every man that cometh i?ito the world."
Besides, there is not the most remote indication in the
Christian Scriptures that this instruction would not be
perpetual ; and their silence on such a subject, a sub-
ject involving the most sacred privileges of our race,
must surely be regarded as positive evidence that this
instruction would be accorded to us for ever.

How clear soever appears to be the evidence of rea-
son ,that man, being universally a moral and accountable

* 1 Cor. xii. 7. f Luke ii. 32. % John viii. 12.

§ John i. 9. || Rom. ii. 14. fl Jer. xxxi. 33.

76 THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION [ESSAY I.

agent, must be possessed, universally, of a moral law ;
and how distinct soever the testimony of revelation,
that he does universally possess it — objections are still
urged against its existence.

Of these, perhaps the most popular are those which
are founded upon the varying dictates of the " Con-
science." If the view which we have taken of the
nature and operations of the conscience be just, these
objections will have little weight. That the dictates of
the conscience should vary in individuals respectively,
is precisely what, from the circumstances of the case,
is to be expected ; but this variation does not impeach
the existence of that purer ray which, whether in less
or greater brightness, irradiates the heart of man.

I am, however, disposed here to notice the objec-
tions* that may be founded upon national derelictions
of portions of the moral law. ' ' There is, ' ' says Locke,
\ ' scarce that principle of morality to be named, or rule
of virtue to be thought on, which is not somewhere or
other slighted and condemned by the. general fashion
of whole societies of men, governed by practical opin-
ions and rules of living quite opposite to others. " —
And Paley : " There is scarcely a single vice which, in
some age or country of the world, has not been count-
enanced by public opinion : in one country it is
esteemed an office of piety in children to sustain their
aged parents, in another to dispatch them out of the
way : suicide in one age of the world has been heroism,
in another felony ; theft which is punished by most
laws, by the laws of Sparta was not unfrequently re-
warded : you shall hear duelling alternately reprobated
and applauded according to the sex, age, or station of
the person you converse with : the forgiveness of injur-
ies and insults is accounted by one sort of people mag-
nanimity, by another, meanness, "f

* Not urged specifically, perhaps, against the Divine guid-
ance ; but they will equally afford an illustration of the truth.

t Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 1. c. 5.

CHAP. VI.] OF THE WIUU OF GOD. 77

Upon all which I observe, that to whatever purpose
these reasonings are directed, they are defective in an
essential point. They show us indeed what the exter-
nal actions of men have been, but give no proof that
these actions were conformable with the secret internal
judgment : and this last is the only important point.
That a rule of virtue is l ' slighted and condemned by
the general fashion'' is no sort of evidence that those
who joined in this general fashion did not still know
that it was a rule of virtue. There are many duties
which, in the present day, are slighted by the general
fashion, and yet no man will stand up and say that
they are not duties. ' ' There is scarcely a single vice
which has not been countenanced by public opinion ; ' '
but where is the proof that it has been apppoved by
private and secret judgment? There is a great deal
of difference between those sentiments which men seem
to entertain respecting their duties when they give ex-
pression to " public opinion," and when they rest
their heads on their pillows in calm reflection. ' ' Sui-
cide in one age of the world has been heroism, in an-
other felony ;V but it is not every action which a man
says is heroic, that he believes is right. * * Forgiveness
of injuries and insults is accounted by one sort of peo-
ple magnanimity, by another, meanness ;" and yet they
who thus vulgarly employ the word meanness, do not
imagine that forbearance and placability are really
wrong.

I have met with an example which serves to confirm
me in the judgment, that public notions or rather pub-
lic actions are a very equivocal evidence of the real
sentiments of mankind. "Can there be greater bar-
barity than to hurt an infant? Its helplessness, its
innocence, its amiableness, call forth the compassion
even of an enemy. — What then should we imagine
must be the heart of a parent who would injure that

78 THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION [ESSAY I.

weakness which a furious enemy is afraid to violate ?
Yet the exposition, that is, the murder of new-born
infants, was a practice allowed of in almost all the
states of Greece, even among the polite and civilized
Athenians. ' ' This seems a strong case against us. But
what were the grounds upon which this atrocity was
defended ?— ' ' Philosophers, instead of censuring, sup-
ported the horrible abuse, by far-fetched considerations
of public utility."*

By far-fetched considerations of public iitility ! Why
had they recourse to such arguments as these ? Because
they found that the custom could not be reconciled with
direct and acknowledged rules of virtue : because they felt
and knew that it was wrong. The very circumstance
that they had recourse to "far-fetched arguments," is
evidence that they were conscious that clearer and
more immediate arguments were against them. They
knew that infanticide was an immoral act.

I attach some importance to "the indications which
this class of reasoning affords of the comparative uni-
formity of human opinion, even when it is nominally
discordant. One other illustration may be offered from
more private life. Boswell in his Life of Johnson, says
that he proposed the question to the moralist,
1 ' Whether duelling was contrary to the laws of Christ-
ianity V ' Let the reader notice the essence of the re-
ply : "Sir, as men become in a high degree refined,
various causes of offence arise which are considered to
be of such importance that life must be staked to atone
for them, though in reality they are not so. In a state
of highly polished society, an affront is held to be a
serious injury. It must therefore be resented, or
rather a duel must be fought upon it, as men have agreed
to banish from their society one who puts up with an
affront without fighting a duel. Now, Sir, it is never
unlawful to fight in self-defence. He then who fights

* Theory Mor. Sent. p. 5, c. 2.

CHAP. VI.] OF THE WIIX OF GOD. 79

a duel, does not fight from passion against his antago-
nist, but out of self-defence, to avert the stigma of the
world, and to prevent himself from being driven from
society. — While such notions prevail no doubt a man
may lawfully fight a duel." The question was, the
consistency of duelling with the laws of Christianity ;
and there is not a word about Christianity in the reply.
Why ? Because its laws can never be shown to allow
duelling ; and Johnson doubtless knew this. Accord-
ingly, like the philosophers who tried to justify the
kindred crime of infanticide, he had recourse to ' ' far-
fetched considerations," — to the high polish of society
— to the stigma of the world — to the notions that pre-
vail. Now, whilst the readers of Boswell commonly
think they have Johnson's authority in favor of duell-
ing, I think they have his authority against it. I
think that the mode in which he justified duelling,
evinced his consciousness that it was not compatible
with the moral law.

And thus it is, that with respect to public opinions,
and general fashions, and thence descending to private
life, we shall find that men very usually know the
requisitions of the moral law better than they seem to
know them ; and that he who estimates the moral
knowledge of societies or individuals by their common
language, refers to an uncertain and fallacious standard.

After all, the uniformity of human opinion respect-
ing the great laws of morality is very remarkable.
Sir James Mackintosh speaks of Grotius, who had cited
poets, orators, historians, etc., and says, "He quotes
them as witnesses, whose conspiring testimony , mightily
strengthened and confirmed by their discordance on
almost every other subject, is a conclusive proof of the
unanimity of the whole human race, on the great rules
of duty and fundamental principles of morals."*

From poets and orators we may turn to savage life.
* Disc, on Study of I^aw of Nature

8o THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION [ESSAY I.

In 1683, that is, soon after the colonization of Pennsyl-
vania, the founder of the colony held a " council and
consultation ' ' with some of the Indians. In the
course of the interview it appeared that these savages
believed in a state of future retribution ; and they de -
scribed their simple ideas of the respective states of the
good and had. The vices that they enumerated as
those which would consign them to punishment, are
remarkable, inasmuch as they so nearly correspond
to similar enumerations in the Christian Scriptures.
They were " theft, swearing, lying, whoring, murder,
and the like ;V* and the New Testament affirms that
those who are guilty of adultery, fornication, lying,
theft, murder, etc., shall not inherit the kingdom of
God. The same writer having on his travels met with
some Indians, stopped and gave them some good and
serious advices. "They wept," says he, " and tears
ran down their naked bodies. They smote their hands
upon their breasts and said, ' The Good man here told
them what I said was all good.' "f

But reasonings such as these are in reality not neces-
sary to the support of the truth of the immediate com-
munication of the will of God ; because if the variations
in men's notions of right and wrong were greater than
they are, they would not impeach the existence of that
communication. In the first place, we never affirm
that the Deity communicates all his law to every man :
and in the second place, it is sufficiently certain that
multitudes know his laws, and yet neglect to fulfill
them.

If, in conclusion, it should be asked, What assistance
can be yielded, in the investigation of publicly auth-
orized rules of virtue, by the discussions of the present
chapter? we answer, Very little. But when it is asked,

* John Richardson's L,ife.

t Ibid.

CHAP. VI.] OF THE WIU, OF GOD. 8l

Of what importance are they as illustrating the princi-
ples of morality ? we answer, Very much. If there be
two sources from which it has pleased God to enable
mankind to know His will — a law written externally,
and a law communicated to the heart — it is evident
that both must be regarded as principles of morality,
and that, in a work like the present, both should be
illustrated as such. It is incidental to the latter mode
of moral guidance, that it is little adapted to the for-
mation of external rules : but it is of high and solemn
importance to our species for the secret direction of
the individual man.

ESSAY I.

PART II.

SUBORDINATE MEANS OF DISCOVERING
THE DIVINE WILL.

CHAPTER I.

THE LAW OF THE LAND.

Its authority — Limits to its authority — Morality sometimes
prohibits what the law permits.

The authority of civil government as a director of
individual conduct, is explicitly asserted in the Christ-
ian Scriptures : — "Be subject to principalities and pow-
ers— Obey magistrates,"* — "Submit yourselves to
every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake : whether
it be to the king, as supreme, or unto governors, as
unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of
evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well."f

By this general sanction of civil government, a mul-
titude of questions respecting human duty are at once
decided. In ordinary cases, he upon whom the magis-
trate imposes a law needs not to seek for knowledge of
his duty upon the subject from a higher source. The
Divine will is sufficiently indicated by the fact that
the magistrate commands. Obedience to the law is
obedience to the expressed will of God. He who, in
the payment of a tax to support the just exercise of
government, conforms to the law of the land, as truly
obeys the Divine will, as if the Deity had regulated
questions of taxation, by express rules.

* Tit. iii. i. f i Pet. ii. 13.

CHAP. I.] THE UW OF THE UND. 83

In thus founding the authority of civil government
upon the precepts of revelation, we refer to the ulti-
mate, and for that reason to the most proper sanction.
Not, indeed, that if revelation had been silent, the ob-
ligation of obedience might not have been deduced
from other considerations. The utility of government
— its tendency to promote the order and happiness of
society — powerfully recommend its authority ; so pow-
erfully indeed, that it is probable that the worst gov-
ernment which ever existed, was incomparably better
than none ; and we shall hereafter have occasion to see
that considerations of utility involve actual moral
obligation.

The purity and practical excellence of the motives to
civil obedience which are proposed in the Christian
Scriptures, are especially worthy of regard. ' 'Submit
for the Lord's sake." " Be subject, not only for wrath,
but for conscience'' sake. ' ' Submission for wrath' s sake,
that is, from fear of penalty, implies a very inferior
motive to submission upon grounds of principle and
duty ; and as to practical excellence, who cannot
perceive that he who regulates his obedience by the
motives of Christianity, acts more worthily, and honor-
ably, and consistently, than he who is influenced only
by fear of penalties ? The man who obeys the laws for
conscience' sake, will obey always ; alike when disobe-
dience would be unpunished and unknown, as when it
would be detected the next hour. The magistrate has
a security for such a man's fidelity, which no other
motive can supply. A smuggler will import his kegs
if there is no danger of a seizure — a Christian will not
buy the brandy though no one knows it but himself.

It is to be observed, that the obligation of civil obe-
dience is enforced, whether the particular command of
the law is in itself sanctioned by morality or not.
Antecedently to the existence of the law of the magis-

84 the uw of the i,and. [essay i.

trate respecting the importation of brandy, it was of no
consequence in the view of morality whether brandy
was imported or not ; but the prohibition of the magis-
trate involves a moral obligation to refrain. Other
doctrine has been held ; and it has been asserted, that
unless the particular law is enforced by morality, it
does not become obligatory by the command of the
state.* But if this were true — if no law was obligatory
that was not previously enjoined by morality, ?io moral
obligation would result from the law of the land. Such
a question is surely set at rest by, ' ' Submit yourselves
to every ordinance of man."

But the authority of civil government is a subordinate
authority. If, from any cause, the magistrate enjoins
that which is prohibited by the moral law, the duty of
obedience is withdrawn. ' 'All human authority ceases
at the point where obedience becomes criminal." The
reason is simple ; that when the magistrate enjoins what
is criminal, he has exceeded his power : ' ' the minister of
of God ' ' has gone beyond his commission. There is, in
our day,, no such thing as a moral plenipotentiary .

Upon these principles, the first teachers of Chris-
tianity acted when the rulers ''called them, and com-
manded them not to speak at all nor teach in the name
of Jesus." — "Whether," they replied, "it be right
in the sight of God, to hearken unto you more than
unto God, judge ye."f They accordingly "entered
into the temple early in the morning and taught :" and
when, subsequently, they were again brought before
the council and interrogated, they replied, " We ought
to obey God rather than men ; ' ' and notwithstanding
the renewed command of the council, ■ ' daily in
the temple, and in every house, they ceased not to teach
and preach Jesus Christ. "J Nor let any one suppose
* See Godwin's Political Justice.

t Acts iv. 18. % Acts v. 29, 42.

CHAP. I.] THE UW OF THE LAND. 85

that there is any thing religious in the motives of the
apostles, which involved a peculiar obligation upon
them to refuse obedience : we have already seen that
the obligation to conform to religious duty and to moral
duty, is one.

To disobey the civil magistrate is however not a light
thing. When the Christian conceives that the requi-
sitions of government and of a higher law are conflict-
ing, it is needful that he exercise a strict scrutiny into the
principles of his conduct. But, if upon such scrutiny, the
contrariety of requisitions appears real, no room is left
for doubt respecting his duty, or for hesitation in per-
forming it. With the consideration of consequences
he has then no concern : whatever they may be, his
path is plain before him.

It is sufficiently evident that these doctrines respect
non-compliance only. It is one thing not to comply
with laws, and another to resist those who make or en-
force them. He who thinks the payment of tithes
unchristian ought to decline to pay them ; but he
would act upon strange principles of morality, if, when
an officer came to distrain upon his property, he forcibly
resisted his authority.*

If there are cases in which the positive injunctions
of the law may be disobeyed, it is manifest that the
mere permission of the law to do a given action, con-
veys no sufficient authority to perform it. There are,
perhaps, no disquisitions, connected with the present
subject, which are of greater practical utility than
those which show, that not every thing which is legally
right is morally right ; that a man may be entitled
by law to privileges which morality forbids him to

* We speak here of private obligations only. Respecting the
political obligations which result from the authority of
civil government, some observations will be found in the chap-
ter on Civil Obedience. Ess. iii. c. v.

86 THE I, AW OF THE UND. [ESSAY I.

exercise or to possessions which morality forbids him
to enjoy.

As to the possession, for example, of property : the
general foundation of the right to property is the law
of the land. But as the law of the land is itself subor-
dinate, it is manifest that the right to property must
be subordinate also, and must be held in subjection to
the moral law. A man who has a wife and two sons,
and who is worth fifteen hundred pounds, dies without
a will. The widow possesses no separate property, but
the sons have received from another quarter ten thousand
pounds a-piece. Now, of the fifteen hundred pounds
which the intestate left, the law assigns five hundred
to the mother, and five hundred to each son. Are
these sons morally permitted to take each his five hun-
dred pounds, and to leave their parent with only five
hundred for her support ? Every man I hope will an-
swer, No : and the reason is this ; that the moral law,
which is superior to the law of the land, forbids them
to avail themselves of their legal rights. The moral
law requires justice and benevolence, and a due consid-
eration for the wants and necessities of others ; and if
justice and benevolence would be violated by availing
ourselves of legal permissions, those permissions are
not sufficient authorities to direct our conduct.

It has been laid down, that ' ' so long as we keep
within the design and intention of a law, that law will
justify us, inforo conscientia as in foro humano, what-
ever be the equity or expediency of the law itself."*
From the example which has been offered, I think it
sufficiently appears that this maxim is utterly unsound:
at any rate, its unsoundness will appear from a brief
historical fact. During the Revolutionary war in
America, the Virginian Legislature passed a law, by
which ' ' it was enacted, that all merchants and planters
* Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. iii. p. I, c. 4.

CHAP. I.] THE I.AW OF THE UND. ' 87

in Virginia who owed money to British merchants,
should be exonerated from their debts, if they paid the
money due into the public treasury instead of sending
it to Great Britain ; and all such as stood indebted,
were invited to come forward and give their money, in
this manner, towards the support of the contest in
which America was then engaged." Now, according
to the principles of Paley, these Virginian planters
would have been justified, inforo conscienticz \ in defraud-
ing the British merchants of the money which was
their due. It is quite clear that the ' ' design and in-
tention of the law ' ' was to allow the fraud — the plant-
ers were even invited to commit it ; and yet the heart
of every reader will tell him, that to have availed
themselves of the legal permission, would have been an
act of flagitious dishonesty. The conclusion is there-
fore distinct — that legal decisions respecting property,
are not always a sufficient warrant for individual con-
duct. To the extreme disgrace of these planters it
should be told, that although at first, when they would
have gained little by the fraud, few of them paid their
debts into the treasury, yet afterwards many large
sums were paid. The Legislature offered to take the
American paper money : and as this paper money, in
consequence of its depreciation, was not worth a hund-
redth part of its value in specie, the planters, in thus
paying their debts to their own government, paid but
one pound instead of a hundred, and kept the remain-
ing ninety-nine in their own pockets ! Profligate as
these planters and as this Legislature were, it is pleasant
for the sake of America to add, that in 1796, after the
Supreme Court of the United States had been erected,
the British merchants brought the affair before it, and
the judges directed that every one of these debts should
again be paid to the rightful creditors.

It might be almost imagined that the moral philosc-

88 i THE I,AW OF THE I,AND. [ESSAY I.

pher designed to justify such conduct as that of the
planters. He says, when a man ■ ' refuses to pay a
debt of the reality of which he is conscious, he cannot
plead the intention of the statute, unless he could show
that the law intended to interpose its supreme author-
ity to acquit men of debts of the existence and justice
of which they were themselves sensible."* Now the
planters could show that this was the intention of the
law, and yet they were not justified in availing them-
selves of it. The error of the moralist is founded in
the assumption, that there is " supreme authority " in
the law. Make that authority, as it really is, subordi-
nate, and the error and the fallacious rule which is
founded upon it, will be alike corrected.

In applying to the law of the land as a moral guide,
it is of importance to distinguish its intention from its
letter. The intention is not, indeed, as we have seen,
a final consideration, but the design of a legislature is
evidently of greater import, and consequent obligation,
than the literal interpretation of the words in which
that design is proposed to be expressed. The want of
a sufficient attention to this simple rule, occasions
many snares to private virtue, and the commission of
much practical injustice. In consequence, partly of
the inadequacy of all language, and partly of the ina-
bility of those who frame laws, accurately to provide
for cases which subsequently arise, it happens that the
literal application of a law, sometimes frustrates the
intention of the legislator, and violates the obligations
of justice. Whatever be the cause, it is found in
practice, that courts of law usually regard the letter of
a statute rather than its general intention ; and hence
it happens that many duties devolve upon individuals
in the application of the laws in their own affairs. If
legal courts usually decide by the letter, and if decis-

* Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. iii, p. 1, c. 4.

CHAP. II.] THE LAW OF NATURE. 89

ion by the letter often defeats the objects of the legis-
lator and the claims of justice, how shall these claims
be satisfied except by the conscientious and forbearing
integrity of private men ? Of the cases in which this
integrity should be brought into exercise, several exam-
ples will be offered in the early part of the next Essay.

CHAPTER II.

THE LAW OF NATURE.

Its authority — Limits to its authority — Obligations resulting

from the rights of Nature — Incorrect ideas attached

to the word Nature.

We here use the term, the law of nature, as a con-
venient title under which to advert to the authority, in
moral affairs, of what are called natural instincts and
natural rights.

' ' They who rank pity among the original impulses
of our nature, rightly contend that when this principle
prompts us to the relief of human misery, it indicates
the divine intention and our duty . Indeed, the same
conclusion is deducible from the existence of the pas-
sion, whatever account be given of its origin. Whether
it be an instinct or a habit, it is in fact a property
of our nature which God appointed."*

I should reason similarly respecting natural rights
— the right to life — to personal liberty — to a share of
the productions of the earth, The fact that life is
given us by our Creator — that our personal powers and
mental dispositions are adapted by Him to personal
liberty — and that He has constituted our bodies so as

* Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 3, p. 2, c. 5.

90 THE LAW OF NATURE, [ESSAY I.

to need the productions of the earth, are satisfactory
indications of the Divine will, and of human duty.

So that we conclude the general proposition is true —
that a regard to the law of nature, in estimating
human duty, is accordant with the will of God. There
is little necessity for formally insisting on the authority
of the law of nature, because few are disposed to
dispute that authority, at least when their own interests
are served by appealing to it. If this authority were
questioned, perhaps it might be said that the expres-
sion of the Divine will tacitly sanctions it, because that
expression is addressed to us under the supposition that
our constitution is such as it is ; and because some of
the Divine precepts appear to specify a point at which
the authority of the law of nature stops. To say that
a rule is only in some cases wrong, is to say, that in
many it is right : to which may be added the consider-
ation, that the tendency of the law of nature is mani-
festly beneficial. No man questions that the ' ' original
impulses of our nature ' ' tend powerfully to the well-
being of the species.

In speaking of the instincts of nature, we enter into
no curious definitions of what constitutes an instinct.
Whether any of our passions or emotions be properly
instinctive, or the effect of association, is of little con-
sequence to the purpose, so long as they actually sub-
sist in the human economy, and so long as we have
reason to believe that their subsistence there is in
accordance with the Divine will.

But the authority of the law of nature, like every
other authority, is subordinate to that of the moral
law. This indeed is sufficiently indicated by those
reasonings which show the universal supremacy of that
law. Yet it may be of advantage to remember such
expressions as these : ' ' Be not afraid of them that kill
the body, and after that have no more that they can

CHAP. II.] THE I.AW OF NATURE. 91

do. But fear him which, after he hath killed, hath
power to cast into hell."* This appears distinctly to
place an instinct of nature in subordination to the
moral law. The ' ' fear of them that kill the body," re-
sults from the instinct of self-preservation ; and by this
instinct we are not to be guided when the Divine will
requires us to repress its voice.

Parental affection has been classed amongst the in-
stincts.! The declaration, "He that loveth son or
daughter more than me, is not worthy of me," J clearly
subjects this instinct to the higher authority of the
Divine will ; for the ' ' love ' ' of God is to be mani-
fested by obedience to his law. Another declaration
to the same import subjects also the instinct of self-
preservation : ' ' If a man hate not (that is by compar-
ison) his own life also, he cannot be my disciple. "||
And here it is remarkable, that these affections or in-
stincts are adduced for the purpose of inculcating their
subordination to the moral law.

Upon one of the most powerful instincts of nature,
the restraints of revelation are emphatically laid. Its
operation is restricted, not to a few of its possible ob-
jects, but exclusively to one ; and to that one upon an
express and specified condition. §

The propriety of holding the natural impulses in
subjection to a higher law, appears to be asserted in
this language of Dugald Stewart : ' ' The dictates of
reason and conscience inform us, in language which it
is impossible to mistake, that it is sometimes a duty to
check the most amiable and pleasing emotions of the
heart ; to withdraw, for example, from .the sight of
those distresses which stronger claims forbid us to re-
lieve, and to deny ourselves that exquisite luxury
which arises from the exercise of humanity. ' ' Even

* Luke xii. 4. \ Dr. Price. % Matt. x. 37.

|| Luke xiv. 26.

\ See Matt. v. 28. 1 Cor. vi. 9. vii. I, 2. Gal. v. 19, etc.

92 THE IyAW OF NATURE. [ESSAY I.

that morality which is not founded upon religion,
recommends the same truth. Godwin says, that if
Fenelon were in his palace, and it took fire, and it so
happened that the life either of himself or of his cham-
bermaid must be sacrificed, it would be the duty of the
woman to repress the instinct of self-preservation, and
sacrifice hers — because Fenelon would do more good in
the world.* If the morality of scepticism inculcates
this subjugation of our instincts to indeterminate views
of advantage, much more does the morality of the New
Testament teach us to subject them to the determinate
will of God.

It is upon these principles that some of the most
noble examples of human excellence have been exhib-
ited— those of men who have died for the testimony of
a good conscience. If the strongest of our instincts —
if that instinct, excited to its utmost vigor by the ap-
prehension of a dreadful death, might be of weight to
suspend the obligation of the moral law, it surely
might have been suspended in the case of those who
thus proved their fidelity.

Yet, obvious as is the propriety and the duty of thus
preferring the Divine law before all, the dictates or
the rights of nature are continually urged as of para-
mount obligation. Many persons appear to think that
if a given action is dictated by the law of nature, it is
quite sufficient. Respecting the instinct of self-preser-
vation, especially, they appear to conclude that to
whatever that instinct prompts, it is lawful to conform
to its voice. They do not surely reflect upon the mon-
strousness of -their opinions : they do not surely con-
sider that they are absolutely superseding the moral
law of God, and superseding it upon considerations
resulting merely from the animal part of our constitu-
tion. The Divine laws respect the whole human econ-
* Political Justice.

CHAP. II.] THE I,AW OF NATURE. 93

omy —our prospects in another world as well as our
existence in the present.

Some men, again, speak of our rights in a state of
native, as if to be in a state of nature was to be with-
out the jurisdiction of the moral law. But if man be
a moral and responsible agent, that law applies every
where ; to a state of nature as truly as to every other
state. If some other human being had been left with
Selkirk on Juan Fernandez, and if that other seized an
animal which Selkirk had ensnared, would Selkirk
have been justified in asserting his natural right to the
animal by whatever means f It is very possible that no
means would have availed to procure the restoration of
the rabbit or the bird short of kilting the offender.
Might Selkirk kill the man in assertion of his natural
rights? Every one answers, No — because the unso-
phisticated dictates in every man's mind assure us that
the rights of nature are subordinate to higher laws.

Situations similar to those of a state of nature some-
times arise in society ;* as where money is demanded,
or violence is committed by one person on another,
where no third person can be called in to assistance.
The injured party, in such a case, cannot go to every
length in his own cause by virtue of the law of nature:
he can go only so far as the moral law allows. These
considerations will be found peculiarly applicable to
the rights of self-defence ; and it is pleasant to find
these doctrines supported by that sceptical morality to
which we just now referred. The author of Political
fustice maintains that man possesses no rights ; that is,
no absolute rights — none, of which the just exercise is
not conditional upon the permission of a higher rule.
That rule, with him, is " Justice" — with us it is the
law of God ; but the reasoning is the same in kind.

Nevertheless, the natural rights of man ought to

* See Iyocke on Gov. b. ii. c. 7.

94 THK I,AW OF NATURE. [ESSAY I.

possess extensive application both in private and polit-
ical affairs. If it were sufficiently remembered, that
these rights are abstractedly possessed in equality by
all men, we should find many imperative claims upon
us with which we do not now comply. The artificial
distinctions of society induce forgetfulness of the cir-
cumstance that we are all brethren : not that I would
countenance the speculation of those who think that
all men should be now practically equal ; but that
these distinctions are such, that the general rights of
nature are invaded in a degree which nothing can jus-
tify. There are natural claims of the poor upon the
rich, of dependents upon their superiors, which are
very commonly forgotten : there are endless acts of
superciliousness, and unkindness, and oppression, in
private life, which the law of nature emphatically
condemns. When, sometimes, I see a man of fortune
speaking in terms of supercilious command to his ser-
vant, I feel that he needs to go and learn some lessons
of the law of nature. I feel that he has forgotten
what he is, and what he is not, and what his brother
is : he has forgotten that by nature he and his servant
are in strictness equal ; and that although, by the per-
mission of Providence, a various allotment is assigned
to them now, he should regard every one with that
consideration and respect which is due to a man and a
brother. And when to these considerations are added
those which result from the contemplation of our rela-
tionship to God — that we are the common objects of
his bounty and his goodness, and that we are heirs to
a common salvation, we are presented with such
motives to pay attention to the rights of nature, as
constitute an imperative obligation.

The political duties which result from the law of
nature, it is not our present business to investigate ;
but it may be observed here, that a very limited appeal

CHAP. II.] THE IvAW OF NATURE. 95

to facts is sufficient to evince, that by many political
institutions the rights of nature have been grieviously
sacrificed ; and that if those rights had been sufficiently
regarded, many of these vicious institutions would
never have been exhibited in the world.

It appears worth while at the conclusion of this
chapter to remark, that a person when he speaks of
"Nature," should know distinctly what he means.
The word carries with it a sort of indeterminate authority ;
and he who uses it amiss, may connect that authority
with rules or actions which are little entitled to it.
There are few senses in which the word is used, that
do not refer, however obscurely, to God ; and it is for
that reason that the notion of authority is connected
with the word. "The very name of nature implies,
that it must owe its birth to some prior agent, or, to
speak properly, signifies in itself nothing."* Yet, un-
meaning as the term is, it is one of which many per-
sons are very fond ; — whether it be that their notions
are really indistinct, or that some purposes are answered
by referring to the obscurity of nature rather than to
God. "Nature has decorated the earth with beauty
and magnificence," — "Nature has furnished us with
joints and limbs," — are phrases sufficiently unmean-
ing ; and yet I know not that they are likely to do
any other harm than to give currency to the common
fiction. But when it is said, that "Nature teaches us
to adhere to truth, ' ' — "Nature condemns us for dishon-
esty or deceit," — " Men are taught by nature that they
are responsible beings," — there is considerable danger
that we have both fallacious and injurious notions of
the authority which thus teaches or condemns us.
Upon this subject it were well to take the advice of
Boyle: "Nature," he says, "is sometimes, indeed

* Milton : Christian Doct. p. 14.

96 UTILITY. [ESSAY I.

commonly, taken for a kind of semi-deity. In this
sense it is best not to use it at all."* It is dangerous
to induce confusion into our ideas respecting our rela-
tionship with God.

A law of nature is a very imposing phrase ; and it
might be supposed, from the language of some persons,
that nature was an independent legislatress, who had
sat and framed laws for the government of mankind.
Nature is nothing ; yet it would seem that men do
sometimes practically imagine, that a "law of nature"
possesses proper and independent authority ; and it
may be suspected that with some the notion is so pal-
pable and strong, that they set up the authority of
1 ' the law of nature ' ' without reference to the will of
God, or perhaps in opposition to it. Even if notions
like these float in the mind only with vapory indistinct-
ness, a correspondent indistinctness of moral notions is
likely to ensue. Every man should make to himself
the rule, never to employ the word Nature when he
speaks of ultimate moral authority. A law possesses
no authority; the authority rests only in the legislator:
and as nature makes no laws, a law of nature involves
no obligation but that which is imposed by the Divine
will.

CHAPTER III.

UTILITY.

Obligations resulting from Expediency — Limits to
these obligations.

That in estimating our duties in life we ought to

pay regard to what is useful and beneficial —to what is

* Free Inquiry into the vulgarly received Notions of Nature.

CHAP. III.] UTILITY. 97

likely to promote the welfare of ourselves and of others
— can need little argument to prove. Yet, if it were
required,, it may be easily shown that this regard to
utility is recommended or enforced in the expression
of the Divine will. That will requires the exercise of
pure and universal benevolence ; — which benevolence
is exercised in consulting the interests, the welfare,
and the happiness of mankind. The dictates of utility,
therefore, are frequently no other than the dictates of
benevolence.

Or, if we derive the obligations of utility from con-
siderations connected with our reason, they do not ap-
pear much less distinct. To say that to consult utility
is right, is almost the same as to say, it is right to ex-
ercise our understandings. The daily and hourly use
of reason is to discover what is fit -to be done ; that is,
what is useful and expedient ; and since it is manifest
that the Creator, in endowing us with the faculty, de-
signed that we should exercise it, it is obvious that in
this view also a reference to expediency is consistent
with the Divine will.

When (higher laws being silent) a man judges that
of two alternatives one is dictated by greater utility,
that dictate constitutes an obligation upon him to pre-
fer it. I should not hold a landowner innocent, who
knowingly persisted in adopting a bad mode of raising
corn ; nor should I hold the person innocent who op-
posed an improvement in shipbuilding, or who ob-
structed the formation of a turnpike road that would
benefit the public. These are questions, not of prud-
ence merely, but of morals also.

Obligations resulting from utility possess great ex-
tent of application to political affairs. There are, in-
deed, some public concerns in which the moral law,
antecedently, decides nothing. Whether a duty shall
be imposed, or a charter granted, or a treaty signed,

98 UTILITY. [ESSAY I.

are questions which are perhaps to be determined by-
expediency alone : but when a public man is of the
judgment that any given measure will tend to»the gen-
eral good, he is immoral if he opposes that measure.
The immorality may indeed be made out by a some-
what different process : — such a man violates those
duties of benevolence which religion imposes : he
probably disregards, too, his sense of obligation ; for
if he be of the judgment that a given measure will tend
to the general good, conscience will scarcely be silent
in whispering that ,he ought not to oppose it.

It is sufficiently evident, upon the principles which
have hitherto been advanced, that considerations of
utility are only so far obligatory as they are in accord-
ance with the moral law. Pursuing, however, the meth-
od which has been adopted in the last two chapters, it
may be observed, that this subserviency of utility to
the Divine will, appears to be required by the written
revelation. That habitual preference of futurity to the
present time, which Scripture exhibits, indicates that
our interests here should be held in subordination to
our interests hereafter : and as these higher interests
are to be consulted by the means which revelation pre-
scribes, it is manifest that those means are to be pur-
sued, whatever we may suppose to be their effects upon
the present welfare of ourselves or of other men. ' ' If in
this life only we have hope in God, then are we of all
men most miserable." It certainly is not, in the usual
sense of the word, expedient to be most miserable.
And why did they thus sacrifice expediency ? Because
the communicated will of God required that course of
life by which human interests were apparently sacrificed.
It will be perceived that these considerations result
from the truth, (too little regarded in talking of " Ex-
pediency " and "General Benevolence") that utility,
as it respects mankind, cannot be properly consulted

CHAP. III.] UTIUTY. 99

without taking into account our interests in futurity.
"Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," is a
maxim of which all would approve if we had no con-
cerns with another life. That which might be very
expedient if death were annihilation, may be very in-
expedient now.

"If ye say, We will not dwell in this land, neither
obey the voice of the L,ord your God, saying, No ; but
we will go into the land of Egypt, where we shall see
no war/' " nor have hunger of bread ; and there will
we dwell ; it shall come to pass, that the sword, which
ye feared, shall overtake you there in the land of Egypt;
and the famine, where of ye were afraid, shall follow close
after you there in Egypt : and there ye shall die."* —
" We will burn incense unto the queen of heaven, and
pour out drink-offerings unto her ; for then had we
plenty of victuals, and were well, and saw no evil. But
since we left off, we have wanted all things, and have
been consumed by the sword, and by the famine." —
Therefore, " I will watch over them for evil, and not
for good."f These reasoners argued upon the princi-
ple of making expediency the paramount law ; and it
may be greatly doubted whether those who argue upon
that principle now, have better foundation for their
reasoning than those of old. Here was the prospect of
advantage founded, as they thought, upon experience.
One course of action had led (so they reasoned) to war
and famine, and another to plenty, and health, and
general well-being : yet still our Universal Lawgiver
required them to disregard all these conclusions of ex-
pediency, and simply to conform to His will.

After all, the general experience is, that what is
most expedient with respect to another world, is most
expedient with respect to the present. There may be
cases, and there have been, in which the Divine will

* Jer. xlii. f Jer. xliv. •

IOO UTILITY. [KSSAY I.

may require an absolute renunciation of our present
interests ; as the martyr who maintains his fidelity,
sacrifices all possibility of advantage now. But these
are unusual cases ; and the experience of the contrary
is so general, that the truth has been reduced to a pro-
verb. Perhaps in nineteen cases out of twenty, he
best consults his present welfare, who endeavors to se-
cure it in another world. " By the wise contrivance
of the author of nature, virtue is upon all ordinary
occasions, even with regard to this life, real wisdom,
and the surest and readiest means of obtaining both
safety and advantage."* Were it however, otherwise,
the truth of our principles would not be shaken.
Men's happiness, and especially the happiness of good
men, does not consist merely in external things. The
promise of a hundred fold in this present life may
still be fulfilled in mental felicity ; and if it could not
be, who is the man that would exclude from his com-
putations the prospect, in the world to come, of life
everlasting ?

In the endeavor to produce the greatest sum of hap-
piness, or which is the same thing, in applying the
dictates of utility to our conduct in life, there is one
species of utility that is deplorably disregarded, both in
private and public affairs — that which respects the
religions and moral welfare of mankind. If you hear
a politician expatiating upon the good tendency of a
measure, he tells you how greatly it will promote the
interests of commerce, or how it will enrich a colony,
or how it will propitiate a powerful party, or how it
will injure a nation whom he dreads; but you hear
probably not one word of enquiry whether it will cor-
rupt the character of those who execute the measure,
or whether it will introduce vices into the colony, or
whether it will present new temptations to the virtue

* Dr. Smith : Theor. Mor. Sent.

CHAP. III.] UTILITY. IOI

of the public. And yet these considerations are per-
haps by far the most important in the view even of en-
lightened expediency ; for it is a desperate game to
endeavor to benefit a people by means which may
diminish their virtue. Even such a politician would
probably assent to the unapplied proposition, "the
virtue of a people is the best security for their welfare."
It is the same in private life. You hear a parent who
proposes to change his place of residence, or to engage
in a new profession or pursuit, discussing the compara-
tive conveniences of the proposed situation, the pros-
pect of profit in the new profession, the pleasures which
will result from the new pursuit ; but you hear prob-
ably not one word of enquiry whether the change of
residence will deprive his family of virtuous and bene-
ficial society which will not be replaced — whether the
contemplated profession will not tempt his own virtue
or diminish his usefulness — or whether his children
will not be exposed to circumstances that will probably
taint the purity of their minds. And yet this parent
will acknowledge, in general terms, that ' * nothing can
compensate for the loss of religious and moral char-
acter." Such persons surely make very inaccurate
computations of expediency.

As to the actual conduct of political affairs, men fre-
quently legislate as if there was no such thing as relig-
ion or morality in the world; or as if, at any rate,
religion and morality had no concern with affairs of
state. I believe that a sort of shame (a false and vul-
gar shame no doubt) would be felt by many members
of senates, in directly opposing religious or moral con-
siderations to prospects of advantage. In our own
country, those who are most willing to do this receive,
from vulgar persons, a name of contempt for their ab-
surdity ! How inveterate must be the impurity of a
system, which teaches men to regard as ridiculous that
system which only is sound !

102 THE UW OF NATIONS. [ESSAY I.

CHAPTER IV.
THE LAW OF NATIONS.— THE LAW OF HONOR.

Although the subjects of this chapter can scarcely be regarded
as constituting rules of life, yet we are induced briefly to notice
them in the present Essay, partly, on account of the importance
of the affairs which they regulate, and partly, because they will
afford satisfactory illustration of the principles of Morality.

SECTION I.
THE LAW OF NATIONS.

Obligations and authority of the Law of Nations — Its abuses,
and the limits of its authority — Treaties.

The law of nations, so far as it is founded upon the
principles of morality, partakes of that authority which
those principles possess ; so far as it is founded merely
upon the mutual conventions of states, it possesses that
authority over the contracting parties which results
from the rule, that men ought to abide by their engage-
ments. The principal considerations which present
themselves upon the subject, appear to be these :

i— That the law of nations is binding upon those
states who knowingly allow themselves to be regarded
as parties to it :

2 — That it is wholly nugatory with respect to those
states which are not parties to it :

3 — That it is of no force in opposition to the moral
law.

I. The obligation of the law of nations upon those
who join in the convention, is plain — that is, it rests,
generally, upon all civilized communities which have
intercourse with one another. A tacit engagement

CHAP. IV.] THE LAW OF NATIONS. I03

only is, from the circumstances of the case, to be ex-
pected ; and if any state did not choose to conform to
the law of nations, it should publicly express its dis-
sent. The law of nations is not wont to tighten the
bonds of morality ; so that probably most of its positive
requisitions are enforced by the moral law : and this
consideration should operate as an inducement to a
conscientious fulfilment of these requisitions. In time
of war, the law of nations prohibits poisoning and
assassination, and it is manifestly imperative upon
every state to forbear them : but whilst morality thus
enforces many of the requisitions of the law of nations,
that law frequently stops short, instead of following
on to whither morality would conduct it. This dis-
tinction between assassination and some other modes of
destruction that are practised in war, is not perhaps
very accurately founded in considerations of morality :
nevertheless, since the distinction is made, let it be
made, and let it by all means be regarded. Men need
not add arsenic and the private dagger to those modes
of human destruction which war allows. The obliga-
tion to avoid private murder is clear, even though it
were shown that the obligation extends much further.
Whatever be the reasonableness of the distinction, and
of the rule that is founded upon it, it is perfidious to
violate that rule.

So it is with those maxims of the law of nations
which require that prisoners should not be enslaved,
and that the persons of ambassadors should be re-
spected. Not that I think the man who sat down,
with only the principles of morality before him, would
easily be able to show, from those principles, that the
slavery was wrong whilst other things which the law
of nations allows are right — but that, as these princi-
ples actually enforce the maxims, as the observance of
them is agreed on by civilized states, and as they tend

104 THE IvAW OF NATIONS. [ESSAY I.

to diminish the evils of war, it is imperative on states
to observe them. Incoherent and inconsistent as the
law of nations is, when it is examined by the moral
law, it is pleasant to contemplate the good tendency of
some of its requisitions. In 1702, previous to the de-
claration of war by this country (England), a number
of the anticipated "enemy's" ships had been seized
and detained. When the declaration was made, these
vessels were released, "in pursuance,'' as the procla-
mation stated, "of the law of nations." Some of
these vessels were perhaps shortly after captured, and
irrecoverably lost to their owners : yet though it might
perplex the Christian moralist to show that the release
was right and that the capture was right too, still he may
rejoice that men conform, even i?i part, to the purity
of virtue.

Attempts to deduce the maxims of international law
as they now obtain, from principles of morality, will
always be in vain. Grotius seems as if he would coun-
tenance the attempt when he says, ' ' Some writers
have advanced a doctrine which can never be admitted,
maintaining that the law of nations authorizes one
power to commence hostilities against another, whose
increasing greatness awakens her alarms. As a mat-
ter of expediency," says Grotius, "such a measure
may be adopted ; but the principles of justice can
never be advanced in its favor. "* Alas! if principles of
justice are to decide what the law of nations shall
authorize, it will be needful to establish a new code
to-morrow. A great part of the code arises out of the
conduct of war ; and the usual practices of war are so
foreign to principles of justice and morality, that it is
to no purpose to attempt to found the code upon them.
Nevertheless, let those who refer to the law of nations,
introduce morality by all possible means ; and if they
* Rights of War and Peace.

CHAP. IV.] THE UW OF NATIONS. 105

think they cannot appeal to it always, let them appeal
to it where they can. If they cannot persuade them-
selves to avoid hostilities when some injury is com-
mitted by another nation, let them avoid them when
"another nation's greatness merely awakens their
alarms."

II. That the law of nations is wholly nugatory with
respect to those states which are not parties to it, is a
truth which, however sound, has been too little re-
garded in the conduct of civilized nations. The state
whose subjects discover and take possession of an un-
inhabited island, is entitled by the law of nations
quietly to possess it. And it ought quietly to possess
it ; not that in the view of reason or of morality, the
circumstance of an Englishman's first visiting the
shores of a country, gives any very intelligible right to
the King of England to possess it rather th?n any
other prince, but that, such a rule having been agreed
upon, it ought to be observed ; but by whom ? By
those who are parties to the agreement. For which
reason, the discoverer possesses no sufficient claim to
oppose his right to that of a people who were not
parties to it. So that he who, upon pretence of dis-
covery, should forcibly exclude from a large extent of
territory a people who knew nothing of European
politics, and who in the view of reason possessed an
equal or a greater right, undoubtedly violates the ob-
ligations of morality . It may serve to dispel the ob-
scurity in which habit and self-interest wrap our per-
ceptions, to consider, that amongst the states which
were nearest to the newly -discovered land, a law of
nations might exist which required that such land
should be equally divided amongst them. Whose law
of nations ought to prevail ? That of European states,
or that of states in the Pacific or South Sea? How
happens it that the Englishman possesses a sounder

106 THE LAW OF NATIONS. [ESSAY I.

right to exclude all other nations, than surrounding
nations possess to partition it amongst them ?

Unhappily, our law of nations goes much further ;
and by a monstrous abuse of power, has acted upon the
same doctrine with respect to inhabited countries ; for
when these have been discovered, the law of nations
has talked, with perfect coolness, of setting up a stand-
ard, and thenceforth assigning the territory to the
nation whose subjects set it up ; as if the previous in-
habitants possessed no other claim or right than the
bears and wolves. It has been asked (and asked with
great reason,) what we should say to a canoe-full of
Indians who should discover England, and take posses-
sion of it in the name of their chief ?

Civilized states appear to have acted upon the
maxim, that no people possess political rights but those
who are parties to the law of nations ; and accordingly
the his-tory of European settlements has been, so far as
the aborigines were concerned, too much a history of
outrage and treachery, and blood. Penn acted upon
sounder principles ; he perfectly well knew that neither
an established practice, nor the law of nations, could
impart a right to a country which was justly possessed
by former inhabitants ; and therefore, although Charles
II. "granted " him Pennsylvania, he did not imagine
that the gift of a man in London, could justify him in
taking possession of a distant country without the oc-
cupiers' consent. What was ' ' granted ' ' therefore by
his sovereign, he purchased of the owners ; and the
sellers were satisfied with their bargain and with him.
The experience of Pennsylvania has shown that integ-
rity is politic as well as right. When nations shall
possess greater expansion of knowledge, and exercise
greater purity of virtue, it will be found that many of
the principles which regulate international intercourse,
are foolish as well as vicious ; that whilst they disre-

CHAP. IV.] THE UW OF NATIONS. I07

gard the interests of morality they sacrifice their
own.

III. Respecting the third consideration, that the law
of nations is of no force in opposition to the moral law,
little needs to be said here. It is evident that, upon
whatever foundation the law of nations rests, its author-
ity is subordinate to that of the will of God. When,
therefore, we say that amongst civilized states, when
an island is discovered by one state, other states are
bound to refrain, it is not identical with saying that
the discoverer is at liberty to keep possession by what-
ever means. The mode of asserting all rights is to be
regulated in subordination to the moral law. Duplic-
ity, and fraud, and violence, and bloodshed, may per-
haps sometimes be the only means of availing ourselves
of the rights which the law of nations grants ; but it
were a confused species of morality which should allow
the commivssion of all this, because it is consistent with
the law of nations.

A kindred remark applies to the obligation of treat-
ies. Treaties do not oblige us to do what is morally
wrong. A treaty is a string of engagements ; but
those engagements are no more exempt from the juris-
diction of the moral law, than the promise of a man to
assassinate another. Does such a promise morally
bind the ruffian ? No : and for this reason, and for
no other, that the performance is unlawful. And so it
is with treaties. Two nations enter into a treaty of
offensive and defensive alliance. Subsequently one of
them engages in an unjust and profligate war. Does
the treaty morally bind the other nation to abet the
profligacy and injustice ? No : if it did, any man
might make any action lawful to himself by previously
engaging to do it. No doubt such a nation and such a
ruffian have done wrong ; but their offence consisted
in making the engagement, not in breaking it. Even

108 THE I,AW OF HONOR. [ESSAY I.

if ordinary wars were defensible, treaties of offensive
alliance that are unconditional with respect to time or
objects, can never be justified. The state, however,
which, in the pursuit of a temporary policy, has been
weak enough, or vicious enough to make them, should
not hesitate to refuse fulfilment, when the act of fulfil-
ment is incompatible with the moral law. Such a state
should decline to perform the treaty, and retire with
shame — with shame, not that it has violated its engage-
ments, but that it was ever so vicious as to make them.

SECTION II.

THE IvAW OF HONOR.

Authority of the Law of Honor — Its character.

The law of honor consists of a set of maxims written
or understood, by which persons of a certain class agree
to regulate, or are expected to regulate, their conduct.
It is evident that the obligation of the law of honor, as
such, results exclusively from the agreement, tacit or
expressed, of the parties concerned. It binds them
because they have agreed to be bound, and for no other
reason. He who does not choose to be ranked amongst
the subjects of the law of honor, is under no obligation
to obey its rules. These rules are precisely upon the
same footing as the laws of free-masonry, or the regu-
lations of a reading-room. He who does not choose to
subscribe to the room, or to promise conformity to
masonic laws, is under no obligation to regard the rules
of either.

For which reason, it is very remarkable that at the
commencement of his Moral Philosophy, Dr. Paley
says, The rules of life " are, the law of honor, the law

CHAP. IV.] THE LAW OF HONOR. I09

of the land, and the Scriptures." It were strange in-
deed, if that were a rule of life which every man is at
liberty to disregard if he pleases ; and which, in point
of fact, nine persons out of ten do disregard without
blame. Who would think of taxing the writer of these
pages with violating a " rule of life," because he pays
no attention to the law of honor ? ' ■ The Scriptures ' '
communicate the will of God ; ' ' the law of the land ' '
is enforced by that will ; but where is the sanction of
the law of honor ? — It is so much the more remarkable
that this law should have been thus formally proposed
as a rule of life, because, in the same work, it is de-
scribed as "unauthorized." How can a set of unauth-
orized maxims compose a rule of life? But further:
the author says that the law of honor is a ' ' capricious
rule, which abhors deceit, yet applauds the address of
a successful intrigue " — And further still : "it allows
of fornication, adultery, drunkenness, prodigality,
duelling, and of revenge in the extreme. ' ' Surely then
it cannot, with any propriety of language, be called a
rule of life.

Placing, then, the obligation of the law of honor, as
such, upon that which appears to be its proper basis —
the duty to perform our lawful engagements — it may
be concluded, that when a man goes to a gaming-house
or a race-course, and loses his money by betting or
playing, he is morally bound to pay : not because mor-
ality adjusts the rules of the billiard room or the turf,
not becaUvSe the law of the land sanctions the stake,
but becau.se the party previously promised to pay it.
Nor would it affect this obligation, to allege that the
stake was itself both illegal and immoral. So it was ;
but the payment is not. The payment of such a debt
involves no breach of the moral law. The guilt con-
sists not in paying the money, but in staking it. Nev-
ertheless, there may be prior claims upon a man's prop-

no The uw of honor. [essay i.

erty which he ought first to pay. Such are those of
lawful creditors. The practice of paying debts of
honor with promptitude, and of delaying the payment
of other debts, argues confusion or depravity of princi-
ple. It is not honor, in any virtuous and rational sense
of the word, which induces men to pay debts of honor
instantly. Real honor would induce them to pay their
lawful debts first : and indeed it may be suspected that
the motive to the prompt payment of gaming debts, is
usually no other than the desire to preserve a fair name
with the world. Integrity of principle has often so
little to do with it, that this principle is sacrificed in
order to pay them.

With respect to those maxims of the law of honor
which require conduct that the moral law forbids, it is
quite manifest that they are utterly indefensible. ■ ' If
unauthorized laws of honor be allowed to create ex-
ceptions to Divine prohibition, there is an end of all
morality as founded in the will of the Deity, and the
obligation of every duty may at one time or another be
discharged." * These observations apply to those
foolish maxims of honor which relate to dueling.
These maxims can never justify the individual in dis-
regarding the obligations of morality. He who acts
upon them acts wickedly ; unless indeed he be so little
informed of the requisitions of morality, that he does
not, upon this subject, perceive the distinction between
right and wrong. The man of honor therefore should
pay a gambling debt, but he should not send a chal-
lenge or accept it. The one is permitted by the moral
law, the other is forbidden.

Whatever advantages may result from the law of
honor, it is, as a system, both contemptible and bad.
Even its advantages are of an ambiguous kind ; for
although it may prompt to rectitude of conduct, that

* Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. Hi. c. 9.

CHAP. I.] RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. Ill

conduct is not founded upon rectitude of principle. The
motive is not so good as the act. And as to many of its
particular rules, both positive and negative, they are the
proper subject of reprobation and abhorrence. We ought
to reprobate and abhor a system which enjoins the fero-
cious practice of challenges and duels, and which allows
many of the most flagitious and degrading vices that
infest the world.

ESSAY II.

PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.

The division which has commonly been made of the private obligations
of man, into those which respect himself, his neighbor, and his Creator,
does not appear to be attended with any considerable advantages.- These
several obligations are indeed so involved the one with the other, that there
are few personal duties which are not also in some degree relative, and
there are no duties, either relative or personal, which may not be regarded
as duties to God. The suicide's or the drunkard's vice injures his family or
his friends : for every offence against morality is an injury to ourselves, and
a violation of the duties which we owe to Him whose law is the foundation
of morality. Neglecting, therefore, these minuter distinctions, we observe
those only which separate the private from the political obligations of
mankind.

CHAPTER I.

RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS.

Factitious semblances of devotion — Religious conversation— Sabbatical in-
stitutions— Non-sanctity of days— Of temporal employments : Travelling:
Stage-coaches : "Sunday-papers : " Amusements— Holydays— Ceremonial
institutions and devotional formularies — Utility of forms — Forms of pray-
er— Extempore prayer— Scepticism — Motives of Scepticism.

Of the two classes of religious obligations — that which
respects the exercise of piety towards God, and that
which respects visible testimonials of our reverence and
devotion, the business of a work like this is principally
with the latter. Yet at the risk of being charged with
deviating from this proper business, I would adventure
a few paragraphs respecting devotion of mind.

112 REUG-IOUS OBLIGATIONS. [ESSAY II.

That the worship of our Father who is in heaven
consists, not in assembling with others at an appointed
place and hour ; not in joining in the rituals of a Chris-
tian church, or in performing ceremonies, or in par-
ticipating of sacraments,* all men will agree ; be-
cause all men know that these things may be done
whilst the mind is wholly intent upon other affairs,
and even without any belief in the existence of God.
' ' Two attendances upon public worship is a form com-
plied with by thousands who never kept a Sabbath in
their lives, "f Devotion, it is evident, is an operation
of the mind ; the sincere aspiration of a dependent and
grateful being to Him who has all power both in heaven
and in earth ; and as the exercise of devotion is not
necessarily dependent upon external circumstances, it
may be maintained in solitude or in society, in the
place appropriated to worship or in the field, in the
hour of business or of quietude and rest. Even under
a less spiritual dispensation of old, a good man ' ' wor-
shipped, leaning upon the top of his staff."

Now it is to be feared that some persons, who
acknowledge that devotion is a mental exercise, im-
pose upon themselves some feelings as devotional
which are wholly foreign to the worship of .God.
There is a sort of spurious devotion — feelings, having
the resemblance of worship, but not possessing its
nature, and not producing its effects. "Devotion,"
says Blair, ' ' is a powerful principle, which penetrates
the soul, which purifies the affections from debasing at-
tachments, and by a fixed and steady regard to God,
subdues every sinful passion, and forms the inclinations
. to piety and virtue. ,rJ To purify the affections and

*It is to be regretted that this word, of which the origin is so
exceptionable, should be used to designate what are regarded as
solemn acts of religion.

t Cowper's Letters. % Sermons, No. 10.

CHAP. I.] RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. 113

subdue the passions, is a serious operation ; it implies
a sacrifice of inclination ; a subjugation of the will.
This mental operation many persons are not willing to
undergo ; and it is not therefore wonderful that some
persons are willing to satisfy themselves with the ex-
ercise of a species of devotion that shall be attained at
less cost.

A person goes to an oratorio of sacred music. The
majestic flow of harmony, the exalted subjects of the
hymns or anthems, the full and rapt assembly, excite,
and warm, and agitate his mind ; sympathy becomes
powerful ; he feels the stirring of unwonted emotions ;
weeps, perhaps, or exults ; and when he leaves the as-
sembly, persuades himself that he has been worshipping
and glorifying God.

There are some preachers with whom it appears to
be an object of much solicitude, to excite the hearer to
a warm and impassioned state of feeling. By ardent
declamation or passionate displays of the hopes and
terrors of religion, they arouse and alarm his imagina-
tion. The hearer, who desires perhaps to experience
the ardors of religion, cultivates the glowing sensa-
tions, abandons his mind to the impulse of feeling, and
at length goes home in complacency with his religious
sensibility, and glads himself with having felt the fer-
vors of devotion.

Kindred illusion may be the result of calmer causes.
The lofty and silent aisle of an ancient cathedral, the
venerable ruins of some once honored abbey, the
boundless expanse of the heaven of stars, the calm im-
mensity of the still ocean, or the majesty and terror of
a tempest, sometimes suffuses the mind with a sort of
reverence and awe ; a sort of " philosophic transport,"
which a person would willingly hope is devotion of the
heart.

It might be sufficient to assure us of the spuriousness

n4 REUGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. [ESSAY II.

of these semblances of religious feeling, to consider
that emotions very similar in their nature are often
excited by subjects which have no connection with
religion. I know not whether the affecting scenes of
the drama and of fictitious* story, want much but
association with ideas of religion to make them as de-
votional as those which have been noticed ; and if, on
the other hand, the feelings of him who attends an
oratorio were excited by a military band, he would
think not of the Deity or of heaven, but of armies and
conquests. Nor should it be forgotten, that persons
who have habitually little pretension to religion, are
perhaps as capable of this factitious devotion as those
in whom religion is constantly influential ; and surely
it is not to be imagined, that those who rarely direct
reverend thoughts to their Creator, can suddenly adore
Him for an hour and then forget him again, until some
new excitement again arouses their raptures, to be again
forgotten.

To religious feelings as to other things, the truth ap-
plies— "By their fruits ye shall know them." If
these feelings do not tend to c ! purify the affections
from debasing attachments;" if they do not tend to

form the inclinations to piety and virtue," they cer-
tainly are not devotional. Upon him whose mind is really
prostrated in the presence of his God, the legitimate
effect is, that he should be impressed with a more sen-
sible consciousness of the Divine presence ; that he
should deviate with less facility from the path of duty;
that his desires and thoughts should be reduced to
Christian subjugation ; that he should feel an influen-
tial addition to his dispositions to goodness ; and that
his affections should be expanded towards his fellow
men. He who rises from the sensibilities of seeming
devotion, and finds, that effects such as these are not
produced in his mind, may rest assured that, in what-

CHAP. I.] RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. 115

ever he has been employed, it has not been in the pure
worship of that God who is a spirit. To the real pros-
tration of the soul in the Divine presence, it is neces-
sary that the mind should be still : — " Be still and
know that I am God." Such devotion is sufficient for
the whole mind ; it needs not — perhaps in its purest
state it admits not — the intrusion of external things.
And when the soul is thus permitted to enter as it
were into the sanctuary of God ; when it is humble in
his presence ; when all its desires are involved in the
one desire of devotedness to him ; then is the hour of
acceptable worship — then the petition of the soul is
prayer — then is its gratitude thanksgiving — then is its
oblation praise.

That such devotion, when such is attainable, will
have a powerful tendency to produce obedience to the
moral law, may justly be expected : and here indeed
is the true connection of the subject of these remarks
with the general object of the present essays. With-
out real and efficient piety of mind, we are not to ex-
pect a consistent observance of the moral law. That
law requires, sometimes, sacrifices of inclination and of
interest, and a general subjugation of the passions,
which religion, and religion only, can capacitate and
induce us to make. I recommend not enthusiasm or
fanaticism, but that sincere and reverent application of
the soul to its Creator, which alone is likely to give
either distinctness to our perceptions of his will, or
efficiency to our motives to fulfill it.

A few sentences will be indulged to me here respect-
ing religious conversation. I believe both that the
proposition is true, and that it is expedient to set it
down — that religious conversation is one of the banes
of the religious world. There are many who are really
attached to religion, and who sometimes feel its power,

Il6 REUGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. [ESSAY II.

but who allow their better feelings to evaporate in an
ebullition of words. They forget how much relig-
ion is an affair of the mind and how little of the
tongue : they forget how possible it is to live under its
power without talking of it to their friends ; and some,
it is to be feared, may forget how possible it is to talk
without feeling its influence. Not that the good man's
piety is to live in his breast like an anchorite in his
cell. The evil does not consist in speaking of religion,
but in speaking too much ; not in manifesting our
allegiance to God ; not in encouraging by exhortation,
and amending by our advice ; not in placing the light
upon a candlestick — but in making religion a common
topic of discourse. Of all species of well intended re-
ligious conversation, that perhaps is the most excep-
tionable which consists in narrating our own religious
feelings. Many thus intrude upon that religious
quietude which is peculiarly favorable to the Christian
character. The habit of communicating "ex-
periences ' ' I believe is to be very prejudicial to the mind.
It may sometimes be right to do this : in the great
majority of instances I believe it is not beneficial, and
not right. Men thus dissipate religious impressions,
and therefore diminish their effects. Such observation
as I have been enabled to make, has sufficed to con-
vince me that, where the religious character is solid,
there is but little religious talk ; and that, where there
is much talk, the religious character is superficial, and,
like other superficial things, is easily destroyed. And
if these be the attendants, and in part the consequences
of general religious conversation, how peculiarly
dangerous must that conversation be, which exposes
those impressions that perhaps were designed exclu-
sively for ourselves, and the use of which may be
frustrated by communicating them to others. Our
solicitude should be directed to the invigoration of the

CHAP. I.] RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. 1 17

religious character in our own minds ; and we should
be anxious that the plant of piety, if it had fewer
branches might have a deeper root.

SABBATICAL INSTITUTIONS.

' ' Not forsaking the assembling of ourselves together,
as the manner of some is."* The Divinely authorized
institution of Moses respecting a weekly Sabbath, and
the practice of the first teachers of Christianity, con-
stitute a sufficient recommendation to set apart certain
times for the exercise of public worship, even were
there no injunctions such as that which is placed at the
head of this paragraph. It is, besides, manifestly
proper, that beings who are dependent upon God for
all things, and especially for their hopes of immortality,
should devote a portion of their time to the expression
of their gratitude, and submission, and reverence.
Community of dependence and of hope dictates the
propriety of united worship ; and worship to be united,
must be performed at times previously fixed.

From the duty of observing the Hebrew Sabbath,
we are sufficiently exempted by the fact, that it was
actually not observed by the apostles of Christ. The
early Christians met, not on the last day of the week,
but on the first. Whatever reason may be assigned
as a motive for this rejection of the ancient Sabbath, I
think it will tend to discountenance the observance of
any day, as such : for if that day did not possess per-
petual sanctity, what day does possess it?

And with respect to the general tenor of the Chris-
tian Scriptures as to the sanctity of particular days, it is
I think manifestly adverse to the opinion that one day
is obligatory rather than another. ■ ' Let no man
therefore judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of
an holyday, or of the new-moon or of the Sabbath-
*Heb. x. 25.

Il8 REUGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. [ESSAY II.

days ; which are a shadow of things to come ; but the
body is of Christ."* Although this "Sabbath-day"
was that of the Jews, yet the passage indicates the
writer's sentiments, generally, respecting the sanctity
of specific days : he classes them with matters which
all agree to be unimportant ; — with meats, and drinks,
and new-moons ; and pronounces them to be alike
"shadows." That strong passage addressed to the
Christians of Galatia is of the same import : ' ' How
turn ye again to the weak and beggarly elements
whereunto ye desire again to be in bondage ? Ye ob-
serve days, and months, and times, and years. I am
afraid of you, lest I have bestowed upon you labor in
vain."f That which, in writing to the Christians of
Colosse, the apostle called "shadows," he now, in
writing to those of Galatia, calls " beggarly elements. "
The obvious tendency is to discredit the observance of
particular times ; and if he designed to except the first
day of the week, it is not probable that he would have
failed to except it.

Nevertheless, the question whether we are obliged to
observe the first day of the week because it is the first,
is one point — whether we ought to devote it to religious
exercises, seeing that it is actually set apart for the pur-
pose, is another. The early Christians met on that
day, and their example has been followed in succeed-
ing times ; but if for any sufficient reason, (and such
reasons, however unlikely to arise, are yet conceivable,)
the Christian- world should fix upon another day of the
week instead of the first, I perceive no grounds upon
which the arrangement could be objected to. As there
is no sanctity in any day, and no obligation to appro-
priate one day rather than another, that which is actually
fixed upon is the best and the right one. Bearing in

* Col. ii. 16, 17. In Rom. xiv. 5, 6, there is a parallel passage.
fGal. iv. 9, 10, 11.

CHAP. I.] RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. 119

mind, then, that it is right to devote some portion of
our time to religious exercises, and that no objection
exists to the day which is actually appropriated, the
duty seems very obvious — so to employ it.

Cessation from labor on the first day of the week,
is nowhere enjoined in the Christian Scriptures. Upon
this subject, the principles on which a person should
regulate his conduct appear to be these : He should
reflect that the whole of the day is not too large a por- .
tion of our time to devote to public worship, to religious
recollectedness, and sedateness of mind ; and therefore
that occupations which would interfere with this se-
dateness and recollectedness, or with public worship,
ought to be foreborne. Even if he supposed that the
devoting of the whole of the day was not necessary for
himself, he should reflect, that since a considerable
part of mankind are obliged, from various causes, to
attend to matters unconnected with religion during a
part of the day, and that one set attends to them dur-
ing one part and another during another —the whole of
the day is necessary for the community, even though
it were not for each individual : and if every individual
should attend to his ordinary affairs during that por-
tion of the day which he deemed superabundant, the
consequence might soon be that the day would not be
devoted to religion at all.

These views will enable the reader to judge in what
manner we should decide questions respecting attention
to temporal affairs on particular occasions. The day
is not sacred, therefore business is not necessarily sin-
ful ; the day ought to be devoted to religion, therefore
other concerns which are not necessary are generally,
wrong. The remonstrance, "Which of you shall
have an ass, or an ox fallen into a pit, and will not
straightway pull him out on the Sabbath-day ? ' ' suffi-
ciently indicates that, when reasonable calls are made

120 RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. [ESSAY II.

upon us, we are at liberty to attend to them. Of the
reasonableness of these calls every man must endeavor
to judge for himself. A tradesman ought, as a general
rule, to refuse to buy or sell goods. If I sold clothing,
I would furnish a surtout to a man who was suddenly
summoned on a journey, but not to a man who could
call the next morning. Were I a builder, I would
prop a falling wall, but not proceed in the erection of
a house. Were I a lawyer, I would deliver an opinion
to an applicant to whom the delay of a day would be a
serious injury, but not to save him the expense of an
extra night's lodging by waiting. The medical pro-
fession, and those who sell medicine, are differently
situated, yet it is not to be doubted that both, and
especially the latter, might devote a smaller portion of
the day to their secular employments, if earnestness in
religious concerns were as great as the opportunities to
attend to them. Some physicians in extensive prac-
tice, attend almost as regularly on public worship as
any of their neighbors. Excursions of pleasure on this
day are rarely defensible ; they do not comport with
the purposes to which the day is appropriated. To at-
tempt specific rules upon such a subject were, however,
vain. Not every thing which partakes of relaxation
is unallowable. A walk in the country may be proper
and right, when a party to a watering place would be
improper and wrong.* There will be little difficulty
in determining what it is allowable to do and what it is
not, if the enquiry be not, how much secularity does

* The scrupulousness of the ''Puritans" in the reign of
Charles I., and the laxity of L,aud, whose ordinances enjoined
sports after the hours of public worship, were both really,
though perhaps not equally, improper. The Puritans attached
sanctity to the day; and Laud did not consider, or did not re-
gard the consideration, that his sports would not only discredit
the notion of sanctity, but preclude that recollected ness of mind
which ought to be maintained throughout the whole day.

CHAP. I.] RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. 121

religion allow? but, how much can I, without a neglect
of duty, avoid?

The habit which obtains with many persons of travel-
ling on this day, is peculiarly indefensible ; because it
not only keeps the traveller from his church or meet-
ing, but keeps away his servants, or the postmen on the
road, and ostlers, and cooks, and waiters. All these
may be detained from public worship by one man's
journey of fifty miles. Such a man incurs some re-
sponsibility. The plea of ' ' saving time ' ' is not re-
mote from irreverence ; for if it has any meaning it is
this, that our time is of more value when employed in
business, than when employed in the worship of God.
It is discreditable to this country that the number of
carriages which traverse it on this day is so great. The
evil may rightly and perhaps easily be regulated by the
Legislature. You talk of difficulties : — you would
have talked of many more, if it were now, for the first
time, proposed to shut up the general post-office one
day in seven. We should have heard of parents dying
before their children could hear of their danger : of
bills dishonored and merchants discredited for want of a
post ; and of a multitude of other inconveniences which
busy anticipation would have discovered. Yet the
general post-office is shut ; and where is the evil ?

A similar regulation would be desirable with respect
to ■ • Sunday Papers. ' ' The ordinary contents of a
newspaper are little accordant with religious sobriety
and abstraction from the world. News of armies, and
of funds and markets, of political contests and party
animosities, of robberies and trials, of sporting, and
boxing, and the stage ; with merriment, and scandal,
and advertisements — are sufficiently ill adapted to the
cultivation of religiousness of mind.

Private, and especially public amusements on this
day, are clearly wrong. It is remarkable that they

122 RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. [KSSAY II.

appear least willing to dispense with their amusements
on this day, who pursue them on every other ; and the
observation affords one illustration amongst the many
of the pitiable effects of what is called — though it is
only called — a life of pleasure.

Upon every kind and mode of negligence respecting
these religious obligations, the question is not simply,
whether the individual himself sustains moral injury,
but also whether he occasions injury to those around
him. The example is mischievous. Even supposing
that a man may feel devotion in his counting-house,
or at the tavern, or over a pack of cards, his neighbors
who know where he is, or his family who see what he is
doing, are encouraged to follow his example, with-
out any idea of carrying their religion with them.
' ' My neighbor amuses himself — my father attends to
his ledgers — and why may not I?" — So that, if such
things were not intrinsically unlawful, they would be
wrong because they are inexpedient. Some things
might be done without blame by the lone tenant of a
wild, which involve positive guilt in a man in society.

Holydays,such as those which are distinguished by the
names of Christmas-day and Good -Friday, possess no
sanction from Scripture : they are of human institution.
If any religious community thinks it is desirable to de-
vote more than fifty-two days in the year to the purposes
of religion, it is unquestionably right that they should
devote them ; and it is amongst the good institutions
of several Christian communities, that they do weekly
appropriate some additional hours to these purposes.
The observance of the days in question is however of
another kind ; here the observance refers to the day as
such ; and I. know not how the censure can be avoided
which was directed to those Galatians who ' ' observed
days, and months, and times, and years." Whatever
may be the sentiments of enlightened men, those who

CHAP I.] RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. 123

are not enlightened are likely to regard such days as
sacred in themselves. ■ This is turning to beggarly ele-
ments : this partakes of the character of superstition ;
and superstition of every kind and in every degree, is
incongruous with that ' ' glorious liberty ' ' which
Christianity describes, and to which it would con-
duct us.

CEREMONIAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEVOTIONAL
FORMULARIES.

If God has made known his will that any given cere-
mony shall be performed in his church, that expression
is sufficient ; we do not then enquire into the reasonable-
ness of the ceremony, nor into its utility. There is
nothing in the act of sprinkling water in an infant's
face, or of immersing the person of an adult, which
recommends it to the view of reason, any more that
tw7enty other acts which might be performed : yet, if
it be clear that such an act is required by the Divine
will, all further controversy is at an end. It is not
the business, any more than it is the desire, of the
writer here to enquire whether the Deity has thus ex-
pressed his will respecting any of the rites which are
adopted in some Christian churches ; yet the reader
should carefully bear in mind what it is that consti-
tutes the obligation of a rite or ceremony, and what
does not. Setting utility aside, the obligation must
be constituted by an expression of the Divine will :
and he who enquires into the obligation of these things,
should reflect that they acquire a sort of adventitious
sanctity from the power of association. Being con-
nected from early life with his ideas of religion, he
learns to attach to them the authority which he at-
taches to religion itself ; and thus perhaps he scarcely
knows, because he does not enquire, whether a given

124 RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. [ESSAY II.

institution is founded upon the law of God, or intro-
duced by the authority of men. * ■

Of some ceremonies or rites, and of almost all form-
ularies and other appendages of public worship, it is
acknowledged that they possess no proper sanction
from the will of God. Supposing the written expres-
sion of that will to contain nothing by which we can
judge either of their propriety or impropriety, the
standard to which they are to be referred is that of
utility alone.

Now, it is highly probable that benefits result from
these adjuncts of religion, because, in the present state
of mankind, it may be expected that some persons are
impressed with useful sentiments respecting religion
through the intervention of these adjuncts, who might
otherwise scarcely regard religion at all : it is probable
that many are induced to attend upon public worship
by the attraction of its appendages, who would other-
wise stay away. Simply to be present at the font or
the communion table, may be a means of inducing
many religious considerations into the mind. And as
to those who are attracted to public worship by its ac-
companiments, they may at least be in the way of
religious benefit. One goes to hear the singing, and
one the organ, and one to see the paintings or the
architecture ; a still larger number go because they are
sure to find some occupation for their thoughts ; some
prayers or other offices of devotion, something to hear,
and see, and do. ! ' The transitions from one office of
devotion to another, from confession to prayer, from
prayer to thanksgiving, from thanksgiving to ' hearing
of the word,' are contrived, like scenes in the drama,
to supply the mind with a succession of diversified en-
gagements. ' ' * These diversified engagements, I say,
attract some who would not otherwise attend ; and it is

* Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 5, c. 5.

CHAP. I.] RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. 125

better that they should go from imperfect motives than
that they should not go at all. It must, however, be
confessed, that the groundwork of this species of utility
is similar to that which has been urged in favor of the
use of images by the Romish Church. "Idols," say
they, " are laymen's books ; and a great mea?is to stir
up pious thoughts and devotion in the learnedest."*
Indeed, if it is once admitted that the prospect of ad-
vantage is a sufficient reason for introducing objects
addressed to the senses into the public offices of wor-
ship, it is not easy to define where we shall stop. If
we may have magnificent architecture, and music, and
chanting, and paintings, why may we not have the yet
more imposing pomp of the Catholic worship ? I do
not say that this pomp is useful and right, but that the
pri?iciple on which such things are introduced into the
worship of God furnishes no satisfactory means of de-
ciding what amount of external observances should be
introduced, and what should not. If figures on canvas
are lawful because they are useful, why is not a figure
in marble or in wood ? Why may we not have images
by way of laymen's books, and of stirring up pious
thoughts and devotion ?

But it is to be apprehended of such things, or of
M contrivances like scenes in a drama," that they have
much less tendency to promote devotion than some
men may suppose. No doubt they may possess an
imposing effect, they may powerfully interest and
affect the imagination ; but does not this partake too
much of that factitious devotion of which we speak ?
Is it certain that such things have much tendency to
purify the mind, and raise up within it a power that
shall efficiently resist temptation ?

Even if some benefits do result from the employment
of these appendages of worship, they are not without
their dangers and their evils. With respect to those
* Milton's Prose Works, v, 4, p. 266.

126 RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. [ESSAY II.

which are addressed to the senses, whether to the eye
or ear, there is obviously a danger that like other sen-
sible objects they will withdraw the mind from its
proper business — the cultivation of pure religious
affections towards God. And respecting the formu-
laries of devotion, it has been said by a writer, whom
none will suspect of overstating their evils, "The
arrogant man, as if like the dervise in the Persian
fable, he had shot his soul into the character he as-
sumes, repeats, with complete self -application, Lord,
I am not high-minded : the trifler says, / hate vain
thoughts : the irreligious, Lord, how I love thy law : he
who seldom prays at all, confidently repeats, All the
day lo7ig I am occupied in thy statutes* These are not
light considerations : here is insincerity and untruths ;
and insincerity and untruths, it should be remembered,
in the place and at the time when we profess to be
humbled in the presence of God. The evils too are
inseparable from the system. Wherever preconcerted
formularies are introduced, there will always be some
persons who join in the use of them without propriety,
or sincerity or decorum. Nor are the evils much ex-
tenuated by the hope which has been suggested, that
1 ' the holy vehicle of their hypocrisy may be made that
of their conversion." It is very Christian-like to in-
dulge this hope, though I fear it is not very reason-
able. Hypocrisy is itself an offence against God ; and
it can scarcely be expected that anything so imme-
diately connected with the offence will often effect such
an end.

It is not, however, in the case of those who use these
forms in a manner positively hypocritical, that the
greatest evil and danger consists : ' ' There is a kind of
mechanical memory in the tongue, which runs over the
form without any aid of the understanding, without
* More's Moral Sketches, 3d Ed. p. 429.

CHAP. I.] REUGIOUS OBUGAXKXNS. '. J 127

any concurrence of the will, without any consent of the
affections ; for do we not sometimes implore God to
hear a prayer to which we are ourselves not attend-
ing ? ■ ' * We have sufficient reason for knowing that
to draw nigh to God with our lips whilst our hearts are
far from him, is a serious offence in his sight ; and
when it is considered how powerful is the tendency of
oft-repeated words to lose their practical connection
with feelings and ideas, it is to be feared that this class
of evils, resulting from the use of forms, is of very wide
extent. Nor is it to be forgotten, that as even religious
persons sometimes employ ' ' the form without any aid
of the understanding, ' ' so others are in danger of sub-
stituting the form for the reality, and of imagining
that, if they are exemplary in the observance of the
externals of devotion, the work of religion is done.

Such circumstances may reasonably make us hesitate
in deciding the question of the propriety of these ex-
ternal things, as a question of expediency . They may
reasonably make us do more than this ; for does Chris-
tianity allow us to invent a system, of which some of
the consequences are so bad, for the sake of a bene-
ficial end?

Forms of prayer have been supposed to rest on an
authority somewhat more definite than that of other
religious forms. " The Lord's Prayer is a precedent,
as well as a pattern, for forms of prayer. Our Lord
appears, if not to have prescribed, at least to have
authorized the use of fixed forms, when he complied
with the request of the disciple who said unto him,
1 Lord teach us to pray, as John also taught his disci-
ples.' "f If we turn to Matt, vi., where the fullest
account is given of the subject, we are, I think, pre-
sented with a different view. Our Saviour, who had

* More's Moral Sketches, 3d Ed. p. 327. .
f Mor. and Pol. Phil. p. 3. b. 5. c. 5.

128 RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. [ESSAY II.

been instituting his more perfect laws in place of the
doctrines which had been taught of old time, proceeded
to the prevalent mode of giving alms, of praying, of
fasting, and of laying up wealth. He first describes
these modes, and then directs in what manner Chris-
tians ought to give alms, and pray and fast. Now, if
it be contended that he requires us to employ that par-
ticular form of prayer which he then dictated, it must
also be contended that he requires us to adopt that par-
ticular mode of giving money which he described, and
those particular actions, when fasting, which he men-
tions. If we are obliged to use the form of prayer, we
are obliged to give money in secret ; and when we fast
to put oil upon our heads. If these particular modes
were not enjoined, neither is the form of prayer ; and
the Scriptures contain no indication that this form was
ever used at all, either by the apostles or their con-
verts. But if the argument only asserts that fixed
forms are " authorized " by the language of Christ, the
question becomes a question merely of expediency.
Supposing that they are authorized, they are to be em-
ployed only if they are useful. Even in this view, it
may be remarked that there is no reason to suppose,
from the Christian Scriptures, that either Christ him-
self or his apostles ever used a fixed form. If he had
designed to authorize, and therefore to recommend
their adoption, is it not probable that some indications
of their having been employed wTould be presented?
But instead of this, we find that every prayer which is
recorded ill the volume was delivered extempore, upon
the then occasion, and arising out of the then existing
circumstances.

Yet after all, the important question is not between
preconcerted and extempore prayer as such, but whether
any prayer is proper and right but that which is elic-
ited by the influence of the Divine power. The en-

CHAP. I.] REUG10US OBLIGATIONS. I29

quiry into this solemn subject would lead us too wide
from our general business. The truth, however, that
" we know not what to pray for as we ought," is as
truly applicable to extempore as to formal prayer.
Words merely do not constitute prayer, whether they
be prepared beforehand, or conceived at the moment
they are addressed. There is reason to believe that he
only offers perfectly acceptable supplications, who
offers them M according to the will of God," and " of
the ability which God giveth :" — and if such be indeed
the truth, it is scarcely compatible either with a pre-
scribed form of words, or with extempore prayer at
prescribed times. — Yet if any Christian, in the piety of
his heart, believes it to be most conducive to his relig-
ious interests to pray at stated times or in fixed forms,
far be it from me to censure this the mode of his de-
votion, or to assume that his petition will not obtain
access to the Universal Lord.

Finally, respecting uncommanded ceremonials and
rituals of all kinds, and respecting all the appendages
of public worship which have been adopted as helps to
devotion, there is one truth to which perhaps every
good man will assent — that if religion possessed its
sufficient and rightful influence, if devotion of the
heart were duly maintained without these things, they
would no longer be needed. He who enjoys the vig-
orous exercise of his limbs, is encumbered by the em-
ployment of a crutch. Whether the Christian world is
yet prepared for the relinquishment of these append-
ages and ' ' helps ' ' — whether an equal degree of effica-
cious religion would be maintained without them — are
questions which I presume not to determine : but it
may nevertheless be decided, that this is the state of the
Christian church to which we should direct our hopes
and our endeavors — and that Christianity will never
possess its proper influence, and will not effect its des-

I30 REUGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. [ESSAY II.

tined objects, until the internal dedication of the heart
is universally attained.

To those who may sometimes be brought into con-
tact with persons who profess scepticism respecting
Christianity, and especially to those who are conscious
of any tendency in their own minds to listen to the ob-
jections of these persons, it may be useful to observe,
that the grounds upon which sceptics build their dis-
belief of Christianity, are commonly very slight. The
number is comparatively few whose opinions are the
result of any tolerable degree of investigation. They
embraced sceptical notions through the means which
they now take of diffusing them amongst others — not by
arguments but jests ; not by objections to the historical
evidence of Christianity, but by conceits and witti-
cisms ; not by examining the nature of religion as it
was delivered by its Founder, but by exposing the con-
duct of those who profess it. Perhaps the seeming
paradox is true, that no men are so credulous, that no
men accept important propositions upon such slender
evidence, as the majority of those who reject Chris-
tianity. To believe that the religious opinions of al-
most all the civilized world are founded upon impos-
ture, is to believe an important proposition ; a propo-
sition which no man, who properly employs his facul-
ties, would believe without considerable weight of evi-
dence. But what is the evidence upon which the
1 ' unfledged witlings who essay their wanton efforts ' '
against religion, usually found their notions? Alas!
they are so far from having rejected Christianity upon
the examination of its evidences that they do not know
what Christianity is. To disbelieve the religion of
Christianity upon grounds which shall be creditable to
the understanding, involves no light task. A man
must investigate and scrutinize ; he must examine the

CHAP. I.] RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. I3I

credibility of testimony ; he must weigh and compare
evidence ; he must enquire into the reality of historical
facts. If, after rationally doing all this, he disbelieves
in Christianity — be it so. I think him, doubtless, mis-
taken, but I do not think him puerile and credulous.
But he who professes scepticism without any of this
species of enquiry, is credulous and puerile indeed ;
and such most sceptics actually are. " Concerning un-
believers and doubters of every class, one observation
may almost universally be made w7ith truth, that they
are little acquainted with the nature of the Christian
religion, and still less with the evidence by which it is
supported."* In France, scepticism has extended it-
self as widely perhaps as in any country in the world,
and its philosophers forty or fifty years ago, were
ranked amongst the most intelligent and sagacious of
mankind. And upon what grounds did these men re-
ject Christianity ? Dr. Priestley went with Lord Shel-
burne to France, and he says, ' ' I had an opportunity
of seeing and conversing with every person of emi-
nence wherever we came : ' ' I found ' ' all the philo-
sophical persons to whom I was introduced at Paris, un-
believers in Christianity, and even professed atheists.
As I chose on all occasions to appear as a Christian, I
was told by some of them that I was the only person
they had ever met with, of whose understanding they
had any opinion, who professed to believe in Chris-
tianity. But on interrogating them on the subject, I
soon found that they had given no proper attention to it,
and did not really know what Christianity was. This
was also the case with a great part of the company that
I saw at Lord Shelburne's."f If these philosophical
men rejected Christianity in such contemptible and
shameful ignorance of its nature and evidences, upon

* Gisborne's Duties of Men.
t Memoirs of Dr. Priestley.

132 RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS [ESSAY II.

what grounds are we to suppose the ordinary striplings
of infidelity reject it ?

How then does it happen that those who affect scep-
ticism are so ambitious to make their scepticism
known ? Because it is a short and easy road to dis-
tinction ; because it affords a cheap means of gratifying
vanity. To "rise above vulgar prejudices and super-
stitions"— "to entertain enlarged and liberal opin-
ions,' ' are phrases of great attraction, especially to
young men ; and how shall they show that they rise
above vulgar prejudices, how shall they so easily mani-
fest the enlargement of their views, as by rejecting a
system which all their neighbors agree to be true?
They feel important to themselves, and that they are
objects of curiosity to others : and they are objects of
curiosity, not on account of their own qualities, but on
account of the greatness of that which they contemn.
The peasant who reviles a peasant, may revile him
without an auditor, but a province will listen to him
who vilifies a king. I know not that an intelligent
person should be advised to reason with these puny
assailants : their notions and their conduct are not the
result of reasoning. What they need is the humilia-
tion of vanity and the exposure of folly. A few simple
interrogations would expose their folly ; and for the
purposes of humiliation, simply pass them by. The
sun that shines upon them, makes them look bright
and large. L,et reason and truth withdraw their rays,
and these seeming stars will quickly set in silence and
in darkness.

More contemptible motives to the profession of infi-
delity cannot perhaps exist, but there are some which
are more detestable. Hartley says that ' ' the strictness
and purity of the Christian religion in respect to sexual
licentiousness, is probably the chief thing which makes

CHAP. II ] PROPERTY. 133

vicious men first fear and hate, and then vilify and op-
pose it."*

Whether therefore we regard the motives which lead
to scepticism, or the reasonableness of the grounds
upon which it is commonly founded, there is surely
much reason for an ingenuous young person to hold in
contempt the jests, and pleasantries, and sophistries
respecting revelation with which he may be assailed.

CHAPTER II.
PROPERTY.

Foundation of the Right to Property — Insolvency : Perpetual
obligation to pay debts : Reform of public opinion : Ex-
amples of integrity — Wills, Legatees, Heirs : Informal Wills :
Intestates — Minor's debts — A Wife's debts — Bills of Ex-
change— Unjust defendants — Privateers — Confiscations — In-
surance— Settlements — Houses of infamy — Literary property —
Rewards.

Disquisitions respecting the origin of property ap-
pear to be of little use ; partly because the origin can
scarcely be determined, and partly because, if it could
be determined, the discovery would be little applicable
to the present condition of human affairs. In whatever
manner an estate was acquired two thousand years ago,
it is of no consequence in enquiring who ought to
possess it now.

The foundation of the right to property is a more
important point. Ordinarily, the foundation is the law
of the land. Of civil government — which institution
is sanctioned by the Divine will — one of the great offi-
ces is, to regulate the distribution of property ; to give
it, if it has the power of giving ; or to decide between
opposing claimants, to whom it shall be assigned.

* Observations on Man.

134 PROPERTY. [ESSAY II.

The proposition therefore, as a general rule, is sound;
— He possesses a right to property to whom the law of the
land assigns it. This however is only a general rule.
It has been sufficiently seen that some legal possessions
are not permitted by the moral law. The occasional
opposition between the moral and the legal right to
property, is inseparable from the principle on which
law is founded — that of acting upon general rules. It
is impossible to frame any rule, the application of which
shall, in every variety of circumstances, effect the
requisitions of Christian morality. A rule which in
nine cases proves equitable, may prove utterly unjust
in the tenth. A rule which in nine cases promotes the
welfare of the citizen, may in the tenth outrage reason
and humanity.

It is evident that in the present state of legal institu-
tions, the evils which result from laws respecting prop-
erty must be prevented, if they are prevented at all, by
the exercise of virtue in individuals. If the law assigns
a hundred pounds to me, which every upright man
perceives ought in equity to have been assigned to an-
other, that other has no means of enforcing his claim.
Either therefore the claim of equity must be disre-
garded, or / must voluntarily satisfy it.

There are many cases connected with the acquisition
or retention of property, with which the decisions of
law are not immediately connected, but respecting
which it is needful to exercise a careful discrimination,
in order to conform to the requisitions of Christian rec-
titude. The whole subject is of great interest, and
of extensive practical application in the intercourse
of life. The reader will therefore be presented with
several miscellaneous examples, in which the moral
law appears to require greater purity of rectitude than
is required by statutes, or than is ordinarily practised
by mankind.

CHAP. II.] PROPERTY. I35

Insolvency. — Why is a man obliged to pay his
debts ? It is to be hoped that the morality of few per-
sons is lax enough to reply — Because the law compels
him. But why, then, is he obliged to pay them?
Because the moral law requires it. That this is the
primary ground of the obligation is evident ; otherwise
the payment of any debt which a vicious or corrupt
legislature resolved to cancel, would cease to be oblig-
atory upon the debtor. The Virginian statute, which
we noticed in the last Essay, would have been a suffic-
ient justification to the planters to defraud their
creditors.

A man becomes insolvent and is made a bankrupt: he
pays his creditors ten shillings instead of twenty, and
obtains his certificate. The law, therefore, discharges
him from the obligation to pay more. The bankrupt
receives a large legacy, or he engages in business and
acquires property. Being then able to pay the re-
mainder of his debts, does the legal discharge exempt
him from the obligation to pay them ? No : and for
this reason that the legal discharge is not a moral dis-
charge ; that as the duty to pay at all was not founded
primarily on the law, the law cannot warrant him in
withholding a part.

It is however said, that the creditors have relin-
quished their right to the remainder by signing the
certificate. But why did they accept half their de-
mands instead of the whole? Because they were
obliged to do it ; they could get no more. As to
granting the certificate, they do it because to withhold
it would be only an act of gratuitous unkindness. It
would be preposterous to say that creditors relinquish
their claims voluntarily; for no one would give up his
claim to twenty shillings on the receipt of ten if he
could get the other ten by refusing. It might as
reasonably be said that a man parts with a limb volun-

I36 PROPERTY. [ESSAY II.

tarily, because, having incurably lacerated it, he sub-
mits to an amputation. It is to be remembered, too,
that the necessary relinquishment of half the demand
is occasioned by the debtor himself : and it seems very
manifest that when a man, by his' own act, deprives
another of his property, he cannot allege the conse-
quences of that act as a justification of withholding it
after restoration is in his power.

The mode in which an insolvent man obtains a dis-
charge, does not appear to affect his subsequent duties.
Compositions, and bankruptcies, and discharges by an
insolvent act are in this respect alike. The acceptance
of a part instead of the whole is not voluntary in either
case ; and neither case exempts the debtor from the ob-
ligation to pay in full if he can.

If it should be urged that when a person intrusts
property to another, he knowingly undertakes the risk
of that other's insolvency, and that, if the contingent
loss happens, he has no claims to justice on the other,
the answer is this ; that whatever may be thought of
these claims, they are not the grounds upon which the
debtor is obliged to pay. The debtor always engages
to pay, and the engagement is enforced by morality ;
the engagement therefore is binding, whatever risk
another man may incur by relying upon it. The
causes which have occasioned a person's insolvency, al-
though they greatly affect his character, do not affect
his obligations : the duty to repay when he has the
power, is the same whether the insolvency were occa-
sioned by his fault or his misfortune. In all cases, the
reasoning that applies to the debt, applies also to the
interest that accrues upon it; although with respect to the
acceptance of both, and especially of interest, a credi-
tor should exercise a considerate discretion. — A man
who has failed of paying his debts ought always to
live with frugality, and carefully to economize such

CHAP. II.] PROPERTY. I37

money as he gains. He should reflect that he is a
trustee for his creditors, and that all the needless
money which he expends is not his but theirs.

The amount of property which the trading part of a
commercial nation loses by insolvency, is great enough
to constitute a considerable national evil. The fraud,
too, that is practised under cover of insolvency, is
doubtless the most extensive of all species of private
robbery. The profligacy of some of these cases is well
known to be extreme. He who is a bankrupt to-day,
riots in the luxuries of affluence to-morrow ; bows to
the creditors whose money he is spending, and exults
in the success and the impunity of his wickedness. Of
such conduct we should not speak or think but with
detestation. We should no more sit at the table, or
take the hand of such a man, than if we knew he had
got his money last night on the highway. There is a
wickedness in some bankruptcies to which the guilt of
ordinary robbers approaches but at a distance. Happy,
if such wickedness could not be practised with legal
impunity I* Happy, if public opinion supplied the
deficiency of the law and held the iniquity in rightful
abhorrence !f

Perhaps nothing would tend so efficaciously to di-
minish the general evils of insolvency, as a sound state
of public opinion respecting the obligation to pay our
debts. The insolvent who, with the means of paying,
retains the money in his own pocket, is, and he should
be regarded as being, a dishonest man. If public
opinion held such conduct to be of the same character
as theft, probably a more powerful motive to avoid
insolvency would be established than any which now
exists. Who would not anxiously (and therefore, in
almost all cases, successfully) struggle against insol-
vency, when he knew that it would be followed, if not
* See the 3d Essay. t Id.

I38 PROPERTY. [ESSAY II.

by permanent poverty, by permanent disgrace ? If it
should be said that to act upon such a system would
overwhelm an insolvent's energies, keep him in per-
petual inactivity, and deprive his family of the benefit
of his exertions — I answer, that the evil, supposing it
to impend, would be much less extensive than may be
imagined. The calamity being foreseen, would pre-
vent men from becoming insolvent ; and it is certain
that the majority might have avoided insolvency by
sufficient care. Besides, if a man's principles are such
that he would rather sink into inactivity than exert
himself in order to be just, it is not necessary to mould
public opinion to his character. The question too is,
not whether some men would not prefer indolence to
the calls of justice, but whether the public should
judge accurately respecting what those calls are. The
state, and especially a family, might lose occasionally
by this reform of opinion — and so they do by sending
a man to New South Wales ; but who would think this
a good reason for setting criminals at large? And
after all, much more would be gained by preventing
insolvency, than lost by the ill consequences upon the
few who failed to pay their debts.

It is cause of satisfaction that, respecting this recti-
fied state of opinion, and respecting integrity of private
virtue, some examples are offered. There is one com-
munity of Christians which holds its members obliged
to pay their debts whenever they possess the ability,
without regard to the legal discharge.* By this

*" Where any have injured others in their property, the
greatest frugality should be observed by themselves and their
families ; and although they may have a legal discharge from
their creditors, both equity and our Christian profession de-
mand, that none, when they have it in their power, should rest
satisfied until a just restitution be made to those who have suf-
fered by them."

11 And it is the judgment of this meeting, that monthly and

CHAP. II. PROPERTY. I39

means, there is thrown over the character of every
bankrupt who possesses property, a shade which noth-
ing but payment can dispel. The effect (in conjunc-
tion we may hope with private integrity of principle) is
good — good, both in instituting a new motive to avoid
insolvency and in inducing some of those who do become
insolvent, subsequently to pay all their debts.

Of this latter effect many honorable instances might be
given : two of which having fallen under my observation,
I would briefly mention. — A man had become insolvent,
I believe in early life ; his creditors divided his property
amongst them, and gave him a legal discharge. He
appears to have formed the resolution to pay the re-
mainder, if his own exertions should enable him to do
it. He procured employment, by which however he
never gained more than twenty shillings a week ; and
worked industriously and lived frugally for eighteen
years. At the expiration of this time, he found he had
accumulated enough to pay the remainder, and he
sent the money to his creditors. Such a man, I think,
might hope to derive, during the remainder of his life,
greater satisfaction from the consciousness of integrity,
than he would have derived from expending the money
on himself. It should be told that many of his credi-
tors, when they heard the circumstances, declined to
receive the money, or voluntarily presented it to him
again. One of these was my neighbor ; he had been
little accustomed to exemplary virtue, and the proffered
money astonished him : he talked in loud commenda-

other meetings ought not to receive collections or bequests for
the use of the poor, or any other services of the Society, of per-
sons who have fallen short in the payment of their just debts,
though legally discharged by their creditors : for until such
persons have paid the deficiency, their possessions cannot in
equity be considered as their own."

Official Documents of the Yearly Meeting of the Society of
Friends.

140 PROPERTY. [ESSAY II.

tion of what to him was unheard-of integrity ; signed
a receipt for the amount, and sent it back as a present
to the debtor. The other instance may furnish hints
of a useful kind. It was the case of a female who had
endeavored to support herself by the profits of a shop.
She however became insolvent, paid some dividend,
and received a discharge. She again entered into
business, and in the course of years had accumulated
enough to pay the remainder of her debts. But the
infirmities of age were now coming on, and the annual
income from her savings was just sufficient for the
wants of declining years. Being thus at present unable
to discharge her obligations without subjecting herself
to the necessity of obtaining relief from others, she
executed a will, directing that at her death the credi-
tors should be paid the remainder of their demands :
and when she died they were paid accordingly.

Wm<s, Legatees, and Heirs. — The right of a
person to order the distribution of his property after
death, is recommended by its utility ; and were this
less manifest than it is, it would be sufficient for us
that the right is established by civil government.

It however happens in practice, that persons some-
times distribute their property in a manner that is both
unreasonable and unjust. This evil the law cannot
easily remedy ; and consequently the duty of remedy-
ing it, devolves upon those to whom the property is
bequeathed. If they do not prevent the injustice, it
cannot be prevented. This indicates the propriety, on
the part of a legatee or an heir, of considering, when
property devolves to him in a manner or in a propor-
tion that appears improper, how he may exercise up-
right integrity, lest he should be the practical agent of
injustice or oppression. Another cause for the exer-
cise of this integrity consists in this circumstance : —
When the right of a person to bequeath his property is

CHAP. II.] PROPERTY. 141

admitted, it is evident that his intention ought in gen-
eral to be the standard of his successor's conduct : and
accordingly the law, in making enactments upon the
subject, directs much of its solicitude to the means of
ascertaining and of fulfilling the testator's intentions.
These intentions must, according to the existing sys-
tems of jurisprudence, be ascertained by some general
rules — by a written declaration perhaps, or a declara-
tion of a specified kind, or made in a prescribed form,
or attested in a particular manner. But in consequence
of this it happens, that as through accident or inad-
vertency a testator does not always comply with these
forms, the law, which adheres to its rules, frustrates
his intentions, and therefore, in effect, defeats its own
object in prescribing the forms. Here again the in-
tentions of the deceased and the demands of equity
cannot be fulfilled, except by the virtuous integrity of
heirs and legatees.

I. If my father, who had one son besides myself, left
nine-tenths of his property to me, and only the remain-
ing tenth to my brother, I should not think the will,
however authentic, justified me in taking so large a
proportion, unless I could discover some reasonable
motive which influenced my father's mind. If my
brother already possessed a fortune and I had none ; if
I were married and had a numerous family ; and he
were single and unlikely to marry; if he was incurably
extravagant, and would probably in a few weeks or
months squander his patrimony ; in these, or in such
circumstances, I should think myself at liberty to ap-
propriate my father's bequest : otherwi.se I should not.
Thus, if the disproportionate division was the effect of
some unreasonable prejudice against my brother, or
fondness for me ; or if it was made at the unfair insti-
gation of another person, or in a temporary fit of pas-
sion or disgust ; I could not, virtuously, enforce the

142 PROPERTY. [ESSAY II.

will. The reason is plain. The will being unjust or
extremely unreasonable, I should be guilty of injustice
or extreme unreasonableness in enforcing it.

A man who possesses five thousand pounds, has two
sons, of whom John is well provided for, and Thomas
is not. With the privity of his sons he makes a will,
leaving four thousand pounds to Thomas and one to
John, explaining to both the reasons of this division.
A fire happens in the house and the will is burnt ;
and the father, before he has the opportunity of
making another, is carried off by a fever. Now the
English law would assign a half of the money to
each brother. If John demands his half, is he a
just man? Every one I think will perceive that he
is not, and that, if he demanded it, he would violate
the duties of benevolence. The law is not his suf-
ficient rule.

A person whose near relations do not stand in need
of his money, adopts the children of distant relatives,
with the declared intention or manifest design of pro-
viding for them at his death. If, under such circum-
stances, he dies without a will, the heir at law could
not morally avail himself of his legal privilege, to the
injury of these expectant parties. They need the
money, and he does not ; which is one good reason for
not seizing it ; but the intention of the deceased in-
vested them with a right ; and so that the intention is
known, it matters little to the moral obligation,
whether it is expressed on paper or not.

Possibly some reader may say, that if an heir or lega-
tee must always institute enquiries into the uncertain
claims of others before he accepts the property of the
deceased, and if he is obliged to give up his own claims
whenever their' s seem to preponderate, he will be in-
volved in endless doubts and scruples, and testators
will never know whether their wills will be executed

CHAP. II.] PROPERTY. 143

or not : the answer is, that no such scrupulousness is
demanded. Hardheartedness, and extreme unreason-
ableness, and injustice, are one class of considerations ;
critical scruples, and uncertain claims, are another.

It may be worth a paragraph to remark, that it is to
be feared some persons think too complacently of their
charitable bequests, or, what is worse, hope that it is a
species of good works which will counterbalance the
offence of some present irregularities of conduct. Such
bequests ought not to be discouraged ; and yet it
should be remembered, that he who gives money after
his death, parts with nothing of his own. He gives it
only when he cannot retain it. The man who leaves
his money for the single purpose of doing good, does
right : but he who hopes that it is a work of merit,
should remember that the money is given, that the pri-
vation is endured, not by himself but by his heirs. A
man who has more than he needs, should dispense it
whilst it is his own.

Minors' Debts. — A young man under twenty-one
years of age purchases articles of a tradesman, of which
some are necessary and some are not. Payment for
unnecessary articles cannot be enforced by the English
law — the reason with the Legislature being this, that
thoughtless youths might be practised upon by design-
ing persons, and induced to make needless and extrav-
agant purchases. But is the youth who purchases un-
necessary articles with the promise to pay when he
becomes of age, exempted from the obligation? Now
it is to be remembered, generally, that this obligation
is not founded upon the law of the land, and therefore
that the law cannot dispense with it. But if the trades-
man has actually taken advantage of the inexperience of
a youth, to cajole him into debts of which he was not
conscious of the amount or the impropriety, it does not
appear that he is obliged to pay them ; and for this

144 PROPERTY. [ESSAY II.

reason, that he did not, in any proper sense of the
term, come under an obligation to pay them. In other
cases, the obligation remains. The circumstance that
the law will not assist the creditor to recover the money
does not dispense with it. It is fit, no doubt, that
these dishonorable tradesmen should be punished,
though the mode of punishing them is exceptionable
indeed. It operates as a powerful temptation to fraud
in young men, and it is a bad system to discourage dis-
honesty in one person by tempting the probity of an-
other. The youth, too, is of all persons the last who
should profit by the punishment of the trader. He is
reprehensible himself ; young men who contract such
debts are seldom so young or so ignorant as not to
know that they are doing wrong.

A man's wife "runs him into debt" by extrava-
gant purchases which he is alike unable to prevent or
to afford. Many persons sell goods to such a woman,
who are conscious of her habits and of the husband's
situation, yet continue to supply her extravagance, be-
cause they know the law will enable them to enforce
payment from the husband. These persons act legally,
but they are legally wicked. Do they act as they
would desire others to act towards them ? Would one
of these men wish another tradesman so to supply his
own wife if she was notoriously a spendthrift ? If not,
morality condemns his conduct : and the laws, in effect,
condemn it too ; for the Legislature would not have
made husbands responsible for their wives' debts any
more than for their children's, but for the presumption
that the wife generally buys what the husband ap-
proves. Debts of unprincipled extravagance, are not
debts which the law intended to provide that the hus-
band should pay. If all women contracted such debts,
the Legislature would instantly alter the law. If the
Legislature could have made the distinction, perhaps

CHAP. II.] PROPERTY. 145

it would have made it ; since it did not or could not,
the deficiency must be supplied by private integrity.

Bills of Exchange. — The law of England pro-
vides, that if the possessor of a bill of exchange fails
to demand payment on the day on which it becomes
due, he takes the responsibility, in case of its eventual
non-payment, from the previous endorsers, and incurs
it himself. This as a general rule may be just. A
party may be able to pay to-day and unable a week
hence ; and if in such a case a loss arises by one man's
negligence, it were manifestly unreasonable that it
should be sustained by others. But if the acceptor be-
comes unable to pay a week or a month before the bill
is due, the previous endorsers cannot in justice throw
the loss upon the last possessor, even though he fails
to present it on the appointed day. For why did the
law make its provision ? In order to secure persons
from the loss of their property by the negligence of
others over whom they had no control. But, in the
supposed case, the loss is not occasioned by any such
cause, and therefore the spirit of the law does not
apply to it. You are insisting upon its literal, in op-
position to its just, interpretation. Whether the bill
was presented on the right day or the wrong, makes
no difference to the previous endorsers, and for such a
case the law was not made.

A similar rule of virtue applies to the case of giving
notice of refusal to accept or to pay. If, in consequence
of the want of this notice, the party is subjected to
loss, he may avail himself of the legal exemption from
the last possessor's claim. If the want of notice made
no difference in his situation, he may not.

Unjust Defendants. — It does not present a very
favorable view of the state of private principle, that
there are so many who refuse justice to plaintiffs, un-
less they are compelled to be just by the law. It is in-

146 PROPERTY. [ESSAY IL

disputable, that a multitude of suits are undertaken in
order to obtain property or rights which the defendant
knows he ought voluntarily to give up. Such a per-
son is certainly a dishonest man. When the verdict is
given against him, I regard him in the light of a con-
victed robber — differing from other robbers in the cir-
cumstance that he is tried at nisi prius instead of the
Crown bar. For what is the difference between him
who takes what is another's and him who withholds
it ? This severity of censure applies to some who are
sued for damages. A man who, whether by design or
inadvertency, has injured another, and will not com-
pensate him unless he is legally compelled to do it, is
surely unjust. Yet many of these persons seem to
think that injury to property, or person, or character,
entails no duty to make reparation except it be en-
forced. Why, the law does not create this duty, it only
compels us to fulfil it. If the minds of such persons
were under the influence of integrity, they would pay
such debts without compulsion. — This subject is one
amongst the many upon which public opinion needs to
be aroused and to be rectified. When our estimates of
moral character are adjusted to individual probity of
principle, some of those who now pass in society as
creditable persons, will be placed at the same point on
the scale of morality, as many of those who are con-
signed to a jail.

An upright man should not accept a present of a hun-
dred pounds from a person who had not paid his debts,
nor become his legatee. If the money were not right-
fully his, he cannot give it ; if it be rightfully his cred-
itors' it cannot be mine.

Privatkers. — Although familiarity with war occa-
sions many obliquities in the moral notions of a people,
yet the silent verdict of public opinion is, I think,
against the rectitude of privateering. It is not re-

CHAP. II.] PROPERTY. 147

garded as creditable and virtuous ; and this public dis-
approbation appears to be on the increase. Consider-
able exertion at least has been made, on the part of the
American government, to abolish it. — To this private
plunderer himself I do not talk of the obligations of
morality ; he has many lessons of virtue to learn before
he will be likely to listen to such virtue as it is the ob-
ject of these pages to recommend : but to him who per-
ceives the flagitiousness of the practice, I would urge
the consideration that he ought not to receive the
plunder of a privateer even at second hand. If a man
ought not to be the legatee of a bankrupt, he ought not
to be the legatee of him who gained his money by
privateering. Yet it is to be feared that many who
would not fit out a privateer, would accept the money
which the owners had stolen. If it be stolen, it is not
theirs to give ; and what one has no right to give,
another has no right to accept.

During one of our wars with France, a gentleman
who entertained such views of integrity as these was
partner in a merchant vessel, and, in spite of his repre-
sentations, the other owners resolved to fit her out as a
privateer. They did so, and she happened to capture
several vessels. This gentleman received from time to
time his share of the prizes, and laid it by ; till, at the
conclusion of the war, it amounted to a considerable
sum. What was to be done with the money ? He felt
that, as an upright man, he could not retain the
money ; and he accordingly went to France, advertised
for the owners of the captured vessels, and returned to
them the amount. Such conduct, instead of being a
matter for good men to admire, and for men of loose
morality to regard as needless scrupulosity, ought, when
such circumstances arise, to be an ordinary occurrence.
I do not relate the fact because I think it entitles the
party to any extraordinary praise. He was honest ; and

148 PROPERTY. [ESSAY II.

honesty was his duty. The praise, if praise be due,
consists in this — that he was upright where most men
would have been unjust. Similar integrity upon
parallel subjects may often be exhibited again — upon
privateering it cannot often be repeated ; for when the
virtue of the public is great enough to make such in-
tegrity frequent, it will be great enough to frown
privateering from the world.

At the time of war with the Dutch, about forty years
ago, an English merchant vessel captured a Dutch
Indiaman. It happened that one of the owners of the
merchantman was one of the Society of Friends or
Quakers. This society, as it objects to war, does not
permit its members to share in such a manner in the
profits of war. However, this person, when he heard
of the capture, insured his share of the prize. The
vessel could not be brought into port, and he received
of the underwriters eighteen hundred pounds. To
have retained this money would have been equivalent
to quitting the society, so he gave it to his friends to
dispose of it as justice might appear to prescribe. The
state of public affairs on the Continent did not allow
the trustees immediately to take any active measures
to discover the owners of the captured vessel. The
money, therefore, was allowed to accumulate. At the
termination of the war with France, the circumstances
of the case were repeatedly published in the Dutch
journals, and the full amount of every claim that has
been clearly made out has been paid by the trustees.

Confiscations. — I do not know whether the history
of confiscations affords any examples of persons who
refused to accept the confiscated property. Yet, when
it is considered under what circumstances these seizures
are frequently made — of revolution and civil war, and
the like, when the vindictive passions overpower the
claims of justice and humanity — it cannot be doubted

CHAP. II.] PROPERTY. 149

that the acceptance of confiscated property has some-
times been an act irreconcilable with integrity. Look,
for example, at the confiscations of the French Revo-
lution. The Government which at the moment held
the reins, doubtless sanctioned the appropriation of the
property which they seized ; and in so far the accep-
tance was legal. But that surely is not sufficient. Let
an upright man suppose himself to be the neighbor of
another, who, with his family, enjoys the comforts of a
paternal estate. In the distractions of political tur-
bulence this neighbor is carried off and banished, and
the estate is seized by order of the government.
Would such a man accept this estate when the govern-
ment offered it, without enquiry and consideration ?
Would he sit down in the warm comforts of plenty,
whilst his neighbor was wandering, destitute perhaps,
in another land, and whilst his family were in sorrow
and in want ? Would he not consider whether the con-
fiscation was consistent with justice and rectitude —
and whether, if it were right with respect to the man,
it was right with respect to his children and his wife,
who perhaps did not participate in his offences? It
may serve to give clearness to our perception to con-
sider, that if Louis XVII. had been restored to the
throne soon after his father's death, it is probable that
many of the emigrants would have been reinstated in
their possessions. Louis's restoration might have been
the result of some intrigue, or of a battle. Do, then,
the obligations of mankind as to enjoying the property
of another, depend on such circumstances as battles
and intrigues ? If the returning emigrant would have
rightfully repossessed his estate if the battle was suc-
cessful, can the present occupier rightfully possess it if
the battle is not successful ? Is the result of a political
manoeuvre a proper rule to guide a man's conscience
in retaining or giving up the houses and lands of his

I50 PROPERTY. [ESSAY II.

neighbors ? Politicians, and those who profit by con-
fiscations, may be little influenced by considerations
like these ; but there are other men, who, I think, will
perceive that they are important, and who, though con-
fiscated property may never be offered to them, will be
able to apply the principles which these considerations
illustrate, to their own conduct in other affairs.

Insurance. — It is very possible for a man to act
dishonestly every day and yet never to defraud another
of a shilling. A merchant who conducts his business
partly or wholly with borrowed capital, is not honest if
he endangers the loss of an amount of property which, if
lost, would disable him from paying his debts. He
who possesses a thousand pounds of his own and bor-
rows a thousand of some one else, cannot .virtuously
speculate so extensively as that, if his prospects should
be disappointed, he would lose twelve hundred. The
speculation is dishonest whether it succeeds or not : it is
risking other men's property without their consent.
Under similar circumstances it is unjust not to insure.
Perhaps the majority of uninsured traders, if their
houses and goods were burnt, would be unable to pay
their creditors. The injustice consists not in the actual
loss which may be inflicted, (for whether a fire hap-
pens or not, the injustice is the same,) but in eridanger-
ing the infliction of the loss. There are but two ways
in which, under such circumstances, the claims of rec-
titude can be satisfied — one is by not endangering the
property, and the other by telling its actual owner that
it will be endangered, and leaving him to incur the
risk or not as he pleases.

' ' Those who hold the property of others afe not
warranted, on the principles of justice, in neglecting
to intorm themselves from time to time, of the real
situation of their affairs. "* This enforces the doctrines

* Official Documents of the Yearly Meeting of the Society of
Friends ; 1826.

CHAP. 1 1. "I PROPERTY. 151

which we have delivered. It asserts that injustice at-
taches to not investigating ; and this injustice is often
real whether creditors are injured or not.

During the seventeenth century, when religious per-
secution was very active, some beautiful examples of
integrity were offered by its victims. It was common
for officers to seize the property of conscientious and
good men, and sometimes to plunder them with such
relentless barbarity as scarcely to leave them the com-
mon utensils of a kitchen. These persons sometimes
had the property of others on their premises, and when
they heard that the officers were likely to make a seiz-
ure, industriously removed from their premises all
property but their own. At one period, a number of
traders in the country who had made purchases in the
London markets, found that their plunderers were
likely to disable them from paying for their purchases,
and they requested the merchants to take back, and
the merchants did take back, their goods.

In passing, I would remark, that the readers of mere
general history only, are very imperfectly acquainted
with the extent to which persecution on account of
religion has been practised in these kingdoms, ages
since protestantism became the religion of the state. A
competent acquaintance with this species of history, is
of incomparable greater value than much of the matter
with which historians are wont to fill their pages.

Settlements. — It is not an unfrequent occurence,
when a merchant or other person becomes insolvent,
that the creditors unexpectedly find the estate is charge-
able with a large settlement on the wife. There is a
consideration connected with this which in a greater
degree involves integrity of character than perhaps is
often supposed. Men in business obtain credit from
others in consequence of the opinions which others
form of their character and property. The latter,

152 PROPERTY. [ESSAY II.

if it be not the greater foundation of credit, is a great
one. A person lives then at the rate of a thousand a
year ; he maintains a respectable establishment, and
diffuses over all its parts indications of property.
These appearances are relied upon by other men : they
think they may safely entrust him, and they do entrust
him, with goods or money; until, when his insolvency is
suddenly announced, they are surprised and alarmed, to
find that five hundred a year is settled on his wife. Now
this person has induced others to confide their property
to him by holding out fallacious appearances. He has
in reality deceived them ; and the deception is as real,
though it may not be as palpable, as if he had deluded
them with verbal falsehoods. He has been acting a
continued untruth. Perhaps such a man will say that
he never denied that the greater part of his apparent
property was settled on his wife. This may be true ;
but, when his neighbor came to him to lodge five or six
hundred pounds in his hands ; when he was conscious
that this neighbor's confidence was founded upon the
belief that his apparent property was really his own ;
when there was reason to apprehend, that if his neigh-
bor had known his actual circumstances he would have
hesitated in entrusting him with the money, then he
does really and practically deceive his neighbor, and it
is not a sufficient justification to say that he has uttered
no untruth. The reader will observe that the case is
very different from that of a person who conducts his
business with borrowed money. This person must an-
nually pay the income of the money to the lender. He
does not expend it on his own establishment, and con-
sequently does not hold out the same fallacious appear-
ances. Some profligate spendthrifts take a house, buy
elegant furniture, and keep a handsome equipage, in
order by these appearances to deceive and defraud
traders. No man doubts whether these persons act

CHAP. II.] PROPERTY 153

criminally. How then can he be innocent who know-
ingly practises a deception similar in kind though vary-
ing in degree ?

Houses of Infamy. — If it were not that a want of
virtue is so common amongst men, we should wonder
at the coolness with which some persons of decent rep-
utation are content to let their houses to persons of
abandoned character, and to put periodically into their
pockets, the profits of infamy. Sophisms may easily
be invented to palliate the conduct ; but nothing can
make it right. Such a landlord knows perfectly to
what purposes his house will be devoted, and knows
that he shall receive the wages, not perhaps of his own
iniquity, but still the wages of iniquity. He is almost
a partaker with them in their sins. If I were to sell a
man arsenic or a pistol, knowing that the buyer wanted
it to commit murder, should I not be a bad man ? If
I let a man a house, knowing that the renter wants it
for purposes of wickedness, am I au innocent man ?
Not that it is to be affirmed that no one may receive
ill-gotten money. A grocer may sell a pound of sugar
to a woman though he knows she is upon the town.
But, if we cannot specify the point at which a lawful
degree of participation terminates, we can determine
respecting some degrees of participation, that they
are unlawful. To the majority of such offenders
against the moral law, these arguments may be urged
in vain ; there are some of whom we may indulge
greater hope. Respectable public brewers are in the
habit of purchasing beer houses in order that they may
supply the publicans with their porter. Some of these
houses are notoriously the resort of the most abandoned
of mankind ; the daily scenes of riot, and drunkenness,
and of the most filthy debauchery. Yet these houses
are purchased by brewers — perhaps there is a competi-
tion amongst them for the premises ; they put in a ten-

154 PROPERTY. [ESSAY II.

ant of their own, supply him with beer, and regularly
receive the profits of this excess of wickedness. Is
there no such obligation as that of abstaining even
from the appearance of evil ? Is there no such thing
as guilt without a personal participation in it ? All
pleas such as that, if one man did not supply such a
house another would, are vain subterfuges. Upon
such reasoning, you might rob a traveller on the road,
if you knew that at the next turning a footpad was
waiting to plunder him if you did not. Selling such
houses to be occupied as before, would be like selling
slaves because you thought it criminal to keep them in
bondage. The obligation to discountenance wicked-
ness rests upon him who possesses the power. • ' To
him who knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him
it is sin. ' ' To retain our virtue may in such cases cost
us something, but he who values virtue at its worth
will not think that he retains it at a dear rate.

IyiTKRARY Prjdpbrty. — Upon similar grounds there
are some of the profits of the press which a good man
cannot accept. There are some periodical works and
some newspapers, from which, if he were offered an
annual income, he would feel himself bound to reject
it. Suppose there is a newspaper which is lucrative
because it gratifies a vicious taste for slander or in-
decency— or suppose there is a magazine of which the
profits result from the attraction of irreligious or licen-
tious articles, I would not put into my pocket, every
quarter of a year, the money which was gained by
vitiating mankind. In all such cases, there is one sort
of obligation which applies with great force, the ob-
ligation not to discourage rectitude by our example.
Upon this ground, a man of virtue would hesitate even
to contribute an article to such a publication, lest they
who knew he was a contributor, should think they had
his example to justify improprieties of their own.

CHAP. II.] PROPERTY. 155

Rewards. — A person loses his pocket-book contain-
ing fifty pounds, and offers ten pounds to the finder if
he will restore it. The finder ought not to demand the
reward. It implies surely some imputation upon a
man's integrity, when he accepts payment for being
honest. For, for what else is he paid? If he retains
the property he is manifestly fraudulent. To be paid
for giving it up, is to be paid for not committing fraud.
The loser offers the reward in order to over-power the
temptation to dishonesty. To accept the reward is
therefore tacitly to acknowledge that you would have
been dishonest if it had not been offered. This cer-
tainly is not maintaining an integrity that is ! ' above
suspicion." It will be said that the reward is offered
voluntarily . This, in proper language, is not true.
Two evils are presented to the loser, of which he is
compelled to choose one. If men were honest, he
would not offer the reward : he would make it known
that he had lost his pocket-book, and the finder, if a
finder there were, would restore it. The offered ten
pounds is a tax which is imposed upon him by the
want of uprightness in mankind, and he who demands
the money actively promotes the imposition. The
very word reward carries with it its own reprobation.
As a reward, the man of integrity would receive noth-
ing. If the loser requested it, he might if he needed
it, accept a donation ; but he would let it be under-
stood, that he accepted a present not that he received a
debt.

Perhaps examples enough or more than enough, have
been accumulated to illustrate this class of obligations.
Many appeared needful, because it is a class which is
deplorably neglected in practice. So strong is the
temptation to think that we may rightfully possess
whatever the law assigns to us — so insinuating is the
notion, upon subjects of property, that whatever the

156 INEQUALITY OF PROPERTY. [ESSAY II.

law does not punish we may rightfully do, that there
is little danger of supplying too many motives to
habitual discrimination of our duties and to habitual
purity of conduct. Let the reader especially remem-
ber, that the examples which are offered are not all of
them selected on account of their individual impor-
tance, but rather as illustrations of the general prin-
ciple. A man may meet with a hundred circumstances
in life to which none of these examples are relevant,
but I think he will not have much difficulty in estimat-
ing the principles which they illustrate. And this in-
duces the observation, that although several of these
examples are taken from British law or British cus-
toms, they do not, on that account, lose their appli-
cability where these laws and customs do not obtain.
If this book should ever be read in a foreign land, or
if it should be read in this land when public institutions
or the tenor of men's conduct shall be changed, the
principles of its morality will, nevertheless, be appli-
cable to the affairs of life.

CHAPTER III.

INEQUALITY OF PROPERTY.

Accumulation of wealth : its proper limits — Provision for chil-
dren : ' ' Keeping up the family. ' '

That many and great evils result from that inequal-
ity of property which exists in civilized countries, is
indicated by the many propositions which have been
made to diminish or destroy it. We want not indeed
such evidence j for it is sufficiently manifest to every
man who will look round upon his neighbors. We
join not with those who declaim against all inequality
of property : the real evil is not that it is unequal, but

CHAP. III.] INEQUALITY OF PROPERTY. I57

that it is greatly unequal ; not that one man is richer
than another, but that one man is so rich as to be
luxurious, or imperious, or profligate, and that another
is so poor as to be abject and depraved, as well as to
be destitute of the proper comforts of life.

There are two means by which this pernicious in-
equality of property may be diminished ; by political
institutions, and by the exertions of private men. Our
present business is with the latter.

To a person who possesses and expends more than
he needs, there are two reasonable inducements to di-
minish its amount — first, to benefit others, and next to
benefit his family and himself. The claims of benevo-
lence towards others are often and earnestly urged
upon the public, and for that reason they will not be
repeated here. Not that there is no occasion to repeat
the lessson, for it is very inadequately learnt ; but
that it is of more consequence to exhibit obligations
which are less frequently enforced. To insist upon
diminishing the amount of a man's property for the
sake of his family and himself, may present to some
men new ideas, and to some men the doctrine may be
paradoxical.

Large possessions are in a great majority of instances
injurious to the possessor — that is to say, those who
hold them are generally less excellent, both as citizens
and as men, than those who do not. The truth ap-
pears to be established by the concurrent judgment of
mankind. Lord Bacon says — " Certainly great riches
have sold more men than they have bought out. As
baggage is to an army, so are riches to virtue. — It
hindereth the march, yea and the care of it sometimes
loseth or disturbeth the victory." — " It is to be feared
that the general tendency of rank, and especially of
riches, is to withdraw the heart from spiritual exer-

158 INEQUALITY OF PROPERTY. [ESSAY II.

cises."* " A much looser system of morals commonly
prevails in the higher than in the middling and lower
orders of society, "f " The middle rank contains most
virtue and abilities. ' ' J

" Wealth heap'd on wealth, nor truth nor safety buys,
The dangers gather as the treasures rise. ' ' \

It was an observation of Voltaire' s that the English
people were, like their butts of beer, froth at top, dregs
at bottom — in the middle excellent. The most rational,
the wisest, the best portion of mankind, belong to that
class who ' ' possess neither poverty nor riches. ' ' Let
the reader look around him. Let him observe who are
the persons that contribute most to the moral and
physical amelioration of mankind ; who they are that
practically and personally support our unnumbered in-
stitutions of benevolence ; who they are that exhibit
the worthiest examples of intellectual exertion ; who
they are to whom he would himself apply if he needed
to avail himself of a manly and discriminating judg-
ment. That they are the poor is not to be expected :
we appeal to himself whether they are the rich. Who
then would make his son a rich man ? Who would re-
move his child out of that station in society which is
thus peculiarly favorable to intellectual and moral
excellence ?

If a man knows that wealth will in all probability be
injurious to himself and to his children, injurious too
in the most important points, the religious and moral
character, it is manifestly a point of the soundest wis-
dom and the truest kindness to decline to accumulate
it. Upon this subject, it is admirable to observe with
what exactness the precepts of Christianity are adapted

* More's Moral Sketches, 3d Edit. p. 446.
f Wilberforce : Pract. View.
% Wollestoncroft : Rights of Women, c. 4.
I Johnson : Vanity of Human Wishes.

CHAP. III.] INEQUALITY OF PROPERTY. 159

to that conduct which the experience of life recom-
mends. ' ' The care of this world and the deceitf ulness
of riches choke the word :" — " choked with cares, and
riches, and pleasures of this life, and bring no fruit to
perfection;" — "How hardly shall they that have
riches enter into the kingdom of God !" " They that
will be rich fall into temptation and a snare, and into
many foolish and hurtful lusts which drown men in
destruction and perdition." Not that riches necessar-
ily lead to these consequences, but that such is their
tendency ; a tendency so uniform and powerful that it
is to be feared these are their very frequent results.
Now this language of the Christian scriptures does not
contain merely statements of fact — it imposes duties ;
and whatever may be the precise mode of regarding
those duties, one point is perfectly clear; — that he who
sets no other limit to his possessions or accumulations
than inability or indisposition to obtain more, does not
conform to the will of God. Assuredly, if any speci-
fied thing is declared by Christianity to be highly
likely to obstruct our advancement in goodness, and to
endanger our final felicity, against that thing, whatever
it be, it is imperative upon us to guard with wakeful
solicitude.

And therefore, without affirming that no circum-
stance can justify a great accumulation of property,
it may safely be concluded that far the greater number
of those who do accumulate it, do wrong : nor do I see
any reason to be deterred from ranking the distribution
of a portion of great wealth, or refusal to accumulate
it, amongst the imperative duties which are imposed by
the moral law. In truth, a man may almost discover
whether such conduct is obligatory, by referring to the
motives which induce him to acquire great property or
to retain it. The motives are generally impure ; the
desire of splendor, or the ambition of eminence, or

i6o INEQUALITY OF PROPERTY. [ESSAY II.

the love of personal indulgence. Are these motives
fit to be brought into competition with the probable
welfare, the virtue, the usefulness, and the happiness
of his family and himself ? Yet such is the competi-
tion, and to such unworthy objects, duty, and reason,
and affection are sacrificed.

It will be said, a man should provide for his family ;
and make them, if he can, independent. That he
should provide for his family is true ; that he should
make them independent, at any rate that he should give
them an affluent independence, forms no part of his
duty, and is frequently .a violation of it. As it respects
almost all men, he will best approve himself a wise and
kind parent, who leaves to his sons so much only as
may enable them, by moderate engagements, to enjoy
the conveniences and comforts of life ; and to his
daughters a sufficiency to possess similar comforts, but
not a sufficiency to shine amongst the great, or to
mingle with the votaries of expensive dissipation. If
any father prefers other objects to the welfare and hap-
piness of his children — if wisdom and kindness towards
them are with him subordinate considerations, it is not
probable that he will listen to reasonings like these.
But where is the parent who dares to acknowledge this
preference to his own mind ?

It were idle to affect to specify any amount of prop-
erty which a person ought not to exceed. The cir-
cumstances of one man may make it reasonable that he
should acquire or retain much more than another who
has fewer claims. Yet somewhat of a general rule may
be suggested. He who is accumulating should con-
sider why he desires more. If it really is, that he be-
lieves an addition will increase the welfare and useful-
ness and virtue of his family, it is probable that further
accumulation may be right. If no such belief is sin-
cerely entertained, it is more than probable that it is

CHAP. III.] INEQUALITY OF PROPERTY. l6l

wrong. He who already possesses affluence should
consider its actual existing effects. — If he employs a
competent portion of it in increasing the happiness of
others, if it does not produce any injurious effect upon
his own mind, if it does not diminish or impair the vir-
tues of his children, if they are grateful for their priv-
ileges rather than vain of their superiority, if they
second his own endeavors to diffuse happiness around
them, he may remain as he is. If such effects are not
produced, but instead of them others of an opposite
tendency, he certainly has too much. — Upon this serious
subject let the Christian parent be serious. If, as is
proved by the experience of every day, great property
usually inflicts great injuries upon those who possess
it, what motive can induce a good man to lay it up for
his children? What motive will be his justification, if
it tempts them from virtue ?

When children are similarly situated with respect to
their probable wants, there seems no reason for preferr-
ing the elder to the younger, or sons to daughters.
Since the proper object of a parent in making a divi-
sion of his property, is the comfort and welfare of his
children — if this object is likely to be better secured
by an equal than by any other division, an equal divi-
sion ought to be made. It is a common, though not a
very reasonable opinion, that a son needs a larger por-
tion than a daughter. To be sure, if he is to live in
greater affluence than she, he does. But why should
he? There appears no motive in reason, and certainly
there is none in affection, for diminishing one child's
comforts to increase another's. A son too has greater
opportunities of gain. A woman almost never grows
rich except by legacies or marriage ; so that, if her
father do not provide for her, it is probable that she
will not be provided for at all. As to marriage, the
opportunity is frequently not offered to a woman ; and

162 INEQUALITY OF PROPERTY. [ESSAY II.

a father if he can, should so provide for his daughter
as to enable her, in single life, to live in a state of
comfort not greatly inferior to her brother's. The re-
mark that the custom of preferring sons is general, and
therefore that when a couple marry the inequality is
adjusted, applies only to the case of those who do
marry. The number of women who do not is great ;
and a parent cannot foresee his daughter's lot. Be-
sides, since marriage is (and is reasonably) a great ob-
ject to a woman, and is desirable both for women and
for men, there appears a propriety in increasing the
probability of marriage by giving to women such
property as shall constitute an additional inducement
to marriage in the men. I shall hardly be suspected of
recommending persons to "marry for money." My
meaning is this : A young man possesses five hundred
a year, and lives on a corresponding scale. He is at-
tached to a woman who has but one hundred a year.
This young man sees that if he marries, he must re-
duce his scale of living ; and the consideration operates
(I do not say that it ought to operate) to deter him
from marriage. But if the young man possessed three
hundred a year and lived accordingly, and if the object
of his attachment possessed three hundred a year also,
he would not be prevented from marrying her by the
fear of being obliged to diminish his system of ex-
penditure. Just complaints are made of those half-
concealed blandishments by which some women who
need ' - a settlement ' ' endeavor to procure it by mar-
riage. Those blandishments would become more
tempered with propriety, if one great motive was
taken away by the possession of a competence of their
own.

Perhaps it is remarkable, that the obligation not to
accumulate great property for ourselves or our chil-
dren, is so little enforced by the writers on morality.

CHAP. III.] INEQUALITY OF PROPERTY. 163

None will dispute that such accumulation is both un-
wise and unkind. Every one acknowledges too that
the general evils of the existing inequality of property
are enormously great ; yet how few insist upon those
means by which, more than by any other private
means, these evils may be diminished ! If all men de-
clined to retain, or refrained from acquiring, more
than is likely to be beneficial to their families and
themselves, the pernicious inequality of property
would quickly be diminished or destroyed. There is a
motive upon the individual to do this, which some
public reformations do not offer. He who contributes
almost nothing to diminish the general mischiefs of
extreme poverty and extreme wealth, may yet do so
much benefit to his own connections as shall greatly
overpay him for the sacrifice of vanity or inclination.
Perhaps it may be said that there is a claim too of jus-
tice. A man who has acquired a reasonable sufficiency,
and who nevertheless retains his business to acquire
more than a sufficiency, practises a sort of injustice
towards another who needs his means of gain. There
are always many who cannot enjoy the comforts of
life, because others are improperly occupying the
means by which those comforts are to be obtained. Is
it the part of a Christian to do this ? — even abating the
consideration that he is injuring himself by withholding
comforts from another.

I64 LITIGATION — ARBITRATION. [ESSAY II.

CHAPTER IV.
LITIGATION— ARBITRATION.

Practice of early Christians — Evils of Litigation — Efficiency of
Arbitration.

In the third Essay,* some enquiry will be attempted,
as to whether justice may not often be administered
between contending parties, or to public offenders, by
some species of arbitration rather than by law ; —
whether a gradual substitution of equity for fixed
rules of decision, is not congruous alike with philoso-
phy and morals. — The present chapter, however, and
that which succeeds it, proceed upon the supposition that
the administration of justice continues in its present
state.

The question for an individual, when he has some
cause of dispute with another respecting property or
rights is, By what means ought I to endeavor to adjust
it? Three modes of adjustment may be supposed to
be offered : Private arrangement with the other party
— Reference to impartial men — and law. Private ad-
justment is the best mode ; arbitration is good ; law is
good only when it is the sole alternative.

The litigiousness of some of the early Christians at
Corinth gave occasion to the energetic expostulation ;
' ■ Dare any of you, having a matter against another,
go to law before the unjust, and not before the saints?
Do ye not know that the saints shall judge the world?
And if the world shall be judged by you, are ye un-
worthy to judge the smallest matters? Know ye not
that we shall judge angels? How much more things
that pertain to this life? If then, ye have judgments
of things pertaining to this life, set them to judge who

* Chap. X.

CHAP. IV.] LITIGATION — ARBITRATION. 165

are least esteemed in the church. I speak to your
shame. Is it so that there is not a wise man among
you ? No, not one that shall be able to j udge between
his brethren ? But brother goeth to law with brother,
and that before the unbelievers. Now therefore there
is utterly a fault among you, because ye go to law one
with another. Why do ye not rather take wrong?
Why do ye not rather suffer yourselves to be de-
frauded ? " * Upon this, one observation is especially
to be remembered : that a great part of its pointedness
of reprehension is directed, not so much to litigation,
as to litigation before pagans. " Brother goeth to law
with brother, and that before the unbelievers. ' ' The
impropriety of exposing the disagreements of Chris-
tians in pagan courts, was manifest and great. They
who had rejected the dominant religion, for a religion
of which one peculiar characteristic was good will and
unanimity, were especially called upon to exhibit in
their conduct an illustration of its purer principles.
Few things, not grossly vicious, would bring upon
Christians and upon Christianity itself so much re-
proach as a litigiousness which could not or would not
find arbitration amongst themselves. The advice of
the apostle appears to have been acted upon : ' ' The
primitive church, which was always zealous to recon-
cile the brethren and to procure pardon for the offender
from the person offended, did ordain, according to the
epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians, that the saints
or Christians should not maintain a process of law one
against the other at the bar of tribunals of infidels. ' ' f
The Christian of the present day is differently circum-
stanced, because, though he appeals to the law, he
does not appeal to pagan judges ; and therefore so

* 1 Cor. vi.

f Ryeaut's L,ives of the Popes, fol. 2d, ed. 1688, Introd. p. 2.

1 66 LITIGATION — ARBITRATION. [ESSAY II.

much of the apostle's censure as was occasioned by the
paganism of the courts, does not apply to us.

To this indeed there is an exception founded upon
analogy. If at the commencement of the Reformation,
two of the reformers had carried a dispute respecting
property before Romish courts, they would have come
under some portion of that reprobation which was ad-
dressed to the Corinthians. Certainly, when persons
profess such a love for religious purity and excellence
that they publicly withdraw from the general religion
of a people, there ought to be so much purity and ex-
cellence amongst them, that it would be needless to
have recourse to those from whom they had separated,
to adjust their disputes. The Catholic of those days
might reasonably have turned upon such reformers and
said, "Is it so that there is not a wise man among you,
no not one that shall be able to judge between his
brethren?" And if indeed, no such wise man was to
be found, it might safely be concluded that their refor-
mation was an empty name. — For the same reasons,
those who, in the present times, think it right to with-
draw from other protestant churches in order to main-
tain sounder doctrines or purer practice, cast reproach
upon their own community if they cannot settle their
disputes amongst themselves. Pretensions to sound-
ness and purity are of little avail if they do not enable
those who make them to repose in one another such
confidence as this. Were I a Wesleyan or a Baptist, I
should think it discreditable to go to law with one of
my own brotherhood.

But, though the apostle' § prohibition of going to law
appears to have been founded upon the paganism of
the courts, his language evidently conveys disapproba-
tion, generally, of appeals to the law. He insists upon
the propriety of adjusting disputes by arbitration.
Christians, he says, ought not to be unworthy to judge

CHAP. IV.] IJTIGATION— ARBITRATION. 167

the smallest matters ; and so emphatically does he in-
sist upon the truth, that their religion ought to
capacitate them to act as arbitrators, that he inti-
mates that even a small advance in Christian excel-
lence is sufficient for such a purpose as this : — "Set
them to judge who are least esteemed in the church."
It will perhaps be acknowledged that when Christianity
shall possess its proper influence over us, there will be
little reason to recur, for adjustment of our disagree-
ments, to fixed rules of law. And though this influ-
ence is so far short of universal prevalence, who can-
not find amongst those to whom he may have access,
some who are capable of deciding rightly and justly ?
The state of that Christian country must indeed be bad,
if it contains not, even in every little district, one that
is able to judge between his brethren.

Nevertheless, there are cases in which the Christian
may properly appeal to the law. He may have an an-
tagonist who can in no other manner be induced to be
just, or to act aright. Under some such circumstances
Paul himself pursued a similar course : "I appeal unto
Caesar." — " Is it lawful for you to scourge a man that
is a Roman, and uncondemned ?" And when he had
been illegally taken into custody he availed himself of
his legal privileges, and made the magistrates ' ' come
themselves and fetch him out." There are, besides, in
the present condition of jurisprudence, some cases in
which the rule of justice depends upon the rule of law
— so that a thing is just or not just according as the
law determines. In such cases, neither party, however
well disposed, may be able distinctly to tell what justice
requires until the law informs them. Even then,
however, there are better means of procedure than by
prosecuting suits. The parties may obtain ' 'Opinions. ' '

Besides these considerations there are others which
powerfully recommend arbitration in preference to law.

168 LITIGATION — ARBITRATION. [ESSAY II.

The evils of litigation, from which arbitration is in a
great degree exempt, are great.

Expense is an important item. A reasonable man
desires of course to obtain justice as inexpensively as
he can ; and the great cost of obtaining it in courts of
law, is a powerful reason for preferring arbitration.

Legal Injustice. — He who desires that justice should
be dispensed between him and another, should suffi-
ciently bear in mind how much injustice is inflicted by
the law. We have seen in some of the preceding
chapters that law is often very wide of equity ; and he
who desires to secure himself from an inequitable de-
cision, possesses a powerful motive to prefer arbitra-
tion. The technicalities of the law and the artifices
of lawyers are almost innumerable. Sometimes, when
a party thinks he is on the eve of obtaining a just ver^
diet, he is suddenly disappointed and his cause is lost
by some technical defect — the omission of a word or
the mis-spelling of a name ; matters which in no de-
gree affect the validity of his claims. If the only ad-
vantage which arbitration offers to disagreeing parties,
was exemption from these deplorable evils, it would
be a substantial and sufficient argument in its favor.
There is no reason to doubt, that justice would
generally be administered by a reference to two or
three upright and disinterested men. When facts are
laid before such persons, they are seldom at a loss to
decide what justice requires. Its principles are not so
critical or remote as usually to require much labor of
research to discover what they dictate. It might be
concluded, therefore, even if experience did not con-
firm it, that an arbitration, if it did not decide abso-
lutely aright, would at least come to as just a decision
as can be attained by human means. But experience
does confirm the conclusion. It is known that the
Society of Friends never permits its members to carry

CHAP. IV.] UTIGATION— ARBITRATION. 169

disagreements with one another before courts of law.
All, if they continue in the Society must submit to
arbitration. And what is the consequence ? They
find, practically, that arbitration is the best mode :
that justice is in fact administered by it, administered
more satisfactorily and with fewer exceptions than in
legal courts. No one pretends to dispute this. In-
deed if it were disputable, it may be presumed that
this community would abandon the practice. They
adhere to it because it is the most Christian practice
and the best.

Inquietude. — The expense, the injustice, the delays
and vexations which are attendant upon lawsuits,
bring altogether a degree of inquietude upon the mind
which greatly deducts from the enjoyment of life, and
from the capacity to attend with composure to other
and perhaps more important concerns. If to this we
add the heart-burnings and ill-will which suits fre-
quently occasion, a considerable sum of evil is in this
respect presented to us : a sum of evil, be it remem-
bered, from which arbitration is in a great degree
exempt.

Upon the whole, arbitration is recommended by
such various and powerful arguments, that when it is
proposed by one of two contending parties and objected
to by the other, there is reason to presume that, with
that other, justice is not the paramount object of
desire.

170 THE MORALITY OF I,EGAI, PRACTICE. [ESSAY II.

CHAPTER V.
THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE.

Complexity of law — Professional untruths — Defences of legal
practice — Effects of legal practice : Seduction : Theft : Pecu-
lation— Pleading — The duties of the profession — Effects of
legal practice on the profession, and on the public.

If it should be asked why, in a book of general
morality, the writer selects for observation the practice
of a particular profession, the answer is simply this,
that the practice of this particular profession pecu-
liarly needs it. It peculiarly needs to be brought into
juxtaposition with sound principles of morality. Be-
sides this, an honest comparison of the practice with
the principles will afford useful illustration of the
requisitions of virtue.

That public opinion pronounces that there is, in the
ordinary character of legal practice, much that is not
reconcilable with rectitude, can need no proof. The
public opinion could scarcely become general unless it
were founded upon truth, and that it is general is
evinced by the language of all ranks of men ; from that
of him who writes a treatise of morality, to that of him
who familiarly uses a censorious proverb. It may
reasonably be concluded that when the professional
conduct of a particular set of men is characterized
peculiarly with sacrifices of rectitude, there must be
some general and peculiar cause. There appears noth-
ing in the profession, as such, to produce this effect —
nothing in taking a part in the administration of jus-
tice which necessarily leads men away from the regard
to justice. How then are we to account for the fact as
it exists, or where shall we primarily lay the censure ?
Is it the fault of the men, or of the institutions ; of the
lawyers or of the law ? Doubtless the original fault is
in the law.

CHAP V.] THE MORALITY OF I.EGAI, PRACTICE. 171

Wherever fixed rules of deciding controversies be-
tween man and man, or fixed rules of administering
punishment to public offenders are established — there
it is inevitable that equity will sometimes be sacrificed
to rules. These rules are laws, that is, they must be
uniformly, and for the most part literally applied ; and
this literal application (as we have already had mani-
fold occasion to show,) is sometimes productive of
practical injustice. Since, then, the legal profession
employ themselves in enforcing this literal application
— since they habitually exert themselves to do this
with little regard to the equity of the result, they can-
not fail to deserve and to obtain the character of a pro-
fession that sacrifices rectitude. I know not that this
is evitable so long as numerous and fixed rules are
adopted in the administration of justice.

But whilst thus the original cause of the sacrifice of
virtue amongst legal men is to be sought in legal insti-
tutions, it cannot be doubted that they are themselves
chargeable with greatly adding to the evils which these
institutions occasion. This is just what, in the present
state of human virtue, we might expect, lawyers
familiarize to their minds the notion, that whatever is
legally right is right ; and when they have once habit-
uated themselves to sacrifice the manifest dictates of
equity to law, where shall they stop ? If a material
informality in an instument is to them sufficient justifi-
cation of a sacrifice of these dictates, they will soon
sacrifice them because a word has been mis-spelt by an
attorney's clerk. When they have gone thus far, they
will go further. The practice of disregarding rectitude
in courts of justice will become habitual. They will
go onward, from insisting upon legal technicalities to
an endeavor to pervert the law, then to the giving a
false coloring to facts, and then onward and still on-
ward until witnesses are abashed and confounded, until

172 THE MORALITY OF LEGAI, PRACTICE. [ESSAY II.

juries are misled by impassioned appeals to their feel-
ings, until deliberate untruths are solemnly averred,
until, in a word, all the pitiable and degrading specta-
cles are exhibited which are now exhibited in legal
practice.

But when we say that the original cause of this un-
happy system is to be found in the law itself, is it tan-
tamount to a justification of the system ? No : if it
were, it would be sufficient to justify any departure
from rectitude — it would be sufficient to justify any
crime, to be able to show that the perpetrator possessed
strong temptation. Strong temptation is undoubtedly
placed before the legal practitioner. This should abate
our censure, but it should not cause us to be silent.

We affirm that a lawyer cannot morally enforce the
application of legal rules, without regard to the claims
of equity in the particular case.

If it has been seen, in the preceding chapters, that
morality is paramount to law ; if it has been seen
that there are many instances in which private persons
are morally obliged to forego their legal pretensions,
then it is equally clear that a lawyer is obliged to hold
morality as paramount to law in his own practice. If
one man may not urge an unjust legal pretension, an-
other may not assist him in urging it. No man it may
be hoped will say it is the lawyer's only business to
apply the law. Men cannot so cheaply exempt them-
selves from the obligations of morality. Yet here the
questions is really suspended ; for if the busi?iess of the
profession does not justify a disregard of morality, it is
not capable of justification. Suspended ! It is lament-
able that such a question can exist. For to what does
the alternative lead us? Is a man, when he under-
takes a client's business, at liberty to advance his in-
terest by every method, good or bad, which the law
will not punish ? If he is, there is an end of morality.

CHAP. V.] THE MORALITY OF tKGAI, PRACTICE. I73

If he is not, something must limit and restrict him ; and
that something is the moral law.

Of every custom, however indefensible, some advo-
cates offer themselves ; and some accordingly have at-
tempted to justify the practice of the bar.* Of that
particular item in the practice, which consists in utter-
ing untruths in order to serve a client, Dr. Paley has
been the defender. ■ ' There are falsehoods, ' ' says he,
"which are not criminal ; as where no one is deceived,
which is the case with -an advocate in asserting the
justice, or his belief of the justice, of his client's
cause." It is plain that in support of this position
one argument, and only one can be urged, and that
one has been selected. ' ' No confidence is destroyed,
because none was reposed ; no promise to speak the
truth is violated, because none was given or understood
to be given, "f The defence is not very creditable
even if it were valid : it defends men from the im-
putation of falsehood because their falsehoods are so
habitual that no one gives them credit !

But the defence is not valid. Of this the reader may
satisfy himself by considering why, if no one ever be-
lieves what advocates say, they continue to speak.
They would not, year after year, persist in uttering un-
truths in our courts, without attaining an object, and
knowing that they wrould not attain it. If no one ever
in fact believed them, they w7ould cease to asseverate.
They do not love falsehood for its own sake, and
utter it gratuitously and for nothing. The custom it-
self, therefore, disproves the argument that is brought
to defend it. Whenever that defence becomes valid —
whenever it is really true that ' ' no confidence is re-

* I speak of the bar, because that branch of the profession
offers the nfost convenient illustration of the subject. The rea-
sonings will generally apply to other branches.

f Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 3. p. 1. c. 15.

174 *HE MORALITY OF I,EGAI, PRACTICE. [ ESSAY II.

posed" in advocates, they will cease to use falsehood,
for it will have lost its motive. But the real practice is
to mingle falsehood and truth together, and so to in-
volve the one with the other that the jury cannot
easily separate them. The jury know that some of the
pleader's statements are true, and these they believe.
Now he makes other statements wTith the same deliber-
ate emphasis ; and how shall the jury know whether
these are false or true ? How shall they discover the
point at which they shall begin to ' ' repose no confi-
dence ?' ' Knowing that a part is true, they cannot al-
ways know that another part is not true. That it is
the pleader's design to persuade them of the truth of
all he affirms, is manifest. Suppose an advocate when
he rose should say, "Gentlemen, I am now going to
speak the truth ;" and after narrating the facts of the
case should say, "Gentlemen, I am now going to ad-
dress you with fictions." Why would not an advocate
do this ? Because then no confidence would be reposed,
which is the same thing as to say that he pursues his
present plan because some confidence is reposed ; and
this decides the question. The decision should not be
concealed — that the advocate who employs untruths in
his pleadings, does really and most strictly, lie.

And even if no one ever did believe an advocate, his
false declarations would still be lies, because he always
professes to speak the truth. This indeed is true upon
the Archdeacon's own showing; for he says, "Who-
ever seriously addresses his discourse to another, tacitly
promises to speak the truth." The case is very differ-
ent from others which he proposes as parallel — "para-
bles, fables, jests." In these, the speaker does not
profess to state facts. But the pleader does profess
to state facts. He intends and endeavors to mis-
lead. His untruths therefore are lies to him whether
they are believed or not ; just as, in vulgar life,

CHAP. V.] THE MORAUTY OE I.ECAI, PRACTICE. 175

a man whose falsehoods are so notorious that no one gives
him credit, is not the less a liar than if he were believed.
Gisborne is another defender of legal practice, and as-
sumes a wider ground of justification. "The stand-
ard, ' ' says he, "to which the advocate refers the cause
of his client, is not the law of reason nor the law of
God, but the law of the land. His peculiar and proper
object is not to prove the side of the question which
he maintains morally right, but legally right. The
law offers its protection only on certain preliminary
conditions ; it refuses to take cognizance of injuries or
to enforce redress, unless the one be proved in the
specific manner and the other claimed in the precise
form, which it prescribes ; and consequently, whatever
be the pleader's opinion of his cause, he is guilty of no
breach of truth and justice in defeating the preten-
sions of the persons whom he opposes, by evincing that
they have not made good the terms on which
alone they could be legally entitled, on which alone
they could suppose themselves entitled, to success."*
There is something specious in this reasoning, but
what is its amount ? — that if the laws of a country
proceed upon such and such maxims, they exempt us
from the authority of the laws of God. We arrive at
this often refuted doctrine at last. Either the acts of
a legislature may suspend the obligations of morality
or they may not. If they may, there is an end of that
morality which is founded upon the Divine will : if they
may not, the argument of Gisborne is a fallacy. But
in truth he himself shows its fallaciousness : he says,
1 ' If a cause should present itself of an aspect so dark
as to leave the advocate no reasonable doubt of its
being founded in iniquity or baseness, or to justify
extremely strong suspicions of its evil nature and
tendency, he is bound in the sight of God to refuse all
* Duties of men. The Legal Profession.

176 THE MORAUTY OE I.EGAI, PRACTICE. [ESSAY II,

connection with the business. ' ' Why is he thus bound
to refuse ? Because he will otherwise violate the moral
law : and this is the very reason why he is bound in
other cases. Observe too the inconsistency : first we
are told that whatever be the pleader's opinion of a
cause, " he is guilty of no breach of truth and justice "
in advocating it ; and afterwards, that if the cause is
of an ' ' evil nature and tendency ' ' he may not advo-
cate it ! That such reasoning does not prove what it
is designed to prove is evident ; but it proves some-
thing else — that the practice cannot be defended. Such
reasoning w7ould not be advanced if better could be
found. Let us not, however seem to avail ourselves
of a writer's words without reference to his meaning.
The meaning in the present instance is clearly this —
that a pleader, generally, may undertake a vicious
cause ; but that if it be very vicious, he must refrain.
You may abet an act of a certain shade of iniquity, but
not if it be of a certain shade deeper : you may violate
the moral law to a certain extent, but not to every ex-
tent. To him who w7ould recommend rectitude in its
purity, few reasonings are more satisfactory than such
as these. They prove the truth which they assail by
evincing that it cannot be disproved.

Dr. Johnson tried a shorter course : - - You do not
know a cause to be good or bad till the judge deter-
mines it. An argument that does not convince you
may convince the judge to whom you urge it, and if
it does convince him, why then he is right and you are
wrong." This is satisfactory. It is always satisfac-
tory to perceive that a powerful intellect can find
nothing but idle sophistry to urge against the obliga-
tions of virtue. One other argument is this : Eminent
barristers, it is said, should not be too scrupulous, be-
cause clients might fear their causes would be rejected
by virtuous pleaders, and might therefore go to " needy

CHAP. V.] THE MORALITY OE LEGAIv PRACTICE. 1 77

and unprincipled chicaners." Why, if their causes
were good, virtuous pleaders would undertake them;
and if they were bad, it matters not how soon they
were discountenanced. In a right state of things, the
very circumstance that only an ' ' unprincipled chi-
caner" would undertake a particular cause, would go
far towards procuring a verdict against it. Besides, it
is a very loose morality that recommends good men to
do improper things lest they should be done by the
bad.

Seeing therefore that no tolerable defence can be ad-
duced of the ordinary legal practice, let us consider for
a moment what are its practical results.

A civil action is brought into court, and evidence
has been heard which satisfies every man that the
plaintiff is entitled in justice to a verdict. It is, on the
part of the defendant, a clear case of dishonesty. Sud-
denly, the pleader discovers that there is some verbal
flaw in a document, some technical irregularity in the
proceedings — and the plaintiff loses his cause. The
public are disappointed in their expectations of justice ;
the jury and the court are grieved ; and the unhappy
sufferer retires, injured and wronged — without redress
or hope of redress. Can this be right ? Can it be
sufficient to justify a man in this conduct, to urge that
such things are his business — the means by which he
obtains his living ? The same excuse would justify a
corsair, or a troop of Arabian banditti which plunders
the caravan. Yet indefensible, immoral, as this con-
duct is, it is the every day practice of the profession ;
and the amount of injustice which is inflicted by this
practice is enormous. The plea that such are the rules
of the law is not admissible. Whatever utility we may
be disposed to allow to the uniform application of the
law, it will not justify such conduct as this. The in-
tegrity of the law would not have been violated, though

178 THE MORALITY OE LEGAL PRACTICE. [ ESSAY II.

the pleader had not pointed out the mis-spelling, for
example, of a word. For a judge to refuse to allow
the law to take its course after the mistake has been
urged, is one thing ; for a pleader to detect and to urge
it, is another. The judge may not be able to regard
the equity of the case without sacrificing the uniform
operation of the law. But if the inadvertency is not
pointed out, that uniform operation is perfect though
equity be awarded. There is no excuse for thus in-
flicting injustice. It is an act of pure gratuitous mis-
chief : an act not required by law, an act condemned
by morality, an act possessing no apology but that the
agent is tempted by the gains of his profession.

An unhappy father seeks, in a court of justice, some
redress for the misery which a seducer has inflicted
upon his family ; a redress which, if he were success-
ful, is deplorably inadequate, both as a recompense to
the sufferers and as a punishment to the criminal.
This case is established, and it is manifest that equity
and the public good require exemplary damages.
What then does the pleader do ? He stands up and
employs every contrivance to prevent the jury from
awarding these damages. He eloquently endeavors to
persuade them that the act involved little guilt ; casts un-
deserved imputations upon the immediate sufferer and
upon her family ; jests, and banters, and sneers, about all
the evidence of the case : imputes bad motives (with-
out truth or with it) to the prosecutor ; expatiates
upon the little property (whether it be little or much)
which the seducer possesses ; by these and by such
means he labors to prevent this injured father from
obtaining any redress, to secure the criminal from all
punishment, and to encourage in other men the crime
itself. Compassion, justice, morality, the public good,
everything is sacrified — to what? To that which,
upon such a subject, it were a shame to mention.

CHAP. V.] THE MORALITY OF EEGAE PRACTICE. 179

In the criminal courts, the same conduct is practised,
and with the same indefensibility. Can it be neces-
sary, or ought it to be necessary, to insist upon the
proposition — "If it be right that offenders should be
punished, it is not right to make them pass with im-
punity." If a police officer has seized a thief and car-
ried him to prison, every one knows that it would be
vicious in me to effect his escape. Yet this is the
every day practice of the profession. It is their regu-
lar and constant endeavor to prevent justice from being
administered to offenders. Is it a sufficient justifica-
tion of preventing the execution of justice, of prevent-
ing that which every good citizen is desirous of pro-
moting— to say that a man is an advocate by profes-
sion ? Is the circumstance of belonging to the legal
profession a good reason for disregarding those duties
which are obligatory upon every other man ? He who
wards off punishment from swindlers and robbers, and
sends them amongst the public upon the work of fraud
and plunder again, surely deserves worse of his coun-
try than many a hungry man who filches a loaf or a
trinket from a stall. As to employing legal artifices or
the tactics of declamation in order to obtain the con-
viction of a prisoner w7hom there is reason to believe to
be innocent ; or as to endeavoring to inflict upon him a
punishment greater than his deserts, the wickedness is
so palpable that it is wonderful that even the power of
custom protects it from the reprobation of the world.

In Scotland, where the criminal process is in some
respects superior to ours, the proportion of those
prisoners who escape punishment on account of ' ' tech-
nical niceties, ' ' is very great. Of the persons acquitted
in our courts, at least o?ie half escape from technical
niceties, or rules of evidence which give advantage to
the prisoner, with which, in the other part of the

l8o THE MORALITY OF EEGAE PRACTICE. [ESSAY II.

island, they are wholly unacquainted."* Is not this a
great public evil ? And if we charge that evil origi-
nally upon the law, is it warrantable, is it morale in
the advocate actively to increase and extend it ?

The plea that it is of consequence that law should be
uniformly administered, does not suffice to justify the
pleader in criminal any more than in civil courts. ' 'A
thief was caught coming out of a house in Highbury
Terrace, with a watch he had stolen therein upon him.
He was found guilty by the jury upon the clearest evi-
dence of the theft ; but his counsel having discovered
that he was charged in the indictment with having
stolen a watch, the property of the owner of the house,
whereas the watch really belonged to his daughter, the
prisoner got clear off. ' ' f The pretext of the value of
an uniform operation of the law will not avail here.
Suppose the counsel, though he did discover the watch
was the daughter's, had not insisted upon the inaccur-
acy, no evil would have ensued. The integrity of the
law w7ould not have been violated. The act of a coun-
sel therefore in such a case is simply and only a defeat
of public justice, an injury to the State, an encourage-
ment to thieves ; and surely there is no reason, either
in morals or in common sense, why any particular class of
men should be privileged thus to injure the community.
The wrife of a respectable tradesman in the town in
which I live was left a widow with eight or ten child-
ren. She employed a confidential person to assist in
conducting the business. The business was flourish-
ing ; and yet at the end of every year she was surprised
and afflicted to find that her profits were unaccountably
small. At length this confidential person was sus-
pected of peculation. Money was marked and placed
as usual under his care. It was soon missed aud found

* Remarks on the Administration of Criminal Justice in
Scotland, etc.
f West. Rev. No. 8, Art. I.

CHAP. V.] THE MORALITY OF EEGAE PRACTICE. l8l

upon his person ; and when the police searched his
house, they found in his possession, methodically
stowed away, five or six thousand pounds, the accumu-
lated plunder of years ! This cruel and atrocious rob-
ber found no difficulty in obtaining advocates, who
employed every artifice of defence, who had recourse
to every technicality of law, to screen him from pun-
ishment and to secure for him the quiet possession of
his plunder. They found in the indictment some
word, of which the ordinary and the legal acceptation
were different ; and the indictment was quashed !
Happily, another was proof against the casuistry, and
the criminal was found guilty.

Will it be said that pleaders are not supposed to
know, till the verdict is pronounced, whether a pris-
oner is guilty or not ? If this were true, it would not
avail as a justification ; but, in reality, it is only a sub-
terfuge. In this very case, after the verdict had been
pronounced, after the prisoner's guilt had been ascer-
tained, a new trial was obtained ; not on account of
any doubt in the evidence — that was unequivocal — but
on account of some irregularity in passing sentence.
And now the same conduct was repeated. Knowing
that the prisoner was guilty, advocates still exerted
their talents and eloquence to procure impunity for him,
nay to reward him at the expense of public duty and
of private justice. They did not succeed : the plun-
derer was transported ; but their want of success does
not diminish the impropriety, the immorality, of their
endeavors. If, by the trickery of law, this man had
obtained an acquittal, what would have been the con-
sequence ? Not merely that he would have possessed,
undisturbed, his plundered thousands ; not merely that
he might have laughed at the family whose money he
was spending ; but that a hundred or a thousand other
shopmen, taking confidence from his success and his

1 82 THE MORALITY OF ^EGAI, PRACTICE. [ESSAY II

impunity, might enter upon a similar course of treach-
ery and fraud. They might think that if the hour of
detection should arrive, nothing was wanting but a
sagacious advocate to protect them from punishment,
and to secure their spoil. Will any man then say, as
an excuse for the legal practice, that it is "usual,"
1 ' customary, ' ' the ' ' business of the profession ?' ' It
is preposterous.*

It really is a dreadful consideration, that a body of
men, respectable in the various relationships of life,
should make, in consequence of the vicious maxims of
a profession, these deplorable sacrifices of rectitude.
To a writer upon such a subject, it is difficult to speak
with that plainness which morality requires without
seeming to speak illiberally of men. But it is not a
question of liberality but of morals. When a barrister
arrives at an assize town on the circuit, and tacitly
publishes that (abating a few, and only a few, cases)
he is willing to take the brief of any client ; that he is
ready to employ his abilities, his ingenuity, in proving
that any given cause is good or that it is bad ; and
when, having gone before a jury, he urges the side on
which he happens to have been employed, with all
the earnestness of seeming integrity and truth, and
bends all the faculties which God has given him in
promotion of its success ; when we see all this, and re-

* Some obstacles in the way of this mode of defeating the
ends of justice have been happily interposed by the admirable
exertions of the late Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment. Still such cases are applicable as illustrations of what
the duties of the profession are ; and, unfortunately, opportun-
ities in abundance remain for sacrificing the duties of the pro-
fession to its ' ' business. ' ' Here, without any advertence to
political opinion, it may be remarked, that one such statesman
as Robert Peel is of more value to his country than a multitude
of those who take office and leave it without any endeavor to
ameliorate the national institutions.

CHAP. V.] THE MORAUTY OF I^EGAI, PRACTICE. 183

member that it was the toss of a die whether he should
have done exactly the contrary, I think that no ex-
pression characterizes the procedure but that of intel-
lectual and moral prostitution. In any other place than
a court of justice, every one would say that it was pros-
titution : a court of justice cannot make it less.

Perhaps the reader has heard of the pleader who, by
some accident, mistook the side on which he was to
argue, and earnestly contended for the opponent's
cause. His distressed client at length conveyed an in-
timation of his mistake, and he, with forensic dexterity
told the jury that hitherto he had only been anticipat-
ing the arguments of the opposing counsel, and that now
he would proceed to show they were fallacions. If the
reader should imagine there is peculiar indecency in
this, his sentiment would be founded upon habit rather
than upon reason. There is, really, very little differ-
ence between contending for both sides of the same
cause, and contending for either side, as the earliest
retainer may decide. I lately read the report of a
trial in which retainers from both parties had been
sent to a counsel, and when the cause was brought
into court it was still undecided for whom he should
appear. The scale was turned by the judgment of
another counsel, and the pleader instantly appeared on
behalf of the client to whom his brother had allotted
him.

Probably it will be asked, What is a legal man to
do? How shall he discriminate his duties, or know,
in the present state of legal institutions, what extent
of advocation morality allows? These are fair ques-
tions, and he who asks them is entitled to an answer.
I confess that an answer is difficult : and why is it
difficult ? Because the whole system is unsound. He
who would rectify the ordinary legal practice, is in the
situation of a physician who can scarcely prescribe with

1 84 THE MORALITY OF I,EGAI< PRACTICE. [ESSAY II.

effect for a particular symptom in a patient's case, un-
less he will submit to an entirely new regimen and
mode of life. The conscientious lawyer is surrounded
with temptations and with difficulties resulting from the
general system of the law ; difficulties and temptations
so great that it may almost appear to be the part of a
wise man to fly rather than to encounter them. There
is however nothing necessarily incidental to the legal
profession which makes it incompatible with morality.
He who has the firmness to maintain his allegiance to
virtue may doubtless maintain it. Such a man would
consider, that law being in general the practical stand-
ard of equity, the pleader may properly illustrate and
enforce it. He may assiduously examine statutes and
precedents, and honorably adduce them on behalf of
his client. He may distinctly and luminously exhibit
his client's claims. In examining his witnesses he may
educe the whole truth : in examining the other party's,
he may endeavor to detect collusion, and to elicit facts
which they may attempt to conceal ; in a word, he may
lay before the court a just and lucid view of the whole
question. But he may not quote statutes and adjudged
cases which he really does not think apply to the sub-
ject, or if they do appear to apply, he may not urge
them as possessing greater force or applicability than
he really thinks they possess. He may not endeavor
to mislead the jury by appealing to their feelings, by
employing ridicule, and especially by unfounded in-
sinuations or misrepresentation of facts. He may not
endeavor to make his own witnesses affirm more than
he thinks they know, or induce them, by artful ques-
tions, to give a coloring to facts different from the col-
oring of truth. He may not endeavor to conceal or
discredit the truth by attempting to confuse the other
witnesses, or by entrapping them into contradictions.
Such as these appear to be the rules which rectitude

CHAP. V.] THE MORALITY OF I^EGAI, PRACTICE. 185

imposes in ordinary cases. There are some cases
which a professional man ought not to undertake at all.
This is indeed acknowledged by numbers of the pro-
fession. The obligation to reject them is of course
founded upon their contrariety to virtue. How then
shall a legal man know whether he ought to undertake
a cause at all, but by some previous consideration of
its merits. This must really be done if he would con-
form to the requisitions of morality. There is not an
alternative : and ' • absurd " or " impracticable " as it
may be pronounced to be, we do not shrink from ex-
plicitly maintaining the truth. Impracticable ! it is at
any rate not impracticable to withdraw from the pro-
fession or to decline to enter it. A man is not com-
pelled to be a lawyer : and if there are so many diffi-
culties in the practice of professional virtue, what is to
be said ? Are we to say, Virtue must be sacrificed to a
profession — or, The profession must be sacrificed to
virtue ? The pleader will perhaps say that he cannot
tell what the merits of a case are until they are elicited
in court : but this surely would not avail to justify a
disregard of morality in any other case. To defend
one's self for an habitual disregard of the claims of
rectitude, because we cannot tell, when we begin a
course of action, whether it will involve a sacrifice of
rectitude or not, is an ill defence indeed. At any rate,
if he connects himself with a cause of questionable
rectitude, he needs not and he ought not to advocate
it, whilst ignorant of its merits, as if he knew that it
was good. He ought not to advocate it further than he
thinks it is good.

There is one consideration under which a pleader
may assist a client even with a bad cause, which is,
that it is proper to prevent the client from suffering too
far. I would acknowledge, generally, the justice of
the opposite party's claims, or, if it were a criminal

186 THE MORALITY OE EEGAE PRACTICE. [ESSAY II.

case, I would acquiesce in the evidence which carried
conviction to my mind ; but still, in both, something
may remain for the pleader to do. The plaintiff may
demand a thousand pounds when only eight hundred
are due, and a pleader, though he could not with integ-
rity resist the whole demand, could resist the excess of
the demand above the just amount. Or if the prosecu-
tor urges the guilt of a prisoner and attempts to pro-
cure the infliction of an undue punishment, a pleader,
though he knows the prisoner's guilt, may rightly pre-
vent a sentence too severe. Murray, the grammarian,
had been a barrister in America : " I do not recollect,"
says he, "that I ever encouraged a client to proceed
at law when I thought his cause was unjust or indefensi-
ble ; but in such cases, I believe it was my invariable
practice to discourage litigation and to recommend a
peaceable settlement of differences. In the retrospect
of this mode of practice, I have always had great satis-
faction, and I am persuaded that a different procedure
would have been the source of many painful recollec-
tions."*

One serious consideration remains — the effect of the
immorality of legal practice upon the personal char-
acter of the profession. "The lawyer who is fre-
quently engaged in resisting what he strongly suspects
to be just, in maintaining what he deems to be in strict-
ness untenable, in advancing inconclusive reasoning,
and seeking after flaws in the sound replies of his an-
tagonists, can be preserved by nothing short of serious
and invariable solicitude, from the risk of having the
distinction between moral right and wrong almost
erased from his mind."f Is it indeed so? Tremend-
ous is the risk. Is it indeed so? Then the custom
which entails this fearful risk must infallibly be bad.

* Memoirs of Lindley Murray, p. 43.
f Gisborne.

CHAP. V.] THE MORALITY OF I.EGAI, PRACTICE. 187

Assuredly no virtuous conduct tends to erase the dis-
tinctions between right and wrong from the mind.

It is by no means certain, that if a lawyer were to
enter upon life with a steady determination to act upon
the principles of strict integrity, his experience would
occasion any exception to the general rule, that the
path of virtue is the path of interest. The client who
was conscious of the goodness of his cause, would pre-
fer the advocate whose known maxims of conduct gave
weight to every cause that he undertook. When such
a man appeared before a jury, they would attend to
his statements and his* reasonings with that confidence
which integrity only can inspire. They would not
make, as they now do, perpetual deductions from his
averred facts ; they would not be upon the watch, as
they now are, to protect themselves from illusion, and
casuistry, and misrepresentation. Such a man, I say,
would have* a weight of advocacy which no other quali-
fication can supply ; and upright clients, knowing this
would find it their interest to employ him. The
majority of clients, it is to be hoped, are upright.
Professional success, therefore, would probably follow.
And if a few such pleaders, nay if one such pleader
was established, the consequence might be beneficial
and extensive to a degree which it is not easy to com-
pute. It might soon become necessary for other plead-
ers to act upon the same principles, because clients
would not entrust their interests to any but those
whose characters would give weight to their advocacy.
Thus even the profligate part of the profession might
be reformed by motives of interest if not from choice.
Want of credit might be want of practice ; for it might
eventually be almost equivalent to the loss of a cause
to entrust it to a bad man. The effects would extend
to the public. If none but upright men could be efn-

188 PROMISES.— WES. [ESSAY II.

cient advocates, and if upright men would not advo-
cate vicious causes, vicious causes would not be prose-
cuted. But if such be the probable or even the possi-
ble results of sterling integrity, if it might be the
means of reforming the practice of a large and influ-
ential profession, and of almost exterminating wicked
litigation from a people — the obligation to practise this
integrity is proportionately great: the amount of depend-
ing good involves a corresponding amount of responsi-
bility upon him who contributes to perpetuate the evil.

CHAPTER VI.

PROMISES.— LIES.

Promises. — Definition of a promise — Parole — Extorted prom-
ises— John Fletcher.

LIES. — Milton's definition — Lies in war : to robbers : to luna-
tics : to the sick — Hyperbole — Irony — Complimentary un-
truths— " Not at home."

A Promise is a contract, differing from such con-
tracts as a lawyer would draw up, in the circumstance
that ordinarily it is not written. The motive for sign-
ing a contract is to give assurance or security to the
receiver that its terms will be fulfilled. The same
motive is the inducement to a promise. The general
obligation of promises needs little illustration, be-
cause it is not disputed. Men are not left without the
consciousness that what they promise, they ought to
perform ; and thus thousands, who can give no philo-
sophical account of the matter, know, with certain as-
surance, that if they violate their engagements they
violate the law of God.

CHAP. VI.] PROMISES.— LIES. 189

Some philosophers deduce the obligation of promises
from the expediency of fulfilling them. Doubtless ful-
filment is expedient ; but there is a shorter and a safer
road to truth. To promise and not to perform, is to
deceive ; and deceit is peculiarly and especially con-
demned by Christianity. A lie has been defined to be
4 - a breach of promise ; ! ' and, since the Scriptures
condemn lying, they condemn breaches of promise.

Persons sometimes deceive others by making a
promise in a sense different from that in which they
know it will be understood. They hope this species of
deceit is less criminal than breaking their word, and
wish to gain the advantage of deceiving without its
guilt. They dislike the shame but perform the act. A
son has abandoned his father's house, and the father
promises that if he returns, he shall be received with
open arms. The son returns, the father "opens his
arms " to receive him, and then proceeds to treat him
with rigor. This father falsifies his promise as truly
as if he had specifically engaged to treat him with
kindness. The sense in which a promise binds a per-
son, is the sense in which he knows it is accepted by the
other party.

It is very possible to promise without speaking. Those
who purchase at auctions frequently advance on the price
by a sign or a nod. An auctioneer, in selling an estate
says, (< Nine hundred and ninety pounds are offered."
He who makes the customary sign to indicate an ad-
vance of ten pounds, promises to give a thousand. — A
person who brings up his children or others in the
known and encouraged expectation that he will provide
for them, promises to provide for them. A shipmaster
promises to deliver a pipe of wine at the accustomed
port, although he may have made no written and no
verbal engagement respecting it.

Parole, such as is taken of military men, is of imper-

19° PROMISES.— UES. [ESSAY II.

aiive obligation. The prisoner who escapes by breach
of parole, ought to be regarded as the perpetrator of an
aggravated crime : aggravated, since his word was ac-
cepted, as he knows, because peculiar reliance was
placed upon it, and since he adds to the ordinary guilt
of breach of promise, that of casting suspicion and en-
tailing suffering upon other men. If breach of parole
were general, parole would not be taken. It is one of
the anomalies which are presented by the adherents to
the law of honor, that they do not reject from their
society the man who impeaches their respectability and
his own, whilst they reject the man who really im-
peaches neither the one nor the other. — To say I am
a man of honor and therefore you may rely upon my
word ; and then, as soon as it is accepted to violate
that word is no ordinary deceit. An upright man
never broke parole.

Promises are not binding if performance is unlawful.
Sometimes men promise to commit a wicked act — even
to assassination ; but a man is not required to commit
murder because he has promised to commit it. Thus,
in the Christian Scriptures, the son who had said, " I
will not" work in the vineyard, and "afterwards re-
pented and went," is spoken of with approbation : his
promise was not binding, because fulfilment would
have been wrong. Cranmer, whose religious firmness
was overcome in the prospect of the stake, recanted ;
that is, he promised to abandon the protestant faith.
Neither was his promise binding. To have regarded it
would have been a crime. The offence both of Cran-
mer and of the son in the parable, consisted not in vio-
lating their promises, but in making them.

Some scrupulous persons appear to attach a needless
obligation to expressions which they employ in the
form of promises. You ask a lady if she will join a
party in a walk ; she declines, but presently recollect-

CHAP. VI.] PROMISES. — UES. 191

ing some inducement to go, she is in doubt whether
her refusal does not oblige her to stay at home. Such
a person should recollect, that her refusal does not par-
take of the character of a promise : there is no other
party to it ; she comes under no engagement to an-
other. She only expresses her present intention, which
intention she is at liberty to alter.

Many promises are conditional though the conditions
are not expressed. A man says to some friends, I will
dine with you at two o'clock ; but as he is preparing
to go his child meets with an accident which requires
his attention. This man does not violate a promise by
absenting himself, because such promises are in fact
made and accepted with the" tacit understanding that
they are subject to such conditions. No one would
expect, when his friend engaged to dine with him, that
he intended to bind himself to come, though he left a
child unassisted with a fractured arm. Accordingly,
when a person means to exclude such conditions he
says, * ■ I will certainly do so and so if I am living and
able."

Yet even to seem to disregard an engagement is an
evil. To an ingenuous and Christian mind there is
always something painful in not performing it. Of this
evil the principal source is gratuitously brought upon
us by the habit of using unconditional terms for con-
ditional engagements. That which is only intention
should be expressed as intention. It is better, and
more becoming the condition of humanity, to say, I in-
tend to do a thing, than, I will do a thing. The
recollection of our dependency upon uncontrollable cir-
cumstances should be present with us even in little
affairs — "Go to now, ye that say, To-day or to-morrow
we will go into such a city and buy and sell and get
gain : whereas ye know not what shall be on the mor-
row.— Ye ought to say, If the Lord will, we shall live,

192 PROMISES.— UBS. [ESSAY II.

and do this or that." Not indeed that the sacred
name of God is to be introduced to express the condi-
tions of our little engagements ; but the principle
should never be forgotten — that we know not what
shall be on the morrow.

Respecting the often discussed question, whether ex-
torted promises are binding, there has been, I suspect,
a general want of advertence to one important point.
What is an extorted promise ? If by an extorted prom-
ise, is meant a promise that is made involuntarily,
without the concurrence of the will ; if it is the effect
of any ungovernable impulse, and made without the
consciousness of the party — then it is not a promise.
This may happen. Fear or agitation may be so great
that a person really does not know what he says or
does ; and in such a case a man's promises do not bind
him any more than the promises of a man in a fit of
insanity. But if by an ■ ' extorted ' ' promise it is only
meant that very powerful inducements were held out to
making it, inducements however which did not take
away the power of choice — then these promises are in
strictness voluntary, and like all other voluntary en-
gagements, they ought to be fulfilled. But perhaps
fulfilment itself is unlawful. Then ypu may not fulfil
it. The offence consists in making such engagements.
It will be said, a robber threatened to take my life un-
less I would promise to reveal the place where my
neighbor's money was deposited. Ought I not to make
the promise in order to save my life ? No. Here, in
reality, is the origin of the difficulties and the doubts.
To rob your neighbor is criminal ; to enable another
man to rob him is criminal too. Instead, therefore, of
discussing the obligation of \ ' extorted ' ' promises, we
should consider whether such promises may lawfully
be made. The prospect of saving life is one of the
utmost inducements to make them, and yet, amongst

CHAP. VI.] PROMISES. — WES. 193

those things which we are to hold subservient to our
Christian fidelity, is our "own life also." If, how-
ever, giving way to the weakness of nature, a person
makes the promise, he should regulate his performance
by the ordinary principles. Fulfil the promise unless
fulfilment be wrong : and if, in estimating the pro-
priety of fulfilling it, any difficulty arises, it must be
charged not to the imperfection of moral principles, but
to the entanglement in which we involve ourselves by
having begun to deviate from rectitude. If we had
not unlawfully made the promise we should have had
no difficulty in ascertaining our subsequent duty. The
traveller who does not desert the proper road, easily
finds his way ; he who once loses sight of it, has many
difficulties in returning.

The history of that good man John Fletcher (L,a
Flechere) affords an example to our purpose. Fletcher
had a brother, De Gons, and a nephew, a profligate
youth. This youth came one day to his uncle De
Gons, and holding up a pistol, declared he would in-
stantly shoot him if he did not give him an order for
five hundred crowns. De Gons in terror gave it ; and
the nephew then, under the same threat, required him
solemnly to promise that he would not prosecute him ;
and De Gons made the promise accordingly. That is
what is called an extorted promise, and an extorted gift.
How, in similar circumstances, did Fletcher act? This
youth afterwards went to him, told him of the " pres-
ent " which De Gons had made, and showed him the
order. Fletcher suspected some fraud, and thinking
it right to prevent its success, he put the order in his
pocket. It was at the risk of his life. The young
man instantly presented his pistol, declaring that he
would fire if he did not deliver it up. Fletcher did not
submit to the extortion : he told him that his life was
secure under the protection of God, refused to deliver

194 PROMISES.— UES. [ESSAY II.

up the order, and severely remonstrated with his
nephew on his profligacy. The young man was re-
strained and softened ; and before he left his uncle,
gave him many assurances that he would amend his
his life. — De Gons might have been perplexed with
doubts as to the obligation of his ■ ' extorted ' ' prom-
ise : — Fletcher could have no doubts to solve.

LIES.

The guilt of lying, like that of many other offences,
has been needlessly founded upon its ill effects. These
effects constitute a good reason for adhering to truth,
but they are not the greatest nor the best. ' ' Putting
away lying, speak every man truth with his neigh-
bor."* "Ye shall not steal, neither deal falsely,
neither lie one to another. "f "The law is made for
unholy and profane, for murderers — for liars. "J It
may afford the reader some instruction, to observe
with what crimes lying is associated in Scripture —
with perjury, and murder, and parricide. Not that it
is necessary to suppose that the measure of guilt of
these crimes is equal, but that the guilt of all is great.
With respect to lying, there is no trace in these pas-
sages that its guilt is conditional upon its effects, or that
it is not always, and for whatever purpose, prohibited
by the Divine will.

A lie is, uttering what is not true when the speaker
professes to utter truth, or when he knows it is ex-
pected by the hearer. I do not perceive that any looser
definition is allowable, because every looser definition
would permit deceit.

Milton's definition, considering the general tenor of
his character, was very lax. He says, "Falsehood is
incurred when any one, from a dishonest motive, either
perverts the truth or utters what is false to one to

* Eph. iv. 25. | Lev. xix. 11. % % Tim. i. 9, xo.

CHAP. VI.] PROMISES. — UES. I95

whom it is his duty to speak the truth."* To whom is it
not our duty to speak the truth? What constitutes
duty but the will of God? and where is it found that
it is his will that we should sometimes lie ! — But another
condition is proposed : In order to constitute a lie, the
motive to it must be dishonest. Is not all deceit dis-
honesty ; and can any one utter a lie without deceit ?
A man who travels in the Arctic regions comes home
and writes a narrative professedly faithful, of his ad-
ventures, and decorates it with marvellous incidents
which never happened, and stories of wonders which
he never saw. You tell this man he has been passing
lies upon the public. Oh no, he says, I had not ' ! a
dishonest motive." I only meant to make readers
wonder. — Milton's mode of substantiating his doctrine,
is worthy of remark. He makes many references for
authority to the Hebrew Scriptures, but not o?ie to the
Christian. The reason is plain though perhaps he was
not aware of it, that the purer moral system which the
Christian lawgiver introduced, did not countenance
the doctrine. Another argument is so feeble that it
may well be concluded no valid argument can be
found. If it had been discoverable would not Milton
have found it ? He says, "It is universally admitted
that feints and stratagems in war, when unaccompanied
by perjury or breach of faith, do not fall under the de-
scription of falsehood. — It is scarcely possible to exe-
cute any of the artifices of war, without openly utter-
ing the greatest untruths with the indisputable inten-
tion of deceiving. "f And so, because the "greatest
untruths" are uttered in conducting one of the most
flagitious departments of the most unchristian system
in the world, we are told, in a system of Christian
doctrine, that untruths are lawful !

* Christian Doctrine, p. 658.
t Id. 659.

I96 PROMISES.— WES. [ESSAY II.

Paley's philosophy is 3^et more lax : he says that we
may tell a falsehood to a person who ' ' has no right to
know the truth."* What constitutes a right to know
the truth it were not easy to determine. But if a man
has no right to know the truth — withhold it ; but do
not utter a lie. A man has no right to know how
much property I possess. If, however, he imperti-
nently chooses to ask, what am I to do? Refuse to tell
him, says Christian morality. What am I to do ? Tell
him it is ten times as great as it is, says the morality of
Paley.

To say that when a man is tempted to employ a false-
hood, he is to consider the degree of " inconveniency
which results from the want of confidence in such
cases," f and to employ the falsehood or not as this de-
gree shall prescribe, is surely to trifle with morality.
What is the hope that a man will decide aright, who
sets about such a calculation at such a time ? Another
kind of falsehood which it is said is lawful, is that M to
a robber, to conceal your property." A man gets into
my house, and desires to know where he shall find my
plate. I tell him it is in the chest in such a room,
knowing that it is in a closet in another. By such a
falsehood I might save my property or possibly my life;
but if the prospect of doing this be a sufficient reason
for violating the moral law, there is no action which
we may not lawfully commit. May a person, in order
so to save his property or life, commit parricide?
Every reader says, No. But where is the ground of
the distinction ? If you may lie for the sake of such
advantages, why may you not kill? What makes
murder unlawful but that which makes lying unlawful
too ? No man surely will say that we must make dis-
tinctions in the atrocity of such actions, and that
though it is not lawful for the sake of advantage to
* Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 3. p. 1. c. 15. | Id.

CHAP. VI.] PROMISES.— WES. I97

commit an act of a certain intensity of guilt, yet it
is lawful to commit one of a certain gradation less.
Such doctrine would be purely gratuitous and un-
founded : it would be equivalent to saying that we are
at liberty to disobey the Divine laws when we think
fit. The case is very simple : If I may tell a false-
hood to a robber in order to save my property, I may
commit parricide for the same purpose ; for lying and
parricide are placed together and jointly condemned *
in the revelation from God.

Then we are told that we may ' ' tell a falsehood to a
madman for his own advantage, ' ' and this because it
is beneficial. Dr. Carter may furnish an answer : he
speaks of the Female Lunatic Asylum, Saltpetriere in
Paris, and says, " The great object to which the views
of the officers of La Saltpetriere are directed, is to gain
the confidence of the patients ; and this object is gen-
erally attained by gentleness, by appearing to take an
interest in their affairs, by a decision of character
equally remote from the extremes of indulgence and
severity, and by the most scrupulous observance of good
faith. Upon this latter, particular stress seems to be
laid by M. Pinel, who remarks ' that insane persons,
like children, lose all confidence and all respect if you
fail in your word towards them ; and they immediately
set their ingenuity to work to deceive and circumvent
you.' "f What then becomes of the doctrine of V tell-
ing falsehoods to madmen for their own advantage ? ' '
It is pleasant thus to find the evidence of experience
enforcing the dictates of principle, and that what mor-
ality declares to be right, facts declare to be expedient.

Persons frequently employ falsehoods to a sick man
who cannot recover, lest it should discompose his mind.
This is called kindness, although an earnest prepara-

* 1 Tim. i. 9, 10.

t Account of the Principal Hospitals in France, &c.

198 PROMISES.— LIES. [ESSAY II.

tion for death may be at stake upon their speaking the
truth. There is a peculiar inconsistency sometimes
exhibited on such occasions : the persons who will not
discompose a sick man -for the sake of his interests in
futurity, will discompose him without scruple if he has
not made his will. Is a bequest of more consequence
to the survivor, than a hope full of immortality to the
dying man ?

It is curious to remark how zealously persons repro-
bate ' ' pious frauds ; ' ' that is, lies for the religious
benefit of the deceived party. Surely if any reason
for employing falsehood be a good one, it is the pros-
pect of effecting religious benefit. How is it then that
we so freely condemn these falsehoods, whilst we con-
tend for others which are used for less important pur-
poses ?

Still, not every expression that is at variance with
facts is a lie, because there are some expressions in
which the speaker does not pretend, and the hearer
does not expect, literal truth. Of this class are hyper-
boles and jests, fables and tales of professed fiction :
of this class too, are parables, such as are employed in
the New Testament. In such cases affirmative lan-
guage is used in the same terms as if the allegations
were true, yet as it is known that it does not profess to
narrate facts, no lie is uttered. It is the same with
some kinds of irony : " Cry aloud," said Elijah to the
priests of the idol, "for he is a god, peradventure he
sleepeth." And yet, because a given untruth is not a
lie, it does not therefore follow, that it is innocent : for
it is very possible to employ such expressions without
any sufficient justification. A man who thinks he can
best inculcate virtue through a fable, may write one : he
who desires to discountenance an absurdity, may employ
irony. Yet every one should use as little of such
language as he can, because it is frequently

CHAP. VI.] PROMISES. — WES. I99

dangerous language. The man who familiarizes him-
self to a departure from literal truth, is in danger of
departing from it without reason and without excuse.
Some of these departures are like lies ; so much like
them that both speaker and hearer may reasonably
question whether they are lies or not. The lapse from
untruths which can deceive no one, to those which are
intended to deceive, proceeds by almost imperceptible
gradations on the scale of evil : and it is not the part
of wisdom to approach the verge of guilt. Nor is it to
be forgotten, that language, professedly fictitious, is
not always understood to be such by those who hear
it. This applies especially to the case of children —
that is, of mankind during that period of life in which
they are acquiring some of their first notions of morality.
The boy who hears his father using hyperboles and
irony with a grave countenance, probably thinks he
has his father's example for telling lies among his
schoolfellows.

Amongst the indefensible untruths which often are
not lies are those which factitious politeness enjoins.
Such are compliments and complimentary subscrip-
tions, and many other untruths of expression and of
action which pass currently in the world. These are,
no doubt, often estimated at their value : the receiver
knows that they are base coin though they shine like
the good. Now, although it is not to be pretended
that such expressions, so estimated, are lies, yet I will
venture to affirm that the reader cannot set up for
them any tolerable defence ; and if he cannot show that
they are right he may be quite sure that they are
wrong. A defence has however been attempted :
1 ' How much is happiness increased by the general adop-
tion of a system of concerted and limited deceit ! He
from whose doctrine it flows that we are to be in no
case hypocrites, would, in mere manners, reduce us to

200 PROMISES.— LIES. [ESSAY II.

a degree of barbarism beyond that of the rudest sav-
age." We do not enter here into such questions as
whether a man may smile when his friend calls upon
him, though he would rather just then that he had
staid away. Whatever the reader may think of these
questions, the ' ' system of deceit ' ' which passes in the
world cannot be justified by the decision. There is no
fear that ■ ' a degree of barbarism beyond that of the
rudest savage ' ' would ensue, if this system were
amended. The first teachers of Christianity, who will
not be charged with being in " any case hypocrites,"
both recommended and practised gentleness and court-
esy. * And as to the increase of happiness which is
assumed to result from this system of deceit, the fact
is of a very questionable kind. No society I believe
sufficiently discourages it ; but that society which dis-
courages it probably as much as any other, certainly
enjoys its full average of happiness. But the apology
proceeds, and more seriously errs : ' ' The employment
of falsehood for the production of good, cannot be more
unworthy of the Divine Being than the acknowledged
employment of rapine and murder for the same pur-
pose. " f Is it then not perceived that to employ the
wickedness of man is a very different thing from hold-
ing its agents innocent f Some of those whose wicked-
ness has been thus employed, have been punished for
that wickedness. Even to show that the Deity has
employed falsehood for the production of good, would
in no degree establish the doctrine that falsehood is
right.

The childish and senseless practice of requiring ser-
vants to "deny" their masters, has had many apolo-
gists— I suppose because many perceive that it is
wrong. It is not always true that such a servant does
* i Peter, ii. i. Tit. iii. 2. 1 Peter, iii. 8.
t Edin. Rev. vol. 1, Art. Belsham's Philosophy of the Mind.

CHAP. VII.] OATHS. 20 1

not in strictness lie ; for, how well soever the folly may
be understood by the gay world, some who knock at
their doors have no other idea than that they may
depend upon the servant's word. Of this the servant
is sometimes conscious, and to these persons therefore he
who denies his master, lies. An uninitiated servant
suffers a shock to his moral principles when he is first
required to tell these falsehoods. It diminishes his
previous abhorrence of lying, and otherwise deterior-
ates his moral character. Even if no such ill conse-
quences resulted from this foolish custom, there is ob-
jection to it which is short, but sufficient — nothi?ig can
be said in its defence.

CHAPTER VII.
OATHS.

THEIR MORAL CHARACTER— THEIR EFFICACY AS
SECURITIES OF VERACITY— THEIR EFFECTS.

A curse — Immorality of oaths — Oaths of the ancient Jews —
Milton — Paley— The High Priest's adjuration — Early Christ-
ians— Inefficacy of oaths — Motives to veracity — Religious
sanctions : Public opinion ; Legal penalties — Oaths in Evi-
dence : Parliamentary Evidence: Courts Martial — The United
States — Effects of oaths : Falsehood — General obligations.

1 ' An oath is that whereby we call God to witness
the truth of what we say, with a curse upon ourselves,
either implied or expressed, should it prove false."*

A Curse. — Now supposing the Christian Scriptures
to contain no information respecting the moral char-
acter of oaths, how far is it reasonable, or prudent, or

* Milton : Christian Doctrine, p. 579.

202 OATHS. [ESSAY II.

reverent, for a man to stake his salvation upon the
truth of what he says ? To bring forward so tremend-
ous an event as " everlasting destruction from the
presence of the Lord," in attestation of the offence per-
haps of a poacher or of the claim to a field, is surely
to make unwarrantably light of the most awful things.
This consideration applies, even if a man is sure that
he speaks the truth ; but, who is, beforehand, sure of
this ? Oaths in evidence, for example, are taken be-
fore the testimony is given. A person swears that he
will speak the truth. Who, I ask, is sure that he will
do this ? Who is sure that the embarrassment of a
public examination, that the ensnaring questions of
counsel, that the secret influence of inclination or in-
terest, will not occasion him to utter one inaccurate
expression ? Who, at any rate, is so sure of this that
it is rational, or justifiable, specifically to stake his sal-
vation upon his accuracy ? Thousands of honest men
have been mistaken ; their allegations have been sin-
cere, but untrue. And if this should be thought not a
legitimate objection, let it be remembered, that few
men's minds are so sternly upright, that they can an-
swer a variety of questions upon subjects on which their
feelings, and wishes, and interest are involved, with-
out some little deduction from the truth, in speaking
of matters that are against their cause, or some little
overcoloring of facts in their own favor. It is a cir-
cumstance of constant occurrence, that even a well-
intentioned witness adds to or deducts a little from the
truth. Who then, amidst such temptation, would
make, who ought to make, his hope of heaven depend-
ent on his strict adherence to accurate veracity ? And
if such considerations indicate the impropriety of swear-
ing upon subjects which affect the lives, and liberties,
and property of others, how shall we estimate the im-
propriety of using these dreadful imprecations to attest

CHAP. VII.] OATHS. 203

the delivery of a summons for a debt of half-a-crown !

These are moral objections to the use of oaths inde-
pendently of any reference to the direct moral law.
Another objection of the same kind is this : To take an
oath is to assume that the Deity will become a party in
the case — that we can call upon Him, when we please,
to follow up by. the exercise of his almighty power, the
contracts (often the very insignificant contracts) which
men make with men. Is it not irreverent, and for that
reason immoral, to call upon Him to exercise this power
in reference to subjects which are so insignificant that
other men will scarcely listen with patience to their de-
tails? The objection goes even further. A robber
exacts an oath of the man whom he has plundered,
that he will not attempt to pursue or prosecute him.
Pursuit and prosecution are duties ; so then the oath
assumes that the Deity will punish the swearer in
futurity if he fulfils a duty. Confederates in a danger-
ous and wicked enterprise bind one another to secrecy
and to mutual assistance, by oaths — assuming that
God will become a party to their wickedness, and if
they do not perpetrate it will punish them for their
virtue.

Upon every subject of questionable rectitude that is
sanctioned by habit and the usages of society, a person
should place himself in the independent situation of
an enquirer. He should not seek for arguments to de-
fend an existing practice, but should simply enquire
what our practice ought to be. One of the most
powerful causes of the slow amendment of public insti-
tutions, consists in this circumstance, that most men
endeavor rather to justify what exists than to consider
whether it ought to exist or not. This cause operates
upon the question of oaths. We therefore invite the
reader, in considering the citation which follows, to
suppose himself to be one of the listeners at the Mount

204 OATHS. [ESSAY II.

— to know knothing of the customs of the present day;
and to have no desire to justify them.

' ' Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of
old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself but shalt
perform unto the Lord thine oaths. But I say unto
you, Swear not at all : neither by heaven for it is God's
throne, nor by the earth for it is his footstool, neither
by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King.
Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou
canst not make one hair white or black. But let your
communication be yea, yea, nay, nay ; for whatsoever is
more than these, cometh of evil." *

If a person should take a New Testament, and read
these words to ten intelligent Asiatics who had never
heard of them before, does any man believe that a sin-
gle individual of them would think that the words did
not prohibit all oaths ? I lay stress upon this consid-
eration : if ten unbiassed persons would, at the first
hearing, say the prohibition was universal, we have no
contemptible argument that that is the real meaning of
the words. For to whom were the words addressed ?
Not to schoolmen, of whom it was known that they
would make nice distinctions and curious investiga-
tions ; not to men of learning, who were in the habit of
cautiously weighing the import of words — but to a
multitude — a mixed and unschooled multitude. It was
to such persons that the prohibition was addressed ; it
was to such apprehensions that its form was adapted.

11 It hath been said of old time, Thou shalt not for-
swear thyself." Why refer to what was said of old
time ? For this reason assuredly ; to point out that the
present requisitions were different from the former ;
that what was prohibited now was differe?it from what
was prohibited before. And what was prohibited
before ? Swearing falsely — Swearing and not performing.
* Matt. v. 33—37-

CHAP. VII ] OATHS. 205

What then could be prohibited now? Swearing
truly — Swearing, even, and performing : that is, swear-
ing at all ; for it is manifest that if truth may not be
attested by an oath, no oath may be taken. Of old
time it was said, ' ' Ye shall not swear by my name
falsely." * " If a man swear an oath to bind his soul
with a bond, he shall not break his word." f There
could be no intelligible purpose in contradistinguish-
ing the new precept from these, but to point out a
characteristic difference ; and there is no intelligible
characteristic difference but that which denounces all
oaths. Such were the views of the early Christians.
''The old law," says one of them," is satisfied with
the honest keeping of the oath, but Christ cuts off the
opportunity of perjury." % In acknowledging that
this prefatory reference to the former law, is in my
view absolutely conclusive of our Christian duty, I
would remark as an extraordinary circumstance, that
Dr. Paley, in citing the passage, omits this introduc-
tion and takes no notice of it in his argument.

1 ' I say unto you, Swear not at all. ' ' The words are
absolute and exclusive.

' ' Neither by heaven, nor by the earth, nor by Jeru-
salem, nor by thy own head." Respecting this
enumeration it is said that it prohibits swearing by cer-
tain objects, but not by all objects. To which a suffi-
cient answer is found in the parallel passage in James :
"Swear not," he says; "neither by heaven, neither
by the earth, neither by any other oath."§ This mode
of prohibition, by which an absolute and universal
rule is first proposed and then followed by certain
examples of the prohibited things, is elsewhere em-
ployed in Scripture. "Thou shalt have no other
gods before me. Thou shalt not make unto thee any
* Lev. xix. 12. f Numb. xxx. 2. % Basil.

\ James v. 12.

206 Oaths. [essay ii.

graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in
heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is
in the water under the earth. ' ' * No man supposes
that this after-enumeration was designed to restrict the
obligation of the law — Thou shalt have no other gods
before me. Yet it were as reasonable to say that it
was lawful to make idols in the form of imaginary
monsters because they were not mentioned in the
enumeration, as that it is lawful to swear any given
kind of oath because it is not mentioned in the enumer-
ation. Upon this part of the prohibition it is curious
that two contradictory opinions are advanced by the
defenders of oaths. The first class of reasoners says,
The prohibition allows us to swear by the Deity, but
disallows swearing by inferior things. The second
class says, The prohibition allows swearing by inferior
things, but disallows swearing by the Deity. Of the
first class is Milton. The injunction, he says, " does
not prohibit us from swearing by the name of God —
We are only commanded not to swear by heaven, &c. ' ' f
But here again the Scripture itself furnishes a conclu-
sive answer. It asserts that to swear by heaven is to
swear, by the Deity : ' ' He that shall swear by heaven,
sweareth by the throne of God, and by Him that sitteth
thereon." % To prohibit swearing by heaven, is there-
fore to prohibit swearing by God. — Amongst the second
class is Dr. Paley. He says, " On account of the rela-
tion which these things, [the heavens, the earth, &c]
bore to the Supreme Being, to swear by any of them
was in effect and substance to swear by Him ; for
which reason our Saviour says, Swear not at all ; that
is, neither directly by God nor indirectly by anything
related to him. ' ' § But if we are thus prohibited from
swearing by any thing related to Him, how happens it

* Exod. xx. 3, 4. f Christ. Doc. p. 582.

% Matt, xxiii. 22. \ Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 3, p. 1, c. 16.

CHAP. VII.] OATHS. 207

that Paley proceeds to justify judicial oaths ? Does not
the judicial deponent swear by something related to
God ? Does he not swear by something much more
nearly related than the earth or our own heads ? Is
not our hope of salvation more nearly related than a mem-
ber of our bodies ? — But after he has thus taken pains
to show that swearing by the Almighty was especially
forbidden, he enforces his general argument by saying
that Christ did swear by the Almighty ! He says that
the high priest examined our Saviour upon oath, "by
the living God;" which oath he took. This is
wonderful ; and the more wonderful because of these
two arguments the one immediately follows the other.
It is contended, within half a dozen lines, first that
Christ forbade swearing by God, and next that he
violated his own command.

" But let your communication be yea, yea, nay, nay."
This is remarkable : it is positive superadded to nega-
tive commands. We are told not only what we ought
not, but what we ought to do. It has indeed been
said that the expression " your communication," fixes
the meaning to apply to the ordinary intercourse of
life. But to this there is a fatal objection : the whole
prohibition sets out with a reference not to conversa-
tional language but to solemn declarations on solemn
occasions. " Oaths, Oaths to the I,ord," are placed at
the head of the passage ; and it is too manifest to be
insisted upon that solemn declarations, and not every-
day talk, were the subject of the prohibition.

"Whatsoever is more than these, cometh of evil."
This is indeed most accurately true. Evil is the
foundation of oaths : it is because men are bad that it
is supposed oaths are needed : take away the wicked-
ness of mankind, and we shall still have occasion for
no and yes, but we .shall need nothing "more than
these." And this consideration furnishes a distinct

2o8 OATHS. [ESSAY II.

motive to a good man to decline to swear. To take an
oath is tacitly to acknowledge that this ' ' evil ' ' exists
in his own mind — that with him Christianity has not
effected its destined objects.

From this investigation of the passage, it appears
manifest that all swearing upon all occasions is pro-
hibited. Yet the ordinary opinion, or rather perhaps
the ordinary defence is, that the passage has no refer-
ence to judicial oaths. "We explain our Saviour's
words to relate not to judicial oaths but to the practice
of vain, wanton, and unauthorized swearing in common
discourse." To this we have just seen that there is
one conclusive answer : our Saviour distinctly and
specifically mentions, as the subject of his instructions,
solemn oaths. But there is another conclusive answer
even upon our opponents' own showing. They say
first, that Christ described particular forms of oaths
which might be employed, and next, that his precepts
referred to wanton swearing ; that is to say, that Christ
described what particular forms of wanton swearing he
allowed and what he disallowed ! .You cannot avoid
this monstrous conclusion. If Christ spoke only of
vain and wanton swearing, and if he described the
modes that were lawful, he sanctioned wanton swear-
ing provided we swear in the prescribed form.

With such distinctness of evidence as to the univer-
sality of the prohibition of oaths by Jesus Christ, it is
not in strictness necessary to refer to those passages in
the Christian Scriptures which some persons adduce in
favor of their employment. If Christ have prohibited
them, nothing else can prove them to be right. Our
reference to these passages will accordingly be short.

" I adjure thee by the living God that thou tell us
whether thou be the Christ, the son of God." To
those who allege that Christ, in answering to this
"Thou hast said," took an oath, a sufficient answer

CHAP. VII.] OATHS. 209

has already been intimated. If Christ then took an
oath, he swore by the Deity, and this is precisely the
very kind of oath which it is acknowledged he himself
forbade. But what imaginable reason could there be
for examining him upon oath ? Who ever heard of
calling upon a prisoner to swear that he was guilty ?
Nothing was wanted but a simple declaration that he
was the Son of God. With this view the proceeding
was extremely natural. Finding that to the less
urgent solicitation he made no reply, the high priest
proceeded to the more urgent. Schleusner expressly
remarks upon the passage that the words, I adjure, do
not here mean, " I make to swear or put upon oath,"
but ' • I solemnly and in the name of God exhort and
enjoin." This is evidently the natural and the only
natural meaning ; just as it was the natural meaning
when the evil spirit said, " I adjure thee by the living
God that thou torment me not. ' ' The evil spirit Surely
did not administer an oath.

' ' God is my witness that without ceasing I make
mention of you always in my prayers."* That the
Almighty was witness to* the subject of his prayers is
most true ; but to state this truth is not to swear.
Neither this language nor that which is indicated
below, contains the characteristics of an oath according
to the definitions even of those who urge the expres-
sions. None of them contain according to Milton's
definition, "a curse upon ourselves;" nor according
to Paley's "an invocation of God's vengeance."
Similar language, but in a more emphatic form is em-
ployed in writing to the Corinthian converts. It ap-
pears from 2 Cor. 1 1 . that Paul had resolved not again
to go to Corinth in heaviness, lest he should make
them sorry. And to assure them why he had made
this resolution he says, - ' I call God for a record upon
* Rom. i. 9. See also 1 Thess. ii. 5. and Gal. i. 20.

2IO OATHS. [ESSAY II.

my soul that to spare you I came out as yet unto
Corinth." In order to show this to be an oath, it will
be necessary to show that the apostle imprecated the
vengeance of God if he did not speak the truth. Who
can show this ? — The expression appears to me to be
only an emphatical mode of saying, God is witness ;
or as the expression is sometimes employed in the
present day, God knows that such was my endeavor or
desire.

The next and the last argument is of a very excep-
tionable class ; it is founded upon silence. ' ' For men
verily swear by the greater, and an oath for confirma-
tion is to them an end of all strife. ' ' * Respecting this
it is said that it ' ' speaks of the custom of swearing
judicially without any mark of censure or disapproba-
tion. ' ' Will it then be contended that whatever an
apostle mentions without reprobating, he approves?
The same apostle speaks just in the same manner of the
pagan games ; of running a race for prizes and of
" striving for the mastery." Yet who would admit
the argument, that because Paul did not then censure
the games, he thought them right ! The existing
custom both of swearing and of the games, are adduced
merely by way of illustration of the writer's subject.

Respecting the lawfulness of oaths, then, as de-
termined by the Christian Scriptures, how does the
balance of evidence stand ? On the one side, we have
plain emphatical prohibitions — prohibitions, of which
the distinctness is more fully proved the more they are
investigated ; on the other we have — counter pre-
cepts ? No ; it is not even pretended ; but we have
examples of the use of language, of which it is saying
much to say, that it is doubtful whether they are oaths
or not. How, then, would the man of reason and of
philosophy decide ? — M Many of the Christian fathers,"

* Heb. vi. 16.

CHAP. VII.] OATHS. 211

says Grotius, "condemned all oaths without excep-
tion."* Grotius was himself an advocate of oaths.
11 1 say nothing of perjury," says Tertullian, "since
sweari?ig itself is unlawful to Christians. ' ' f Chrys-
ostom says, " Do not say to me, I swear for a just pur-
pose : it is no longer lawful for thee to swear either
justly or unjustly." | "He who," says Gregory of
Nysse, ' ' has precluded murder by taking away anger,
and who has taken away the pollution of adultery by
subduing desire, has expelled from our life the curse
of perjury by forbidding us to swear ; for where there
is no oath, there can be no infringement of it."§
Such is the conviction which the language of
Christ conveyed to the early converts to his pure
religion ; and such is the conviction which I think it
would convey to us if custom had not familiarized us
with the evil, and if we did not read the New Testa-
ment rather to find justifications of our practice, than
to discover the truth and to apply it to our conduct.

EFFICACY OF OATHS AS SECURITIES FOR VERACITY.

Men naturally speak the truth unless they have some
inducements to falsehood. When they have such in-
ducements what is it that overcomes them and still
prompts them to speak the truth ?

Considerations of duty, founded upon religion :

The apprehension of the ill opinion of other men :

The fear of legal penalties.

I. It is obvious that the intervention of an oath is
designed to strengthen only the first of these motives —
that is, the religious sanction. I say to strengthen the
religious sanction. No one supposses it creates that
sanction; because people know that the sanction is felt
to apply to falsehood as well as to perjury. The advant-

* Rights of War and Peace. f De Idol. cap. II.

% In Gen. ii. Horn. xv. \ In Cant. Home. 13.

UNIVERSITY
Or r.,,rnoi&\K

212 OATHS. [ESSAY II.

age of an oath, then, if advantage there be, is in the
increased power which it gives to sentiments of duty
founded upon religion. Now, it will be our endeavor
to show that this increased power is small ; that, in
fact, the oath, as such, adds very little to the motives
to veracity. What class of men will the reader select
in order to illustrate its greatest power ?

Good men? They will speak the truth whether
without an oath or with it. They know that God has
appended to falsehood as to perjury the threat of his
displeasure and of punishment in futurity. Upon them
religion possesses its rightful influence without the in-
tervention of an oath.

Bad men? Men who care nothing for religion?
They will care nothing for it though they take an oath.

Men of ambigious character? Men on whom the
sanctions of religion are sometimes operative and some-
times not ? Perhaps it will be said that to these the
solemnity of an oath is necessary to rouse their latent
apprehensions, and to bind them to veracity. But
these persons do not go before a legal officer or into a
court of justice as they go into a parlor or meet an
acquaintance in the street. Recollection of mind is
forced upon them by the circumstances of their situa-
tion. The court and the forms of law, and the audi-
ence, and the after publicity of the evidence, fix the
attention even of the careless. The man of only occa-
sional seriousness, is serious then; and if in their hours
of seriousness, such persons regard the sanctions of re-
ligion, they will regard them in a court of justice
though without an oath.

Yet it may be supposed by the reader that the solem-
nity of a specific imprecation of the Divine vengeance
would, nevertheless, frequently add stronger motives
to adhere to truth. But what is the evidence of exper-
ience ? After testimony has been given on affirmation,

CHAP. VII.] OATHS. 213

the parties are sometimes examined on the same sub-
ject upon oath. Now Pothier says, " In forty years of
practice, I have only met two instances where the part-
ies, in the case of an oath offered after evidence have
been prevented by a sense of religion from persisting in
their testimonies." Two instances in forty years; and
even with respect to these it is to be remembered, that
one great reason why simple affirmations do not bind
men is, that their obligation is artificially diminished
(as we shall presently see) by the employment of oaths.
To the evidence resulting from these truths I know of
but one limitary consideration ; and to this the reader
must attach such weight as he thinks it deserves — that
a man on whom an oath had been originally imposed
might then have been bound to veracity, who would
not incur the shame of having lied by refusing after-
wards to confirm his falsehoods with an oath.

II. The next inducement to adhere to truth is the
apprehension of the ill opinion of others. And this in-
ducement, either in its direct or indirect operation, will
be found to be incomparably more powerful than that
religious inducement which is applied by an oath as
such. Not so much because religious sanctions are less
operative than public opinion, as because public opinion
applies or detaches the religious sanction. Upon this
subject a serious mistake has been made ; for it has
been contended that the influence of religious motives
is comparatively nothing — that unless men are impelled
to speak the truth by fear of disgrace or of legal penal-
ties, they care very little for the sanctions of religion.
But the truth is, that the sanctions of religion are, in a
great degree, either brought into operation, or pre-
vented from operating, by these secondary motives.
Religious sanctions necessarily follow the judgments of
the mind ; if a man by any means becomes convinced
that a given action is wrong, the religious obligation to

214 OATHS. [ESSAY II.

refrain from it follows. Now, the judgments of men
respecting right and wrong are very powerfully affected
by public opinion. It commonly happens that that
which a man has been habitually taught to think wrong,
he does think wrong. Men are thus taught by public
opinion. So that if the public attach disgrace to any
species of mendacity or perjury, the religious sanction
will commonly apply to that species. If there are in-
stances of mendacity or perjury to which public disap-
probation does not attach — to those instances the relig-
ious sanction will commonly not apply, or apply but
weakly. The power of public opinion in binding to
veracity is therefore twofold. It has its direct influ-
ence arising from the fear which all men feel of the dis-
approbation of others, and the indirect influence aris-
ing from the fact that public opinion applies the sanc-
tions of religion.

III. Of the influence of legal penalties in binding to
veracity, little needs to be said. It is obvious that if
they induce men to refrain from theft and violence,
they wili induce men to refrain from perjury. But it
may be remarked, that the legal penalty tends to give
vigor and efficiency to public opinion. He whom the
law punishes as a criminal, is generally regarded as a
criminal by the world.

Now that which we affirm is this — that unless
public opinion or legal penalties enforce veracity,
very little will be added by an oath to the motives
to veracity more than would subsist in the case
of simple affirmation. The observance of the Ox-
ford statutes is promised by the members on oath
— yet no one observes them. They swear to observe
them, they imprecate the Divine vengeance if they
do not observe them, and yet they disregard them
every day. The oath then is of no avail. An oath,
as such, does not here bind men's consciences. And

CHAP. VII.] OATHS. 215

why ? Because those sanctions by which men's con-
sciences are bound, are not applied. The law applies
none : public opinion applies none : and therefore
the religious sanction is weak ; too weak with most
men to avail. Not that no motives founded upon
religion present themselves to the mind ; for I
doubt not there are good men who would refuse to
take these oaths simply in consequence of religious
motives : but constant experience shows that these
men are comparatively few ; and if any one should say
that upon them an oath is influential, we answer, that
they are precisely the very persons who would be
bound by their simple promises without an oath.

The oaths of jurymen afford another instance.
Jurymen swear that they will give a verdict according
to the evidence, and yet it is perfectly well known that
they often assent to a verdict which they believe to be
contrary to that evidence. They do not all coincide in
the verdict which the foreman pronounces, it is indeed
often impossible that they should coincide. This per-
jury is committed by multitudes ; yet what juryman
cares for it, or refuses, in consequence of his oath, to
deliver a verdict which he believes to be improper?
The reason that they do not care is, that the oath, as
such, does not bind their consciences. It stands alone.
The public do not often reprobate the violation of such
oaths ; the law does not punish it ; jurymen learn to
think that it is no harm to violate them ; and the re-
sulting conclusion is, that the form of an oath cannot
and does not supply the deficiency ; — It cannot and
does not apply the religious sanction.

Step a few yards from the jury-box to the witness-
box, and you see the difference. There public opinion
interposes its power — there the punishment of perjury
impends — there the religious sanction is applied — and
there, consequently, men regard the truth. If the

2l6 OATHS. [ESSAY II.

simple intervention of an oath was that which bound
men to veracity, they would be bound in the jury-box
as much as at ten feet off ; but it is not.

A custom-house oath is nugatory even to a proverb.
Yet it is an oath : yet the swearer does stake his salva-
tion upon his veracity ; and still his veracity is not se-
cured. Why? Because an oath, as such, applies to
the minds of most men little or no motive to veracity.
They do not in fact think that their salvation is staked,
necessarily, by oaths. They think it is either staked
or not, according to certain other circumstances quite
independent of the oath itself. These circumstances
are not associated with custom-house oaths, and there-
fore they do not avail.

We return then to our proposition — Unless public
opinion or legal penalties enforce veracity, very little
is added by an oath to the motives to veracity, more
than would subsist in the case of simple affirmation.

It is obvious that the legislature might, if it pleased,
attach the same penalties to falsehood as it now at-
taches to perjury ; and therefore all the motives to
veracity which are furnished by the law in. the case of
oaths, might be equally furnished in the case of affirma-
tion. This is in fact done by the legislature in the
case of the Society of Friends.

It is also obvious that public opinion might be ap-
plied to affirmation much more powerfully than it is
now. The simple circumstance of disusing oaths would
effect this. Even now, when the public disapproba-
tion is excited against a man who has given false evi-
dence in a court of justice, by what is it excited? by
his having broken his oath, or by his having given
false testimony ? It is the falsehood which excites the
disapprobation, much more than the circumstance that
the falseheod was in spite of an oath. This public dis-
approbation is founded upon the general perception of

CHAP. VII.] OATHS. 21 7

the guilt of. false testimony and of its perniciousness.
Now if affirmation only was employed, this public dis-
approbation would follow the lying witness, as it now
follows, or nearly as it now follows, the perjured wit-
ness. Every thing but the mere oath would be the
same — the fear of penalties, the fear of disgrace, the
motives of religion would remain ; and we have just
shown how little a mere oath avails. But we have
artificially dimished the public reprobation of lying by
establishing oaths. The tendency of instituting oaths
is manifestly to diffuse the sentiment that there is a
difference in the degree of obligation not to lie, and not
to swear falsely. This difference is made, not so much
by adding stronger motives to veracity by an oath, as
by deducting from the motives to veracity in simple
affirmations. Let the public opinion take its own
healthful and unobstructed course, and falsehood in
evidence will quickly be regarded as a flagrant offence.
Take away oaths, and the public reprobation of false-
hood will immediately increase in power, and will bring
with its increase an increasing efficiency in the religious
sanction. The present relative estimate of lying and
perjury is a very inaccurate standard by which to judge
of the efficiency of oaths. We have artificially reduced
the abhorrence of lying, and then say that that abhor-
rence is not great enough to bind men to the truth.

Our reasoning then proceeds by these steps. Oaths
are designed to apply a strong religious sanction : they
however do not apply it unless they are seconded by
the apprehension of penalties or disgrace. The appre-
hension of penalties and disgrace may be attached to
falsehood, and with this apprehension the religious
sanction will also be attached to it. Therefore, all
those motives which bind men to veracity may be ap-
plied to falsehood as well as to oaths. — In other words,
oaths are needless.

2l8 OATHS. [ESSAY II.

But in reality we have evidence of this needlessness
from every day experience. In some of the most im-
portant of temporal affairs, an oath is never used. The
Houses of Parliament in their examinations of witnesses
employ no oaths. They are convinced (and therefore
they have proved) that the truth can be discovered
without them. But if affirmation is thus a sufficient
security for veracity in the great questions of a legis-
lature, how can it be insufficient in the little questions
of private life ? There is a strange inconsistency here.
That same Parliament which declares, by its every-day
practice, that oaths are needless, continues, by its
every-day practice, to impose them ! Even more :
those very men who themselves take oaths as a neces-
sary qualification for their duties as legislators, proceed
to the exercise of these duties upon the mere testimony
of other men ! — Peers are never required to take oaths
in delivering their testimony, yet no one thinks that
a peer's evidence in a court of justice may not be as
much depended upon as that of him who swears. Why
are peers in fact bound to veracity though without an
oath ? Will you say that the religious sanction is more
powerful upon lords than upon other men ? The sup-
position were ridiculous. How then does it happen ?
You reply, Their honor binds them : Very well ; that is
the same as to say that public opinion binds them. But
then, he who says that honor, or anything else besides
pure religious sanctions, binds men to veracity, im-
pugns the very grounds upon which oaths are defended.

Oath evidence again is not required by courts-
martial. But can any man assign a reason why a per-
son who would speak the truth on affirmation before
military officers, would not speak it on affirmation be-
fore a judge? Arbitrations too proceed often, perhaps
generally, upon evidence of parole. Yet do not arbi-
trators discover the truth as well as courts of justice?

CHAP. VII.] OATHS. 219

and if they did not, it would be little in favor of oaths,
because a part of the sanction of veracity is, in the case
of arbitration, withdrawn.*

But we have even tried the experiment of affirma-
tions in our own courts of justice, and tried it for some
ages past. The Society of Friends uniformly give
their evidence in courts of law on their words alone.
No man imagines that their words do not bind them.
No legal court would listen with more suspicion to a
witness because he was a Quaker. Here all the
motives to veracity are applied : there is the religious
motive, which in such cases all but desperately bad
men feel : there is the motive of public opinion : and
there is the motive arising from the penalties of the
law. If the same motives were applied to other men,
why should they not be as effectual in securing veracity
as they are upon the Quakers ?

We have an example even yet more extensive. In
all the courts of the United States of America, no one
is obliged to take an oath. What are we to conclude?
Are the Americans so foolish a people that they per-
sist in accepting affirmations knowing that they do not
bind witnesses to truth ? Or, do the Americans really
find that affirmations are sufficient ? But one answer
can be given : — They find that affirmations are suffi-
cient : they prove undeniably that oaths are needless.
No one will imagine that virtue on the other side the
Atlantic is so much greater than on this, that while an
affirmation is sufficient for an American an oath is
necessary here.

So that whether we enquire into the moral lawful-
ness of oaths, they are not lawful ; or into their
practical utility, they are of little use or of none.

EFFECTS OF OATHS.
There is a power and efficacy in our religion which

220 OATHS. [ESSAY II.

elevates those who heartily accept it above that low
moral state in which alone an oath can even be sup-
posed to be of advantage. • The man who takes an
oath, virtually declares that his word would not bind
him ; and this is an admission which no good man
should make — for the sake both of his own moral
character and of the credit of religion itself. It is the
testimony even of infidelity, that ' ' wherever men of
uncommon energy and dignity of mind have existed,
they have felt the degradation of binding their asser-
tions with an oath."* This degradation, this descent
from the proper ground on which a man of integrity
should stand, illustrates the proposition that whatever
exceeds affirmation ' ' cometh of evil. ' ' The evil origin
is so palpable that you cannot comply with the custom
without feeling that you sacrifice the dignity of virtue.
It is related of Solon that he said, " A good man ought
to be in that estimation that he needs not an oath ; be-
cause it is to be reputed a lessening of his honor if he
be forced to swear. " f If to take an oath lessened a
pagan's honor, what must be its effect upon a Chris-
tian's purity.

Oaths, at least the system of oaths which obtains in
this country, tends powerfully to deprave the moral
character. We have seen that they are continually
violated — that men are continually referring to the
most tremendous sanctions of religion with the habitual
belief that those sanctions impose no practical obliga-
tion. Can this have any other tendency than to
diminish the influence of religious sanctions upon other
things ? If a man sets light by the Divine vengeance
in the jury-box to-day, is he likely to give full weight
to that vengeance before a magistrate to-morrow ? We
cannot prevent the effects of habit. Such things will

* Godwin : Political Justice, vol. 2. p. 633. f Stobceus :
Serm. 3.

CHAP. VII.] OATHS. 22t

infallibly deteriorate the moral character, because they
infallibly diminish the power of those principles upon
which the moral character is founded.

Oaths encourage falsehood. We have already seen
that the effect of instituting oaths is to diminish the
practical obligation of simple affirmation. The law
says, You must speak the truth when you are upon
your oath ; which is the same thing as to say that it is
less harm to violate truth when you are not on your
oath. The court sometimes reminds a witness that he
is upon oath, which is equivalent to saying, If you
were not, we should think less of your mendacity.
The same lesson is inculcated by the assignation of
penalties to perjury and not to falsehood. What is a
man to conclude, but that the law thinks light of the
crime which it does not punish ; and that since he may
lie with impunity, it is not much harm to lie? Com-
mon language bears testimony to the effect. The vul-
gar phrase, I will take my oath to it, clearly evinces
the prevalent notion that a man may lie with less guilt
when he does not take his oath. No answer can be
made to this remark, unless any one can show that the
extra sanction of an oath is so much added to the obli-
gation which would otherwise attach to simple affirma-
tion. And who can show this? Experience proves
the contrary : ■ ' Experience bears ample testimony to
the fact, that the prevalence of oaths among men
(Christians not excepted) has produced a very
material and a very general effect in reducing their
estimate of the obligation of plain truth, in its natural
and simple forms. "* — ' ' There is no cause of insincerity,
prevarication, and falsehood, more powerful than the
practice of administering oaths in a court of justice." f

Upon this subject the legislator plays a desperate
game against the morality of a people. He wishes to

* Gurney : Observations, &c. c. X. f Godwin : v. 2. p. 634.

222 OATHS. [ESSAY II.

make them speak the truth when they undertake an
office or deliver evidence. Even supposing him to suc-
ceed, what is the cost? That of diminishing the
motives to veracity in all the affairs of life. A man
may not be called upon to take an oath above two or
three times in his life, but he is called upon to speak
the truth every day.

A few, but a few serious, words remain. The in-
vestigations of this chapter are not matters to employ
speculation but to influence our practice. If it be in-
deed true that Jesus Christ has imperatively forbidden
us to employ an oath, a duty, an imperative duty is im-
posed upon us. It is worse than merely vain to hear
his laws unless we obey them. Of him therefore who
is assured of the prohibition, it is indispensably re-
quired that he should refuse an oath. There is no
other means of maintaining our allegiance to God.
Our pretensions to Christianity are at stake : for he
who, knowing the Christian law, will not conform to it,
is certainly not a Christian. How then does it happen,
that although persons frequently acknowledge they
thinks oaths are forbidden, so few, when they are called
upon to swear, decline to do it ? Alas, this offers one
evidence amongst the many, of the want of uncom-
promising moral principles in the world — of such prin-
ciples as it has been the endeavor of these pages to en-
force— of such principles as would prompt us and
enable us to sacrifice every thing to Christian fidelity.
By what means do the persons of whom we speak sup-
pose that the will of God respecting oaths is to be
effected ? To whose practice do they look for an ex-
emplification of the Christian standard ? Do they await
some miracle by which the whole world shall be con-
vinced, and oaths shall be abolished without the agency
of man ? Such are not the means by which it is the pleas-
ure of the Universal I^ord to act. He effects his moral

CHAP. VIII.] IMMORAL AGENCY. 223

purposes by the instrumentality of faithful men . Where
are these faithful men ?— But let it be : if those who are
called to this fidelity refuse, theirs will be the dishonor
and the offence. But the work will eventually be done.
Other and better men will assuredly arise to acquire
the Christian honor and to receive the Christian re-
ward.

CHAPTER VIII.

IMMORAL AGENCY.

Publication and circulation of books — Seneca — Circulating
Libraries — Prosecutions — Political affairs.

A grkat portion of the moral evil in the world, is the
result not so much of the intensity of individual wick-
edness, as of a general incompleteness in the practical
virtue of all classes of men. If it were possible to take
away misconduct from one half of the community and
to add its amount to the remainder, it is probable that
the moral character of our species would be soon bene-
fited by the change. Now, the ill dispositions of the
bad are powerfully encouraged by the want of upright
examples in those who are better. A man may de-
viate considerably from rectitude, and still be as good
as his neighbors. From such a man, the motive to
excellence which the constant presence of virtuous
example supplies, is taken away. So that there is
reason to believe, that if the bad were to become worse,
and the reputable to become proportionably better, the
average virtue of the world would speedily be increased.

One of the modes by which the efficacy of example
in reputable persons is miserably diminished, is by
what we have called immoral agency — by their being
willing to encourage, at second hand, evils which they

224 IMMORAL AGENCY. [ESSAY II.

would not commit as principals. Linked together as
men are in society, it is frequently difficult to perform
an unwarrantable action without some sort of co-opera-
tion from creditable men. This co-operation is not
often, except in flagrant cases, refused ; and thus not
only is the commission of such actions facilitated, but
a general relaxation is induced in the practical esti-
mates which men form of the standard of rectitude.

Since, then, so much evil attends this agency in un-
warrantable conduct, it manifestly becomes a good man
to look around upon the nature of his intercourse with
others, and to consider whether he is not virtually
promoting evils which his judgment deprecates, or re-
ducing the standard of moral judgment in the world.
The reader would have no difficulty in perceiving that,
if a strenuous opponent of the slave trade should
establish a manufactory of manacles, and thumbscrews,
and iron collars for the slave merchants, he would be
grossly inconsistent with himself. The reader would
perceive too, that his labors in the cause of the aboli-
tion would be almost nullified by the viciousness of his
example, and that he would generally discredit preten-
sions to philanthropy. Now, that which we desire the
reader to do is, to apply the principles which this illus-
tration exhibits to other and less flagrant cases. Other
cases of co-operation with evil may be less flagrant
than this ; but they are not, on that account, innocent.
I have read, in the life of a man of great purity of
character, that he refused to draw up a will or some
such document because it contained a transfer of some
slaves. He thought that slavery was absolutely wrong ;
and therefore would not, even by the remotest im-
plication, sanction the system by his example.* I think

* One of the publications of this excellent man contains a
paragraph much to our present purpose : "In all our concerns,
it is necessary that nothing we do may carry the appearance of

CHAP. VIII.] IMMORAL AGENCY. 225

he exercised a sound Christian judgment, and if all
who prepare such documents acted upon the same
principles, I know not whether they would not so in-
fluence public opinion as greatly to hasten the abolition
of slavery itself. Yet where is the man who would
refuse to do this, or to do things even less defensible
than this ?

Publication and Circulation of Books. — It is a
very common thing to hear of the evils of pernicious
reading, of how it enervates the mind, or how it de-
praves the principles. The complaints are doubtless
just. These books could not be read, and these evils
would be spared the world, if one did not write, and
another did not print, and another did not sell, and
another did not circulate them. Are those then, with-
out whose agency the mischief could not ensue, to be
held innocent in affording this agency ! Yet, loudly
as we complain of the evil, and carefully as we warn
our children to avoid it, how seldom do we hear public
reprobation of the writers ! As to printers, and book-
sellers, and library keepers, we scarcely hear their
offences mentioned at all. We speak not of those
abandoned publications which all respectable men con-
demn, but of those which, pernicious as they are con-
fessed to be, furnish reading-rooms and libraries, and
are habitually sold in almost every bookseller's shop.
Seneca says, ' ' He that lends a man money to carry
him to a bawdy-house, or a weapon for his revenge,
makes himself a partner of his crime." He, too, who
writes or sells a book which will, in all probability, in-
jure the reader, is accessory to the mischief which may

approbation of the works of wickedness, make the unrighteous
more at ease in unrighteousness, or occasion the injuries com-
mitted against the oppressed to be more lightly looked over. ' '
— Considerations on the True Harmony of Mankind, c 3, by
John Woolman.

226 IMMORAL AGENCY. [ESSAY II.

be done ; with this aggravation, when compared with
the examples of Seneca, that whilst the money would
probably do mischief but to one or two persons, the
book may injure a hundred or a thousand. Of the
writers of injurious books, we need say no more. If
the inferior agents are censurable, the primary agent
must be more censurable. A printer or a bookseller
should, however, reflect, that to be not so bad as
another, is a very different thing from being innocent.
When we see that the owner of a press will print any
work that is offered to him, with no other concern
about its tendency than whether it will subject him to
penalties from the law, we surely must perceive that
he exercises but a very imperfect virtue. Is it
obligatory upon us not to promote ill principles in
other men ? He does not fulfil the obligation. Is it
obligatory upon us to promote rectitude by unimpeach-
able example ? He does not exhibit that example. If
it were right for my neighbor to furnish me with the
means of moral injury, it would not be wrong for me
to accept and to employ them.

I stand in a bookseller's shop, and observe his cus-
tomers successively coming in. One orders a lexicon,
aud one a work of scurrilous infidelity ; one Captain
Cook's Voyages, and one a new licentious romance.
If the bookseller takes and executes all these orders
with the same willingness, I cannot but perceive that
there is an inconsistency, an incompleteness, in his
moral principles of action. Perhaps this person is so
conscious of the mischievous effects of such books, that
he would not allow them in the hands of his children,
nor suffer them to be seen on his parlor table. But if
he thus knows the evils which they inflict, can it be
right for him to be the agent in diffusing them ? Such
a person does not exhibit that consistency, that com-
pleteness of virtuous conduct, without which the

CHAP. VIII.] IMMORAL AGENCY. 227

Christian character cannot be fully exhibited. Step
into the shop of this bookseller's neighbor, a druggist,
and there, if a person asks for some arsenic, the trades-
man begins to be anxious. He considers whether it is
probable the buyer wants it for a proper purpose. If
he does sell it, he cautions the buyer to keep it where
others cannot have access to it ; and, before he delivers
the packet, legibly inscribes upon it poison. One of
these men sells poison to the body, and the other
poison to the mind. If the anxiety and caution of the
druggist is right, the indifference of the bookseller
must be wrong. Add to which, that the druggist
would not sell arsenic at all if it were not sometimes
useful ; but to what readers can a vicious book be
useful ?

Suppose for a moment that no printer would commit
.such a book to his press, and that no bookseller would
sell it, the consequence would be, that nine-tenths of
these manuscripts would be thrown into the fire, or
rather, that they would never have been written. The
inference is obvious ; and surely it is not needful again
to enforce the consideration, that although your
refusal might not prevent vicious books from being
published, you are not therefore exempted from the
obligation to refuse. A man must do his duty whether
the effects of his fidelity be such as he would desire or
not. Such purity of conduct might, no doubt, circum-
scribe a man's business, and so does purity of conduct
in some other professions ; but if this be a sufficient
excuse for contributing to demoralize the world, if
profit be a justification of a departure from rectitude, it
will be easy to defend the business of a pickpocket.

I know that the principles of conduct which these
paragraphs recommend, lead to grave practical conse-
quences : I know that they lead to the conclusion that
the business of a printer or bookseller, as it is ordi-

228 IMMORAL AGENCY. [ESSAY II.

narily conducted, is not consistent with Christian up-
rightness. A man may carry on a business in select
works; and this, by some conscientious parsons, is
really done. In the present state of the press, the diffi-
culty of obtaining a considerable business as a book-
seller without circulating injurious works may fre-
quently be great, and it is in consequence of this diffi-
culty that we see so few booksellers amongst the Quak-
ers. The few who do conduct the business generally
reside in large towns, where the demand for all books
is so great that a person can procure a competent in-
come though he excludes the bad.

He who is more studious to justify his conduct than
to act aright may say, that if a person may sell no book
that can injure another, he can scarcely sell any book.
The answer is, that although there must be some diffi-
culty in discrimination, though a bookseller cannot
always inform himself what the precise 'tendency of a
book is — yet there can be no difficulty in judging re-
specting numberless books, that their tendency is bad.
If we cannot define the precise distinction between the
good and the evil, we can, nevertheless, perceive the
evil when it has attained to a certain extent. He who
cannot distinguish day from evening can distinguish it
from night.

The case of the proprietors of common circulating
libraries is yet more palpable ; because the majority of
the books which they contain inflict injury upon their
readers. How it happens that persons of respectable
character, and who join with others in lamenting the
frivolity, and worse than frivolity, of the age, never-
theless daily and hourly contribute to the mischief,
without any apparent consciousness of inconsistency, it
is difficult to explain. A person establishes, perhaps,
one of these libraries for the first time in a country
town. He supplies the younger and less busy part of

CHAP. VIII.] IMMORAL AGENCY. 229

its inhabitants with a source of moral injury from
which hitherto they had been exempt. The girl who,
till now, possessed sober views of life, he teaches to
dream of the extravagances of love ; he familiarizes her
ideas with intrigue and licentiousness ; destroys her dis-
position for rational pursuits ; and prepares her, it may
be, for a victim of debauchery. These evils, or such
as these, he inflicts, not upon one or two, but upon as
many as he can ; and yet this person lays his head upon
his pillow, as if, in all this, he was not offending against
virtue or against man !

Politic ai. Affairs. — The amount of immoral
agency which is practised in these affairs, is very
great. Look to any of the continental governments,
or to any that have subsisted there, how few acts of
misrule, of oppression, of injustice, and of crime, have
been prevented by the want of agents of the iniquity !
I speak not of notoriously bad men: of these, bad
governors can usually find enough : but I speak of men
who pretend to respectability and virtue of character,
and who are actually called respectable by the world.
There is perhaps no class of affairs in which the agency
of others is more indispensable to the accomplishment
of a vicious act, than in the political. Very little —
comparatively very little — of oppression and of the po-
litical vices of rulers should wTe see, if reputable men
did not lend their agency. These evils could not be
committed through the agency of merely bad men; be-
cause the very fact that bad men only would abet them,
would frequently preclude the possibility of their
commission. It is not to be pretended that no pub-
lic men possess or have possessed sufficient virtue
to refuse to be the agents of a vicious government —
but they are few. If they were numerous, especially
if they were as numerous as they ought to be,
history, even very modern history, would have had a

23O IMMORAL AGENCY. [ESSAY II.

far other record to frame than that which now devolves
10 her. Can it be needful to argue upon such things ?
Can it be needful to prove that, neither the commands
of ministers, nor "systems of policy," nor any other
circumstance, exempts a public man from the obliga-
tions of the moral law ? Public men often act as if they
thought that to be a public man was to be brought
under the jurisdiction of a new and a relaxed morality.
They often act as if they thought that not to be the
prime mover in political misdeeds, was to be exempt
from all moral responsibility for those deeds. A
dagger, if it could think, would think it was not re-
sponsible for the assassination of which it was the
agent. A public man may be a political dagger, but
he cannot, like the dagger, be irresponsible.

These illustrations of immoral agency and of the
obligation to avoid it might be multiplied, if enough
had not been offered to make our sentiments, and the
reasons upon which they are founded, obvious to the
reader. Undoubtedly, in the present state of society,
it is no easy task, upon these subjects, to wash our
hands in innocency. But if we cannot avoid all
agency, direct or indirect, in evil things, we can avoid
much: and it will be sufficiently early to complain of
the difficulty of complete purity, when we have dis-
missed from our conduct as much impurity as we can.

CHAP. IX.] INFXUENCiC OF INDIVIDUALS, ETC. 23 1

CHAPTER IX.

THE INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALS UPON PUBLIC
NOTIONS OF MORALITY.

Public notions of morality — Errors of public opinion: their
effects — Duelling — Glory — Military virtues — Military talent —
Bravery — Courage — Patriotism not the soldier's motive — Mili-
tary fame — Public opinion of unchastity: In women: In men
— Power of character — Character in Legal men — Fame — -
Faults of great men — The Press — Newspapers — History: Its
defects: Its power.

That the influence of public opinion upon the prac-
tice of virtue is very great, needs no proof. Of this
influence the reader has seen some remarkable illustra-
tions in the discussion of the efficacy of oaths in bind-
ing to veracity.* There is, indeed, almost no action
and no institution which public opinion does not affect.
In moral affairs it makes men call one mode of human
destruction murderous and one honorable; it makes
the same action abominable in one individual and
venial in another: in public institutions, from a village
workhouse to the constitution of a state, it is powerful
alike for evil or for good. If it be misdirected, it will
strengthen and perpetuate corruption and abuse; if it
be directed aright, it will eventually remove corruptions
and correct abuses with a power which no power can
withstand.

In proportion to the greatness of its power is the ne-
cessity of rectifying public opinion itself. To con-
tribute to its rectitude is to exercise exalted philan-
thropy— to contribute to its incorrectness is to spread
wickedness and misery in the world. The purpose of
the present chapter is to remark upon some of those
subjects on which the public opinion appears to be in-
accurate, and upon the consequent obligation upon in-
dividuals not to perpetuate that inaccuracy and its
* Essay 2, chap. 7.

232 INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALS UPON [ESSAY .II.

attendant evils by their conduct or their language.
Of the positive part of the obligation — that which re-
spects the active correction of common opinions little
will be said. He who does not promote the evil can
scarcely fail of promoting the good. A man often must
deliver his sentiments respecting the principles and
actions of others, and if he delivers them, so as not to
encourage what is wrong, he will practically encourage
what is right.

It might have been presumed of a people who assent
to the authority of the moral law, that their notions
of the merit or turpitude of actions would have been
conformable with the doctrines which that law delivers.
Far other is the fact. The estimates of the moral law
and of public opinion are discordant to excess. Men
have practiced a sort of transposition with the moral
precepts, and have assigned to them arbitrary and ca-
pricious, and therefore new and mischievous, stations
on the moral scale. The order both of the vices and
the virtues is greatly deranged.

"How, it may reasonably be asked, do these strange
incongruities arise? First, men practise a sort of
voluntary deception on themselves ; they persuade
themselves to think that an offence which they desire
to commit, is not so vicious as the moral law indicates,
or as others to which they have little temptation.
They persuade themselves again, that a virtue which
is easily practised, is of great worth, because they thus
flatter themselves with complacent notions of their ex-
cellences at a cheap rate. Virtues which are difficult
they, for the same reason, depreciate. This is the dic-
tate of interest. It is manifestly good policy to think
lightly of the value of a quality which we do not
choose to be at the cost of possessing ; and who would
willingly think there was much evil in a vice which he
practised every day? — That which a man thus

CHAP. IX.] PUBLIC NOTIONS OF MORALITY. 233

persuades himself to think a trivial vice or an unimpor-
tant virtue, he of course speaks of as such amongst his
neighbors. They perhaps are as much interested in
propagating the delusion as he : they listen with will-
ing ears, and cherish and proclaim the grateful false-
hood. By these and by other means the public notions
become influenced ; a long continuance of the general
chicanery at length actually confounds the public
opinion ; and when once an opinion has become a
public opinion, there is no difficulty in accounting for
the perpetuation of the fallacy.

If sometimes the mind of an individual recurs to the
purer standard, a multitude of obstacles present them-
selves to its practical adoption. He hopes that under
the present circumstances of society an exact obedience
to the moral law is not required ; he tries to think that
the notions of a kingdom or a continent cannot be so
erroneous ; and at any rate trusts that as he deviates
with millions, millions will hardly be held guilty at the
bar of God. The misdirection of public opinion is an
obstacle to the virtue even of good men. He who looks
beyond the notions of others, and founds his moral
principles upon the moral law, yet feels that it is more
difficult to conform to that law when he is discounte-
nanced by the general notions than if those notions
supported and encouraged him. What then must the
effect of such misdirection be upon those to whom ac-
ceptance in the world is the principal concern, and
who, if others applaud or smile, seem to be indifferent
whether their own hearts condemn them ?

Now, with a participation in the evils which the mis-
direction of public opinion occasions, every one is
chargeable who speaks of moral actions according to a
standard that varies from that which Christianity has
exhibited. Here is the cause of the evil, and here
must be its remedy. " It is an important maxim in

234 INFLUENCE OE INDIVIDUALS UPON [ESSAY II.

morals as well as in education to call things by their
right names."* "To bestow good names on bad
things, is to give them a passport in the world under a
delusive disguise, "f " The soft names and plausible
colors under which deceit, sensuality, and revenge are
presented to us in common discourse, weaken by de-
grees our natural sense of the distinction between good
and evil. "J Public notions of morality constitute a
sort of line of demarcation, which is regarded by most
men in their practice as a boundary between right and
wrong. He who contributes to fix this boundary in
the wrong place, who places evil on the side of virtue,
or goodness on the side of vice, offends more deeply
against the morality and the welfare of the world, than
multitudes who are punished by the arm of law. If
moral offences are to be estimated by their conse-
quences, few will be found so deep as that of habitually
giving good names to bad things. It is well indeed
for the responsibility of individuals that their contri-
bution to the aggregate mischief is commonly small.
Yet every man should remember that it is by the con-
tribution of individuals that the aggregate is formed ;
and that it can only be by the deductions of individuals
that it will be done away.

Duelling. — If two boys who disagreed about a
game of marbles or a penny tart, should therefore walk
out by the river side, quietly take off their clothes,
and when they had got into the water, each try to
keep the other's head down until one of them was
drowned, we should doubtless think that these two
boys were mad. If, when the survivor returned to his
schoolfellows, they patted him on the shoulder, told him
he was a spirited fellow, and that, if he had not tried the
feat in the water, they would never have played at mar-

* Rees's Encyclop. Art. Philos. Moral.

f Knox's Essays, No. 34. J Blair, Serm. 9.

CHAP. IX.] PUBLIC NOTIONS OF MORALITY. 235

bles or any other game with him again, we should doubt-
less think that these boys were infected w7ith a most re-
volting and disgusting depravity and ferociousness. We
should instantly exert ourselves to correct their principles,
should feel assured that nothing could ever induce us
to tolerate, much less to encourage such abandoned
depravity. And yet we do both tolerate and encourage
such depravity every day. Change the penny tart for
some other trifle ; instead of boys put men, and instead
of a river, a pistol — and we encourage it all. We vir-
tually pat the survivor's shoulder, tell him he is a man
of honor, and that, if he had not shot at his acquaint-
ance, we would never have dined with him again.
" Revolting and disgusting depravity " are at once ex-
cluded from our vocabulary. We substitute such
phrases as ' ' the course which a gentleman is obliged to
pursue" — "it was necessary to his honor" — "one
could not have associated with him if he had not
fought. ' ' — We are the schoolboys, grown up ; and by
the absurdity, and more than absurdity of our phrases
and actions, shooting or drowning (it matters not
which) becomes the practice of the national school.

It is not a trifling question that a man puts to him-
self when he asks, What is the amount of my contribu-
tion to this detestable practice? It is by individual
contributions to the public notions respecting it that
the practice is kept up. Men do not fire at one another
because they are fond of risking their own lives or
other men's, but because public notions are such as
they are. Nor do I think any deduction can be more
manifestly just, than that he who contributes to the
misdirection of these notions is responsible for a share
of the evil and the guilt. When some offence has
given probability to a duel, every man acts immorally
who evinces any disposition to coolness with either
party until he has resolved to fight ; and if eventually

236 influence; of individuals upon [essay ii.

one of them falls, he is a party to his destruction.
Every word of unfriendliness, every look of indiffer-
ence, is positive guilt; for it is such words and such
looks that drive men to their pistols. It is the same
after a victim has fallen. "I pity his family, but they
have the consolation of knowing that he vindicated his
honor, ' ' is equivalent to urging another and another to
fight. Every heedless gossip who asks, "Have you
heard of this affair of honor?" and every reporter of
news who relates it as a proper and necessary proced-
ure, participates in the general crime.

If they who hear of an intended meeting amongst
their friends hasten to manifest that they will continue
their intercouse with the parties though they do not
fight — if none talks of vindicating honor by demand-
ing satisfaction — if he who speaks and he who writes
of this atrocity, speaks and writes as reason and morals
dictate, duelling will soon disappear from the world.
To contribute to the suppression of the custom is there-
fore easy, and let no man, and let no woman, who does
not, as occasion offers, express reprobation of the
custom, think that their hands are clear of blood.
They especially are responsible for its continuance
whose station or general character gives peculiar influ-
ence to their opinions in its favor.

Glory: Military Virtues. — To prove that war
is an evil were much the same as to prove that the
light of the sun is a good. And yet, though no one
will dispute the truth, there are few who consider, and
few who know how great the evil is. The practice is
encircled with so many glittering fictions, that most
men are content with but a vague and inadequate idea
of the calamities, moral, physical, and political, which
it inflicts upon our species. But if few men consider
how prodigious its mischiefs are they see enough to agree
in the conclusion, that the less frequently it happens

CHAP. IX.] PUBLIC NOTIONS OF MORALITY. 237

the better for the common interests of man. Sup-
posing then that some wars are lawful and unavoidable,
it is nevertheless manifest, that whatever tends to make
them more frequent than necessity requires, must be
very pernicious to mankind. Now, in consequence of
a misdirection of public notions, this needless frequency
exists. Public opinion is favorable, not so much to
war in the abstract or in practice, as to the profession
of arms; and the inevitable consequence is this, that
war itself is greatly promoted without reference to the
causes for which it may be undertaken. By attaching
notions of honor to the military profession, and of glory
to military achievements, three wars probably have
been occasioned where there otherwise would have been
but one. To talk of the " splendors of conquest,"
and the u glories of victory," to extol those who "fall
covered with honor in their country's cause," is to
occasion the recurrence of wars, not because they are
necessary, but because they are desired. It is in fact
contributing, according to the speaker's power, to des-
olate provinces and set villages in flames, to ruin thous-
ands and destroy thousands — to inflict, in brief, all the
evils and the miseries which war inflicts. ' ' Splend-
ors,"— "Glories," — "Honors!" — the listening soldier
wants to signalize himself like the heroes who are de-
parted; he wants to thrust his sickle into the fields of
fame and reap undying laurels: — How shall he signal-
ize himself without a war, and on what field can he
reap glory but in the field of battle ? The consequence
is inevitable: Multitudes desire war; — they are fond of
war — and it requires no sagacity to discover, that to
desire and to love it is to make it likely to happen.
Thus a perpetual motive to human destruction is
created, of which the tendency is as inevitable as the
tendency of a stone to fall to the earth. The present
state of public opinion manifestly promotes the

238 INFLUENCE) OF INDIVIDUALS UPON [FSSAY II.

recurrence of wars of all kinds, necessary (if such there
are) and unnecessary. It promotes wars of pure aggres-
sion, of the most unmingled wickedness; it promoted
the wars of the departed Iyouises and Napoleons. It
awards f ' glory " to the soldier wherever be his achieve-
ments and in whatever cause.

Now, waiving the after consideration as to the
nature of glory itself, the individual may judge of his
duties with respect to public opinion by its effects.
To minister to the popular notions of glory is to en-
courage needless wars; it is therefore his duty not to
minister to these notions. Common talk by a man's
fireside contributes its little to the universal evil, and
shares in the universal offence. Of the writers of
some books it is not too much to suppose, that they
have occasioned more murders than all the clubs and
pistols of assassins for ages have effected. Is there no
responsibility for this?

But perhaps it will afford to some men new ideas if
we enquire what the real nature of the military virtues
is. They receive more of applause than virtues of any
other kind. How does this happen ? We must seek a
solution in the seeming paradox, that their pretensions
to the characters of virtues are few and small. They
receive much applause because they merit little. They
could not subsist without it; and if men resolve to
practice war, and consequently to require the conduct
which gives success to war, they must decorate that
conduct with glittering fictions, and extol the military
virtues though they be neither .good nor great. Of
every species of real excellence it is the general char-
acteristic that it is not anxious for applause. The
more elevated the virtue the less the desire, and the
less is the public voice a motive to action. What
should we say of that man's benevolence who would
not relieve a neighbor in distress unless the donation

CHAP. IX.] PUBLIC NOTIONS OF MORALITY. 239

would be praised in a newspaper ? What should we say
of that man's piety who prayed only when he was
"seen of men?" But the military virtues live upon
applause; it is their vital element and their food, their
great pervading motive and reward. Are there, then,
amongst the respective virtues such discordances of
character — such total contrariety of nature and essence ?
No, no. But how, then, do you account for the fact,
that whilst all other great virtues are independent of
the public praise and stand aloof from it, the military
virtues can scarely exist without it ?

It is again a characteristic of exalted virtue, that it
tends to produce exalted virtues of other kinds. He
that is distinguished by diffusive benevolence, is rarely
chargeable with profaneness or debauchery. The man
of piety is not seen drunk. The man of candor and
humility is not vindictive or unchaste. Can the same
thing be predicated of the tendency of military vir-
tues ? Do they tend powerfully to the production of
all other virtues ? Is the brave man peculiarly pious ?
Is the military patriot peculiarly chaste ? Is he who
pants for glory and acquires it, distinguished by un-
usual placability and temperance? No, no. How then
do you account for the fact, that whilst other virtues
thus strongly tend to produce and to foster one
another,* the military virtues have little of such tend-
ency, or none ?

The simple truth, however veiled and however un-
welcome, is this, that the military virtues will not/
endure examination. They are called what they are
not, or what they are in a very inferior degree to that
which popular notions imply. It would not serve the
purposes of war to represent these qualities as being
what they are: we therefore dress them with factitious

* " The virtues are nearly related, and live in the greatest
harmony with each other." — OpiE.

-?40 INFLUENCE OE INDIVIDUALS UPON [ESSAY II.

and alluring ornaments; and they have been dressed so
long that we admire the show, and forget to enquire
what is underneath. Our applauses of military virtues
do not adorn them like the natural bloom of loveliness;
it is the paint of that which, if seen, would not attract,
if it did not repel us. They are not like the verdure
which adorns the meadow, but the greenness that con-
ceals a bog. If the reader says that we indulge in
declamation, we invite, we solicit him to investigate
the truth. And yet, without enquiring further, there
is conclusive evidence in the fact, that glory, that
praise, is the vital principle of military virtue. Let us
take sound rules for our guides of judgment, and it is
not possible, that we should regard any quality as pos-
sessing much virtue which lives only or chiefly upon
praise. And who will pretend that the ranks of armies
would be filled if no tongue talked of bravery and
glory, and no newspaper published the achievements of
a regiment ?*

" Truth is a naked and open daylight, that doth not
show the masques and mummeries and triumphs of the
world half so stately and daintily as candlelights, "f
Let us dismiss, then, that candlelight examination
which men are wont to adopt when they contemplate
military virtues, and see what appearance they exhibit
in the daylight of truth. Military talent, and active
courage, and patriotism, or some other motive, appear
to be the foundations and the subjects of our applause.

* It is pleasant to hear an intelligent woman say, ' ' I cannot
tell how or why the love of glory is a less selfish principle than
the love of riches:"* and it is pleasant to hear one of our then
principal Reviews say, ' ' Glory is the most selfish of all passions
except love."f That which is selfish can hardly be very vir-
tuous.

f Lord Bacon: Essays.

* Memoirs of late Jane Taylor. f West. Rev. No. 13.

CHAP. IX.] PUBLIC NOTIONS OF1 MORALITY. 241

With respect to talent little needs to be said, since
few have an opportunity of displaying it. An able
general may exhibit his capacity for military affairs ;
but of the mass of those who join in battles and par-
ticipate in their ' ' glories, ' ' little more is expected than
that they should be obedient, and brave.

Valor and bravery, however, may be exhibited by
the many — not by generals and admirals alone, but by
ensigns and midshipmen, by seamen and by privates.
What then is valor, and what is bravery ? ' ' There is
nothing great but what is virtuous, nor indeed truly
great but what is composed and quiet."* There is
much of truth in this. Yet where then is the greatness of
bravery, for where is the composure and quietude of the
quality ? ' ' Valor or active courage is for the most part
constitutional, and therefore can have no more claim to
moral merit than wit, beauty or health. ' ' f Accordingly,
the question which we have just asked respecting
military talent, may be especially asked respecting
bravery. Cannot bravery be exhibited in common by
the good and the bad? — Yet further. ''It is a great
weakness for a man to value himself upon any thing
wherein he shall be outdone by fools and brutes. ' ' Is
not the bravery of the bravest outdone even by brutes.
When the soldier has vigorously assaulted the enemy,
when though repulsed he returns to the conflict, when
being wounded he still brandishes his sword, till it drops
from his grasp by faintness or death — he surely is
brave. What then is the moral rank to which he has
attained? He has attained to the rank of a bull-dog.
The dog, too, vigorously assails his enemy ; when
tossed into the air he returns to the conflict ; when
gored he still continues to bite, and yields not his hold
until he is stunned or killed. Contemplating bravery

> * Seneca, f Soame Jenyns : Internal Evid. of Christianity.
Prop. 3.

242 INFLtmNCK OF INDIVIDUALS UPON [KSSAY II.

as such, there is not a man in Britain or in Europe
whose bravery entitles him to praise which he must
not share with the combatants of a cockpit. Of the
moral qualities that are components of bravery, the
reader may form some conception from this lan-
guage of a man who is said to be a large landed pro-
prietor, a magistrate, and a member of parliament.
' ' I am one of those who think that evil alone does not
result from poaching. The risk poachers run from
the dangers that beset them, added to their occupation
being carried on in cold dark nights, begets a hardi-
hood of frame and contempt of danger that is not with-
out its value. I never heard or knew of a poacher
being a coward. They all make good soldiers ; and
military men are well aware that two or three men in
each troop or company, of bold and enterprising spirits,
are not without their effect on their comrades. ' ' The
same may of course be said of smugglers and highway-
men. If these are the characters in whom we are
peculiarly to seek for bravery, what are the moral qual-
ities of bravery itself ! All just, all rational, and I
will venture to affirm all permanent reputation refers to
the mind or to virtue ; and what connection has animal
power or animal hardihood with intellect or goodness?
I do not decry courage : he who was better acquainted
than we are with the nature and worth of human
actions, attached much value to courage, but he at-
tached none to bravery.* Courage he recommended
by his precepts and enforced by his example : bravery
he never recommended at all. The wisdom of this dis-
tinction and its accordancy with the principles of his
religion are plain. Bravery requires the existence of
many of those dispositions which he disallowed.
* ' ' Whatever merit valor may have assumed among pagans,
with Christians it can pretend to none." Soame Jenyns : In-
ternal Evid. of Christianity, Prop. 3.

CHAP. IX.] PUBLIC NOTIONS OF MORALITY. 243

Animosity, the desire of retaliation, the disposition to
injure and destroy — all this is necessary to the existence
of bravery, but all this is incompatible with Christian-
ity. The courage which Christianity requires is to
bravery what fortitude is to daring — an effort of the
mental principles rather than of the spirits. It is a
calm steady determinateness of purpose, that will not
be diverted by solicitation or awed by fear. " Behold, I
go bound in the spirit unto Jerusalem, not knowing the
things that shall befall me there ; save that the Holy
Ghost witnesseth in every city, saying that bonds and
afflictions abide me. But none of these things move me,
neither count I my life dear u?ito myself. * What re-
semblance has bravery to courage like this? This
courage is a virtue, and a virtue which it is difficult to
acquire or to practise; and we have heedlessly or ingen-
iously transferred its praise to another quality which is
inferior in its nature and easier to acquire, in order that
we may obtain the reputation of virtue at a cheap rate.

Of those who thus extol the lower qualities of our
nature, few perhaps are conscious to what a degree
they are deluded. In exhibiting this delusion let us
not forget the purpose for which it is done. The popu-
lar notion respecting bravery does not terminate in an
innoxious mistake. The consequences are practically
and greatly evil. He that has placed his hopes upon
the praises of valor, desires of course an opportunity of
acquiring them, and this opportunity he cannot find
but in the destruction of men. That such powerful
motives will lead to this destruction when even am-
bition can scarcely find a pretext, we need not the tes-
timony of experience to assure us. It is enough that
we consider the principles which actuate mankind.

And if we turn from actions to motives, from bravery
to patriotism, we are presented with similar delusions,
* Acts xx. 22.

244 INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALS UPON [ESSAY II.

and with similar mischiefs as their consequence. To
" fight nobly for our country," to <( fall covered with
glory in our country's cause," to " sacrifice our lives
for the liberties and laws and religion of our country, ' '
are phrases in the mouth of multitudes. What do they
mean, and to whom do they apply? We contend, that
to say generally of those who perish in war that ' ' they
have died for their country," is simply untrue : and
for this simple reason, that they did not fight for it.
It is not true that patriotism is their motive. Why is
a boy destined from school for the army ? Is it that his
father is more patriotic than his neighbor, who des-
tines his son for the bar ? Or if the boy himself begs
his father to buy an ensigncy, is it because he loves
his country, or is it because he dreams of glory, and
admires scarlet and plumes and swords ? The officer
enters the service in order that he may obtain an' in-
come, not in order to benefit his fellow citizens. The
private enters it because he prefers a soldier's life to
another, or because he has no wish but the wish for
change. And having entered the army, what is the
motive that induces the private or his superiors to
fight ? It is that fighting is part of their business ; that
is one of the conditions upon which they were hired.
Patriotism is not the motive. Of those who fall in
battle, is there one in a hundred who even thinks of
his country's good ? He thinks perhaps of glory and of
the fame of his regiment — he hopes perhaps that " Sal-
amanca " or ' ' Austerlitz ' ' will henceforth be in-
scribed on its colors ; but rational views of his country's
welfare are foreign to his mind. He has scarcely a
thought about the matter. He fights in battle as a
horse draws in a carriage, because he is compelled to
do it, or because he has done it before ; but he proba-
bly thinks no more of his country's good than the same
horse, if he were carrying corn to a granary, would

CHAP. IX.] PUBLIC NOTIONS OF MORALITY. 245

think he was providing for the comforts of his master.
The truth therefore is, that we give to the soldier that
of which we are wont to be sufficiently sparing — a
gratuitous concession of merit. If he but "fights
bravely," he is a patriot and secure of his praise.

To sacrifice our lives for the liberties and laws and re-
ligion of our native land, are undoubtedly high-sound-
ing words ; but who are they that will do it ? Who is
it that will sacrifice his life for his country ? Will the
senator who supports a war ? Will the writer who de-
claims upon patriotism ? Will the minister of religion
who recommends the sacrifice ? Take away war and its
fictions, and there is not a man of them who will do it.
Will he sacrifice his life at home ? If the loss of his life
in London or at York would procure just so much bene-
fit to his country as the loss of one soldier's in the
field, would he be willing to lay his head upon the
block? Is he willing, for such a coritribution to his
country's good, to resign himself without notice and
without remembrance to the executioner ? Alas for the
fictions of war ! where is such a man ? Men will not
sacrifice their lives at all unless it be in war ; and they
do not sacrifice them in war from motives of patriotism.
In no rational use of language, therefore, can it be
said that the soldier " dies for his country."

Not that there may not be or that there have not
been persons who fight from motives of patriotism.
But the occurrence is comparatively rare. There may
be physicians who qualify themselves for practice from
motives of benevolence to the sick ; or lawyers who
assume the gown in order to plead for the injured and
oppressed ; but ' it is an unusual motive, and so is
patriotism to the soldier.

And after all, even if all soldiers fought out of zeal
for their country, what is the merit of patriotism itself ?
I do not say that it possesses no virtue, but I affirm

246 INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUATES UPON [ESSAY II.

and hope hereafter to show, that its virtue is extrava-
gantly overrated,* and that if every one who fought
did fight for his country, he would often be actuated
only by a mode of selfishness — of selfishness which
sacrifices the general interests of the species to the in-
terests of a part.

Such and so low are the qualities which have ob-
tained from deluded and deluding millions, fame,
honors, glories. A prodigious structure, and almost
without a base : — a structure so vast, so brilliant, so
attractive, that the greater portion of mankind are con-
tent to gaze in admiration, without any enquiry into
its basis or any solicitude for its durability. If, how-
ever, it should be that the gorgeous temple will be
able to stand only till Christian truth and light become
predominant, it surely will be wise of those who seek a
niche in its apartments as their paramount and final
good, to pause ere they proceed. If they desire a rep-
utation that shall outlive guilt and fiction, let them
look to the basis of military fame. If this fame should
one day sink into oblivion and contempt, it will not be
the first instance in which wide-spread glory has been
found to be a glittering bubble that has burst and been
forgotten. Look at the days of chivalry. Of the ten
thousand Quixotes of the middle ages, where is now
the honor or the name ? Yet poets once sang their
praises, and the chronicler of their achievements be-
lieved he was recording an everlasting fame. Where
are now the glories of the tournament ? Glories

" Of which all Europe rang from side to side."

Where is the champion whom princesses caressed and
nobles envied ? Where are the triumphs of Scotus and
Aquinas, and where are the folios that perpetuated their
fame ? The glories of war have indeed outlived these ;
* Essay III, c. 9.

CHAP. IX.] PUBLIC NOTIONS OF MORALITY. 247

human passions are less mutable than human follies ;
but I am willing to avow the conviction, that these
glories are alike destined to sink into forgetfulness,
and that the time is approaching when the applauses
of heroism and the splendors of conquest will be remem-
bered only as follies and iniquities that are past. Let
him who seeks for fame other than that which an era of
Christian purity will allow, make haste ; for every hour
that he delays its acquisition will shorten its duration.
This is certain if there be certainty in the promises of
Heaven.

But we must not forget the purpose for which
these illustrations of the military virtues are offered to
the reader ; — to remind him not merely that they are
fictions, but fictions which are the occasion of
excess of misery to mankind — to remind him that it is
his business, from considerations of humanity and of
religion, to refuse to give currency to the popular de-
lusions— and to remind him that if he does promote
them, he promotes, by the act, misery in all its forms and
guilt in all its excesses. Upon such subjects, men are
not left to exercise their own inclinations. Morality
interposes its commands ; and they are commands
which, if we would be moral, we must obey.

Unchastity.— No portion of these pages is devoted
to the enforcement of moral obligations upon this sub-
ject, partly because these obligations are commonly
acknowledged how little soever they may be regarded,
and partly because, as the reader will have seen, the
object of these essays is to recommend those applica-
tions of the moral law which are frequently neglected
in the practice even of respectable men. — But in refer-
ence to the influence of public opinion on offences con-
nected with the sexual constitution, it will readily be
perceived that something should be said, when it is
considered that some of the popular notions respecting

248 INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALS UPON [ESSAY II.

them are extravagantly inconsistent with the moral
law. The want of chastity in a woman is visited by
public opinion with the severest reprobation — in men,
with very little or with none. Now, morality makes
no such distinction. The offence is frequently adverted
to in the Christian scriptures ; but I believe there is no
one precept which intimates that, in the estimation of
its writer, there was any difference in the turpitude of
the offence respectively in men and women. If it be
in this volume that we are to seek for the principles of
the moral law, how shall we defend the state of popu-
lar opinion? "If unchastity in a woman, whom St.
Paul terms the glory of man, be such a scandal and dis-
honor, then certainly in a man, who is both the image
and glory of God, it must, though commonly not so
thought, be much more deflowering and dishonor-
able. "* But this departure from the moral law, like
all other departures, produces its legitimate, that is,
pernicious effects. The sex in whom popular opinion
reprobates the offences, comparatively seldom commits
them : the sex in whom it tolerates the offences, com-
mits them to an enormous extent. It is obvious, there-
fore, that to promote the present state of popular
opinion, is to promote and to encourage the want of
chastity in men.

That some very beneficial consequences result from
the strong direction of its current against the offence
in a woman, is certain. The consciousness that upon
the retention of her reputation depends so tremendous
a stake, is probably a more efficacious motive to its
preservation than any other. The abandonment to
which the loss of personal integrity generally consigns
a woman, is a perpetual and fearful warning to the sex.
Almost every human being deprecates and dreads the
general disfavor of mankind; and thus, notwithstanding
* Milton : Christian Doctrine, p. 624.

CHAP. IX.] PUBLIC NOTIONS OF MORAUTY. 249

temptations of all kinds, the number of women
who do incur it is comparatively small.

But the fact that public opinion is thus powerful in
restraining one sex, is a sufficient evidence that it
would also be powerful in restraining the other. Waiv-
ing for the present the question whether the popular
disapprobation of the crime in a woman is not too
severe — if the man who was guilty was forthwith and
immediately consigned to infamy : if he was expelled
from virtuous society, and condemned for the remainder
of life to the lowest degradation, how quickly would the
frequency of the crime be diminished ! The reforma-
tion amongst men would effect a reformation amongst
women too ; and the reciprocal temptations which each
addresses to the other, would in a great degree be
withdrawn. If there were few seducers few would be
seduced ; and few therefore would in turn become the
seducers of men.

But instead of this direction of public opinion, what
is the ordinary language respecting the man who thus
violates the moral law ? We are told that "he is
rather unsteady ; " that " there is a little of the young
man about him ; " that " he is not free from indiscre-
tions. ' ' And what is he likely to think of all this ?
Why, that for a young man to have a little of the
young man about him is perfectly natural ; that to be
rather unsteady and a little indiscreet is not, to be
sure, what one would wish, but that it is no great
harm and will soon wear off. To employ such lan-
guage is, we say, to encourage and promote the crime
— a crime which brings more wretchedness and vice
into the world than almost any other ; and for which,
if Christianity is to be believed, the Universal Judge
will call to a severe account. If the immediate agent
be obnoxious to punishment, can he who encouraged
him expect to escape? I am persuaded that the

250 INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALS UPON [ESSAY II.

frequency of this gross offence is attributable much
more to the levity of public notions as founded upon
levity of language, than to passion ; and perhaps,
therefore, some of those who promote this levity may
be in every respect as criminal as if they committed
the crime itself.

Women themselves contribute greatly to the com-
mon levity and to its attendant mischiefs. Many a
female who talks in the language of abhorrence of an
offending sister, and averts her eye in contumely if she
meets her in the street, is perfectly willing to be the
friend and intimate of the equally offending man. That
such women are themselves duped by the vulgar dis-
tinction is not to be doubted — but then we are not to
imagine that she who practises this inconsistency ab-
hors the crime so much as the criminal. Her abhor-
rence is directed, not so much to the violation of the
moral law as to the party by whom it is violated. ' ' To
little respect has that woman a claim on the score of
modesty, though her reputation may be white as the
driven snow, who smiles on the libertine whilst she
spurns the victims of his lawless appetites." No,
no. — If such women would convince us that it is the
impurity which they reprobate, let them reprobate it
wherever it is found : if they would convince us that
morals or philanthropy is their motive when they
spurn the sinning sister, let them give proof by spurn-
ing him who has occasioned her to sin.

The common style of narrating occurrences and trials
of seduction &c, in the public prints, is very mis-
chievous. These flagitious actions are, it seems, a
legitimate subject of merriment ; one of the many droll
things which a newspaper contains. It is humiliating
to see respectable men sacrifice the interests of society
to such small temptation. They pander to the ap-
petite of the gross and idle of the public : — they want

CHAP. IX.] PUBLIC NOTIONS OF MORAUTY. 25 1

to sell their newspapers. — Much of this ill-timed merri-
ment is found in the addresses of counsel, and this is
one mode amongst the many in which the legal profes-
sion appears to think itself licensed to sacrifice virtue
to the usages which it has, for its own advantage,
adopted. There is cruelty as well as other vices in
these things. When we take into account the intense
suffering which prostitution produces upon its victims
and upon their friends, he who contributes, even thus
indirectly, to its extension, does not exhibit even a
tolerable sensibility to human misery. Even infidelity
acknowledges the claims of humanity ; and therefore,
if religion and religious morals were rejected, this
heartless levity of language would still be indefensible.
We call the man benevolent who relieves or diminishes
wretchedness : what should we call him who extends
and increases it?

In connection with this subject, an observation sug-
gests itself respecting the power of character in affect-
ing the whole moral principles of the mind. If loss of
character does not follow a breach of morality, that
breach may be single and alone. The agent's virtue
is so far deteriorated, but the breach does not open
wide the door to other modes of crime. If loss of
character does follow one offence, one of the great
barriers which exclude the flood of evil is thrown down ;
and though the offence which produced loss of char-
acter be really no greater than the offence with which
it is retained, yet its consequences upon the moral con-
dition are incomparably greater. The reason is, that
if you take away a person's reputation you take away
one of the principal motives to propriety of conduct.
The laborer who, being tempted to steal a piece of
bacon from the farmer, finds that no one will take him
into his house or give him employment, and that
wherever he goes he is pointed at as a thief, is almost

252 INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALS UPON [ESSAY II.

as much driven as tempted to repeat the crime. His
fellow laborer, who has much more heinously violated
the moral law by a flagitious intrigue with a servant
girl, receives from the farmer a few reproaches and a
few jests, retains his place, never perhaps repeats the
offence, and subsequently maintains a decent morality.
It has been said, "Asa woman collects all her virtue
into this point, the loss of her chastity is generally the
destruction of her moral principle." What is to be
understood by collecting virtue into one point, it is not
easy to discover. The truth is, that as popular notions
have agreed that she who loses her chastity shall re-
tain no reputation, a principal motive to the practice
of other virtues is taken away : — she therefore disre-
gards them ; and thus by degrees her moral principle
is utterly depraved. If public opinion was so modi-
fied that the world did not abandon a woman who has
been robbed of chastity, it is probable that a much
larger number of these unhappy persons would return
to virtue. The case of men offers illustration and
proof. The unchaste man retains his character, or at
any rate he retains so much that it is of great import-
ance to him to preserve the remainder. Public opin-
ion accordingly holds its strong rein upon other parts
of his conduct, and by this rein he is restrained from
deviating into other walks of vice. If the direction of
public opinion were exchanged, if the woman's offence
was held venial and the man's infamous, the world
might stand in wonder at the altered scene. We
should have worthy and respectable prostitutes, while
the men whom we now invite to our tables and marry
to our daughters, would be repulsed as the most aban-
doned of mankind. Of this I have met with a curious
illustration. — Amongst the North American Indians
" seduction is regarded as a despicable crime, and more
blame is attached to the man than to the woman :

CHAP. IX. J PUBtIC NOTIONS OF MORALITY. 253

hence the offence on the part of the female is more
readily forgotten and forgiven, and she finds little or
no difficulty in forming a subsequent matrimonial
alliance when deserted by her betrayer, who is gen-
erally regarded with distrust , and avoided in social inter-
course."*

It becomes a serious question how we shall fix upon
the degree in which diminution of character ought to
be consequent upon offences against morality. It is
not I think too much to say, that no single crime, once
committed, under the influence perhaps of strong temp-
tation, ought to occasion such a loss of character as to
make the individual regard himself as abandoned. I
make no exceptions — not even for murder. I am per-
suaded that some murders are committed with less of
personal guilt than is sometimes involved in much
smaller crimes ; but however that may be, there is no
reason why, even to, the murderer, the motives and the
avenues to amendment should be closed. Still less
ought they to be closed against the female who is per-
haps the victim — strictly the victim of seduction. Yet
if the public do not express, and strongly express, their
disapprobation, we have seen that they practically en
courage offences. In this difficulty I know of no better
and no other guide than that system which the tenor
of Christianity prescribes — abhorrence of the evil and
commiseration of him who commits it. The union of
these dispositions will be likely to produce, with re-
spect to offenses of all kinds, that conduct which most
effectually tends to discountenance them, while it as
effectually tends to reform the offenders. These, how-
ever, are not the dispositions which actuate the public
in measuring their reprobation of unchastity in women.
Something probably might rightly be deducted from
the severity with which their offence is visited : much

* Hunter's Memoirs.

254 INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALS UPON [ES9AY II.

may be rightly altered in the motives which induce this
severity. And as to men, much should be added to
the quantum of reprobation, and much correction
should be applied to the principles by which it is regu-
lated.

Fame. — The observations which were offered respect-
ing contributing to the passion for glory, involve
kindred doctrines respecting contributions generally to
individual fame. If the pretensions of those with
whose applauses the popular voice is filled, were ex-
amined by the only proper test, the test which Chris-
tianity allows, it would be found that multitudes whom
the world thus honors must be shorn of their beams.
Before Bacon's daylight of truth, poets and statesmen
and philosophers without number would hide their di-
minished heads. The mighty indeed would be fallen.
Yet it is for the acquisition of this fame that multi-
tudes toil. It is their motive to ac.tion ; and they pur-
sue that conduct which will procure fame whether it
ought to procure it or not. The inference as to the
duties of individuals in contributing to fame, is ob-
vious.

' ' The profligacy of a man of fashion is looked upon
with much less contempt and aversion than that of a
man of meaner condition*"* It ought to be looked
upon with much more. But men of fashion are not
our concern. Our business is with men of talent and
genius, with the eminent and the great. The profli-
gacy of these, too, is regarded with much less of aver-
sion than that of less gifted men. To be great,
whether intellectually or otherwise, is often like a pass-
port to impunity ; and men talk as if we ought to speak
leniently of the faults of a man who delights us by his
genius or his talent. This precisely is the man whose
faults we should be most prompt to mark, because he
* Ad. Smith : Theo. Mor. Sent.

CHAP. IX.] FUBUC NOTIONS OF1 MORALITY. 255

is the man whose faults are most seducing to the world.
Intellectual superiority brings, no doubt, its congenial
temptations. L,et these affect our judgments of the
man, but let them not diminish our reprobation of his
offences. So to extenuate the individual as to apologize
for his faults, is to inj ure the cause of virtue in one of
its most vulnerable parts. ' ' Oh ! that I could see in
men who oppose tyranny in the state, a disdain of the
tyranny of low passions in themselves. I cannot rec-
oncile myself to the idea of an immoral patriot, or to
that separation of private from public virtue which
some men think to be possible. ' ** Probably it is possi-
ble : probably there may be such a thing as an im-
moral patriot : for public opinion applauds the patriot-
ism without condemning the immorality. If men
constantly made a fit deduction from their praises of
public virtue on account of its association with private
vice, the union would frequently be severed ; and he
who hoped for celebrity from the public would find it
needful to be good as well as great. He who applauds
human excellence and really admires it, should en-
deavor to make its examples as pure and perfect as he
can. He should hold out a motive to consistency of
excellence, by evincing that nothing else can obtain
praise unmingled with censure. This endeavor should
be constant and uniform. The hearer should never be
allowed to suppose that in appreciating a person's
merits, we are indifferent to his faults. It has been
complained of one of our principal works of periodical
literature, that amongst its many and ardent praises of
Shakespeare, it has almost never alluded to his inde-
cencies. The silence is reprehensible : for what is a
reader to conclude but that indecency is a very venial
offence ? Under such circumstances, not to be with
morality is to be against it. Silence is positive mischief.
*Dr. Price : Revolution Serm.

256 INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALS UPON [KSSAY II.

People talk to us of liberality, and of allowances
for the aberrations of genius, and for the temptations
of greatness. It is well. Let the allowances be made.
— But this is frequently only affectation of candor. It
is not that we are lenient to failings, but that we are
indifferent to vice. It is not even enlightened benevo-
lence to genius or greatness itself. The faults and
vices with which talented men are chargeable deduct
greatly from their own happiness ; and it cannot be
doubted that their misdeeds have been the more wil-
lingly committed from the consciousness that apolo-
gists would be found amongst the admiring world. It
is sufficient to make that world knit its brows in anger,
to insist upon the moral demerits of a Robert Burns.
Pathetic and voluble extenuations are instantly urged.
There are extenuations of such a man's vices, and they
ought to be regarded : but no extenuations can remove
the charge of voluntary and intentional violations of
morality. Let us not hear of the enthusiasm of poetry.
Men do not write poetry as they chatter with their
neighbors : they sit down to a deliberate act ; and he
who in his verses offends against morals, intentionally
and deliberately offends.

After all, posterity exercises some justice in its
award. When the first glitter and the first applauses
are past — when death and a few years of sobriety have
given opportunity to the public mind to attend to
truth, it makes a deduction, though not a due deduc-
tion, for the shaded portions of the great man's char-
acter. It is not forgotten that Marlborough was
avaricious, that Bacon was mean ; and there are great
names of the present day of whom it will not be forgot-
ten that they had deep and dark shades in their repu-
tation. It is perhaps wonderful that those who seek
for fame are so indifferent to these deductions from its
amount. Supposing the intellectual pretensions of

CHAP. IX.] PUBLIC NOTIONS OF MORALITY. 257

Newton and Voltaire were equal, how different is their
fame ! How many and how great qualifications are
employed in praising the one ! How few and how
small in praising the other ! Editions of the works of
some of our first writers are advertised, " in which the
exceptionable passages are expunged." How foolish,
how uncalculating even as to celebrity, to have in-
serted these passages ! To write in the hope of fame,
works which posterity will mutilate before they place
them in their libraries ! — Charles James Fox said, that if,
during his administration, they could effect the abolition
of the slave trade, it ' ' would entail more true glory
upon them, and more honor upon their country, than
any other transaction in which they could be en-
gaged."* If this be true, (and who will dispute it ?)
ministers usually provide very ill for their reputation
with posterity. How anxiously devoted to measures
comparatively insignificant ! How phlegmatic respect-
ing those calls of humanity and public principle, a re-
gard of which will alone secure the permanent honors
of the world ! It may safely be relied upon, that
' ' much more unperishable is the greatness of goodness
than the greatness of power, " f or the greatness of
talent. And the difference will progressively increase.
If, as there is reason to believe, the moral condition of
mankind will improve, their estimate of the good por-
tion of a great man's character will be enhanced, and
their reprobation of the bad will become more intense
— until at length it will perhaps be found, respecting
some of those who now receive the applauses of the
world, that the balance of public opinion is against
them, and that, in the universal estimate of merit and
demerit, they will be ranked on the side of the latter.
These motives to virtue in great men are not addressed
to the Christian : he has higher motives and better : but
* Fell's Memoirs. t Sir R. K. Porter.

258 INFLUENCE OE INDIVIDUALS UPON [ESSAY II.

since it is more desirable that a man should act well
from imperfect motives than that he should act ill, we
urge him to regard the integrity of his fame.

The Press. — It is manifest that if the obligations
which have been urged apply to those who speak, they
apply with tenfold responsibility to those who write.
The man who, in talking to half a dozen of his acquain-
tance, contributes to confuse or pervert their moral
notions, is accountable for the mischief which he may
do six persons. He who writes a book containing
similar language, is answerable for a so much greater
amount of mischief as the number of his readers may
exceed six, and as the influence of books exceeds that
of conversation, by the evidence of greater deliberation
in their contents and by the greater attention which is
paid by the reader. It is not a light matter, even in
this view, to write a book for the public. We very
insufficiently consider the amount of the obligations
and the extent of the responsibility which we entail
upon ourselves." Every one knows the power of the
press in influencing the public mind. He that pub-
lishes five hundred copies of a jpook, of which any part
is likely to derange the moral judgment of a reader,
contributes materially to the propagation of evil. If
each of his books is read by four persons, he endangers
the infliction of this evil, whatever be its amount, upon
two thousand minds. Who shall tell the sum of the
mischief ? In this country the periodical press is a
powerful engine for evil or for good. The influence
of the contents of one number of a newspaper may be
small, but it is perpetually recurring. The editor of a
journal, of which no more than a thousand copies are
circulated in a week, and each of which is read by half
a dozen persons, undertakes in a year a part of the
moral guidance of thirty thousand individuals. Of
some daily papers the number of readers is so great,

CHAP. IX.] PUBLIC NOTIONS OF MORALITY. 259

that in the course of twelve months they may influence
the opinions and the conduct of six or eight millions of
men. To say nothing therefore of editors who inten-
tionally mislead and vitiate the public, and remember-
ing with what carelessness respecting the moral ten-
dency of articles a newspaper is filled, it may safely be
concluded that some creditable editors do harm in the
world to an extent, in comparison with which robberies
and treasons are as nothing.

It is not easy to imagine the sum of advantages
which would result if the periodical press not only ex-
cluded that which does harm, but preferred that which
does good. Not that grave moralities, not, especially,
that religious disquisitions, are to be desired ; but that
every reader should see and feel that the editor main-
tained an allegiance to virtue and to truth. There is
hardly any class of topics in which this allegiance may
not be manifested, and manifested without any incon-
gruous associations. You may relate the common
occurrences of the day in such a manner as to do either
good or evil. The trial of a thief, the particulars of a
conflagration, the death of a statesman, the criticism
of a debate, and a hundred other matters, may be re-
corded so as to exercise a moral influence over the
reader for the better or the worse. That the influence
is frequently for the worse needs no proof ; and it is so
much the less defensible because it may be changed to
the contrary without a word, directly, respecting morals
or religion.

However, newspapers do much more good than
harm, especially in politics. They are in this country
one of the most vigorous and beneficial instruments of
political advantage. They effect incalculable benefit
both in checking the statesman who would abuse
power, and in so influencing the public opinion as to
prepare it for, and therefore to render necessary, an

26o INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALS UPON [ESSAY II.

amelioration of political and civil institutions. The
great desideratum is enlargement of views and purity of
principle. We want in editorial labors less of parti-
zanship, less of petty squabbles about the worthless dis-
cussions of the day : we want more of the philosophy
of politics, more of that grasping intelligence which
can send a reader's reflections from facts to principles.
Our journals are, to what they ought to be, what a
chronicle of the middle ages is to a philosophical his-
tory. The disjointed fragments of political intelligence
ought to be connected by a sort of enlightened run-
ning commentary. There is talent enough embarked
in some of these ; but the talent too commonly expends
itself upon subjects and in speculations which are of
little interest beyond the present week.

And here we are reminded of that miserable direction
to public opinion which is given in historical works.*
I do not speak of party bias, though that is sufficiently
mischievous ; but of the irrational selection by histor-
ians of comparatively unimportant things to fill the
greater portion of their pages. People exclaim that
the history of Europe is little more than a history of
human violence and wickedness. But they confound
history with that portion of history which historians
record. That portion is doubtless written almost in
blood — but it is a very small, and in truth a very sub-
ordinate portion. The intrigues of cabinets ; the rise
and fall of ministers ; wars and battles, and victories
and defeats ; the plunder of provinces ; the dismem-
berment of empires ; these are the things which fill
the pages of the historian, but these are not the things
which compose the history of man. He that would
acquaint himself with the history of his species, must

* ' ' Next to the guilt of those who commit wicked actions, is
that of the historian who glosses them over and excuses them. ' '
Southey: Book of the Church, c. 8.

CHAP. IX.j PUBLIC NOTIONS OF MORALITY. 26l

apply to other and to calmer scenes. ' ' It is a cruel
mortification, in searching for what is instructive in
the history of past times, to find that the exploits of
conquerors who have desolated the earth and the freaks
of tyrants who have rendered nations unhappy, are re-
corded with minute and often disgusting accuracy,
while the discovery of useful arts and the progress of
the most beneficial branches of commerce, are passed
over in silence, and suffered to sink into oblivion."*
Even a more cruel mortification than this is to find re-
corded almost nothing respecting the intellectual and
moral history of man. You are presented with five or
six weighty volumes which profess to be a history of
England ; and after reading them to the end you have
hardly found any thing to satisfy that interesting ques-
tion— how has my country been enabled to advance
from barbarism to civilization ; to come forth from
darkness into light ? Yes, by applying philosophy to
facts yourself, you may attain some, though it be but
an imperfect, reply. But the historian himself should
have done this. The facts of history, simply as such,
are of comparatively little concern. He is the true his-
torian of man who regards mere facts rather as the
illiistratio7is of history than as its subject matter. As
to the history of cabinets and courts, of intrigue and
oppression, of campaigns and generals, we can almost
spare it all. It is of wonderfully little consequence
whether they are remembered or not, except as lessons
of instruction — except as proofs of the evils of bad
principles and bad institutions. For any other pur-
pose, Blenheim ! we can spare thee. And Eouis, even
Louis " le grande!" we can spare thee. And thy suc-
cessor and his Pompadour ! we can spare ye all.

Much power is in the hands of the historian if he
will exert it : if he will make the occurrences of the
* Robertson : Disq. on Anct. Comm. of India.

262 MORAE EDUCATION. [ESSAY II.

past subservient to the elucidations of the principles of
human nature — of the principles of political truth — of
the rules of political rectitude ; if he will refuse to
make men ambitious of power by filling his pages with
the feats or freaks of men in power ; if he will give no
currency to the vulgar delusions about glory : — if he
will do these things, and such as these, he will deserve
well of his country and of man ; for he will contribute
to that rectification of public opinion which, when it is
complete and determinate, will be the most powerful
of all earthly agents in ameliorating the social condi-
tion of the world.

CHAPTER X.
MORAL EDUCATION.

Union of moral principle with the affections — Society — Morality
of the Ancient Classics — The supply of motives to virtue —
Conscience — Subjugation of the will — Knowledge of our own
minds — Offices of public worship.

To a good moral education, two things are neces-
sary : That the young should receive information re-
specting what is right and what is wrong ; and, That
they should be furnished with motives to adhere to
what is right. We should communicate moral knowl-
edge and moral dispositions.

I. In the endeavor to attain these ends, there is one
great pervading difficulty, consisting in the imperfec-
tion and impurity of the actual moral condition of
mankind. Without referring at present to that moral
guidance with which all men, however circumstanced,
are furnished,* it is evident that much of the practical

* See Essay I., c. vi.

CHAP. X.] MORAL EDUCATION. 263

moral education which an individual receives, is ac-.
quired by habit, and from the actions, opinions, and
general example of those around him. It is thus that,
to a great extent, he acquires his moral education. He
adopts the notions of others, acquires insensibly a
similar set of principles, and forms to himself a similar
scale of right and wrong. It is manifest that the
learner in such a school will often be taught amiss.
Yet how can we prevent him from being so taught ?
or what system of moral education is likely to avail in
opposition to the contagion of example and the in-
fluence of notions insensibly, yet constantly instilled ?
It is to little purpose to take a boy every morning into
a closet, and there teach him moral and religious
truths for an hour, if so soon as the hour is expired,
he is left for the remainder of the day in circumstances
in which these truths are not recommended by any liv-
ing examples.

One of the first and greatest requisites, therefore, in
moral education, is a situation in which the knowledge
and the practice of morality is inculcated by the
habitually virtuous conduct of others. The boy who
is placed in such a situation is in an efficient moral
school, though he may never hear delivered formal
rules of conduct : so that, if parents should ask how
they may best give their child a moral education, I
answer, Be virtuous yourselves.

The young, however, are unavoidably subjected to
bad example as to good : many who may see consis-
tent practical lessons of virtue in their parents' parlors,
must see much that is contrary elsewhere ; and we
must, if we can, so rectify the moral perceptions and
invigorate the moral dispositions, that the mind shall
effectually resist the insinuation of evil.

Religion is the basis of morality. He that would
impart moral knowledge must begin by imparting a

264 MORAE EDUCATION. [ESSAY II.

knowledge of God. We are not advocates of formal
instruction — of lesson learning — in moral any more
than in intellectual education. Not that we affirm it is
undesirable to make a young person commit to memory
maxims of religious truth and moral duty. These
things may be right but they are not the really effi-
cient means of forming the moral character of the
young. These maxims should recommend themselves
to the judgment and affections, and this can hardly be
hoped whilst they are presented only in a didactic and
insulated form to the mind. It is one of the character-
istics of the times, that there is a prodigious increase of
books that are calculated to benefit whilst they delight
the young. These are effective instruments in teaching
morality. A simple narrative, {of facts, if it be pos-
sible,) in which integrity of principle and purity of
conduct are recommended to the affections as well as
to the judgment — without affectation, or improbabil-
ities, or factitious sentiment, is likely to effect substan-
tial good. And if these associations are judiciously
renewed, the good is likely to be permanent as well as
substantial. It is not a light task to write such books,
nor to select them. Authors color their pictures too
highly. They must indeed interest the young, or they
will not be read with pleasure : but the anxiety to give
interest is too great, and the effects may be expected to
diminish as the narrative recedes from congeniality to
the actual condition of mankind.

A judicious parent will often find that the moral cul-
ture of his child may be promoted without seeming to
have the object in view. There are many opportunities
which present themselves for associating virtue with
his affections — for throwing in amongst the accumulat-
ing mass of mental habits, principles of rectitude which
shall pervade and meliorate the whole.

As the mind acquires an increased capacity of

CHAP. X.] MORAI, EDUCATION. 265

judging, I would offer to the young person a sound exhi-
bition, if such can be found, of the principles of
morality. He should know, with as great distinctness
as possible, not only his duty, but the reasons of it. It
has very unfortunately happened that those who have
professed to deliver the principles of morality, have
commonly intermingled error with truth, or have set
out with propositions fundamentally unsound. These
books effect, it is probable, more injury than benefit.
Their truths, for they contain truths, are frequently
deduced from fallacious premises — from premises from
which it is equally easy to deduce errors. The falla-
cies of the moral philosophy of Paley are now in part
detected by the public : there was a time when his
opinions were regarded as more nearly oracular than
now ; and at that time and up to the present time, the
book has effectually confused the moral notions of
multitudes of readers. If the reader thinks that the
principles which have been proposed in the present
essays are just, he might derive some assistance from
them in conducting the moral education of his elder
children.

There is negative as well as positive education — some
things to avoid as well as some to do. Of the things
which are to be avoided, the most obvious is unfit
society for the young. If a boy mixes without re-
straint in whatever society he pleases, his education
will in general be practically bad ; because the world in
general in bad : its moral condition is below the
medium between perfect purity and utter depravation.
Nevertheless, he must at some period mix in society
with almost all sorts of men, and therefore he must
be prepared for it. Very young children should be ex-
cluded if possible from all unfit association, because
they acquire habits before they possess a sufficiency of
counteracting principle. But if a parent has, within

266 MORAI, EDUCATION. [ESSAY II.

his own house, sufficiently endeavored to confirm and
invigorate the moral character of his child, it were
worse than fruitless to endeavor to retaim him in the
seclusion of a monk. He should feel the necessity and
acquire the power of resisting temptation, by being sub-
jected, gradually subjected, to that temptation which
miist one day be presented to him. In the endlessly
diversified circumstances of families, no suggestion of
prudence will be applicable to all ; but if a parent is
conscious that the moral tendency of his domestic as-
sociations is good, it will probably be wise to send bis
children to day-schools rather than to send them
wholly from his family. Schools, as moral instru-
ments, contain much both of good and evil : perhaps
no means will be more effectual in securing much of
the good and avoiding much of the evil, than that of
allowing his children to spend their evenings and early
mornings at home.

In ruminating upon moral education, we cannot, at
least in this age of reading, disregard the influence of
books. That a young person should not read every
book is plain. No discrimination can be attempted
here ; but it may be observed that the best species of
discrimination is that which is supplied by a rectified con-
dition of the mind itself. The best species of prohibition
is not that which a parent pronounces, but that which
is pronounced by purified tastes and inclinations in the
mind of the young. Not that the parent or tutor can
expect that all or many of his children will adequately
make this judicious discrimination ; but if he cannot do
every thing he can do much. There are many persons
whom a contemptible or vicious book disgusts, not-
withstanding the fascinations which it may contain.
This disgust is the result of education in a large sense ;
and some portion of this disgust and of the discrimina-
tion which results from it, may be induced into the

CHAP. X.] MORAI, EDUCATION. 267

mind of a boy by having made him familiar with
superior productions. He who is accustomed to good
society, feels little temptation to join in the vocifera-
ations of an alehouse.

And here it appears necessary to advert to the moral
tendency of studying, without selection, the ancient
classics. The mode in which the writings of the Greek
and L,atin authors operate, is not an ordinary mode.
We do not approach them as we approach ordinary
books, but with a sort of habitual admiration, which
makes their influence, whatever be its nature, pecu-
liarly strong. That admiration would be powerful
alike for good or for evil. Whether the tendency be
good or evil, the admiration will make it great.

Now, previous to enquiring what the positive ill
tendency of these writings is — what is not their tend-
ency? They are pagan books for Christian children.
They neither inculcate Christianity, nor Christian dis-
positions, nor the love of Christianity. But their tend-
ency is not negative merely. They do inculcate that
which is adverse to Christianity and to Christian
dispositions. They set up, as exalted virtues, that
which our own religion never countenanced, if it has
not specifically condemned. They censure as faults
dispositions which our own religion enjoins, or dispo-
sitions so similar that the young will not discriminate
between them. If we enthusiastically admire these
works, who will pretend that we shall not admire the
moral qualities which they applaud ? Who will pretend
that the mind of a young person accurately adjusts his
admiration to those subjects only which Christianity ap-
proves? No : we admire them as a whole ; not perhaps
every sentence or every sentiment, but we admire their
general spirit and character. In a word, we admire
that which our own religion teaches us not to imitate.
And what makes the effect the more intense is, that we

268 M0RAI, EDUCATION. [ESSAY II.

do this at the period of life when we are every day
acquiring our moral notions. We mingle them up with
our early associations respecting right and wrong —
with associations which commonly extend their influ-
ence over the remainder of life.*

A very able essay, which obtained the Norrisian
Medal at Cambridge for 1825, forcibly illustrates these
propositions ; and the illustration is so much the more
valuable, because it appears to have been undesigned.
The title is, ' ' No valid argument can be drawn from
the incredulity of the heathen philosophers against the
truth of the Christian religion. "f The object of the
work is to show, by a reference to their writings, that
the general system of their opinions, feelings, preju-
dices, principles, and conduct, was utterly incongruous
with Christianity ; and that, in consequence of these
principles, &c, they actually did reject the religion.
This is shown with great clearness of evidence ; it is
shown that a class of men, who thought and wrote as
these philosophers thought and wrote, would be ex-
tremely indisposed to adopt the religion and morality
which Christ had introduced. Now, this appears to
me to be conclusive of the question as to the present
tendency of their writings. If the principles and preju-
dices of these persons indisposed them to the accept-
ance of Christianity, those prejudices and principles
will indispose the man who admires and imbibes them
in the present day. Not that they will now produce
the effect in the same degree. We are now surrounded
with many other media by which opinions and princi-
ples are induced, and these are frequently "influenced
by the spirit of Christianity. The study and the admi-
ration of these writings may not therefore be expected

*"All education which inculcates Christian opinions with
pagan tastes, awakens conscience but to tamper with it."
Schimmelpenninck : Biblical Fragments.

t By James Amiraux Jeremie.

CHAP. X.] MORAt EDUCATION. 269

to make men absolutely reject Christianity, but to in-
dispose them, in a greater or less degree, for the hearty
acceptance of Christian principles as their rules of con-
duct.

Propositions have been made to supply young persons
with selected ancient authors, or perhaps with editions
in which exceptionable passages are expunged. I do
not think that this will greatly avail. It is not, I
think, the broad indecencies of Ovid, nor any other in-
sulated class of sentiments or descriptions, that effects
the great mischief ; it is the pervading spirit and tenor
of the whole — a spirit and tenor from which Christian-
ity is not only excluded, but which is actually and
greatly adverse to Christianity. There is indeed one
considerable benefit that is likely to result from such a
selection, and from expunging particular passages.
Boys in ordinary schools do not learn enough of the
classics to acquire much of their general moral spirit,
but they acquire enough to be influenced, and inju-
riously influenced, by being familiar with licentious
language ; and, at any rate, he essentially subserves
the interests of morality, who diminishes the power of
opposing influences though he cannot wholly destroy
it.

Finally, the mode in which intellectual education,
generally, is acquired, may be made either an auxiliary
of moral education or the contrary. A young person
may store his mind with literature and science, and
together, wTith the acquisition, either corrupt his prin-
ciples, or amend and invigorate them. The wyorld is
so abundantly supplied with the means of knowledge —
there are so many paths to the desired temple, that we
may choose our own and yet arrive at it. He that
thinks he cannot possess sufficient knowledge without
plucking fruit of unhallowed trees, surely does not
know how boundless is the variety and number of those

27O MORAt EDUCATION. [ESSAY II.

which bear wholesome fruit. He cannot indeed know
everything without studying the bad ; which, however,
is no more to be recommended in literature than in life.
A man cannot know all the varieties of human society
without taking up his abode with felons and cannibals.

II. But, in reality, the second division of moral edu-
cation is the more important of the two — the supply of
motives to adhere to what is right. Our great deficiency
is not in knowledge but in obedience. Of the offences
which an individual commits against the moral law, the
great majority are committed in the consciousness that he
is doing wrong. Moral education therefore should be
directed, not so much to informing the young what
they ought to do, as to inducing those moral disposi-
tions and principles which will make them adhere to
what they know to be right.

The human mind, of itself, is in a state something
like that of men in a state of nature, where separate
and conflicting desires and motives are not restrained
by any acknowledged head. Government, as it is'neces-
sary to society, is necessary in the individual mind. To
the internal community of the heart the great question
is, Who shall be the legislator ? Who shall regulate
and restrain the passions and affections ? Who shall
command and direct the conduct ? — To these questions
the breast of every man supplies him with an answer.
He knows, because he feels that there is a rightful
legislator in his own heart : he knows, because he
feels, that he ought to obey it.

By whatever designation the reader may think it fit
to indicate this legislator, whether he calls it the law
written in the heart, or moral sense, or moral instinct,
or conscience, we arrive at one practical truth at last ;
that to the moral legislation which does actually sub-
sist in the human mind, it is right that the individual
should conform his conduct.

CHAP. X.] MORAL EDUCATION. 27 1

The great point then is, to induce him to do this — to
induce him, when inclination and this law are at
variance, to sacrifice the inclination to the law ; and
for this purpose it appears proper, first to impress him
with a high, that is, with an accurate estimate of the
authority of the law itself. We have seen that this
law embraces an actual expression of the will of God ;
and we have seen that, even although the conscience
may not always be adequately enlightened, it never-
theless constitutes to the individual an authoritative
law. It is to the conscientious internal apprehension of
rectitude that we should conform our conduct. Such
appears to be the will of God.

It should therefore be especially inculcated, that the
dictate of conscience is never to be sacrificed ; that
whatever may be the consequences of conforming to it,
they are to be ventured. Obedience is to be uncon-
ditional— no questions about the utility of the law—- no
computations of the consequences of obedience — no
presuming upon the lenity of the Divine government.
' ' It is important so to regulate the understanding and
imagination of the young, that they may be prepared
to obey, even when they do not see the reasons of the
commands of God." "We should certainly endeavor
where we can, to show them the reasons of the Divine
commands, and this more and more as their under-
standings gain strength ; but let it be obvious to them
that we do ourselves consider it as quite sufficient if God
has commanded us to do or to avoid anything."*

Obedience to this internal legislator is not, like
obedience to civil government, enforced. The law is
promulgated, but the passions and inclinations can re-
fuse obedience if they will. Penalties and rewards are
indeed annexed ; but he who braves the penalty, and
disregards the reward, may continue to violate the law.

* Carpenter : Principles of Education.

272 MORAL EDUCATION. [ESSAY II.

Obedience therefore must be voluntary, and hence the
paramount importance, in moral education, of habit-
ually subjecting the will. "Parents," says Hartley,
! ' should labor, from the earliest dawnings of under-
standing and desire, to check the growing obstinacy of
the will, curb all sallies of • passion, impress the deep-
est, most amiable, reverential, and awful impressions
of God, a future state, and all sacred things." — " Re-
ligious persons in all periods, who have possessed the
light of revelation, have in a particular manner been
sensible that the habit of self-control lies at the founda-
tion of moral worth."* There is nothing mean or
mean-spirited in this. It is magnanimous in philoso-
phy as it is right in morals. It is the subjugation of
the lower qualities of our nature to wisdom and to
goodness.

The subjugation of the will to the dictates of a
higher law, must be endeavored, if we would succeed,
almost in infancy and in very little things ; from the
earliest dawnings, as Hartley says, of understanding
and desire. Children must first obey their parents,
and those who have the care of them. The habit of
sacrificing the will to another judgment being thus
acquired, the mind is prepared to sacrifice the will to
the judgment pronounced within itself. Show, in every
practicable case, why you cross the inclinations of a
child. I^et obedience be as little blind as it may be.
It is a great failing of some parents that they will not
descend from the imperative mood, and that they seem
to think it a derogation from their authority to place
their orders upon any other foundation than their wills.
But if the child sees — and children are wonderfully
quick-sighted in such things — if the child sees that the
will is that which governs his parent, how shall he
efficiently learn that the will should not govern himself ?

* Carpenter : Principles of Education.

CHAP. X.] MORAL EDUCATION. 273

The internal law carries with it the voucher of its
own reasonableness. A person does not need to be told
that it is proper and right to obey that law. The per-
ception of this rectitude and propriety is coincident with
the dictates themselves. Let the parent, then, very
frequently refer his son and his daughter to their own
minds ; let him teach them to seek for instruction
there. There are dangers on every hand, and dangers
even here. The parent must refer them, if it be possi-
ble, not merely to conscience but to enlightened
conscience. He must unite the two branches of
moral education, and communicate the knowledge
whilst he endeavors to induce the practice of
morality. Without this, his children may obey
their consciences, and yet be in error, and perhaps in
fanaticism. With it, he may hope that their conduct
will be both conscientious, and pure, and right.
Nevertheless, an habitual reference to the internal law
is the great, the primary concern ; for the great major-
ity of a man's moral perceptions are accordant with
truth.

There is one consequence attendant upon this habit-
ual reference to the internal law, which is highly bene-
ficial to the moral character. It leads us to fulfil the
wise instruction of antiquity, Know thyself. It makes
us look within ourselves : it brings us acquainted with
the little and busy world that is within us, with its
many inhabitants and their dispositions and with their
tendencies to evil or to good. This is valuable know-
ledge ; and knowledge for want of which, it may be
feared, the virtue of many has been wrecked in the
hour of tempest. A man's enemies are those of his
own household ; and if he does not know their insidious-
ness and their strength, if he does not know upon what
to depend for assistance, nor where is the probable
point of attack, it is not likely that he will efficiently

274 MORAL EDUCATION. [ ESSAY II.

resist. Such a man is in the situation of the governor
of an unprepared and surprised city. He knows not to
whom to apply for effectual help, and finds perhaps
that those whom he has loved and trusted are the first
to desert or betray him. He feebly resists, soon capitu-
lates, and at last scarcely knows why he did not make
a successful defence.

It is to be regretted that, in the moral education
which commonly obtains, whether formal or incidental,
there is little that is calculated to produce this acquaint-
ance with our own minds ; little that refers us to our-
selves, and much, very much, that calls and sends us
away. Of many it is not too much to say that they
receive almost no moral culture. The plant of virtue
is suffered to grow as a tree grows in a forest, and takes
its chance of storm or sunshine. This, which is good
for oaks and pines, is not good for man. The general
atmosphere around him is infected, and the juices of
the moral plant are often themselves unhealthy.

In the nursery, formularies and creeds are taught ;
but this does not refer the child to its own mind. In-
deed, unless a wakeful solicitude is maintained by those
who teach, the tendency is the reverse. The mind is
kept from habits of introversion, even in the offices of
religion, by practically directing its attention to the
tongue. " Many, it is to be feared, imagine that they
are giving their children religious principles when they
are only teaching them religious truths." You
cannot impart moral education as you teach a child to
spell.

From the nursery a boy is sent to school. He spends
six or eight hours of the day in the school-room, and
the remainder is employed in the sports of boyhood.
Once, or it may be twice, in the day he repeats a form
of prayer, and on one day in the week he goes to
church. There is very little in all this to make him

CHAP. X.] MORAL EDUCATION. 275

acquainted with the internal community ; and habit, if
nothing else, calls his reflections away.

From school or from college the business of life is
begun. It can require no argument to show, that the
ordinary pursuits of life have little tendency to direct a
man's meditations to the moral condition of his own
mind, or that they have much tendency to employ
them upon other and very different things.

Nay, even the offices of public devotion have al-
most a tendency to keep the mind without itself.
What if we say that the self-contemplation which even
natural religion is likely to produce, is obstructed by
the forms of Christian worship ? ' ' The transitions
from one office of devotion to another, are contrived,
like scenes in the drama, to supply the mind with a
succession of diversified engagements."* This supply
of diversified engagements, whatever may be its value
in other respects, has evidently the tendency of which
we speak. It is not designed to supply, and it does
not supply, the opportunity for calmness of recollec-
tion. A man must abstract himself from the external
service if he would investigate the character and dis-
positions of the inmates of his own breast. Even the
architecture and decorations of "churches" come in aid
of the general tendency. They make the eye an auxiliary
of the ear, and both keep the mind at a distance from
those concerns which are peculiarly its own ; from con-
templating its own weaknesses and wants ; and from
applying to God for that peculiar help, which perhaps
itself only needs, and which God only can impart. So
little are the course of education and the subsequent
engagements of life calculated to foster this great
auxiliary of moral character. It is difficult, in the
wide world, to foster it as much as is needful. Noth-
ing but wakeful solicitude on the part of the parent
* Paley, p. 3. b. 5, c. 5.

276 MORAL EDUCATION. [ESSAY II.

can be expected sufficiently to direct the mind within ;
whilst the general tendency of our associations and
habits is to keep it without. L,et him, however, do
what he can. The habitual reference to the dictates
of conscience may be promoted in the very young
mind. This habit, like others, becomes strong by ex-
ercise. He that is faithful in little things is intrusted
with more ; and this is true in respect of knowledge as
in respect of other departments of the Christian life.
Fidelity of obedience is commonly succeeded by in-
crease of light ; and every act of obedience and every
addition to knowledge furnishes new and still stronger
inducements to persevere in the same course. Ac-
quaintance with ourselves is the inseparable attendant
of this course. We know the character and dispositions
of our own inmates by frequent association with them :
and if this fidelity to the internal law, and consequent
knowledge of the internal world, be acquired in early
life, the parent may reasonably hope that it will never
wholly lose its efficiency amidst the bustle and anxieties
of the world.

Undoubtedly, this most efficient security of moral
character is not likely fully to operate during the con-
tinuance of the present state of society and of its in-
stitutions. It is I believe true, that the practice of
morality is most complete amongst those persons who
peculiarly recommend a reference to the internal law,
and whose institutions, religious and social, are con-
gruous with the habit of this reference. Their history
exhibits a more unshaken adherence to that which they
conceived to be right — fewer sacrifices of conscience to
interest or the dread of suffering — less of trimming be-
tween conflicting motives — more, in a word, of adher-
ence to rectitude without regard to consequences. We
have seen that such persons are likely to form accurate
views of rectitude ; but whether they be accurate or

CHAP. XI.] EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE. 277

not, does not affect the value of their moral edu-
cation as securing fidelity to the degree of knowledge
which they possess. It is of more consequence to ad-
here steadily to conscience though it may not be per-
fectly enlightened, than to possess perfect knowledge
without consistency of obedience. But in reality they
who obey most, know most ; and we say that the
general testimony of experience is, that those persons
exhibit the most unyielding fidelity to the moral law
whose moral education has peculiarly directed them to
the law written in the heart.

CHAPTER XI.
EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE.

Advantages of extended education — Infant schools — Habits of
enquiry.

Whether the education of those who are not able
to pay for educating themselves ought to be a private
or a national charge, it is not our present business to
discuss. It is in this country, at least, left to the vol-
untary benevolence of individuals, and this considera-
tion may apologize for a brief reference to it here.

It is not long since it was a question whether the
poor should be educated or not. That time is past,
and it may be hoped the time will soon be passed when
it shall be a question, To what extent ? — that the time
will soon arrive when it will be agreed that no limit
needs to be assigned to the education of the poor, but
that which is assigned by their own necessities, or
which ought to be assigned to the education of all men.
There appears no more reason for excluding a poor

278 EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE. [ESSAY II.

man from the fields of knowledge, than for preventing
him from using his eyes. The mental and the visual
powers were alike given to be employed. A man
should, indeed, " shut his eyes from seeing evil" but
whatever reason there is for letting him see all that is
beautiful, and excellent, and innocent in nature and in
art, there is the same for enabling his mind to expati-
ate in the fields of knowledge.

The objections which are urged against this extended
education, are of the same kind as those which were
urged against any education. They insist upon the
probability of abuse. It was said, They who can write
may forge ; they who can read may read what is per-
nicious. The answer was, or it might have been —
They who can hear, may hear profaneness and learn
it ; they who can see, may see bad examples and follow
them : — but are we therefore to stop our ears and put
out our eyes ? — It is now said, that if you give extended
education to the poor, you will elevate them above their
stations ; that a critic would not drive a wheelbarrow,
and that a philosopher would not shoe horses, or weave
cloth. But these consequences are without the limits
of possibility ; because the question for a poor man is,
whether he shall perform such offices or starve : and
surely it will not be pretended that hungry men would
rather criticise than eat. Science and literature would
not solicit a poor man from his labor more irresistibly
than ease and pleasure do now ; yet in spite of these
solicitations what is the fact ? That the poor man works
for his bread. This is the inevitable result.

It is not the positive but the relative amount of
knowledge that elevates a man above his station in
society. It is not because he knows much, but because
he knows more than his fellows. Educate all, and
none will fancy that he is superior to his neighbors.
Besides, we assign to the possession of knowledge,

CHAP. XI.] EDUCATION OE THE PEOPEE. 279

effects which are produced rather by habits of life.
Ease and comparative leisure are commonly attendant
upon extensive knowledge, and leisure and ease dis-
qualify men for the laborious occupations much more
than the knowledge itself.

There are some collateral advantages of an extended
education of the people, which are of much importance.
It has been observed that if the French had been an
educated people, many of the atrocities of their Revo-
lution would never have happened, and I believe it.
Furious mobs are composed, not of enlightened but of
unenlightened men — of men in whom the passions are
dominant over the judgment, because the judgment
had not been exercised, and informed, and habituated
to direct the conduct. A factious declaimer can much
less easily influence a number of men who acquired at
school the rudiments of knowledge, and who have sub-
sequently devoted their leisure to a Mechanics' Insti-
tute, than a multitude who cannot write or read, and
who have never practised reasoning and considerate
thought. And as the education of a people prevents
political evil, it effects political good. Despotic rulers
well know that knowledge is inimical to their power.
This simple fact is a sufficient reason, to a good and
wise man, to approve knowledge and extend it. The
attention to public institutions and public measures
which is inseparable from an educated population, is a
great good. We all know that the human heart is such,
that the possession of power is commonly attended with
a desire to increase it, even in opposition to the general
weal. It is acknowledged that a check is needed, and
no check is either so efficient or so safe as that of a
watchful and intelligent public mind ; so watchful, that
it is prompt to discover and to expose what is amiss ;
so intelligent, that it is able to form rational judgments
respecting the nature and the means of amendment.

280 EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE. [ESSAY II.

In all public institutions there exists, and it is happy
that there does exist, a sort of vis inertia which habit-
ually resists change. This, which is beneficial as a
general tendency, is often injurious from its excess : the
state of public institutions almost throughout the world,
bears sufficient testimony to the truth, that they need
.alteration and amendment faster than they receive it —
that the internal resistance of change is greater than is
good for man. Unhappily, the ordinary way in which
a people have endeavored to amend their institutions,
has been by some mode of violence. If you ask when
a nation acquired a greater degree of freedom, you are
referred to some era of revolution and probably of
blood. These are not proper, certainly they are not
Christian, remedies for the disease. It is becoming an
undisputed proposition, that no bad institution can per-
manently stand against the distinct opinion of a people.
This opinion is likely to be universal, and to be intelli-
gent only amongst an enlightened community. Now
that reformation of public institutions which results
from public opinion, is the very best in kind, and is
likely to be the best in its mode : — in its kind, because
public opinion is the proper measure of the needed alter-
ation ; and in its mode, because alterations which result
from such a cause, are likely to be temperately made.
It may be feared that some persons object to an ex-
tended education of the people on these very grounds
which we propose as recommendations ; that they
regard the tendency of education to produce examina-
tion, and, if need be, alteration of established . institu-
tions, as a reason for withholding it from the poor. To
these, it is a sufficient answer, that if increase of
knowledge and habits of investigation tend to alter any
established institution, it is fit that it should be altered.
There appears no means of avoiding this conclusion ,
unless it can be shown that increase of knowledge is

CHAP. XI.] EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE. 281

usually attended with depravation of principle, and
that in proportion as the judgment is exercised it de-
cides amiss.

Generally, that intellectual education is good for a
poor man which is good for his richer neighbors : in
other words, that is good for the poor which is good
for man. There may be exceptions to the general
rule ; but he who is disposed to doubt the fitness of a
rich man's education for the poor, will do well to con-
sider first whether the rich man's education is fit for
himself. The children of persons of property can un-
doubtedly learn much more than those of a laborer, and
the laborer must select from the rich man's system a
part only for his own child. But this does not affect
the .general conclusion. The parts which he ought to
select are precisely those parts which are most neces-
sary and beneficial to the rich.

Great as have been the improvements in the methods
of conveying knowledge to the poor, there is reason to
think that they will be yet greater. Some useful sug-
gestions for the instruction of older children may I
think be obtained from the systems in infant schools.
In a well conducted infant school, children acquire much
knowledge, and they acquire it with delight. This
delight is of extreme importance : perhaps it may safely
be concluded, respecting all innocent knowledge, that
if a child acquired it with pleasure he is well taught.
It is worthy observation, that in the infant system, les-
son-learning is nearly or wholly excluded. It is not to
be expected that in the time which is devoted profes-
sedly to education by the children of the poor, much
extent of knowledge can be acquired ; but something
may be acquired which is of much more consequence
than mere school-learning — the love and the habits of
enquiry. If education be so conducted that it is a
positive pleasure to a boy to learn, there is little doubt

282 EDUCATION OE THE PEOPLE. [ESSAY II.

that this love and habit will be induced. Here is the
great advantage of early intellectual culture. The
busiest have some leisure, leisure which they may em-
ploy ill or well ; and that they will employ it well
may reasonably be expected when knowledge is thus
attractive for its own sake. That this effect is in a
considerable degree actually produced, is indicated by
the improved character of the books which poor men
read, and in the prodigious increase in the number of
those books. The supply and demand are correspon-
dent. Almost every year produces books for the
laboring classes of a higher intellectual order than the
last. A journeyman in our days can understand and
relish a work which would have been like Arabic to his
grandfather.

Of moral education we say nothing here, except that
the principles which are applicable to other classes of
mankind are obviously applicable to the poor. With
respect to the inculcation of peculiar religious opinions
on the children who attend schools voluntarily sup-
ported, there is manifestly the same reason for incul-
cating them in this case as for teaching them at all.
This supposes that the supporters of the school are not
themselves divided in their religious opinions. If they
are, and if the adherents to no one creed are able to
support a school of their own, there appears no ground
upon which they can rightly refuse to support a school
in which no religious peculiarities are taught. It is
better that intellectual knowledge, together with im-
perfect religious principles should be communicated,
than that children should remain in darkness. There
is indeed some reason to suspect the genuineness of
that man's philanthropy, who refuses to impart any
knowledge to his neighbors because he cannot, at the
same time, teach them his own creed.

CHAP. XII.] AMUSEMENTS. 283

CHAPTER XII.
AMUSEMENTS.

The Stage — Religious Amusements — Masquerades — Field Sports
— The Turf — Boxing — Wrestling — Opinions of Posterity —
Popular Amusements needless.

It is a remarkable circumstance, that in almost all
Christian countries many of the public and popular
amusements have been regarded as objectionable by
the more sober and conscientious part of the com-
munity. This opinion could scarcely have been
general unless it had been just : yet why should a
people prefer amusements of which good men feel
themselves compelled to disapprove ? Is it because no
public recreation can be devised of which the evil is not
greater than the good ? or because the inclinations of
most men are such, that if it were devised, they would
not enjoy it ? It may be feared that the desires which
are seeking for gratification are not themselves pure ;
and pure pleasures are not congenial to impure minds.
The real cause of. the objectionable nature of many
popular diversions is to be sought in the want of virtue
in the people.

Amusement is confessedly a subordinate concern in
life. It is neither the principal nor amongst the prin-
cipal objects of proper solicitude. No reasonable man
sacrifices the more important thing to the less, and that
a man's religious and moral condition is of incompara-
bly greater importance than his diversion, is sufficiently
plain. In estimating the propriety or rather the law-
fulness of a given amusement, it may safely be laid
down, That none is lawful of which the aggregate con-
sequences are injurious to morals : — nor, if its effects
upon the immediate agents are, in general, morally
bad : — nor if it occasions needless pain and misery to

284 AMUSEMENTS. [ESSAY II.

men or to animals : — nor, lastly, if it occupies much
time or is attended with much expense. — Respecting
all amusements, the question is not whether in their
simple or theoretical character, they are defensible, but
whether they are defensible in their actually existing
state.

Thk Drama. — So that if a person, by way of show-
ing the propriety of theatrical exhibitions, should ask
whether there was any harm in a man's repeating a
composition before others and accompanying it with
appropriate gestures — he would ask a very foolish
question : because he would ask a question that
possesses little or no relevancy to the subject. — What
are the ordinary effects of the stage upon those who
act on it ? One and one only answer can be given — that
whatever happy exceptions there may be, the effect is
bad, — that the moral and religious character of actors
is lower than that of persons in other professions. " It
is an undeniable fact, for the truth of which we may
safely appeal to every age and nation, that the situa-
tion of the performers, particularly of those of the
female sex, is remarkably unfavorable to the mainten-
ance and growth of the religious and moral principle,
and of course highly dangerous to their eternal inter-
ests."*

Therefore, if I take my seat in the theatre, I have
paid three or five shillings as an inducement to a
number of persons to subject their principles to extreme
danger ; — and the defence which I make is, that I am
amused by it. Now, we affirm that this defence is
invalid ; that it is a defence which reason pronounces
to be absurd, and morality to be vicious. Yet I have
no other to make ; it is the sum total of my justifica-
tion.

But this, which is sufficient to decide the morality of
* Wilberforce : Practical View, c. 4, s. 5.

CHAP. XII.] AMUSEMENTS. 285

the question, is not the only nor the chief part of the
evil. The evil which is suffered by performers may
be more intense, but upon spectators and others it is
more extended. The night of a play is the harvest
time of iniquity, where the profligate and the sensual
put in their sickles and reap. It is to no purpose to say
that a man may go to a theatre or parade a saloon
without taking part in the surrounding licentiousness.
All who are there promote the licentiousness, for if none
were there, there would be no licentiousness ; that is
to say, if none purchased tickets there would be neither
actors to be depraved nor dramas to vitiate, nor saloons
to degrade and corrupt, and shock us. — The whole
question of the lawfulness of the dramatic amusements,
as they are ordinarily conducted, is resolved into a very
simple thing : — After the doors on any given night are
closed, have the virtuous or the vicious dispositions of
the attenders been in the greater degree promoted ?
Every one knows that the balance is on the side, of
vice, and this conclusively decides the question — "Is
it lawful to attend?"

The same question is to be asked, and the same
answer I believe will be returned, respecting various
other assemblies for purposes of amusement. They do
more harm than good. They please but they injure
us ; and what makes the case still stronger is, that the
pleasure is frequently such as ought not to be enjoyed.
A tippler enjoys pleasure in becoming drunk, but he is
not to allege the gratification as a set-off against the
immorality. And so it is with no small portion of the
pleasures of an assembly. Dispositions are gratified
which it wTere wiser to thwart ; and, to speak the
truth, if the dispositions of the mind were such as they
ought to be, many of these modes of diversion would
be neither relished nor resorted to. Some persons try
to persuade themselves that charity forms a part of

286 AMUSEMENTS. [ESSAY II.

their motive in attending such places ; as when the
profits of the night are given to a benevolent institu-
tion. They hope, I suppose, that though it would not
be quite right to go if benevolence were not a gainer,
yet that the end warrants the means. But if these
persons are charitable, let them give their guinea
without deducting half for purposes of questionable
propriety. Religious amusements, such as oratorios
and the like, form one of those artifices of chicanery
by which people cheat, or try to cheat, themselves.
The music, say they, is sacred, is devotional ; and we
go to hear it as we go to church : it excites and ani-
mates our religious sensibilities. This, in spite of the
solemnity of the association, is really ludicrous. These
scenes subserve religion no more than they subserve
chemistry. They do not increase its power any more
than the power of the steam-engine. As it respects
Christianity, it is all imposition and fiction ; and it is
unfortunate that some of the most solemn topics of our
religion are brought into such unworthy and debasing
alliance.*

Masquerades are of a more decided character. If
the pleasure which people derive from meeting in dis-
guises consisted merely in the "fun and drollery" of
the thing, we might wonder to see so many children of
five and six feet high, and leave them perhaps to their
childishness : — but the truth is, that to many the zest
of the concealment consists in the opportunity which
it gives of covert licentiousness ; of doing that in
secret, of which, openly, they would profess to be
ashamed. Some men and some women who affect
propriety when the face is shown, are glad of a few
hours of concealed libertinism. It is a time in which
principles are left to guard the citadel of virtue with-
out the auxiliary of public opinion. And ill do they
* See also Essay II., c. I.

CHAP. XII.] AMUSEMENTS. 287

guard it ! It is no equivocal indication of the slender
power of a person's principles, when they do not
restrain him any longer than his misdeeds will produce
exposure. She who is immodest at a masquerade, is
modest nowhere. She may affect the language of
delicacy and maintain external decorum, but she has no
purity of mind.

Thk Field. — If we proceed with the calculation of
the benefits and mischiefs of field-sports, in the mer-
chant-like manner of debtor and creditor, the balance
is presently found to be greatly against them. The
advantages to him who rides after hounds and shoots
pheasants, are — that he is amused, and possibly that
his health is improved ; some of the disadvantages are
— that it is unpropitious to the influence of religion
and the dispositions which religion induces ; that it
expends money and time which a man ought to be
able to employ better ; and that it inflicts gratuitous
misery upon the inferior animals. The value of the
pleasure cannot easily be computed, and as to health
it may pass for nothing ; for if a man is so little con-
cerned for his health that he will not take exercise
without dogs and guns, he has no reason to expect
other men to concern themselves for it in remarking
upon his actions. And then for the other side of the
calculation. That field-sports have any tendency to
make a man better, no one will pretend ; and no one
who looks around him will doubt that their tendency
is in the opposite direction. It is not necessary to
show that every one who rides after the dogs is a
worse man in the evening than he was in the morning :
the influence of such things is to be sought in those
with whom they are habitual. Is the character of the
sportsman , then, distinguished by religious sensibility?
No. By activity of benevolence ? No. By intel-
lectual exertion ? No. By purity of manners ? No.

288 AMUSEMENTS. [ESSAY II.

Sportsmen are not the persons who diffuse the light of
Christianity, or endeavor to rectify the public morals,
or to extend the empire of knowledge. I,ook again at
the clerical sportsman. Is he usually as exemplary in
the discharge of his functions as those who decline
such diversions ? His parishioners know that he is not.
So, then, the religious and moral tendency of field-
sports is bad. It is not necessary to show how the ill
effect is produced. It is sufficient that it actually is
produced.

As to the expenditure of time and money, I daresay
we shall be told that a man has a right to employ both
as he chooses. We have heretofore seen that he has
no such right. Obligations apply just as truly to the
mode of employing leisure and property, as to the use
which a man may make of a pound of arsenic. The
obligations are not indeed alike enforced in a court of
justice : the misuser of arsenic is carried to prison, the
misuser of time and money awaits as sure an enquiry
at another tribunal. But no folly is more absurd than
that of supposing we have a right to do whatever the
law does not punish. Such is the state of mankind, so
great is the amount of misery and degradation, and so
great are the effects of money and active philanthropy
in meliorating this condition of our species, that it is
no light thing for a man to employ his time and prop-
erty upon vain and needless gratifications. It is no
light thing to keep a pack of hounds, and to spend
days and weeks in riding after them. As to the tor-
ture which field-sports inflict upon animals, it is won-
derful to observe our inconsistencies. He who has, in
the day, inflicted upon half a dozen animals almost as
much torture as they are capable of sustaining, and
who has wounded perhaps half a dozen more, and left
them to die of pain or starvation, gives in the evening
a grave reproof to his child, whom he sees amusing

CHAP. XII.] AMUSEMENTS. 289

himself with picking off the wings of flies ! The in-
fliction of pain is not that which gives pleasure to the
sportsman, (this were ferocious depravity,) but he
voluntarily inflicts the pain in order to please himself.
Yet this man sighs and moralizes over the cruelty of
children ! An appropriate device for a sportsman's
dress would be a pair of balances, of which one scale
was laden with " virtue and humanity," and the other
with ■ ' sport ; ' ' the latter should be preponderating
and lifting the other into the air.

The Turf is still worse, partly because it is a
stronghold of gambling, and therefore an efficient cause
of misery and wickedness. It is an amusement of
almost unmingled evil. But upon whom is the evil
chargeable? Upon the fifty or one hundred persons
only who bring horses and make bets ? No ; every man
participates who attends the course. The great attrac-
tion of many public spectacles, and of this amongst
others, consists more in the company than the ostensi-
ble object of amusement. Many go to a race-ground
who cannot tell when they return what horse has been
the victor. Every one therefore who is present must
take his share of the mischief and the responsibility.

It is the same with respect to the gross and vulgar
diversions of boxing, wrestling, and feats of running
and riding. There is the same almost pure and un-
mingled evil — the same popularity resulting from the
concourses who attend, and, by consequence, the par-
ticipation and responsibility in those who do attend.
The drunkenness, and the profaneness, and the
debauchery, lie in part at the doors of those who are
merely lookers-on ; and if these lookers-on make pre-
tensions to purity of character, their example is so much
the more influential and their responsibility tenfold
increased.

The vicissitudes of folly are endless : the vulgar

290 AMUSEMENTS. [ESSAY II.

games of the present day may soon be displaced by
others, the same in genus, but differing in species.
There is a grossness, a vulgarity, a want of mental
elevation in these things, which might induce the man
of intelligence to reprobate them even if the voice of
morality were silent. They are remains of barbarism —
evidences that barbarism still maintains itself amongst
us — proofs that the higher qualities of our nature are
not sufficiently dominant over the lower.

These grossnesses will pass away, as the deadly con-
flicts of men with beasts are passed already. Our
posterity will wonder at the barbarism of us, their
fathers, as we wonder at the barbarism of Rome. I^et
him, then, who loves intellectual elevation advance
beyond the present times, and anticipate, in the recrea-
tions which he encourages, that period when these
diversions shall be regarded as indicating one of the
intermediate stages between the ferociousness of mental
darkness and the purity of mental light.

These criticisms might be extended to many other
species of amusement ; and it is humiliating to discover
that the conclusion will very frequently be the same —
that the evil outbalances the good, and that there are
no grounds upon which a good man can justify a par-
ticipation in them. In thus concluding, it is possible
that the reader may imagine that we would exclude
enjoyment from the world, and substitute a system of
irreproachable austerity. He who thinks this is unac-
quainted with the nature and sources of our better
enjoyments. It is an ordinary mistake to imagine that
pleasure is great only when it is vivid or intemperate,
as a child fancies it were more delightful to devour a
pound of sugar at once, than to eat an ounce daily iu
his food. It is happily and kindly provided that the
greatest sum of enjoyment is that which is quietly and

CHAP. XIII.] SUICIDE. 29I

constantly induced. No men understand the nature
of pleasure so well, or possess it so much, as those who
find it within their own doors. If it were not that
moral education is so bad, multitudes would seek enjoy-
ment and find it here, who now fancy that they never
partake of pleasure except in scenes of diversion. It
is unquestionably true that no community enjoys life
more than that which excludes all these amusements
from its sources of enjoyment. We use therefore the
language, not of speculation, but of experience, when
we say, that none of them is, in any degree, necessary
to the happiness of life.

CHAPTER XIII.
SUICIDE.

Unmanliness of Suicide — Forbidden in the New Testament — Its

folly.

There are few subjects upon which it is more diffi-
cult either to write or to legislate with effect, than that
of suicide. It is difficult to a writer, because a man
does not resolve upon the act until he has first become
steeled to some of the most powerful motives that can
be urged upon the human mind ; and to the legislator,
because he can inflict no penalty upon the offending
party.

It is to be feared that there is little probability of
diminishing the frequency of this miserable offence by
urging the considerations which philosophy suggests.
The voice of nature is louder and stronger than the
voice of philosophy : and as nature speaks to the suicide
in vain, what is the hope that philosophy will be
regarded ? — There appears to be but one efficient means

292 SUICIDE. [ESSAY II.

by which the mind can be armed against the tempta-
tions to suicide, because there is but one that can
support it against every evil of life — practical religion —
belief in the providence of God — confidence in his
wisdom — hope in his goodness. The only anchor that
can hold us in safety, is that which is fixed "within
the vail. ' ' He upon whom religion possesses its proper
influence, finds that it enables him to endure, with
resigned patience, every calamity of life. When
patience thus fulfils its perfect work, suicide, which is
the result of impatience, cannot be committed. He who
is surrounded, by whatever means, with pain or misery,
should remember that the present existence is strictly
pi'obationary — a scene upon which we are to be exer-
cised, and tried, and tempted ; and in which we are to
manifest whether we are willing firmly to endure.
The good or evil of the present life is of importance
chiefly as it influences our allotment in futurity : suf-
ferings are permitted for our advantage : they are
designed to purify and rectify the heart. The universal
Father ' ' scourgeth every son whom he receiveth ; ' '
and the suffering, the scourging, is of little account in
comparison with the prospects of another world. It is
not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall
follow —that glory of which an exceeding and eternal
weight is the reward of a "patient conti?iua7ice in well
doing." To him who thus regards misery, not as an
evil but as a good ; not as the unrestrained assault of
chance or malice, but as the beneficent discipline of a
Father ; to him who remembers that the time is
approaching in which he will be able most feelingly to
say, "For all I bless Thee — most for the severe;" —
every affliction is accompanied with its proper allevia-
tion : the present hour may distress but it does not over-
whelm him ; he may be perplexed but is not in despair :
he sees the darkness and feels the storm, but he knows

CHAP. XI II.] SUICIDE. 293

that light will again arise, and that the storm will
eventually be hushed with an efficacious, ' ' Peace be
still ;" so that there shall be a great calm.

Compared with these motives to avoid the first
promptings to suicide, others are like to be of little
effect ; and yet they are neither inconsiderable nor few.
It is more dignified, more worthy an enlightened
and manly understanding, to meet and endure an inev-
itable evil than to sink beneath it. He who feels
prompted to suicide, sacrifices his life to his fears.
The suicide balances between opposing objects of dread,
(for dreadful self-destruction must be supposed to be,)
and chooses the alternative which he fears least. If
his courage, his firmness, his manliness, were greater,
he who chooses the alternative of suicide, like him who
chooses the duel, would endure the evil rather than
avoid it in a manner which dignity and religion forbid.
The lesson too which the self- destroyer teaches to his
connections, of sinking in despair under the evils of
life, is one of the most pernicious which a man can
bequeath. The power of the example is also great.
Every act of suicide tacitly conveys the sanction of one
more judgment in its favor : frequency of repetition
diminishes the sensation of abhorrence, and makes suc-
ceeding sufferers resort to it with less reluctance.
! ' Besides which general reasons, each case will be
aggravated by its own proper and particular conse-
quences ; by the duties that are deserted ; by the claims
that are defrauded ; by the loss, affliction, or disgrace
which our death, or the manner of it, causes our family,
kindred, or friends ; by the occasion we give to many
to suspect the sincerity of our moral religious profes-
sions, and, together with ours, those of all others ;"*
and lastly, by the scandal which we bring upon religion
* Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 4, c. 3.

294 SUICIDE. [ESSAY II.

itself by declaring, 'practically, that it is not able to
support man under the calamities of life.

Some men say that the New Testament contains no
prohibition of suicide. If this were true, it would avail
nothing, because there are many things which it does
not forbid, but which every one knows to be wicked.
But in reality it does forbid it. Every exhortation
which it gives to be patient, every encouragement to
trust in God, every consideration which it urges as a
support under affliction and distress, is a virtual prohi-
bition of suicide ; — because, if a man commits suicide,
he rejects every such advice and encouragement, and
disregards every such motive.

To him who believes either in revealed or natural
religion, there is a certain folly in the commission of
suicide : for from what does he fly ? From his present
sufferings ; whilst death, for aught that he has reason
to expect, or at any rate for aught that he knows, may
only be the portal to sufferings more intense. Natural
religion, I think, gives no countenance to the supposi-
tion that suicide can be approved by the Deity, because
it proceeds upon the belief that, in another state of
existence, he will compensate good men for the suffer-
ings of the present. At the best, and under either
religion, it is a desperate stake. He that commits
murder may repent, and we hope, be forgiven ; but he
that destroys himself, whilst he incurs a load of guilt,
cuts off, by the act, the power of repentance.

Not every act of suicide is to be attributed to excess
of misery. Some shoot themselves or throw themselves
into a river in rage or revenge, in order to inflict pain
and remorse upon those who have ill used them. Such,
it is to be suspected, is sometimes a motive to self-de-
struction in disappointed love. The unhappy person
leaves behind some message or letter, in the hope of

CHAP. XIV.] RIGHTS OF SKIyF-DKFENCK. 295

exciting that affection and commiseration by the
catastrophe, which he could not excite when alive.
Perhaps such persons hope, too, that the world will
sigh over their early fate, tell of the fidelity of their
loves, and throw a romantic melancholy over their
story. This needs not to be a subject of wonder : un-
numbered multitudes have embraced death in other
forms from kindred motives. We hear continually of
those who die for the sake of glory. This is but
another phantom, and the less amiable phantom of the
two. It is just as reasonable to die in order that the
world may admire our true love, as in order that it
may admire our bravery. And the lover's hope is the
better founded. There are too many aspirants for
glory for each to get even his ' ' peppercorn of praise. ' '
But the lover may hope for higher honors ; a paragraph
may record his fate through the existence of a weekly
paper ; he may be talked of through half a county ;
and some kindred spirit may inscribe a tributary sonnet
in a lady's album.

CHAPTER XIV.

RIGHTS OF SELF-DEFENCE.

These rights not absolute — Their limits — Personal attack-
Preservation of property — Much resistance lawful — Effects of
forbearance — Sharpe — Barclay — Ellwood.

The right of defending ourselves against violence is
easily deducible from the law of nature. There is
however little need to deduce it, because mankind are
at least sufficiently persuaded of its lawfulness. — The
great question, which the opinions and principles that
now influence the world makes it rieedful to discuss is,
whether the right of self-defence is absolute and un-

296 RIGHTS OF SEI,F-DEFENCK. [ESSAY II.

conditional — whether every action whatever is lawful,
provided it is necessary to the preservation of life ?
They who maintain the affirmative, maintain a great
deal ; for they maintain that whenever life is en-
dangered, all rules of morality are, as it respects the
individual, suspended, annihilated : every moral obli-
gation is taken away by the single fact that life is
threatened.

Yet the language that is ordinarily held upon the
subject implies the supposition of all this. "If our
lives are threatened with assassination or open violence
from the hands of robbers or enemies, any means of de-
fence would be allowed, and laudable."* Again,
" There is one case in which all extremities are justifi-
able, namely, when our life is assaulted, and it be-
comes necessary for our preservation to kill the
assailant." f

The reader may the more willingly enquire whether
these propositions are true, because most of those who
lay them down are at little pains to prove their truth.
Men are extremely willing to acquiesce in it without
proof, and writers and speakers think it unnecessary to
adduce it. Thus perhaps it happens that fallacy is not
detected because it is not sought. — If the reader
should think that some of the instances which follow
are remote from the ordinary affairs of life, he is re-
quested to remember that we are discussing the sound-
ness of an alleged absolute ride. If it be found that
there are or have been cases in which it is not absolute
— cases in which all extremities are not lawful in de-
fence of life — then the rule is not sound : then there
are some limits to the right of self-defence.

If ' ' any means of defence are laudable, " if "all ex-
tremities are justifiable," then they are not confined to

* Grotius : Rights of War and Peace, f Paley : Mor. and
Pol. Phil. p. 3, b. iv. c. 1.

CHAP. XIV.] RIGHTS OF SFl,F-DFFENCE.

297

acts of resistance to the assailing party. There may
be other conditions upon which life may be preserved
than that of violence towards him. Some ruffians
seize a man in the highway, and will kill him unless
he will conduct them to his neighbor's property and
assist them in carrying it off. May this man unite
with them in the robbery in order to save his life, or
may he not ? If he may, what becomes of the law,
Thou shalt not steal ? If he may not, then not every
means by which a man may preserve his life is "laud-
able ' ' or " allowed. ' ' We have found an exception
to the rule. There are twenty other wicked things
which violent men may make the sole condition of not
taking our lives. Do all wicked things become lawful
because life is at stake ? If they do, morality is surely
at an end : if they do not, such propositions as those of
Grotitis and Paley are untrue.

A pagan has unalterably resolved to offer me up in
sacrifice on the morrow, unless I will acknowledge the
deity, of his gods and worship them. I shall presume
that the Christian will regard these acts as being,
under every possible circumstance, unlawful. The
night offers me an opportunity of assassinating him.
Now I am placed, so far as the argument is concerned,
in precisely the same situation with respect to this
man, as a traveller is with respect to a ruffian with a
pistol- Life in both cases depends on killing the of-
fender. — Both are acts of self-defence. Am I at
liberty to assassinate this man? The heart of the
Christian surely answers, no. Here then is a case in
which I may not take a violent man's life in order to
save my own. — We have said that the heart of the
Christian answers, no : and this we think is a just
species of appeal. But if any one doubts whether the
assassination would be unlawful, let him consider
whether one of the Christian apostles would have

298 RIGHTS OF SEI,F-DEFENCE. [ESSAY II.

committed it in such a case. Here, at any rate, the heart
of every man answers, no. And mark the reason — be-
cause every man perceives that the act would have
been palpably inconsistent with the apostolic character
and conduct ; or, which is the same thing, with a Chris-
tian character and conduct.

Or put such a case in a somewhat different form. A
furious Turk holds a scimitar over my head, and de-
clares he will instantly dispatch me unless I abjure
Christianity and acknowledge the divine legation of
" the Prophet." Now there are two supposable ways
in which I may save my life ; one by contriving to stab
the Turk, and one " by denying Christ before men."
You say I am not at liberty to deny Christ,- but I am
at liberty to stab the man. Why am I not at liberty
to deny him ? Because Christianity forbids it. Then
we require you to show that Christianity does not
forbid you to take his life. Our religion pronounces
both actions to be wrong. You say that, under these
circumstances, the killing is right. Where is your
proof ? What is the ground of your distinction ? — But,
whether it can be adduced or not, our immediate argu-
ment is established — That there are some things which it
is not lawful to do in order to preserve our lives. — This
conclusion has indeed been practically acted upon. A
company of inquisitors and their agents are about to
conduct a good man to the stake. If he could by any
means destroy these men, he might save his life. It is
a question therefore of self-defence. Supposing these
means to be within his power — supposing he could
contrive a mine, and by suddenly firing it, blow his
persecutors into the air — would it be lawful and
Christian thus to act ? No. The common judgments
of mankind respecting the right temper and conduct of
the martyr, pronounce it to be wrong. It is pro-
nounced to be wrong by the language and example of

CHAP. XIV.] RIGHTS OF SEXF-DEFENCE. 299

the first teachers of Christianity. The conclusion
therefore again is that all extremities are not allowable
in order to preserve life ; — that there is a limit to the
right of self-defence.

It would be to no purpose to say that in some of the
instances which have been proposed, religious duties
interfere with and limit the rights of self-defence.
This is a common fallacy. Religious duties and moral
duties are identical in point of obligation, for they are
imposed by one authority. Religious duties are not
obligatory for any other reason than that which
attaches to moral duties also ; namely the will of God.
He who violates the moral law is as truly unfaithful in
his allegiance to God, as he who denies Christ before men.

So that we come at last to one single and simple
question, whether taking the life of a person who
threatens ours, is or is not compatible with the moral
law. We refer for an answer to the broad principles
of Christian piety and Christian benevolence ; that
piety which reposes habitual confidence in the Divine
Providence, and an habitual preference of futurity to
the present time ; and that benevolence which not only
loves our neighbors as ourselves, but feels that the
Samaritan or the enemy is a neighbor. There is no
conjecture in life in which the exercise of this benevo-
lence may be suspended ; none in which we are not
required to maintain and to practise it. Whether want
implores our compassion, or ingratitude returns ill for
kindness ; whether a fellow creature is drowning in a
river or assailing us on the highway ; everywhere, and
under all circumstances, the duty remains.

Is killing an assailant, then, within or without the
limits of this benevolence? — As to the man, it is evi-
dent that no good-will is exercised towards him by
shooting him through the head. Who indeed will dis-
pute that, before we can thus destroy him, benevolence

300 RIGHTS OP SEXF-DEFENCE. [ESSAY II.

towards him must be excluded from our minds ? We
not only exercise no benevolence ourselves, but pre-
clude him from receiving it from any human heart ;
and, which is a serious item in the account, we cut him
off from all possibility of reformation. To call sinners
to repentance, was one of the great characteristics of
the mission of Christ. Does it appear consistent with
this characteristic for one of His followers to take away
from a sinner the power of repentance ? Is it an act that
accords, and is congruous, with Christian love ?

But an argument has been attempted here. That
we may ' ' kill the assailant is evident in a state of
nature, unless it can be shown that we are bound to
prefer the aggressor's life to our own ; that is to say,
to love our enemy better than ourselves, which can
never be a debt of justice, nor any where appears to be
a duty of charity."* The answer is this : That
although we may not be required to love our enemy
better than ourselves, we are required to love him as
ourselves ; and therefore, in the supposed case, it would
still be a question equally balanced which life ought to
be sacrificed ; for it is quite clear that, if we kill the
assailant , we love him less than ourselves, which does
seem to militate against a duty of charity. But the
truth is that he who, from motives of obedience to the
will of God, spares the aggressor's life even to the
endangering his own, does exercise love both to the
aggressor and to himself, perfectly: to the aggressor,
because by sparing his life we give him the opportunity
of repentance and amendment : to himself, because
every act of obedience to God is perfect benevolence
towards ourselves ; it is consulting and promoting our
most valuable interests ; it is propitiating the favor of
Him who is emphatically " a rich rewarder." — So that
the question remains as before, not whether we should
* Paley : Mor. and Pol. Phil. p. 3, b. 4. c. 1.

CHAP. XIV.] RIGHTS OF SELF-DEFENCE. 301

love our enemy better than ourselves, but whether
Christian principles are acted upon in destroying him :
and if they are not, whether we should prefer Chris-
tianity to ourselves ; whether we should be willing to
lose our life for Christ's sake and the gospel's.

Perhaps it will be said that he should exercise
benevolence to the public as well as to the offender,
and that we may exercise more benevolence to them
by killing than by sparing him. But very few persons,
when they kill a man who attacks them, kill him out
of benevolence to the public. That is not the motive
which influences their conduct, or which they at all
take into the account. Besides, it is by no means cer-
tain that the public would lose anything by the for-
bearance. To be sure, a man can do no more mischief
after he is killed ; but then it is to be remembered, that
robbers are more desperate and more murderous from
the apprehension of swords and pistols than they
would be without it. Men are desperate in proportion
to their apprehensions of danger. The plunderer who
feels a confidence that his own life will not be taken,
may conduct his plunder with comparative gentleness ;
whilst he who knows that his life is in immediate
jeopardy, stuns or murders his victim lest he should be
killed himself. The great evil which a family sustains
by a robbery is often not the loss, but the terror and
the danger ; and these are the evils which, by the ex-
ercise of forbearance, would be diminished. So that,
if some bad men are prevented from committing rob-
beries by the fear of death, the public gains in other
ways by the forbearance : nor is it by any means cer-
tain that the balance of advantages is in favor of the
more violent course. — The argument which we are op-
posing proceeds on the supposition that our own lives
are endangered. Now it is a fact that this very danger
results, in part, from the want of habits of forbearance.

302 RIGHTS OE SELF-DEFENCE. [ESSAY II.

We publicly profess that we would kill an assailant ;
and the assailant, knowing this, prepares to kill us
when otherwise he would forbear.

And after all, if it were granted that a person is at
liberty to take an assailant's life in order to preserve his
own, how is he to know, in the majority of instances,
whether his own would be taken ? When a man breaks
into a person's house and this person, as soon as he
conies up with the robber, takes out a pistol and shoots
him, we are not to be told that this man was killed
" in defence of life." Or go a step further, and a step
further still, by which the intention of the robber to
commit personal violence ' or inflict death is more and
more probable : — You must at last shoot him in un-
certainty whether your life was endangered or not.
Besides, you can withdraw — you can fly. None but
the predetermined murderer wishes to commit murder.
But perhaps you exclaim — " Fly ! fly, and leave your
property, unprotected ! " Yes — unless you mean to
say that preservation of property, as well as preserva-
tion of life, makes it lawful to kill an offender. This
were to adopt a new and a very different proposition ;
but a proposition which I suspect cannot be separated
in practice from the former. He who affirms that he
may kill another in order to preserve his life, and that
he may endanger his life in order to protect his prop-
erty, does in reality affirm that he may kill another in
order to preserve his property. But such a proposi-
tion, in an unconditional form, no one surely will
tolerate. The laws of the land do not admit it, nor do
they even admit the right of taking another's life
simply because he is attempting to take ours. They
require that we should be tender even of the murderer's
life, and that we should fly rather than destroy it. *

We say that the proposition that we may take life
* Blackstone : Com. v. 4, c. 4.

CHAP. XIV.] RIGHTS OP SPI,P-DEPENCP. 303

in order to preserve our property is intolerable. To pre-
serve how much? five hundred pounds, or fifty, or
ten, or a shilling or a sixpence ? It has actually been
declared that the rights of self-defence " justify a man
in taking all forcible methods which are necessary, in
order to procure the restitution of the freedom or the
property of which he had been unjustly deprived." *
All forcible methods to obtain restitution of property !
No limit to the nature or effects of the force ! No
limit to the insignificance of the amount of the prop-
erty ! Apply, then, the rule. A boy snatches a
bunch of grapes from a fruiterer's stall. The fruiterer
runs after the thief, but finds that he is too light of
foot to be overtaken. Moreover, the boy eats as he
runs. " All forcible methods," reasons the fruiterer,
"are justifiable to obtain restitution of property. I
may fire after the plunderer, and when he falls regain
my grapes." All this is just and right, if Gisborne's
proposition is true. It is a dangerous thing to lay
down maxims in morality.

The conclusion, then, to which we are led by these
enquiries is, that he who kills another, even upon the
plea of self-defence, does not do it in the predominance
nor in the exercise of Christian dispositions : and if
this is true, is it not also true, that his life cannot be
thus taken in conformity with the Christian law ?

But this is very far from concluding that no resist-
ance may be made to aggression. We may make, and
we ought to make, a great deal. It is the duty of the
civil magistrate to repress the violence of one man
towards another, and by consequence it is the duty of
the individual, when the civil power cannot operate, to
endeavor to repress it himself. I perceive no reasona-
ble exception to the rule — that whatever Christianity
permits the magistrate to do in order to restrain
* Gisborne : Moral Philosophy.

304 RIGHTS OF SElvF-DEFENCE. [ESSAY II.

violence, it permits the individual, under such circum-
stances to do also. I know the consequences to which
this rule leads in the case of the punishment of death,
and of other questions. These questions will hereafter
be discussed. In the mean time, it may be an act of
candor to the reader to acknowledge, that our chief
motive for the discussions of the present chapter, has
been to pioneer the way for a satisfactory investigation
of the punishment of death, and of other modes by
which human life is taken away.

Many kinds of resistance to aggression come strictly
within the fulfilment of the law of benevolence. He
who, by securing a man, prevents him from commit-
ting an act of great turpitude, is certainly his benefac-
tor ; and if he be thus reserved for justice, the benevo-
lence is great both to him and to the public. It is an
act of much kindness to a bad man to secure him for
the penalties of the law : or it would be such, if penal
law were in the state in which it ought to be, and to
which it appears to be making some approaches. It
would then be very probable that the man would be
reformed : and this is the greatest benefit which can be
conferred upon him and upon the community.

The exercise of Christian forbearance towards violent
men is not tantamount to an invitation of outrage.
Cowardice is one thing ; this forbearance is another-
The man of true forbearance is of all men the least
cowardly. It requires courage in a greater degree and
of a higher order to practice it when life is threatened,
than to draw a sword or fire a pistol. — No : It is the
peculiar privilege of Christian virtue to approve itself
even to the bad. There is something in the nature of
that calmness, and self-possession, and forbearance,
that religion effects, which obtains, nay which almost
commands regard and respect. How different the effect
upon the violent tenants of Newgate, the hardihood of

CHAP. XIV.] RIGHTS OF SKI^-DKFKNCE. 305

a turnkey and the mild courage of an Elizabeth Fry !
Experience, incontestable experience, has proved, that
the minds of few men are so depraved or desperate as
to prevent them from being influenced by real Christian
conduct. L,et him therefore who advocates the taking
the life of an aggressor, first show that all other means
of safety are vain ; let him show that bad men, not-
withstanding the exercise of true Christian forbearance,
persist in their purposes of death : when he has done
this he will have adduced an argument in favor of
taking their lives which will not indeed be conclusive,
but which will approach nearer to conclusiveness than
any that has yet been adduced.

Of the consequences of forbearance, even in the case
of personal attack, there are some examples : Arch-
bishop Sharpe was assaulted by a footpad on the high-
way, who presented a pistol and demanded his money.
The Archbishop spoke to the robber in the language
of a fellow man and of a Christian. The man was
really in distress, and the prelate gave him such money
as he had, and promised that, if he would call at the
palace, he would make up the amount to fifty pounds.
This was the sum of which the robber had said he
stood in the utmost need. The man called and
received the money. About a year and a half after-
wards, this man again came to the palace and
brought back the same sum. He said that his cir-
cumstances had become improved and that, through
the "astonishing goodness" of the Archbishop, he
had become " the most penitent, the most grateful, and
happiest of his species." — L,et the reader consider how
different the Archbishop's feelings were, from what
they would have been if, by his hand this man had
been cut off.*

*See Lond. Chron. "Aug. 12, 1785." See also life of Granville
Sharpe, Esq., p. 13.

3°6 RIGHTS OF self-defence, [essay II.

Barclay, the Apologist, was attacked by a highway-
man. He substituted for the ordinary modes of resist-
ance, a calm expostulation. The felon dropped his
presented pistol, and offered no further violence. A
Leonard Fell was similarly attacked, and from him the
robber took both his money and his horse, and then
threatened to blow out his brains. Fell solemnly spoke
to the man on the wickedness of his life. The robber
was astonished : he had expected, perhaps, curses, or
perhaps a dagger. He declared he would not keep
either the horse or the money, and returned both. " If
thine enemy hunger, feed him ; for in so doing thou
shalt heap coals of fire upon his head."* — The tenor of
the short narrative that follows is somewhat different.
Ellwood, who is known to the literary world as the
suggester to Milton of Paradise Regained, was attend-
ing his father in his coach. Two men waylaid them
in the dark and stopped the carriage. Young Ellwood
got out, and on going up to the nearest, the ruffian
raised a heavy club, "when,"* says Ellwood, "I
whipped out my rapier and made a pass upon him. I
could not have failed running him through up to the
hilt," but the sudden appearance of the bright blade
terrified the man so that he stepped aside, avoided the
thrust, and both he and the other fled. "At that
time," proceeds Ellwood, *' and for a good while after,
I had no regret upon my mind for what I had done. ' '
This was whilst he was young, and when the forbear-
ing principles of Christianity had little influence upon
him. But afterwards, when this influence became
powerful, " a sort of horror," he says, " seized on me
when I considered how near I had been to the staining
of my hands with human blood. And whensoever
afterwards I went that way, and indeed as often since
as the matter has come into my remembrance, my soul
* " Select Anecdotes, &c." by John Barclay.

CHAP XIV.] RIGHTS OE SELF-DEEENCE. 307

has blessed Him who preserved and withheld me from
shedding man's blood."*

That those over whom, as over Ellwood, the influ-
ence of Christianity is imperfect and weak, should
think themselves at liberty upon such occasions to
take the lives of their fellow-men, needs to be no sub-
ject of wonder. Christianity, if we would rightly
estimate its obligations, must be felt in the heart.
They in whose hearts it is not felt, or felt but little*
cannot be expected perfectly to know what its obliga-
tions are. I know not therefore that more appropriate
advice can be given to him who contends for the law-
fulness of taking another man's life in order to save
his own, than that he would first enquire whether the
influence of religion is dominant in his mind. If it is
not, let him suspend his decision until he has attained to
the fulness of the stature of a Christian man. Then,
as he will be of that number who do the will of
Heaven, he may hope to ! ' know of this doctrine
whether it be of God."

* EUwood's Life.

ESSAY III.*

POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGA-
TIONS.

CHAPTER I.

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL TRUTH, AND OF
POLITICAL RECTITUDE.

I. — ' ' Political Power is rightly exercised only when It is pos-
sessed by consent of the community ' ' — Governors Officers of
the public — Transfer of their rights by a whole people — The
people hold the sovereign power — Rights of Governors — A
conciliating system.

II. — "Political Power is rightly exercised only when it sub-
serves the welfare of the community" — Interference with
other nations — Present expedients for present occasions —
Proper business of Governments.

III. — "Political Power is rightly exercised only when it sub-
serves the welfare of the community by means which the
moral law permits ' ' — The moral law alike binding on nations
and individuals — Deviation from rectitude impolitic.

[* This Essay the author did not live to revise, a circumstance
which will account for a want of complete connection of the
different parts of a subject which the reader will sometimes
meet with. There occur also in this part of the manuscript
numerous memoranda, which the author intended to make use
of in a future revision. These are to be distinguished from the
Notes, as the former refer, not to any particular passage but
only to the subject of the chapter or section. They were
hastily, as the thought occurred, written in the margin or on a
blank leaf of the manuscript, and they are here introduced at
the bottom of the page, in those parts to which they appear to
have the nearest reference. — Ed.]

CHAP. I.] PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL TRUTH, ETC. 309

The fundamental principles which are deducible
from the law of nature and from Christianity, respect-
ing political affairs, appear to be these : —

1 . Political Power is rightly possessed only when it
is possessed by consent of the community ; —

2 . It is rightly exercised only when it subserves the
welfare of the community ; —

3. And only when it subserves this purpose, by
means which the moral law permits.

I — "POLITICAL POWER IS RIGHTI.Y POSSESSED ONLY WHEN
IT IS POSSESSED BY CONSENT OF THE COMMUNITY."

Perfect liberty is desirable if it were consistent with
the greatest degree of happiness. But it is not. Men
find that, by giving up a part of their liberty, they are
more happy than by retaining, or attempting to re-
tain, the whole. Government, whatever be its. form,
is the agent by which the i7iexpedient portion of
individual liberty is taken away. Men institute gov-
ernment for their own advantage, and because they
find they are more happy with it than without it.
This is the sole reason, in principle, how little soever it
be adverted to in practice. Governors, therefore, are
the officers of the public, in the proper sense of the
word : not the slaves of the public ; for if they do not
incline to conform to the public will, they are at lib-
erty, like other officers, to give up their office. They
are servants, in the same manner, and for the same
purpose, as a solicitor is the servant of his client, and
the physician of his patient. These are employed by
the patient or the client voluntarily for his own advan-
tage, and for nothing else. A nation, (not an individ-
ual, but a nation,'), is under no other obligation to obe-
dience, than that which arises from the conviction that
obedience is good for itself : — or rather, in more

3IO PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL TRUTH, [ESSAY III.

proper language, a nation is under no obligation to obe-
dience at all. Obedience is voluntary. If they do not
think it proper to obey — that is, if they are not satis-
fied with their officers — they are at liberty to discon-
tinue their obedience, and to appoint other officers
instead.

It is incidental to the office of the first public ser-
vants, that they should exercise authority over those
by whom they are selected ; and hence probably, it has
happened that the terms ' ' public officer, " " public
servant," have excited such strange controversies in
the world. Men have not maintained sufficient dis-
crimination of ideas. Seeing that governors are great
and authoritative, a man imagines it cannot be proper to
say they are servants. Seeing that it is necessary and
right that individuals should obey, he cannot entertain
the notion that they are the servants of those whom
they govern. The truth is, that governors are not the
servants of individuals but of the community. They are
the masters of individuals,, the servants of the public ;
and if this simple distinction had been sufficiently
borne in mind, much perhaps of the vehement conten-
tion upon these matters had been avoided.

But the idea of being a servant to the public, is quite
consistent with the idea of exercising authority over
them. The common language of a patient is founded
upon similar grounds. He sends for a physician : —
the physician comes at his desire — is paid for his ser-
vices— and then the patient says, I am ordered to adopt
a regimen, I am ordered to Italy ; — and he obeys, not
because he may not refuse to obey if he chooses, but
because he confides in the judgment of the physician,
and thinks that it is more to his benefit to be guided by
the physician's judgment than by his own. But it
will be said the physician cannot enforce his orders upon
the patient against his will : neither I answer can the

CHAP. I.] AND OF POWTlCAl, RECTITUDE. 311

governor enforce his upon the public against theirs.
No doubt governors do sometimes so enforce them.
What they do, however, and what they rightfully do,
are separate considerations, and our business is only
with the latter.

The rule that - ' political power is rightly possessed
only when it is possessed by consent of the community, ' '
necessarily applies to the choice of the person who is
to exercise it. No man, and no set of men, rightly
govern unless they are preferred by the public to others.
It is of no consequence that a people should formally
select a president or a king. They continually act
upon the principle without this. A people who are
satisfied with their governor make, day by day, the
choice of which we speak. They prefer him to all
others ; they choose to be served by him rather than
by any other ; and he, therefore, is virtually, though
not formally, selected by the public. But, when we
speak of the right of a particular person or family to
govern a people, we speak, as of all other rights, in
conditional language. The right consists in the prefer-
ence which is given to him ; and exists no longer than
that preference exists. If any governor were fully
conscious that the community preferred another man
or another kind of government, he ought to regard
himself in the light of an usurper if he nevertheless
continues to retain his power. Not that every govern-
ment ought to dissolve itself, or every governor to
abdicate his office, because there is a general but tem-
porary clamor against it. This is one thing — the
steady deliberate judgment of the people is another.
Is it too much to hope that the time may come when
governments will so habitually refer to the purposes of
government, and be regulated by them, that they will
not even wish to hold the reins longer than the people
desire it ; and that nothing more will be needed for a

312 PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL TRUTH, . [KSSAY III.

quiet alteration than that the public judgment should
be quietly expressed?

Political revolutions are not often favorable to the
accurate illustration of political truth ; because, such is
the moral condition of mankind, that they have seldom
acted in conformity with it. Revolutions have com-
monly been the effect of the triumph of a party, or of
the successes of physical power. Yet, if the illustra-
tion of these principles has not been accurate, the
general position of the right of the people to select
their own rulers has often been illustrated. In England,
when James II. left the throne, the people filled it with*
another person, whose real title consisted in the choice
of the people. James continued to talk of his rights to
the crown ; but if William was preferred by the public,
James was, what his son was afterwards called, a pre-
tender. The nonjurors appear to have acted upon
erroneous principles, (except indeed on the score of
former oaths to James ; which, however, ought never
to have been taken. ) If we acquit them of motives of
party, they will appear to have entertained some
notions of the rights of governors independently of the
wishes of the people. At William's death, the nation
preferred James's daughter to his son ; thus again
elevating their judgments above all considerations of
what the pretender called his rights. Anne had then
a right to the throne, and her brother had not. At
the death of Anne, or rather in contemplation of her
death, the public had again to select their governor ;
and they chose, not the immediate representative of the
old family, but the elector of Hanover : and it is in
virtue of the same choice, tacitly expressed at the
present hour, that the heir of the elector now fills the
throne.

[The habitual consciousness on the part of a legisla-
ture, that its authority is possessed in order to make it

CHAP. I.] AND OF POUTlCAI, RECTITUDE. 313

an efficient guardian and promoter of the general wel-
fare and the general satisfaction, would induce a more
mild and conciliating system of internal policy than
that which frequently obtains. Whether it has arisen
from habit resulting from the violent and imperious
character of international policy, or from that tendency
to unkindness and overbearing which the conscious-
ness of power induces, it cannot be doubted that meas-
ures of government are frequently adopted and
conducted with such a high hand as impairs the satis-
faction of the governed, and diminishes, by example,
that considerate attention to the claims of others, upon
which much of the harmony, and therefore the happi-
ness of society consists. Governments are too much
afraid of conciliation. They too habitually suppose that
mildness or concession indicates want of courage or
want of power — that it invites unreasonable demands,
and encourages encroachment and violence on the part
of the governed. Man is not so intractable a being, or
so insensible of the influence of candor and justice. In
private life, he does not the most easily guide the con-
duct of his neighbors, who assumes an imperious, but
he who assumes a temperate and mild demeanor. The
best mode of governing, and the most powerftd mode
too, is to recommend state measures to the judgment
and the affections of a people. If this had been suffi-
ciently done in periods of tranquillity, some of those
conflicts which have arisen between governments and
the people had doubtless been prevented ; and
governments had been spared the mortification of
conceding that to violence which they refused to con-
cede in periods of quiet. We should not wait for times
of agitation to do that which Fox advised even at such
a time, because at other periods it may be done with
greater advantage and with a better grace. "It may
be asked," said Fox, "what I would propose to do in

314 PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL TRUTH, [ESSAY III.

times of agitation like the present ? I will answer
openly : — If there is a tendency in the Dissenters to
discontent, what should I do ? I would instantly repeal
the corporation and test acts, and take from them
thereby all cause of complaint. If there were any
persons tinctured with a republican spirit, I would en-
deavor to amend the representation of the Commons,
and to prove that the House of Commons, though not
chosen by all, should have no other interest than to
prove itself the representative of all. If men were dis-
satisfied on account of disabilities or exemptions, &c. ,
I would repeal the penal statutes, which are a disgrace to
our law-books. If there were other complaints of
grievance, I would redress them where they were really
proved ; but, above all, I would consta?itlyy cheerfully,
patiently listen ; I would make it known, that if any
man felt, or thought he felt a grievance, he might come
freely to the bar of this House and bring his proofs.
And it should be made manifest to all the world that
where they did exist they should be redressed ; where
not, it should be made manifest."*

We need not consider the particular examples and
measures which the statesman instanced. The temper
and spirit is the thing. A government should do that
of which every person would see the propriety in a
private man ; if misconduct was charged upon him,
show that the charge was unfounded ; or, being sub-
stantiated, amend his conduct.]

II. — ' * POLITICAL POWER IS RIGHTLY EXERCISED ONLY WHEN
IT SUBSERVES THE WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY."

This proposition is consequent of the truth of the
last. The community, which has the right to with-
hold power, delegates it, of course, for its own advan-
* Fell's Memoirs of the Public Life of C. J. Fox.

CHAP. I.] AND OF POUTlCAI, RECTITUDE. 315

tage. If in any case its advantage is not consulted,
then the object for which it was delegated is frustrated ;
or, in simple words, the measure which does not pro-
mote the public welfare is not right. It matters noth-
ing whether the community have delegated specifically
so much power for such and such purposes ; the power,
being possessed, entails the obligation. Whether a
sovereign derives absolute authority by inheritance, or
whether a president is entrusted with limited authority
for a year, the principles of their duty are the same.
The obligation to employ it only for the public good,
is just as real and just as great in one case as in the
other. The Russian and the Turk have the same right
to require that the power of their rulers shall be so em-
ployed as the Englishman or American. They may
not be able to assert this right, but that does not
affect its existence nor the ruler's duty, nor his re-
sponsibility to that Almighty Being before whom he
must give an account of his stewardship. These
reasonings, if they needed confirmation derive it from
the fact that the Deity imperatively requires us, ac-
cording to our opportunities, to do good to man.

Governments commonly trouble themselves unneces-
sarily and too much with the politics of other nations.
A prince should turn his back towards other countries
and his face towards his own — just as the proper place
of a landholder is upon his own estates and not upon
his neighbor's. If governments were wise, it would
ere long be found that a great portion of the endless
and wearisome succession of treaties and remonstrances,
and embassies, and alliances, and memorials, and sub-
sidies, might be dispensed with, with so little incon-
venience and so much benefit, that the world would
wonder to think to what futile ends they had been
busying and how needlessly they had been injuring
themselves.

3l6 PRINCIPLES OP POUTlCAI, TRUTH, [ESSAY III.

No doubt, the immoral and irrational system of in-
ternational politics which generally obtains, makes the
path of one government more difficult than it would
otherwise be ; and yet it is probable that the most effi-
cacious way of inducing another government to attend
to its proper business, would be to attend to our own.
It is not sufficiently considered, nor indeed is it suffi-
ciently known, how powerful is the influence of up-
rightness and candor in conciliating the good opinion
and the good offices of other men. Overreaching and
chicanery in one person, induce overreaching and
chicanery in another. Men distrust those whom they
perceive to be unworthy of confidence. Real integrity
is not without its voucher in the hearts of others ; and
they who maintain it are treated with confidence, be-
cause it is seen that confidence can be safely reposed.
Besides, he who busies himself with the politics of
foreign countries, like the busybodies in a petty com-
munity, does not fail to offend. In the last century,
our own country was so much of a busybody, and had
involved itself in such a multitude of treaties and
alliances, that it was found, I believe, quite impossible
to fulfil one, without, by that very act, violating
another. This, of course, would offend. In private
life, that man passes through the world with the least
annoyance and the greatest satisfaction, who confines
his attention to its proper business, that is, generally,
to his own : and who can tell why the experience of
nations should in this case be different from that of
private men? In a rectified state of international
affairs, half a dozen princes on a continent would have
little more occasion to meddle with one another than
half a dozen neighbors in a street.

But indeed, communities frequently contribute to
their own injury. If governors are ambitious, or resent-
ful, or proud, so, often, are the people ; — and the

CHAP. I.] AND OF POLITICAL RKCTlTUDE. 3I7 .

public good has often been sacrificed by the public,
with astonishing preposterousness, to jealousy or vexa-
tion. Some merchants are angry at the loss of a
branch of trade ; they urge the government to inter-
fere ; memorials and remonstrances follow to the state
of whom thay complain ; — and so, by that process of
exasperation which is quite natural when people think
that high language and a high attitude is politic, the
nations soon begin to fight. The merchants applaud
the spirit of their rulers, while in one year they lose
more by the war than they would have lost by the
want of the trade for twenty ; and before peace returns,
the nation has lost more than it would have lost by the
continuance of the evil for twenty centuries. Peace at
length arrives, and the government begins to devise
means of repairing the mischiefs of the war. Both
government and people reflect very complacently on
the wisdom of their measures — forgetting that their con-
duct is only that of a man who wantonly fractures his
own leg with a club, and then boasts to his neighbors
how dexterously he limps to a surgeon.

We know what a sickening detail the history of
Europe is ; and it is obvious to remark, that the sys-
tem which has given rise to such a history must be
vicious and mistaken in its fundamental principles.
The same class of history will continue to after genera-
tions unless these principles are changed — unless
philosophy and Christianity obtain a greater influence
in the* practice of government ; unless, in a word, gov-
ernments are content to do their proper business, and
to leave that which is not their business undone.

When such principles are acted upon, we may
reasonably expect a rapid advancement in the whole
condition of the world. Domestic measures which are
now postponed to the more stirring occupations of
legislators, will be found to be of incomparably greater

3l8 PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL TRUTH, [ESSAY III.

importance than they. A wise code of criminal law,
will be found to be of more consequence and interest
than the acquisition of a million, square miles of terri-
tory : — a judicious encouragement of general education,
will be of more value than all the ' ' glory ' ' that has
been acquired from the days of Alfred till now. Of
moral legislation, however, it will be our after business
to speak ; meanwhile the lover of mankind has some
reason for gratulation, in perceiving indications that
governments will hereafter direct their attention more
to the objects for which they are invested with power.
The statesman who promotes this improvement will be
what many statesman have been called — a great man.
That government only is great which promotes the
prosperity of its own people ; and that people only are
prosperous, who are wise and happy.

III. — ' ' POLITICAL POWER IS RIGHTLY EXERCISED ONLY WHEN
IT SUBSERVES THE WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY BY MEANS
WHICH THE MORAL LAW PERMITS. ' '

It has been said by a Christian writer, that ' ' the
science of politics is but a particular application of that
of morals;" and it has been said by a writer who
rejected Chistianity, that " the morality that ought to
govern the conduct of individuals and of nations, is in
all cases the same. ' ' If there be truth in the principles
which are advanced in the first of these essays, these
propositions are indisputably true. It is the chief pur-
pose of the present work to enforce the supremacy of the
moral law ; and to this supremacy there is no exception
in the case of nations. In the conduct of nations this
supremacy is practically denied, although, perhaps,
few of those who make it subservient to other purposes
would deny it in terms. With their lips they honor
the doctrine, but in their works they deny it. Such

CHAP. I.] AND OF POWTICAI, RECTlTUDf!1 319

procedures must be expected to produce much self-
contradiction, much vacillation between truth and the
wish to disregard it, much vagueness of notions respect-
ing political rectitude, and much casuistry to educe
something like a justification of what cannot be justi-
fied. Iyet the reader observe an illustration : — A moral
philosopher says, "The Christian principles of love,
and forbearance, and kindness, strictly as they are to
be observed between man and man, are to be observed
with precisely the same strictness between nation and
nation." This is an unqualified assertion of the truth.
But the writer thinks it would carry him too far, and
so he makes exceptions. ' ■ In reducing to practice the
Christian principles of forbearance, &c, it will not be
always feasible, nor always safe, to proceed to the same
extent as in acting towards an individual." L,et the
reader exercise his skill in casuistry, by showing the
difference between conforming to laws with ' J precise
strictness, ' ' and conforming to them in their ' ' full
extent." — Thus far Christianity and expediency are
proposed as our joint governors. — We must observe the
moral law, but still we must regulate our observance
of it by considerations of what is feasible and safe.
Presently afterwards, however, Christianity is quite
dethroned, and we are to observe its laws only "so far
as national ability and national security will permit."*
— So that our rule of political conduct stands at length
thus : obey Christianity with precise strictness — when it
suits your interests.

The reasoning by which such doctrines are supported,
is such as it might be expected to be. We are told of
the ' ' caution requisite in affairs of such magnitude —
the great uncertainty of the future conduct of the other
nation " — and of " patriotism." — So that, because the
affairs are of great magnitude, the laws of the Deity

* Gisborne's Moral Philosophy.

320 PRINCIPLES OP POIjTlCAI, TRUTH, [pSSAY III.

are not to be observed ! It is all very well, it seems, to
observe them in little matters, but for our more im-
portant concerns we want rules commensurate with
their dignity — we cannot then be bound by the laws of
God ! The next reason is, that we cannot foresee ' ' the
future conduct " of a nation. — Neither can we that of
an individual. Besides this, inability to foresee incul-
cates the very lesson that we ought to observe the laws
of Him who can foresee. It is a strange thing to urge
the limitation of our powers of judgment, as a reason
for substituting it for the judgment of Him whose
powers are perfect. Then ' ' patriotism " is a reason :
and we are to be patriotic to our country at the expense
of treason to our religion !

The principles upon which these reasonings are
founded, lead to their legitimate results : "In war and
negotiation," says Adam Smith, "the laws of justice
are very seldom observed. Truth and fair dealing are
almost totally disregarded. Treaties are violated, and
the violation, if some advantage is gained by it, sheds
scarce any dishonor upon the violator. The ambassador
who dupes the minister of a foreign nation, is admired
and applauded. The just man, the man who in all
private transactions would be the most beloved and the
most esteemed, in those public transactions is regarded
as a fool and an idiot, who does not understand his
business ; and he incurs always the contempt, and
sometimes even the detestation, of his fellow citizens."*

Now, against all such principles — against all endeav-
ors to defend the rejection of the moral law in political
affairs, we would with all emphasis protest. The
reader sees that it is absurd : — can he need to be con-
vinced that it is unchristian ? Christianity is of para-
mount authority, or another authority is superior.
He who holds another authority as superior,

* Theory of Moral Sentiments.

CHAP. I.] AND OE POUTlCAt RECTITUDE. $21

rejects Christianity ; and the fair and candid step
woul be avowedly to reject it. He should say, in dis-
tinct terms-— Christianity throws some light on political
principles ; but its laws are to be held subservient; to
our interests. This were far more satisfactory than
the trimming system, the perpetual vacillation of
obedience to two masters, and the perpetual endeavor
to do that which never can be done — serve both.

Jesus Christ legislated for man — not for individuals
only, not for families only, not for Christian churches
only, but for man in all his relationships and in all
his circumstances. He legislated for states. In his
moral law we discover no indications that states wTere
exempted from its application, or that any rule which
bound social did not bind political communities. If
any exemption were designed, the onus probandi rests
upon those who assert it : unless they can show that the
Christian precepts are not intended to apply to nations,
the conclusion must be admitted that they are. But in
reality, to except nations from the obligations is impos-
sible ; for nations are composed of individuals, and if
no individual may reject the Christian morality, a
nation may not. Unless, indeed, it can be shown that
when you are an agent for others you may do what
neither yourself nor any of- them might do separately
—a proposition of which certainly the proof must be
required to be very clear and strong.

But the truth is, that those who justify a suspension
of Christian morality in political affairs, are often un-
willing to reason distinctly and candidly upon the sub-
ject. They satisfy themselves with a jest, or a sneer,
or a shrug ; being unwilling either to contemn morality
in politics, or to practise it : and it is to little purpose to
offer arguments to him who does not need conviction,
but virtue.

Expediency is the rock upon which we split — upon

322 PRINCIPLES OE POUflCAI, TRUTH, [ESSAY III.

which, strange as it appears, not only our principles
but our interests suffer continual shipwreck. It has
been upon expediency that European politics have so
long been founded, with such lamentably inexpedient
effects. We consult our interests so anxiously that we
ruin them. But we consult them blindly : we do not
know our interests, nor shall we ever know them
whilst we continue to imagine that we know them
better than he who legislated for the world. Here is
the perpetual folly as well as the perpetual crime.
Esteeming ourselves wise, we have, emphatically, been
fools — of which no other evidence is necessary than
the present political condition of the Christian world.
If ever it was true of any human being, that by his
deviations from rectitude he had provided scourges for
himself, it is true at this hour of every nation in
Europe.

Iyet us attend to this declaration of a man who,
whatever may have been the value of his general politics,
was certainly a great statesman here : ' ' I am one of
those who firmly believe, as much indeed as a man can
believe anything, that the greatest resource a nation
can possess, the surest principle of power, is strict at-
tention to the principles of justice. I firmly believe
that the common proverb of honesty being the best
policy, is as applicable to nations as to individuals."—
11 In all interference with foreign nations justice is the
best foundation of policy, and moderation is the surest
pledge of peace." — "If therefore we have been de-
ficient in justice towards other states, we have been
deficient in wisdom." *

Here, then, is the great truth for which we would
contend — to be unjust is to be unwise. And since
justice is not imposed upon nations more really than
other branches of the moral law, the universal maxim

* Fell's Memoirs of the Public lyife of C. J. Fox.

CHAP. I.] AND OF POLITICAL RECTITUDE. 323

is equally true— to deviate from purity of rectitude is
impolitic as well as wrong. When will this truth be
learnt and be acted upon ? When shall we cast away
the contrivances of a low and unworthy policy and
dare the venture of the consequences of virtue?
When shall we, in political affairs, exercise a little of
that confidence in the knowledge and protection of
God, which we are ready to admire in individual life ?
— Not that it is to be assumed as certain that such
fidelity would cost nothing. Christianity makes no
such promise. But whatever it might cost it would be
worth the purchase. And neither reason nor ex-
perience allows the doubt that a faithful adherence to
the moral law would more effectually serve national
interests, than they have ever yet been served by the
utmost sagacity whilst violating that law.

The contrivances of expediency have become so
habitual to measures of state, that it may probably be
thought the dreamings of a visionary to suppose it pos-
sible that they should be substituted by purity of rec-
titude. And yet I believe it will eventually be done —
not perhaps by the resolution of a few cabinets — it is
not from them that reformation is to be expected — but
by the gradual advance of sound principles upon the
minds of men — principles which will assume more and
more their rightful influence in the world, until at
length the low contrivances of a fluctuating and im-
moral policy will be substituted by firm, and con-
sistent, and invariable integrity.

324 CIVIL UBERTY. [ESSAY III.

CHAPTER II.

CIVIL LIBERTY.

Loss of Liberty — War — Useless laws.

Of personal liberty we say nothing, because its full
possession is incompatible with the existence of society.
All government supposes the relinquishment of a por-
tion of personal liberty.

Civil liberty may, however, be fully enjoyed. It is
enjoyed, where the principles of political truth and
rectitude are applied in practice, because there the
people are deprived of that portion only of liberty which
it would be pernicious to themselves to possess. If
political power is possessed by consent of the com-
munity ; if it is exercised only for their good ; and if
this welfare is consulted by Christian means, the people
are free. No man can divine the particular enjoyments
or exemptions which constitute civil liberty, because
they are contingent upon the circumstances of the
respective nations. A degree of restraint may be neces-
sary for the general welfare of one community, which
would be wholly unnecessary in another. Yet the first
would have no reason to complain of their want of civil
liberty. The complaint, if any be made, should be of
the evils which make the restraint necessary. The
single question is, whether any given degree of
restraint is necessary or not. If it is, though the
restraint may be painful, the civil - liberty of the com-
munity may be said to be complete. It is useless to
say that it is less complete than that of another nation ;
for complete civil liberty is a relative and not a positive
enjoyment. Were it otherwise, no people enjoy, or
are likely for ages to enjoy full civil liberty ; because
none enjoy so much that they could not, in a more vir-
tuous state of mankind, enjoy more. "It is not the

CHAP. II.] CIVII, LIBERTY. 325

rigor, but the inexpediency of laws and acts of author-
ity, which makes them tyrannical."*

Civil liberty (so far as its present enjoyment goes)
does not necessarily depend upon forms of government.
All communities enjoy it who are properly governed.
It may be enjoyed under an absolute monarch ; as we
know it may not be enjoyed under a republic. Actual,
existing liberty, depends upon the actual, existing
administration.

One great cause of diminutions of civil liberty is
war, and if no other motive induced a people jealously
to scrutinize the grounds of a war, this might be suffi-
cient. The increased loss of personal freedom to a
military man is manifest ; — and it is considerable to
other men. The man who now pays twenty pounds a
year in taxes, would probably have paid but two if
there had been no war during the past century. If he
now gets a hundred and fifty pounds a year by his
exertions, he is obliged to labor six weeks out of the
fifty-two, to pay the taxes which war has entailed.
That is to say, he is compelled to work two hours every
day longer than he himself wishes, or than is needful
for his support. This is a material deduction from per-
sonal liberty, and a man would feel it as such, if the
coercion were directly applied — if an officer came to his
house every afternoon at four o'clock, when he had
finished his business, and obliged him, under penalty
of a distraint, to work till six. It is some loss of
liberty, again, to a man to be unable to open as many
windows in his house as he pleases — -or to be forbidden
to acknowledge the receipt of a debt without going to
the next town for a stamp — or to be obliged to ride in
an uneasy carriage unless he will pay for springs. It
were to no purpose to say he may pay for windows and
springs if he will, and if he can. — A slave may, by the

* Paley : Mor. and Pol. Phil. p. 3, b. 6, c. 5.

326 CIVII. LIBERTY. [ESSAY III.

same reasoning, be shown to be free : because, if he will
and if he can, he may purchase his freedom. There
is a loss of liberty in being obliged to submit to the alter-
native ; and we should feel it as a loss if such things
were not habitual, and if we had not receded so con-
siderably from the liberty of nature.

Now, indeed, that war has created a large public
debt, it is necessary to the general good that its inter-
est should be paid ; and in this view a man's civil
liberty is not encroached upon, though his personal
liberty is diminished. The public welfare is consulted
by the diminution. I may deplore the cause without
complaining of the law. It may, upon emergency, be
for the public good to suspend the habeas corpus act.
I should lament that such a state of things existed, but
I should not complain that civil liberty was invaded.
The lesson which such considerations teach, is, jealous
watchfulness against wars for the future.

' ' A law being found to produce no sensible good
effects, is a sufficient reason for repealing it."* It is
not, therefore, sufficient to ask in reply, what harm
does the law occasion ? for you must prove that it does
good : because all laws which do no good, do harm.
They encroach upon or restrain the liberty of the com-
munity, without that reason which only can make the
deduction of any portion of liberty right — the public
good.

* Paley : Mor. and Pol. Phil. p. 3, b. 6, c. 5.

CHAP. III.] CIVII, OBEDIENCE. 327

CHAPTER III.

CIVIL OBEDIENCE.

Expediency of Obedience — Obligations to Obedience — Extent
of the Duty — Resistance to the Civil Power — Obedience may
be withdrawn — King James — America — Non-compliance — In-
terference of the Magistrate.

Submission to government is involved in the very
idea of the institution. None can govern, if none sub-
mit : and hence is derived the duty of submission, so
far as it is independent of Christianity. Government
being necessary to the good of society, submission is
necessary also, and therefore it is right.

This duty is enforced with great distinctness by
Christianity — " Be subject to principalities and pow-
ers."— " Obey magistrates." — ''Submit to every ordi-
nance of man." — The great question, therefore, is,
whether the duty be absolute and unconditional ; and
if not, what are its limits, and how are they to be
ascertained ?

The law of nature proposes few motives to obedience
except those which are dictated by expediency. The
object of instituting government being the good of the
governed, any means of attaining that object is, in the
view of natural reason, right. So that, if in any case
a government does not effect its proper objects, it may
not only be exchanged, but exchanged by any means
which will tend on the whole to the public good. Re-
sistance— arms — civil war — every act is, in the view of
natural reason, lawful if it is useful. But although
good government is the right of the people, it is, never-
theless, not sufficient to release a subject from the
obligation of obedience, that a government adopts some
measures which he thinks are not conducive to the
general good. A wise pagan would not limit his obe-
dience to those measures in which a government acted

328 CIVII, OBEDIENCE. [ESSAY III.

expediently ; because it is often better for the com-
munity that some acts of misgovern ment should be
borne, than that the general system of obedience should
be violated. It is, as a general rule, more necessary to
the welfare of a people that governments should be
regularly obeyed, than that each of their measures
should be good and right. In practice, therefore, even
considerations of utility are sufficient, generally, to
oblige us to submit to the civil power.

When we turn from the law of nature to Christianity ',
we find, as we are wont, that the moral cord is tight-
ened, and that not every means of opposing govern-
ments for the public good is permitted to us. The
consideration of what modes of opposition Christianity
allows, and w7hat it forbids, is of great interest and im-
portance.

" L,et every soul be subject unto the higher powers.
For there is no power but of God : the powers that be
are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth
the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. For rulers
are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. He is
the minister of God to thee for good — a revenger, to
execute wrath upon him that doath evil. Wherefore,
ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also
for conscience sake."* — Upon this often cited and often
canvassed passage, three things are to be observed : —

i . That it asserts the general duty of civil obedience,
because government is an institution sanctioned by the
Deity.

2. That it asserts this duty under the supposition that
the governor is a minister of God for good.

3. That it gives but little other information respect-
ing the extent of the duty of obedience.

I. The obligation to obedience is not founded, there-
fore, simply upon expediency, but upon the more
* Rom. xiii. 1 to 5.

CHAP. III.] CIVIL OBEDIENCE. 329

satisfactory and certain ground, the expressed will of
God. And here the superiority of this motive over
that of fear of the magistrate's power, is manifest. We
are to be subject, not only for wrath, but for con-
science' sake — not only out of fear of man, but out of
fidelity to God. This motive, where it operates, is
likely, as was observed in the first essay, to produce
much more consistent and conscientious obedience than
that of expediency or fear.

II. The duty is inculcated under the supposition
that the governor is a minister for good. It is upon
this supposition that the apostle proceeds : ' 'for rulers
are not a terror to good works, but to the evil ; ' '
which is tantamount to saying, that if they be not a
terror to evil works but to good, the duty of obedience
is altered. " The power that is of God'' says an in-
telligent and Christian writer, ' ( leaves neither ruler
nor subject to the liberty of his own will, but limits
both to the will of God ; so that the magistrate hath
no power to command evil to be done because he is a
magistrate, and the subject hath no liberty to do evil
because a magistrate doth command it."* When,
therefore, the Christian teacher says, ' ' Let every soul
be subject to the higher powers," he proposes not an
absolute but a conditional rule — conditional upon the
nature of the actions which the higher powers require.
The expression, "There is no power but of God,"
does not invalidate this conclusion, because the Apos-
tles themselves did not yield unconditional obedience
to the powers that were. Similar observations apply
to the parallel passage in ist Peter. "Submit your-
selves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake ;
whether it be to the king as supreme, or unto gov-
ernors as unto them that are sent by him, for the

* Crisp: " To the Rulers and Inhabitants in Holland, &c.
Abt. Ann. 1670.

33° CIVIL OBEDIENCE. [ESSAY III.

pwiishment of evildoers and for the praise of them that do
well. ' ' The supposition of the just exercise of power
is still kept in view.

III. The precepts give little other information than
this respecting the extent of the duty of obedience.
' ' Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordi-
nance of God," is, like the direction, to "be subject,"
a conditional proposition. What precise meeting was
here attached to the word " resisteth," cannot perhaps
be known ; but there is reason to think that the mean-
ing was not designed to be precise — that the propo-
sition was general. ' * Magistrates are not to be re-
sisted," without defining, or attempting to define the
limits of civil obedience.

Upon the whole, this often agitated portion of the
Christian Scriptures does not appear to me to convey
much information respecting the duties of civil obedi-
ence ; and although it explicitly asserts the general
duty of obedience to the magistrate, it does not inform
us how far that duty extends, nor what are its limits.

Concluding, then, that specific rules respecting the
extent of civil obedience are not to be found in Script-
ure, we are brought to the position, that we must
ascertain this extent by the general duties which
Christianity imposes upon mankind, and by the general
principles of political truth. In attempting, upon
these grounds, to illustrate our civil duties, I am solic-
itous to remark that the individual Christian who,
regarding himself as a journey er to a better country,
thinks it best for him not to intermeddle in political
affairs, may rightly pursue a path of simpler submission
and acquiescence than that which I believe Christianity
allows. Whatever may be the peculiar business of
individuals, the business of man is to act as the
Christian citizen — not merely to prepare himself
for another world, but to do such good as he may,

CHAP. III.] CIVII, OBEDIENCE. 331

political as well as social, in the present. And yet
so fundamentally, so utterly incongruous with Chris-
tian rectitude, is the state of many branches of
political affairs in the present day, that I know not
whether he who is solicitous to adhere to this rectitude
is not both wise and right in standing aloof. This
consideration applies, especially, to circumstances in
which the limits of civil obedience are brought into
practical illustrations. The tumult and violence which
ordinarily attend any approach to political revolutions
are such, that the best and proper office of a good man
may be rather that of a moderator of both parties
than of a partisan with either. — Nevertheless, it is fit
that the obligations of civil obedience should be dis-
tinctly understood.

Referring, then, to political truth, it is to be remem-
bered that governors are established, not for their own
advantage but for the people's. If they so far disre-
gard this object of their establishment, as greatly to
sacrifice the public welfare, the people (and conse-
quently individuals) may rightly consider whether a
change of governors is not dictated by utility ; and if
it is, they may rightly endeavor to effect such a change
by recommending it to the public, and by transferring
their obedience to those who, there is reason to believe,
will better execute the offices for which government is
instituted. I perceive nothing unchristian in this. A
man who lived in 1688, and was convinced that it was
for the general good that William should be placed on
the throne instead of James, was at liberty to promote,
by all Christian means, the accession of William, and
consequently to withdraw his own, and to recommend
others to withdraw their obedience, from James. The
support of the bill of exclusion in Charles the Second's
reign, was nearly allied to a withdrawing of civil
obedience. The Christian of that day who was

332 CIVII. OBEDIENCE. [ESSAY III.

persuaded that the bill would tend to the public welfare,
was right in supporting it, and he would have been
equally right in continuing his support if Charles had
suddenly died, and his brother had suddenly stepped
into the throne. If I had lived in America fifty years
ago, and had thought the disobedience of the colonies
wrong, and that the whole empire would be injured by
their separation from England, I should have thought
myself at liberty to urge these considerations upon
other men, and otherwise to exert myself (always
within the limits of Christian conduct) to support the
British cause. I might, indeed, have thought that
there was so much violence and wickedness on both
sides, that the Christian could take part with neither :
but this is an accidental connection, and in no degree
affects the principle itself. But when the colonies were
actually separated from Britain, and it was manifestly
the general will to be independent, I should have
readily transferred my obedience to the United States,
convinced that the new government was preferred by
the people ; that, therefore, it was the rightful govern-
ment ; and, being such, that it was my Christian duty
to obey it.

Now the lawful means of discouraging or promoting
an alteration of a government, must be determined by
the general duties of Christian morality. There is, as
we have seen, nothing in political affairs which conveys
a privilege to throw off the Christian character ; and
whatever species of opposition or support involves a
sacrifice or suspension of this character is, for that
reason, wrong. Clamorous and vehement debatings
and harangues — vituperation and calumny — acts of
bloodshed and violence, or instigations to such acts,
are, I think, measures in which the first teachers of
Christianity would not have participated ; measures
which would have violated their own precepts ; and

CHAP. III.] CIVII, OBEDIENCE. 333

measures, therefore, which a Christian is not at liberty
to pursue. Objections to these sentiments will no
doubt be at hand : we shall be told that such opposition
would be ineffectual against the encroachments of power
and the armies of tyranny — that it would be to no pur-
pose to reason with a general who had orders to enforce
obedience ; and that the nature of the power to be
overcome, dictated the necessity of corresponding power
to overcome it. To all which it is, in the first place, a
sufficient answer, that the question is not what evils
may ensue from an adherence to Christianity, but what
Christianity requires. We renew the oft-repeated
truth, that Christian rectitude is paramount. When
the first Christians refused obedience to some of the
existing authorities — they did not resist. They exem-
plified their own .precepts — to prefer the will of God
before all ; and if this preference subjected them to
evils — to bear them without violating other portions of
His will in order to ward them off. But if resistance
to the civil power was thus unlawful when the magis-
trate commanded actions that were morally wrong,
much more clearly is it unlawful, when the wrongness
consists only in political grievances. The inconven-
iences of bad governments cannot constitute a superior
reason for violence, to that which is constituted by the
imposition of laws that are contrary to the laws of God.
And if any one should insist upon the magnitude of
political grievances, the answer is at hand — these evils
cannot cost more to the community as a state, than the
other class of evils costs to the individual as a man.

If fidelity is required in private life, through what-
ever consequences, it is required also in public. The
national suffering can never be so great as the individ-
ual may be. The individual may lose his life for his
fidelity, but there is no such thing as a national martyr-
dom. Besides it is by on means certain that Christian

334 ClVIly obedience. tESSAY ***•

opposition to tnisgovernment would be so ineffectual
as is supposed. Nothing is so invincible as determin-
ate non-compliance. He that resists by force, may be
overcome by greater force ; but nothing can overcome
a calm and fixed determination not to obey. Violence
might, no doubt, slaughter those who practised it, but
it were an unusual ferocity to destroy such persons in
cool malignity. In such enquiries we forget how much
difficulty we entail upon ourselves. A regiment which,
after endeavoring to the uttermost to destroy its ene-
mies, refuses to yield, is in circumstances totally dis-
similar to that which our reasonings suppose. Such a
regiment might be cut to pieces ; but it would be, I
believe, a "new thing under the sun," to go on
slaughtering a people, of whom it was known not only
that they had committed no violence, but that they
would commit none.

Refer again to America : The Americans thought
that it was best for the general welfare that they should
be independent, but England persisted in imposing the
tax. Imagine, then, America to have acted upon
Christian principles, and to have refused to pay it, but
without those acts of exasperation and violence which
they committed. England might have sent a fleet and
an army. To what purpose? Still no one paid the
tax. The soldiery perhaps sometimes committed out-
rages, and they seized goods instead of the impost : still
the tax could not be collected, except by a system of
universal distraint. — Does any man who employs his
reason, believe that England would have overcome
such a people? does he believe that any government,
or any army would have gone on destroying them ?
especially does he believe this, if the Americans con-
tinually reasoned coolly and honorably with the other
party, and manifested, by the unequivocal language of
conduct, that they were actuated by reason and by

CHAP. III.] CIVII, OBEDIENCE. 335

Christian rectitude ? No nation exists which would go
on slaughtering such a people. It is not in human
nature to do such things ; and I am persuaded not
only that American independence would have been se-
cured, but that very far fewer of the Americans would
have been destroyed : that very much less of devasta-
tion and misery would have been occasioned if they had
acted upon these principles instead of upon the vulgar
system of exasperation and violence. In a word, they
would have attained the same advantage with more
virtue, and at less cost. — With respect to those
voluble reasoners who tell us of meanness of spirit, of
pusillanimous submission, of base crouching before
tyranny, and the like, it may be observed that they do
not know what mental greatness is. Courage is not
indicated most unequivocally by wearing swords, or by
wielding them. Many who have courage enough to
take up arms against a bad government, have not
courage enough to resist it by the unbending firmness
of the mind — to maintain a tranquil fidelity to virtue
in opposition to power ; or to endure with serenity the
consequences which may follow.

The Reformation prospered more by the resolute non-
compliance of its supporters, than if all of them had
provided themselves with swords and pistols. The
most severely persecuted body of Christians which this
country has in later ages seen, was a body who never
raised the arm of resistance. They wore out that iron
rod of oppression which the attrition of violence might
have whetted into a weapon that would have cut them
off from the earth, and they now reap the fair fruit of
their principles in the enjoyment of privileges from
which others are still debarred.

There is one class of cases in which obedience is to
be refused to the civil power without any view to an
alteration of existing institutions — that is, when the

336 CIVII, OBEDIENCE. [ESSAY ill.

magistrate commands that which it would be immoral to
obey. What is wrong for the Christian is wrong for
the subject. "All human authority ceases at the
point where obedience becomes criminal." Of 'this
point of criminality every man must judge ultimately
for himself ; for the opinion of another ought not to make
him obey when he thinks it is criminal, nor to refuse
obedience when he thinks it is lawful. Some even
appear to think that the nature of actions is altered by
the command of the state ; that what would be unlaw-
ful without its command is lawful with it. This notion
is founded upon indistinct views of the extent of civil
authority ; for this authority can never be so great as
that of the Deity, and it is the Deity who requires us
not to do evil. The Protestant would not think him-
self obliged to obey if the state should require him to
acknowledge the authority of the Pope ; and why ?
Because he thinks it would be inconsistent with the
Divine will ; and this precisely is the reason why he
should refuse obedience in other cases. He cannot
rationally make distinctions, and say, " I ought to re-
fuse obedience in acknowledging the Pope, but I ought
to obey in becoming the agent of injustice or oppres-
sion." If I had been a Frenchman, and had been
ordered, probably at the instigation of some courtezan,
to immure a man, whom I knew to be innocent, in the
Bastile, I should have refused ; for it never can be
right to be the active agent of such iniquity.

Under an enlightened and lenient government like
our own, the cases are not numerous in which the
Christian is exempted from the obligation to obedience.
When, a century or two ago, persecuting acts were
passed against some Christian communities, the mem-
bers of these communities were not merely at liberty,
they were required to disobey them. One act imposed
a fine of twenty pounds a month for absenting one's

CHAP. III.] CIVII, OBEDIENCE. 337

self from a prescribed form of worship. He who
thought that form less acceptable to the Supreme
Being than another, ought to absent himself notwith-
standing the law. So, when in the present day, a
Christian thinks the profession of arms, or the payment
of preachers whom he disapproves, is wrong, he ought,
notwithstanding any laws, to decline to pay the money
or to bear the arms.

Illegal commands do not appear to carry any obliga-
tion to obedience. Thus, when the Apostles had been
"beaten openly and uncondemned, being Romans,"
the}7 did not regard the directions of the magistracy to
leave the prison, but asserted their right to legal jus-
tice, by making the magistrates ' ' come themselves and
fetch them out." When Charles I, made his demands
of supplies upon his own illegal authority, I should
have thought myself at liberty to refuse to pay them.
This were not a disobedience to government. Govern-
ment wras broken. One of its constituent parts refused
to impose the- tax, and one imposed it. I might,
indeed, have held myself in doubt whether Charles con-
stituted the government or not. If the people had
thought it best to choose him alone for their ruler, he
constituted the government, and his demand would have
been legal ; for a law is but the voice of that govern-
ing power whom the people prefer. As it was, the
people did not choose such a government ; the demand
was illegal, and might therefore be refused. .

338 CIVII, OBEDIENCE. [ESSAY III.

CHAPTER IV.

POLITICAL INFLUENCE.

Effects of influence — Incongruity of public notions — Patronage
— Dependency on the mother country.

The system of governing by influence appears to be
a substitute for the government of force — an interme-
diate step between awing by the sword and directing
by reason and virtue. When the general character of
political measures is such, that reason and virtue do
not sufficiently support them to recommend them, on
their own merits, to the public approbation — these
measures must be rejected, or they must be supported by
foreign means ; and when, by the political institutions
of a people, force is necessarily excluded, nothing
remains but to have recourse to some species of influ-
ence. There is another ground upon which influence
becomes, in a certain sense, necessary — which is, that
there is so much imperfection of virtue in the majority
of legislators — they are so much guided by interested
or ambitious or party motives, that for a measure to be
recommended by its own excellence, is sometimes not
sufficient to procure their concurrence ; and thus it
happens that influence is resorted to, not merely be-
cause public measures are deficient in purity, but
because there is a deficiency of uprightness in public
men.

The degree of this influence, which may be required
to give stability to an executive body, (and therefore to
a constitution,) will vary with the character of its own
policy. The more widely that policy deviates from
rectitude, the greater will be the demand for influence
to induce concurrence in its measures. The degree of
influence that is actually exerted by a government, is
therefore no despicable criterion of the excellence of
its practice.

CHAP. IV.] CIVII, OBEDIENCE. 339

But let it be constantly borne in mind, that when we
thus speak of the ' ' necessity ' ' for influence to support
governments, we speak only of governments as they
are, and of nations as they are. There is no necessity
for influence to support good government over a good
people. All influence but that which addresses itself
to the judgment, is wrong — wrong in morals, and
therefore indefensible upon whatever plea.

4 - All influence but that which addresses itself to the
judgment, is wrong. ' ' Of the moral offence which this
influence implies, many are guilty who oppose govern-
ments, as well as those who support them, or as govern-
ments themselves. It is evidently not a whit more virtuous
to exert influence in opposing governments than in sup-
porting them : nor, indeed, is it so virtuous. To what is a
man influenced ? Obviously, to do that which, without the
influence, he would not do ;— that is to say, he is induced
to violate his judgment at the request or at the will of
other men. It can need no argument to show that this is
vicious. In truth, it is vicious in a very high degree ;
for to conform our conduct to our ow?i sober judgment,
is one of the first dictates of the moral law : and the
viciousness is so much the greater, because the express
purpose for which a man is appointed to legislate, is
that the community may have the benefit of his unin-
fluenced judgment. Breach of trust is added to the
sacrifice of individual integrity. A nation can gain
nothing by the knowledge or experience of a million of
" influenced " legislators. It is curious, that the sub-
mission to influence which men often practise as legis-
lators, they would abhor as judges. What should we
say of a judge or a juryman who accepted a place or a
promise as a bribe for an unjust sentence? We should
prosecute the juryman and address the parliament for
a removal of the judge. Is it then of so much less con-
sequence in what manner affairs of state are conducted

340 CIVIIy OBEDIENCE. [ESSAY III.

than the affairs of individuals, that that which
would be disgraceful in one case, is reputable in
another? No account can be given of this strange in-
congruity of public notions, than that custom has in
one case blinded our eyes, and in the other has taught
us to see. Let the legislator who would abhor to ac-
cept a purse to bribe him to write ignoramus upon a
true bill, apply the principle upon which his abhor-
rence is founded to his political conduct. When our
moral principles are consistent these incongruities will
cease. When uniform truth takes the place of vulgar
practice and opinion, these incongruities will become
wonderful for their absurdity ; and men will scarcely
believe that their fathers, who could see so clearly, saw
so ill. The same sort of stigma which now attaches to
Lord Bacon, will attach to multitudes who pass for
honorable persons in the present day.

A man may lawfully, no doubt, take a more active
part in political measures, in compliance with the
wishes of another, than he might otherwise incline to
do ; but to support the measures of an opposition or an
administration, because they are their measures, can
never be lawful. — Nor can it ever be lawful to magnify
the advantages or to expatiate upon the mischiefs of a
measure, beyond his secret estimate of its demerits or
its merits. That legislator is viciously influenced, who
says or who does any thing which he would think it
not proper to say or do if he were an independent
man.

But it will be said, Since influence is inseparable
from the possession of patronage, and since patronage
must be vested somewhere, what is to be done ? or how
are the evils of influence to be done away ? — a question
which, like many other questions in political morality,
is attended with accidental rather than essential diffi-
culties. Patronage, in a virtuous state of mankind,

CHAP. IV. J CIVII, OBEDIENCE. 341

would be small. There would be none in the church
and little in the state. Men would take the over-sight
of the Christian flock, not for filthy lucre, but of a
ready mind. If the ready mind existed, the influence
of patronage would be needless : and, as a needless
thing, it would be done away. And as to the state,
when we consider how much of patronage in all
nations results from the vicious condition of mankind
— especially for military and naval appointments — it
will appear that much of this class of patronage is ac-
cidental also. Take away that wickedness and violence
in which hostile measures originate, and fleets and
armies would no longer be needed ; and with their dis-
solution there would be a prodigious diminution of
patronage and of influence. So, if we continue the
enquiry, how far any given source of influence arising
from patronage is necessary to the institution of civil
government, we shall find, at last, that the necessary
portion is very small. We are little accustomed to
consider how simple a thing civil government is — nor
what an unnumbered multiplicity of offices and sources
of patronage would be cut off, if it existed in its simple
and rightful state.

342 MORAE LEGISLATION. [ESSAY III.

CHAPTER V.

MORAL- LEGISLATION.

Duties of a Ruler — The two objects of moral legislation — Edu-
cation of the People — Abrogation of bad laws.

If a person who considered the general objects of the
institution of civil government, were to look over the
titles of the acts of a legislature during fifteen or twenty
years, he would probably be surprised to find the pro-
portion so small of those of which it was the express
object to benefit the moral character of the people.
He would find many laws that respected foreign policy,
many perhaps that referred to internal political
economy, many for the punishment of crime — but few
that tended positively to promote the general happiness
by increasing the general virtue. This, I say, may be
a reasonable subject of surprise, when it is considered
that the attainment of this happiness is the original
and proper object of all government. There is a
general want of advertence to this object, arising in
part, perhaps, from the insufficient degree of conviction
that virtue is the best promoter of the general weal.

To prevent an evil is always better than to repair it :
for which reason, if it be in the power of the legislator
to diminish temptation or its influence, he will find that
this is the most efficacious means of diminishing the
offences and of increasing the happiness of a people.
He who vigilantly detects and punishes vicious men,
does well ; but he who prevents them from becoming
vicious, does better. It is better, both for a sufferer,
for a culprit, and for the community, that a man's
purse should remain in his pocket, than that, when it
it is taken away, the thief should be sure of a prison.

So far as is practicable, a government ought to be to a
people, what a judicious parent is to a family— not

CHAP. V.] MORAI, I^GlSIyATlON. 343

merely the ruler, but the instructor and the guide. It
is not perhaps so much in the power of a government
to form the character of a people to virtue or to vice,
as it is in the power of a parent to form that of his
children. But much can be done if every thing cannot
be : and indeed when we take into account the relative
duration of the political body as compared with that of
a family, we may have reason to doubt whether govern-
ments cannot effect as much in ages as parents can do in
years. Now, a judicious father adopts a system of moral
culture as well as of restraint : he does not merely lop
the vagrant branches of his intellectual plant, but he
trains and directs them in their proper course. The
second object is to punish vice — the first to promote
virtue. You may punish vice without securing virtue ;
but, if you secure virtue, the whole work is done.

Yet this primary object of moral legislation is that to
which, comparatively, little attention is paid. Penal-
ties are multiplied upon the doers of evil, but little
endeavor is used to prevent the commission of evil by
inducing principles and habits which overpower the
tendency to the commission. In this respect, we begin
to legislate at the secondary part of our office rather
than at the first. We are political surgeons, who cut
out the tumors in the state, rather than the prescribers
of that wholesome regimen by which the diseases in the
political body are prevented.

But here arises a difficulty — How shall that political
parent teach virtue which is not virtuous itself ? The
governments of most nations, however they may incul-
cate virtue in their enactments, preach it very imper-
fectly by their example. — What then is to be done?
1 ' Make the tree good. ' ' The first step in moral legis-
lation is to rectify the legislator. It holds of nations as
of men, that the beam should be first removed out of
our own eye. Laws, in their insulated character, will

344 MORAI, LEGISLATION. [ESSAY III.

be but partially effectual, whilst the practical example
of a government is bad. To this consideration sufficient
attention is not ordinarily paid. We do not adequately
estimate the influence of a government's example upon
the public character. Government is an object to
which we look up as to our superior ; and the many
interests which prompt men to assimilate themselves to
the character of the government, added to the natural
tendency of subordinate parts to copy the example of
the superior, occasions the character of a government,
independently of its particular measures, to be of im-
mense influence upon the general virtue. Illustrations
abound. If, in any instance, political subserviency is
found to be a more efficient recommendation than
integrity of character, it is easy to perceive that sub-
serviency is practically inculcated, and that integrity is
practically discouraged.

Amongst that portion, then, of a legislator's office
which consists in endeavoring the moral amelioration
of a people, the amendment of political institutions is
conspicuous. In proportion to the greatness of the in-
fluence of governments, is the obligation to direct that
influence in favor of virtue. A government of which
the principles and practice were accordant with recti-
tude, would very powerfully affect the general morals.
He, therefore, who explodes one vicious principle, or
who amends one corrupt practice, is to be regarded as
amongst the most useful and honorable of public men.

If, however, in any state there are difficulties, at
present insurmountable, in the way of improving
political institutions, still let us do what we can. Pre-
cept without example may do some good : nor are we
to forget, that if the public virtue is increased by
whatever means, it will react upon the governing
power. A good people will not long tolerate a bad
government.

CHAP. V.] MORAL LEGISLATION. 345

Amongst the most obvious means of rectifying the
general morals by positive measures, one is the encourag-
ing a judicious education of the people. Upon this
judiciousness almost all its success depends.

But you say, All this will add to the national bur-
dens. We need not be very jealous on this head,
whilst we are so little jealous of more money worse
spent. Is it known, or is it considered, that the ex-
pense of an ordinary campaign would endow a school
in every parish in England and Ireland for ever f Yet
how coolly (who will contradict me if I say — how
needlessly?) we devote money to conduct a campaign !
— Prevent, by a just and conciliating policy, one single
war, and the money thus saved would provide, perpet-
ually, a competent mental and moral education for
every individual who needs it in the three kingdoms.
Let a man for a moment indulge his imagination — let
him rather indulge his reason, in supposing that one
of our wars during the last century had been avoided,
and that, fifty years ago, such an education had been
provided. Of what comparative importance is the war
to us now ? In the one case, the money has provided
the historian with materials to fill his pages with
armaments, and victories, and defeats : — it has en-
abled us

To point a moral or adorn a tale ;

— in the other, it would have effected, and would be
now effecting, and would be destined for ages to effect,
a great amount of solid good ; a great increase of the
virtue, the order, and the happiness of the people.

346 OF THE PROPER ENDS OP PUNISHMENT. [ESSAY III.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE PROPER ENDS OF PUNISHMENT.

The Three Objects of Punishment : — Reformation of the Offen-
der : — Example : — Restitution — Punishment may be increased
as well as diminished.

Why is a man who commits an offence punished for
the act ? Is it for his own advantage, or for that of
others, or for both? — For both, and primarily for his
own : * which answer will perhaps the more readily
recommend itself, if it can be shown that the good of
others, that is, of the public, is best consulted by those
systems of punishment which are most effectual in
benefiting the offender himself.

When we recur to the precepts and the spirit of
Christianity, we find that the one great pervading prin-
ciple by which it requires us to regulate our conduct
towards others, is that of operative, practical good-will
— that good-will which, if they be in suffering, will
prompt us to alleviate the misery ; if they be vicious,
will prompt us to reclaim them from vice. That the
misconduct of the individual exempts us from the
obligation to regard this rule, it would be futile to
imagine. It is by him that the exercise of benevo-
lence is peculiarly needed. He is the morally sick,
who needs the physician ; and such a physician he,
who by comparison is morally whole, should be. If
we adopt the spirit of the declaration, " I came not to
call the righteous but sinners to repentance, ' ' we shall
entertain no doubt that the reformation of offenders is
the primary business of the Christian in devising

* ' ' The end of all correction is either the amendment of
wicked men or to prevent the influence of ill example." This
is the rule of Seneca ; and by mentioning amendment first, he
appears to have regarded it as the primary object.

CHAP. VI.] OF THE PROPER ENDS OF PUNISHMENT. 347

punishments. There appears no reason why, in the
case of public criminals, the spirit of the rule should
not be acted upon — ' ' If a brother be overtaken in a
fault restore such an one. ' ' Amongst the Corinthians
there was an individual who had committed a gross
offence, such as is now punished by the law of England.
Of this criminal Paul speaks in strong terms of repro-
bation in the first epistle. The effect proved to be
good ; and the offender having apparently become re-
formed, the Corinthians were directed in the second
epistle, to forgive and to comfort him.

When therefore a person has committed a crime, the
great duty of those who in common with himself are
candidates for the mercy of God, is to endeavor to
meliorate and rectify the dispositions in which his
crime originates ; to subdue the vehemence of his pas-
sions— to raise up in his mind a power that may coun-
teract the power of future temptation. We should feel
towards these mentally diseased, as we feel towards the
physical sufferer — compassion ; and the great object
should be to cure the disease. No doubt, in endeavor-
ing this object, severe remedies must often be em-
ployed. It is just what we should expect ; and the
remedies will probably be severe in proportion to the
inveteracy and malignity of the complaint. But still
the end should never be forgotten, and I think a just
estimate of our moral obligations, will lead us to re-
gard the attainment of that end as paramount to every
other.

There is one great practical advantage in directing
the attention especially to this moral cure, which is
this, that if it be successful, it prevents the offender
from offending again. It is well known that the pro-
portion of those who, having once suffered the stated
punishment, again transgress the laws and are again

348 OF THE PROPER ENDS OF PUNISHMENT. [ESSAY III.

convicted, is great. But to whatever extent reformation
was attained, this unhappy result would be prevented.

The second object of punishment, that of example,
appears to be recognised as right by Christianity, when
it says that the magistrate is a ' ' terror ' ' to bad men ;
and when it admonishes such to be ' ' afraid ' ' of his
power. There can be no reason for speaking of pun-
ishment as a terror, unless it were right to adopt such
punishments as would deter. In the private discipline
of the church the same idea is kept in view : — "Them
that sin rebuke before all, that others also may fear."*
The parallel of physical disease may also still hold. The
offender is a member of the social body ; and the physi-
cian who endeavors to remove a local disease, always
acts with a reference to the health of the system.

In stating reformation as the first object, we also
conclude, that if, in any case, the attainment of reforma-
tion and the exhibition of example should be found to
be incompatible, the former is to be preferred. I say
if; for it is by no means certain that such cases will
ever arise. The measures which are necessary to
reformation must operate as example ; and in general,
since the reformation of the more hardened offenders is
not to be expected, except by severe measures, the
influence of terror in endeavoring reformation will
increase with the malignity of the crime. This is just
what we need and what the penal legislator is so solici-
tous to secure. The point for the exercise of wisdom
is, to attain the second object in attaining the first.
A primary regard to the first object is compatible with
many modifications of punishment, in order more effect-
ually to attain the second. If there are two measures,
of which both tend alike to reformation, and one tends
most to operate as example, that one should unques-
tionably be preferred.

* i Tim. v. 20.

CHAP. VI.] OF THE PROPER ENDS OF PUNISHMENT. 349

There is a third object which, though subordinate to
the others, might perhaps still obtain greater notice
from the legislator than it is wont to do — restitution or
compensation.* Since what are called criminal actions
are commonly injuries committed by one man upon
another, it appears to be a very obvious dictate of reason
that the injury should be repaired ; — that he from
whom the thief steals a purse should regain its value ;
that he who is injured in his person or otherwise,
should receive such compensation as he may. When
my house is broken into and a hundred pounds' worth
of property is carried off, it is but an imperfect satisfac-
tion to me that the robber will be punished. I ought
to recover the value of my property. The magistrate,
in taking care of the general, should take care of the
individual weal. The laws of England do now award
compensation in damages for some injuries. This is a
recognition of the principle ; although it is remarkable,
not only that the number of offences which .are thus
punished is small , but that they are frequently of a sort
in which pecuniary loss has not been sustained by the
injured party.

I do not imagine that in the present state of penal
law, or of the administration of justice, a general
regard to compensation is practical ;>le, but this does not
pro\^ that it ought not to be regarded. If in an im-
proved state of penal affairs, it should be found practi-
cable to oblige offenders to recompense by their labor
those who had suffered by their crime, this advantage
would attend, that while it would probably involve
considerable punishment, it would approve itself to the
offender's mind as the demand of reason and of justice.

* " The law of nature commands that reparation be made."
Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 6, c. 8. And this dictate of nature
appears to have been recognized in the Mosaic law, in which
compensation to the suffering party is expressly required.

350 OF THE PROPER ENDS OE PUNISHMENT. [ESSAY III.

This is no trifling consideration ; for in every species
of coercion and punishment, public or domestic, it is of
consequence that the punished party should feel the
justice and propriety of the measures which are
adopted.

Respecting the relative utility of different modes of
punishment and of prison discipline, we have little to
say, partly because the practical recognition of refor-
mation as a primary object affords good security for the
adoption of judicious measures, and partly because
these topics have already obtained much of the public
attention. One suggestion may, however, be made,
that as good consequences have followed from making
a prisoner's confinement depend for its duration on his
conduct, so that if it be exemplary the period is dimin-
ished, there appears no sufficient reason why the par-
allel system should not be adopted of increasing the
original sentence if his conduct continue vicious.
There is no breach of reason or of justice in this. For
the reasonable object of punishment is to attain certain
ends, and if, by the original sentence, it is found that
these ends are not attained, reason appears to dictate
that stronger motives should be employed. — It cannot
surely be less reasonable to add to a culprit's penalty if
his conduct be bad, than to deduct from it if it be good-
For a sentence should not be considered as a propitia-
tion of the law, nor when it is inflicted should it be
considered, as of necessity, that all is done. The sen-
tence which the law pronounces is a general rule —
good perhaps as a general rule, but sometimes inade-
quate to its end. And the utility of retaining the power
of adding to a penalty is the same in kind, and proba-
bly greater in degree, than the power of diminishing it.
In one case the culprit is influenced by hope, and in
the other by fear. Fear is the more powerful agent

CHAP. VII.] PUNISHMENT OF DEATH. 35 1

upon some men's minds, and hope upon others. And
as to the justice of such an institution , it appears easily
to be vindicated; for what is the standard of justice?
The sentence of the law ? No ; for if it were, it would
be unjust to abate of it as well as to add. Is it the
original crime of the offender ? No ; for if it were, the
same crime, by whatever variety of conduct it was
afterwards followed, must always receive an equal pen-
alty. The standard of justice is to be estimated by the
ends for which punishments are inflicted. Now,
although it would be too much to affirm that any
penalty, or duration of penalty, would be just until
these ends were attained, yet surely it is not unjust to
endeavor their attainment by some additions to an origi-
nal penalty when they cannot be attained without.

CHAPTER VII.

PUNISHMENT OF DEATH.

Of the three objects of punishment, the punishment of death
regards but one — Reformation of minor offenders : Greater
criminals neglected — Capital punishments not efficient as
examples — Public executions — Paul — Grotius — Murder — The
punishment of death irrevocable — Rousseau — Recapitulation.

I SELECT for observation this peculiar mode of pun-
ishment on account of its peculiar importance.

And here we are impressed at the outset with the
consideration, that of the three great objects which
have just been proposed as the proper ends of punish-
ment, the punishment of death regards but one ; and
that one not the first and the greatest. The only end
which is consulted in taking the life of an offender, is
that of example to other men. His own reformation

352 PUNISHMENT OF DEATH. [ESSAY III.

is put almost out of the question. Now if the prin-
ciples delivered in the preceding chapter be sound,
they present at once an almost insuperable objection to
the punishment of death. If reformation be the
primary object, and if the punishment of death pre-
cludes attention to that object, the punishment of
death is wrong.

To take the life of a fellow -creature is to exert the
utmost possible power which man can possess over
man. It is to perform an action the most serious and
awful which a human being can perform. Respecting
such an action, then, can any truth be more manifest
than that the dictates of Christianity ought, especially
to be taken into account ? If these dictates are rightly
urged upon us in the minor concerns of life, can any
man doubt whether they ought to influence us in the
greatest? Yet what is the fact? Why, that in de-
fending capital punishments, these dictates are almost
placed out of the question. We hear a great deal
about security of property and life, a great deal about
the necessity of making examples ; but almost nothing
about the moral law. It might be imagined that upon
this subject our religion imposed no obligations ; for
nearly every argument that is urged in favor of capital
punishments would be as valid and as appropriate in
the mouth of a pagan as in our own. Can this be
right? Is it conceivable that, in the exercise of the
most tremendous agency which is in the power of man, it
can be right to exclude all reference to the expressed
will of God ?

I acknowledge that this exclusion of the Christian
law from the defences of the punishment, is to me
almost a conclusive argument that the punishment is
wrong. Nothing that is right can need such an ex-
clusion ; and we should not practise it if it were not for
a secret perception, that to apply the pure requisitions

CHAP. VII.] PUNISHMENT OF DEATH. 353

of Christianity would not serve the purpose of the ad-
vocate. Look for a moment upon the capital offender
and upon ourselves. He, a depraved and deep violator
of the law of God — one who is obnoxious to the ven-
geance of heaven — one, however, whom Christ came
peculiarly to call to repentance and to save — Ourselves,
his brethren — brethren by the relationship of nature —
brethren in some degree in offences against God —
brethren especially in the trembling hope of a common
salvation. How ought beings so situated to act towards
one another ? Ought we to kill or to amend him ? Ought
we, so far as is in our power, to cut off his future
hope, or, so far as is in our power, to strengthen the
foundation of that hope ? Is it the reasonable or de-
cent office of one candidate for the mercy of God to
hang his fellow-candidate upon a gibbet ? I am serious,
though men of levity may laugh. If such men reject
Christianity, I do not address them. If they admit its
truth, let them manfully show that its principles
should not thus be applied.

No one disputes that the reformation of offenders is
desirable, though some may not allow it to be the
primary object. For the purposes of reformation we
have recourse to constant oversight — to classification of
offenders — to regular labor — to religious instruction.
For whom ? For minor criminals. Do not the greater
criminals need reformation too ? If all these endeavors
are necessary to effect the amendment of the less de-
praved, are they not necessary to effect the amendment
of the more? But we stop just where our exertions
are most needed ; as if the reformation of a bad man
was of the less consequence as the intensity of his
wickedness became greater. If prison discipline and a
penitentiary be needful for sharpers and pickpockets,
surely they are necessary for murderers and highway-
men. Yet we reform the one and hang the other !

354 PUNISHMENT OE DEATH. [ESSAY III

Since, then, so much is sacrificed to extend the terror
of example, we ought to be indisputably certain that
the terror of capital punishment is greater than that of
all others. We ought not certainly to sacrifice the
requisitions of the Christian law unless we know that a
regard to them would be attended with public evil.*
Do we know this ? Are we indisputably certain that
capital punishments are more efficient as examples
than any others ? We are not. We do not know from
experience, and we cannot know without it. —In Eng-
land the experiment has not been made. The punish-
ment therefore is wrong in us, whatever it might be in
a more experienced people. For it is wrong unless it
can be shown to be right. It is not a neutral affair. If
it is not indispensably necessary, it is unwarrantable.
And since we do not know that it is indispensable, it is,
so far as we are concerned, unwarrantable.

And with respect to the experience of other nations,
who will affirm that crimes have been increased in con-
sequence of the diminished frequency of executions ?
Who will affirm that the laws and punishments of
America are not as effectual as our own ? Yet they
have abolished capital punishment for all private
crimes except murder of the first degree.
Where, then, is our pretension to a justification of our
own practice ? It is a satisfaction that so many facts
and arguments are before the public which show the
inefficacy of the punishment of death in this country ;
and this is one reason why they are not introduced
here. \ ' There are no practical despisers of death like
those who touch, and taste, and handle death daily, by
daily committing capital offences. They make a jest
of death in all its forms ; and all its terrors are in their

* We ought not for any reason to do this ; but I speak in the
present paragraph of the pretensions of expediency.

CHAP. VII.] PUNISHMKNT OF DEATH. 355

mouths a scorn."* " Profligate criminals, such as
common thieves and highwaymen," ''have always
been accustomed to look upon the gibbet as a lot very
likely to fall to them. When it does fall to them
therefore, they consider themselves only as not quite
so lucky as some of their companions, and submit to
their fortune without any other uneasiness than what
may arise from the fear of death — a fear which even, by
such worthless wretches, we frequently see can be
so easily and so very completely conquered." A man
some time ago was executed for uttering forged bank-
notes, and the body was delivered to his friends. What
was the effect of the example upon them ? Why, with
the corpse lying on a bed before them, they were them-
selves seized in the act of again uttering forged bank-
notes. The testimony upon a subject like this, of a
person who has had probably greater and better op-
portunities of ascertaining the practical efficiency of
punishments than any other individual in Europe, is of
great importance. " Capital convicts," says Elizabeth
Fry, "pacify their conscience with the dangerous and
most fallacious notion, that the violent death which
awaits them will serve as a full atonement for all their
sins." f It is their passport to felicity — the purchase-
money of heaven ! Of this deplorable notion the effect
is doubly bad. First, it makes them comparatively
little afraid of death, because they necessarily regard
it as so much less an evil ; and, secondly, it encourages
them to go on in the commission of crimes, because they
imagine that the number or enormity of them, how-
ever great, will not preclude them from admission into
heaven. Of both these mischiefs, the punishment of
death is the immediate source. Substitute another
punishment, and they will not think that that is an

* Irving's Orations, t Observations on the visiting, &c., of
Female Prisoners, p. 73.

356 PUNISHMENT OF DEATH. [ESSAY III.

" atonement for their sins," and will not receive their
present encouragement to continue their crimes. But
with respect to example, this unexceptionable authority
speaks in decided language. ' ' The terror of example
is very generally rendered abortive by the predestinarian
notion, vulgarly prevalent among thieves, that ' if
they are to be hanged they are to be hanged, and noth-
ing can prevent it/"* It may be said that the same
notion might be attached to any other punishment, and
that thus that other would become abortive ; but there
is little reason to expect this, at least in the same de-
gree. The notion is now connected expressly with
hanging, and it is not probable that the same notion
would ever be transferred with equal power to another
penalty. Where then is the overwhelming evidence
of utility, which alone, even in the estimate of ex-
pediency, can justify the punishment of death? It
cannot be adduced ; it does not exist.

But if capital punishments do little good, they do
much harm. "The frequent public destruction of
life has a fearfully hardening effect upon those whom
it is intended to intimidate. While it excites in them
the spirit of revenge, it seldom fails to lower their esti-
mate of the life of man, and renders them less afraid
of taking it away in their turn by acts of personal vio-
lence, "f This is just what a consideration of the
principles of the human mind would teach us to expect.
To familiarize men with the destruction of life, is to
teach them not to abhor that destruction. It is the
legitimate process of the mind in other things. He
who blushes and trembles the first time he utters a lie,
learns by repetition to do it with callous indifference.
Now you execute a man in order to do good by the spec-
tacle— while the practical consequence, it appears, is,

* Observations on the visiting, &c, of Female Prisoners, p. 73.

t Ibid.

CHAP. VII.] PUNISHMENT OF DEATH. 357

that bad men turn away from the spectacle more pre-
pared to commit violence than before. It will be said,
that this effect is produced only upon those who are
already profligate, and that a salutary example is held
out to the public. But the answer is at hand — The
public do not usually begin with capital crimes. These
are committed after the person has become depraved —
that is, after he has arrived at that state in which an
execution will harden rather than deter him. We
" lower their estimate of the life of man." It cannot
be doubted. It is the inevitable tendency of executions.
There is much of justice in an observation of Beccaria's.
"Is it not absurd that the laws which detect and
punish homicide should, in order to prevent murder,
publicly commit murder themselves?"* By the pro-
cedures of a court, we virtually and perhaps literally
expatiate upon the sacredness of human life, upon the
dreadful guilt of taking it away — and then forthwith
take it away ourselves ! It is no subject of wonder that
this "lowers the estimate of the life of man." The
next sentence of the writer upon whose testimony I
offer these comments, is of tremendous import : —
1 • There is much reason to believe that our public exe-
cutions have had a direct and positive tendency to pro-
mote both murder and suicide. " " Why, if a consider-
able time elapse between the trial and the execution,
do we find the severity of the public changed into com-
passion ? For the same reason that a master, if he do not
beat his slave in the moment of resentment, often feels
a repugnance to the beating him at all."f This is
remarkable. If executions were put off for a twelve-
month, I doubt whether the public would bear them.
But why if they were just and right ? Respecting " the
contempt and indignation with which every one looks on

* Essay on Capital Punishments ; c. 28.
t Godwin : Enq. Pol. Just. v. 2, p. 726.

358 PUNISHMENT OF DEATH. [ESSAY III.

an executioner, ' ' Beccaria says the reason is, ■ ' that in a
secret corner of the mind, in which the original impres-
sions of nature are still preserved, men discover a senti-
ment which tells them that their lives are not lawfully in
the power of any one. ' ' * Let him who has the power of
influencing the legislature of the country or public
opinion, (and who has not ?) consider the responsibility
which this declaration implies, if he lifts his voice for
the punishment of death !

But further : the execution of one offender excites
in others " the spirit of revenge." This is extremely
natural. Many a soldier, I dare say, has felt impelled
to revenge the death of his comrades ; and the member
of a gang of thieves, who has fewer restraints of prin-
ciple, is likely to feel it too. But upon whom is his
revenge inflicted ? Upon the legislature, or the jury, or
the witnesses ? No, but upon the public or upon the
first person whose life is in their power, and which they
are prompted to take away. You execute a man, then,
in order to save the lives of others ; and the effect is,
v that you add new inducements to take the lives of
others away.

Of a system which is thus unsound — unsound because
it rejects some of the plainest dictates of the moral law
— and unsound because so many of its effects are bad,
I should be ready to conclude, with no other evidence,
that it was utterly inexpedient and impolitic — that as it
was bad in morals, it was bad in policy. And such
appears to be the fact. — " It is incontrovertibly proved
that punishments of a milder and less injurious nature
are calculated to produce, for every good purpose, afar
more powerful effect.' \\

Finally. — "The best of substitutes for capital pun-
ishment will be found in that judicious management of

* Beccaria : Essay on Capital Punishments, chap. 28.

| Observations on the visiting, &c, of Female Prisoners, p. 75

CHAP. VII.] PUNISHMENT OE DEATH. 359

criminals in prison which it is the object of the present
tract to recommend ;"* which management is Christia?i
management — a system in which reformation is made
the first object, but in which it is found that in order
to effect reformation severity to hardened offenders is
needful. Thus then we arrive at the goal : — we begin
with urging the system that Christianity dictates as
right ; we conclude by discovering that, as it is the
right system, so it is practically the best.

But an argument in favor of capital punishments has
been raised from the Christian Scriptures themselves. —
"If I be an offender, or have committed anything
worthy of death, I refuse not to die. "f This is the
language of an innocent person who was persecuted by
malicious enemies. It was an assertion of innocence ;
an assertion that he had done nothing worthy of death.
The case had no reference to the question of the law-
fulness of capital punishment, but to the question of
the lawfulness of inflicting it upon him. Nor can it be
supposed that it was the design of the speaker to convey
any sanction of the punishment itself, because the
design would have been wholly foreign to the occasion.
The argument of Grotius goes perhaps too far for his
own purpose. " If 1 be an offender, or have done any-
thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die." He
refused not to die, then, if he were an offender, if he
had done one of the ' ' many and grievous things ' '
which the Jews charged upon him. But will it be con-
tended that he meant to sanction the destruction of
every person who was thus " an offender?" — His
enemies were endeavoring to take his life, and he, in
earnest asseveration of his innocence, says, '* If you
can fix your charges upon me, take it."

* Observations on the visiting, &c., of Female Prisoners, p. 76.
t Acts, xxv. 1 1 ; see Grotius : Rights of War and Peace.

360 PUNISHMENT OF DEATH. [ESSAY HI.

Grotius adduces, as an additional evidence of the
sanction of the punishment by Christianity, this
passage, " Servants be subject to your masters with all
fear, &c. — What glory is it, if, when ye be buffeted for
your faults, ye shall take it patiently ? but if, when ye
do well, and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is
acceptable with God."* Some arguments disprove
the doctrine which they are advanced to support, and
this surely is one of them. It surely cannot be true
that Christianity sanctions capital punishments, if this
is the best evidence of the sanction that can be found. f

Some persons again suppose that there is a sort of
moral obligation to take the life of a murderer :
''Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his
blood be shed. ' ' This supposition is an example of
that want of advertence to the supremacy of the Chris-
tian morality, which in the first essay we had occasion
to notice. Our law is the Christian law, and if Chris-
tianity by its precepts or spirit prohibits the punish-
ment of death, it cannot be made right to Christians by
referring to a commandment which was given to Noah.
There is, in truth, some inconsistency in the reason-
ings of those who urge the passage. The fourth, fifth,
and sixth verses of Genesis ninth, each contains a law
delivered to Noah. Of these three laws, we habitually
disregard two : how then can we with reason insist on
the authority of the third ? %

After all, if the command were in full force, it would
not justify our laws ; for they shed the blood of many
who have not shed blood themselves.

* 1 Pet. ii. 18, 20.

f " Wickliffe," says Priestley, " seems to have thought it
wrong to take away the life of a man on any account. ' '

% Indeed it would almost appear from Genesis ix. 5, that even
accidental homicide was thus to be punished with death : and
if so, it is wholly disregarded in our present practice.

CHAP. VII.] PUNISHMENT OP DEATH. 361

And this conducts us to the observation, that the
grounds upon which the United States of America still
affix death to murder of the first degree, do not appear
very clear ; for if other punishments are found effectual
in deterring from crimes of all degrees of enormity up
to the last, how is it shown that they would not be
effectual in the last also ? There is nothing in the con-
stitution of the human mind to indicate, that a mur-
derer is influenced by passions which require that the
counteracting power should be totally different from
that which is employed to restrain every other crime.
The difference too in the personal guilt of the perpetra-
tors of some other crimes, and of murder, is sometimes
extremely small. At any rate, it is not so great as to
imply a necessity for a punishment totally dissimilar.
The truth appears to be, that men entertain a sort of
indistinct notion that murder is a crime which requires
a peculiar punishment, which notion is often founded,
not upon any process of investigation, by which the
propriety of this peculiar punishment is discovered, but
upon some vague ideas respecting the nature of the
crime itself. But the dictate of philosophy is, to employ
that punishment which will be most efficacious. Effi-
cacy is the test of its propriety ; and in estimating this
efficacy, the character of the crime is a foreign consid-
eration. Again, the dictate of Christianity is, to em-
ploy that punishment which, while it deters the
spectator, reforms the man. Now, neither philosophy
nor Christianity appears to be consulted in punishing
murder with death, because it is murder. And it is
worthy of especial remembrance, that the purpose for
which Grotius defends the punishment of death is, that
he may be able to defend the practice of war : — a bad
foundation if this be its best !

. It is one objection to capital punishment that it is
absolutely irrevocable. If an innocent man suffers it

362 PUNISHMENT OF DEATH. [ESSAY III.

is impossible to recall the sentence of the law. Not
that this consideration alone is a sufficient argument
against it, but it is one argument amongst the many.
In a certain sense, indeed, all personal punishments
are irrevocable. The man who by a mistaken verdict
has been confined twelve months in a prison, cannot be
repossessed of the time. But if irrevocable punishments
cannot be dispensed with, they should not be made
needlessly common, and especially those should be
regarded with jealousy which admit of no removal or
relaxation in the event of subsequently discovered
innocence, or subsequent reformation. It is not suffi-
ciently considered that a jury or a court of justice never
know that a prisoner is guilty. — A witness may know
it who saw him commit the act, but others cannot know
it who depend upon testimony, for testimony may be
mistaken or false. All verdicts are founded upon prob-
abilities— probabilities which, though they sometimes
approach to certainty, never attain to it. Surely it is a
serious thing for one man to destroy another upon
grounds short of absolute certainty of his guilt. There
is a sort of indecency attached to it — an assumption of
a degree of authority which ought to be exercised only
by Him whose knowledge is infallibly true. It is un-
happily certain that some have been put to death for
actions which they never committed. At one assizes,
we believe, not less than six persons were hanged, of
whom it was afterwards discovered that they were
entirely innocent. A deplorable instance is given by
Dr. Smollett: — "Rape and murder were perpetrated
upon an unfortunate woman in the neighborhood of
Iyondon, and an innocent man suffered death for this
complicated outrage, while the real criminals assisted
at his execution, heard him appeal to Heaven for his
innocence, and in the character of friends embraced
him while he stood on the brink of eternity."* Others
* Hist, of Eng. v. 3, p. 318.

CHAP. VII.] PUNISHMENT OF DEATH. 363

equally innocent, but whose innocence has never been
made known, have doubtless shared the same fate.
These are tremendous considerations, and ought to
make men solemnly pause before, upon grounds neces-
sarily uncertain, they take away that life which God
has given, and which they cannot restore.

Of the merely philosophical speculations respecting
the rectitude of capital punishments, whether affirma-
tive or negative, I would say little ; for they in truth
deserve little. One advantage indeed attends a brief
review — that the reader will perceive how little the
speculations of philosophers will aid us in the investi-
gation of a Christian question.

The philosopher, however, would prove what the
Christian cannot, and Mably accordingly says, " In the
state of nature, I have a right to take the life of him
who lifts his arm against mine. This right, upo?i
entering into society, I surrender to the magistrate. ' ' If
we conceded the truth of the first position, (which we
do not,) the conclusion from it is an idle sophism ; for
it is obviously preposterous to say, that because I have
a right to take the life of a man who will kill me if I
do not kill him, the state, which is in no such danger,
has a right to do the same. That danger which
constitutes the alleged right in the individual,
does not exist in the case of the state. The foun-
dation of the right is gone, and where can be the
right itself? Having, however, been thus told that the
state has a right to kill, we are next informed, by
Filangieri, that the criminal has no right to live. He
says, " If I have a right to kill another man, he has lost
his right to life."* Rousseau goes a little further.
He tells us, that in consequence of the u social con-
tract ' ' which we make with the sovereign on entering
into society, "Life is a conditional grant of the
* Montagu on Punishment of Death.

364 PUNISHMENT OF DEATH.' [ESSAY III.

state :"* so that we hold our lives, it seems, only as
1 ' tenants at will, ' ' and must give them up whenever
their owner, the state, requires them. The reader has
probably hitherto thought that he retained his head by
some other tenure.

The right of taking an offender's life being thus
proved, Mably shows us how its exercise becomes ex-
pedient. "A murderer," says he, "in taking away
his enemy's life, believes he does him the greatest possible
evil. Death, then, in the murderer's estimation, is the
greatest of evils. By the fear of death, therefore, the
excesses of hatred and revenge must be restrained." If
language wilder than this can be held, Rousseau, I
think , holds it. He says, ' ' The preservation of both sides
(the criminal and the state) is incompatible ; one of
the two must perish." How it happens that a nation
" must perish," if a convict is not hanged, the reader,
I suppose, will not know. Even philosophy, however
concedes as much: " Absolute necessity alone,'" says
Pastoret, " can justify the punishment of death ;" and
Rousseau himself acknowledges that ' ' we have no right
to put to death, even for the sake oj example, any but
those who cannot be permitted to live without danger. ' '
Beccaria limits the right to one specific case — and in
doing this he appears to sacrifice his own principle,
(deduced from that splendid fiction, the "social con-
tract,") which is, that "the punishment of death is
not authorized by any right : — no such right exists. ' '

For myself, I perceive little value in such specula-
tions to whatever conclusions they lead, for there are
shorter and surer roads to truth ; but it is satisfactory to
find that, even upon the principles of such philosophers,
the right to put criminals to death is not easily made out.

The argument, then, respecting the punishment of
death is both distinct and short.
* Contr. Soc. ii. 5, Montagu.

CHAP. VIII.] REUGrOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 365

It rejects, by its very nature, a regard to the first
and greatest object of punishment.

It does not attain either of the other objects so well
as they may be attained by other means.

It is attended with numerous evils peculiarly its own.

CHAPTER VIII.
RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS.

The primitive church — The established church of Ireland —
America — Advantages and disadvantages of established
churches — Alliance of a church with the state — Persecution
generally the growth of religious establishments — State reli-
gions injurious to the civil welfare of a people — Voluntary
payment.

A large number of persons embark from Europe,
and colonize an uninhabited territory in the South Sea.
They erect a government — suppose a republic — and
make all persons, of whatever creed, eligible to the
legislature. The community prospers and increases.
In process of time a member of the legislature, who is
a disciple of John Wesley, persuades himself that it
will tend to the promotion of religion that the preachers
of Methodism should be supported by a national tax ;
that their stipends should be sufficiently ample to pre-
vent them from necessary attention to any business but
that of religion ; and that accordingly they shall be
precluded from the usual pursuits of commerce and
from the professions. He proposes the measure. It is
contended against by the Episcopalian members, and
the Independents, and the Catholics, and the Unitarians
— by all but- the adherents to his own creed. They
insist upon the equality of civil and religious rights,

366 RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. [ESSAY III.

but in vain. The majority prove to be Methodists ;
they support the measure : the law is enacted ; and
Methodism becomes, thenceforth, the religion of the
state. This is a religious establishment.

But it is a religious establishment in its best form ;
and, perhaps, none ever existed of which the constitu-
tion was so simple and so pure. During one portion of
the papal history, the Romish church was indeed not so
much an ' ' establishment ' ' of the state as a separate
and independent constitution. For though some species
of alliance subsisted, yet the Romanists did not acknow-
ledge, as Protestants now do, that the power of estab-
lishing a religion resides in the state.

In the present day other immunities are possessed by
ecclesiastical establishments than those which are
necessary to constitute the institution — such, for exam-
ple, as that of exclusive eligibility to the legislature :
and other alliances with the civil power exist than that
which necessarily results from any preference of a par-
ticular faith — such as that of placing ecclesiastical
patronage in the hands of a government, or of those
who are under its influence. From these circumstances
it happens, that in enquiring into the propriety of relig-
ious establishments, we cannot confine ourselves to
the enquiry whether they are proper as they usually
exist. And this is so much the more needful, because
there is little reason to expect that when once an eccle-
siastical establishment has been erected — when once a
particular church has been selected for the preference
and patronage of the civil power — that preference and
patronage will be confined to those circumstances
which are necessary to the subsistence of an establish-
ment at all.

It is sufficiently obvious that it matters nothing to
the existence of an established church, what the faith of
that church is, or what is the form of its government.

CHAP. VIII.] RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 367

It is not the creed which constitutes the estab-
lishment, but the preference of the civil power. Our
business is not with churches but with church estab-
lishments.

The actual history of religious establishments in
Christian countries, does not differ in essence from that
which we have supposed in the South Sea. They have
been erected by the influence or the assistance of the
civil power. In one country a religion may have owed
its political supremacy to the superstitions of a prince ;
and in another to his policy or ambition : but the effect
has been similar. Whether superstition or policy, the
contrivances of a priesthood, or the fortuitous predomi-
nance of a party, have given rise to the established
church, is of comparatively little consequence to the
fundamental principles of the institution.

The only ground upon which it appears that relig-
ious establishments can be advocated are, first, that of
example or approbation in the primitive churches ;
and, secondly, that of public utility.

I. The primitive church was not a religious estab-
lishment in any sense or in any degree. No establish-
ment existed until the church had lost much of its
purity. Nor is there any expression in the New Testa-
ment, direct or indirect, which would lead a reader to
suppose that Christ or his apostles regarded an estab-
lishment as an eligible institution. "We find, in his
religion no scheme of building up a hierarchy, or of min-
istering to the views of human governments." — "Our
religion, as it came out of the hands of its Founder and
his apostles, exhibited a complete abstraction from all
views either of ecclesiastical or civil policy.'''1*' The evi-
dence which these facts supply respecting the moral
character of religious establishments, whatever be its
weight, tends manifestly to show that that character is
* Paley : Evidences of Christianity, p. 2, c. 2.

368 REUGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. [ESSAY III.

not good. I do not say because Christianity exhibited
this "complete abstraction," that it therefore neces-
sarily condemned establishments ; but I say that the
bearing and the tendency of this negative testimony is
against them.

In the discourses and writings of the first teachers of
our religion, we find such absolute disinterestedness,
so little disposition to assume political superiority, that
to have become the members of an established church
would certainly have been inconsistent in them. It is
indeed almost inconceivable that they could ever have
desired the patronage of the state for themselves or for
their converts. No man conceives that Paul or John
could have participated in the exclusion of any portion
of the Christian church from advantages which they
themselves enjoyed. Every man perceives that to have
done this, would have been to assume a new character,
a character which they had never exhibited before, and
which was incongruous with their former principles
and motives of action. But why is this incongruous
with the apostolic character unless it is incongruous
with Christianity ? Upon this single ground, therefore,
there is reason for the sentiment of ' ' many well-in-
formed persons, that it seems extremely questionable
whether the religion of Jesus Christ admits of any civil
establishment at all."*

I lay stress upon these considerations. We all know
that much may be learnt respecting human duty by a
contemplation of the spirit and temper of Christianity
as it was exhibited by its first teachers. When the
spirit and temper is compared with the essential char-
acter of religious establishments, thev are found to be
incongruous — foreign to one another — having no nat-
ural relationship or similarity. I should regard such
facts, in reference to any question of rectitude, as of
* Simpson's Plea for Religion and the Sacred Writings.

CHAP. VIII.] RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 369

great importance ; but upon a subject so intimately
connected with religion itself, the importance is pecul-
iarly great.

II. The question of the utility of religious estabr
lishments is to be decided by a comparison of their
advantages and their evils.

Of their advantages, the first and greatest appears to
be that they provide, or are assumed to provide, relig-
ious instruction for the whole community. If this
instruction be left by the state to be cared for by each
Christian church as it possesses the zeal or the means,
it may be supposed that many districts will be destitute
of any public religious instruction. At least the state
cannot be assured before hand that every district will
be supplied. And when it is considered how great is
the importance of regular public worship to the virtue
of a people, it is not to be denied, that a scheme which,
by destroying an establishment, would make that in-
struction inadequate or uncertain, is so far to be
regarded as of questionable expediency. But the effect
which would be produced by dispensing with establish-
ments is to be estimated, so far as is in our power, by
facts. Now dissenters are in the situation of separate
unestablished churches. If they do not provide for the
public officers of religion voluntarily, they will not be
provided for. Yet where is any considerable body of
dissenters to be found who do not provide themselves
with a chapel and a preacher ? And if those churches
which are not established, do in fact provide public in-
struction, how is it shown that it would not be provided
although there were no established religion in a state ?
Besides, the dissenters from an established church pro-
vide this under peculiar disadvantages ; for after pay-
ing, in common with others, their quota to the state
religion, they have to pay in addition to their own.
But perhaps it will be said that dissenters from a state

370 RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. [ESSAY III.

religion are actuated by a zeal with which the profes-
sors of that religion are not ; and that the legal pro-
vision supplies the deficiency of zeal. If this be said,
the inquiry imposes itself — How does this dispropor-
tion of zeal arise ? Why should dissenters be more zeal-
ous than churchmen ? What account can be given of
the matter, but that there is something in the patron-
age of the state which induces apathy upon the church
that it prefers? One other account may indeed be
offered — that to be a dissenter is to be a positive relig-
ionist, whilst to be a churchman is frequently only to
be nothing else ; that an establishment embraces all
who are not embraced by others ; and that if those
whom other churches do not include were not cared for
by the state religion, they would not be cared for at
all. This is an argument of apparent weight, but the
effect of reasoning is to diminish that weight. For
what is meant by "including," by "caring for," the
indifferent and irreligious ? An established church only
offers them instruction ; it does not ' ' compel them to
come in," and we have just seen that this offer is made
by unestablished churches also. Who doubts whether
in a district that is sufficient to fill a temple of the state
religion, there would be found persons to offer a temple
of public worship though the state did not compel it ?
Who doubts whether this would be the case if the dis-
trict were inhabited by dissenters ? and if it would not
be done supposing the inhabitants to belong to the state
religion, the conclusion is inevitable, that there is a
tendency to indifference resulting from the patronage
of the state.

To estimate the relative influence of religion in two
countries is no easy task. Yet, I believe, if we com-
pare its influence in the United States with that which
it possesses in most of the European countries which
possess state religions, it will be found that the

CHAP. VIII.] REUGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 37 1

balance is in favor of the community in which there is no
established church : at any rate, the balance is not so
much against it as to afford any evidence in favor of a
state religion. A traveller in America has remarked
' ' There is more religion in the United States than in
England, and more in England than in Italy. The
closer the monopoly, the less abundant the supply. ' ' *
Another traveller writes almost as if he had anticipated
the present disquisition — " It has been often said, that
the disinclination of the heart to religious truth,
renders a state establishment absolutely necessary for
the purpose of Christianizing the country. Ireland and
America can furnish abundant evidence of the fallacy
of such an hypothesis. In the one country we see an
ecclesiastical establishment of the most costly descrip-
tion utterly inoperative in dispelling ignorance or re-
futing error ; in the other no establishment of any kind,
and yet religion making daily and hourly progress, pro-
moting enquiry, diffusing knowledge, strengthening
the weak, and mollifying the hardened. ' ! f

In immediate connection with this subject is the
argument that Dr. Paley places at the head of those
which he advances in favor of religious establishments
— that the knowledge and profession of Christianity can-
not be upholden without a clergy supported by legal pro-
vision, and belonging to o?ie sect of Christians. X The
justness of this proposition is fo7inded upon the necessity
of research. It is said that ' ' Christianity is an histori-
cal religion," and that the truth of its history must be
investigated ; that in order to vindicate its authority
and to ascertain its truths, leisure and education and
learning are indispensable — so that such an ' ' order of
clergy is necessary to perpetuate the evidences of reve-
lation, and to interpret the obscurity of those ancient

* Hall. f Duncan's Trav. in America.

| See Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 6 c. 10.

372 RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. [ESSAY III.

writings in which the religion is contained. ' ' To all
this there is one plain objection, that when once the
evidences of religion are adduced and made public,
when once the obscurity of the ancient writings is in-
terpreted, the work, so far as discovery is concerned,
is done ; and it can hardly be imagined that an estab-
lished clergy is necessary in perpetuity to do that
which in its own nature can be done but once. What-
ever may have been the validity of this argument in
other times, when few but the clergy possessed any
learning, or when the evidences of religion had not
been sought out, it possesses little validity now. These
evidences are brought before the world in a form so
clear *and accessible to literary and good men, that, in
the present state of society, there is little reason to
fear they will be lost for want of an established church.
Nor is it to be forgotten that with respect to our own
country, the best defences of Christianity which exist in
the language, have not been the work either of the
established clergy or of members of the established
church. The expression, that such "an order of
clergy is necessary to perpetuate the evidences of reve-
lation," appears to contain an illusion. Evidences can
in no other sense be perpetuated than by being again and
again brought before the public. If this be the meaning,
it belongs rather to the teaching of religious truths than
to their discovery ; but it is upon the discovery, it is
upon the opportunity of research, that the argument is
founded : and it is particularly to be noticed, that this
is the primary argument which Paley adduces in decid-
ing ' ' the first and most fundamental question upon the
subject."

It pleases Providence to employ human agency in the
vindication and diffusion of his truth ; but to employ
the expression ' ' the knowledge and profession of
Christianity ' ' cannot be upholden without an

CHAP. VIII.] RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 373

established clergy, approaches to irreverence. Even a re-
jector of Christianity says, " If public worship be con-
formable to reason, reason without doubt will prove
adequate to its vindication and support. If it be from
God it is profanation to imagine that it stands in need
of the alliance of the state." * And it is clearly un-
true in fact ; because, without such a clergy, it is
actually upheld, and because, during the three first
centuries, the religion subsisted and spread and pros-
pered without any encouragement from the state. And
it is remarkable, too, that the diffusion of Christianity
in our own times 'in pagan nations, is effected less by
the clergy of established churches than by others, f

One particular manner in which the establishment of
a church injures the character of the church itself is,
by the temptation which it holds out to equivocation
or hypocrisy. It is necessary to the preference of the
teachers of a particular sect, that there should be some
means of discovering who belong to that sect :"— there
must be some test. Before the man who is desirous of
undertaking the ministerial office, there are placed two
roads, one of which conducts to those privileges which
a state religion enjoys, and the other does not. The
latter may be entered by all who will : the former by
tho.se only who affirm their belief of the rectitude of
some church forms or of some points of theology. It
requires no argument to prove that this is to tempt men
to affirm that which they do not believe : that it is to
say to the man who does not believe the stipulated
points, Here is money for you if you will violate your

* Godwin's Pol. Just. 2, 608.

f In the preceding discussion, I have left out all reference to
the proper qualification or appointment of Christian ministers,
and have assumed (but without conceding) that the magistrate
is at liberty to adjust those matters if he pleases.

374 REUGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. [ESSAY III.

conscience. By some the invitation will be accepted ; *
and what is the result? Why that, just as they are
going publicly to insist upon the purity and sanctity of
the moral law, they violate that law themselves. The
injury which is thus done to a Christian church by
establishing it, is negative as well as positive. You
not only tempt some men to equivocation or hypocrisy,
but exclude from the office others of sounder integrity.
Two persons, both of whom do not assent to the pre-
scribed points, are desirous of entering the church.
One is upright and conscientious, the other subservient
and unscrupulous. An establishment excludes the
good man and admits the bad. ' ' Though some pur-
poses of order and tranquillity may be answered by the
establishment of creeds and confessions, yet they are at
all times attended with serious inconveniences : they
check enquiry ; they violate liberty ; they ensnare the
consciences of the clergy, by holding out temptations
to prevarication." f

And with respect to the habitual accommodation of
the exercise of the ministry to the desires of the state
it is manifest that an enlightened and faithful minister
may frequently find himself restrained by a species of
political leading-strings. He had not the full command
of his intellectual and religious attainments. He may
not perhaps communicate the whole counsel of God. %
It was formerly co?iceded to the English clergy that they
might preach against the horrors and impolicy of wrar,

* " Chilli ngworth declared in a letter to Dr. Sheldon, that if
he subscribed he subscribed his own damnation, and yet in no
long space of time he actually did subscribe to the articles of the
church again and again." Simpson's plea.

t Paley : Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 6, c. 10.

X li Honest and disinterested boldness in the path of duty is
one of the first requisites of a minister of the gospel." Gis-
borne. But how shall they be thus disinterested ? Mem. in
the MS.

CHAP. VIII.] REWGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 375

provided they were not chaplains to regiments or in the
navy. Conceded ! Then if the state had pleased, it
might have withheld the concession ; and accordingly
from some the state did withhold it. They were pro-
hibited to preach against that, against which the
apostles wrote ! What would these apostles have said
if a state had bidden them keep silence respecting the
most unchristian custom in the world ? They would
have said, Whether we ought to obey God rather than
man, judge ye. What would they have done? They
would have gone away and preached against it as be-
fore. One question more should be asked — What
would they have said to an alliance which thus brought
the Christian minister under bondage to the state ?

It is sufficiently manifest, that whatever tends to
diminish the virtue, or to impeach the character, of the
ministers of religion, must tend to diminish the influ-
ence of religion upon mankind. If the teacher is not
good, we are not to expect goodness in the taught. If
a man enters the church with impure or unworthy mo-
tives, he cannot do his duty when he is there. If he
makes religion subservient to interest in his own prac-
tice, he cannot eifectually teach others to make relig-
ion paramount to all. Men associate (they ought to
do it less) the idea of religion with that of its teachers ;
and their respect for one is freqently measured by their
respect for the other. Now, that the effect of religious
establishments has been to depress their teachers in the
estimation of mankind, cannot be disputed. The effect
is, in truth, inevitable. And it is manifest that what-
ever conveys disrespectful ideas of religion diminishes
its influence upon the human mind. In brief, we have
seen that to establish a religion is morally pernicious to
its ministers ; and whatever is injurious to them dimin-
ishes the power of religion in the world.

Christianity is a religion of good-will and kind

376 RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. [ESSAY III.

affections. Its essence, so far as the intercourse of society
is concerned, is love. Whatever diminishes good-will
and kind affections amongst Christians, attacks the
essence of Christianity. Now, religious establishments
do this. They generate ill-will, heart-burnings, ani-
mosities— those very things which our religion depre-
cates more almost than any other. It is obvious that
if a fourth or a third of a community think they
are unreasonably excluded from privileges which the
other parts enjoy, feelings of jealousy or envy are
likely to be generated. If the minority are obliged to
pay to the support of a religion they disapprove, these
feelings are likely to be exacerbated. They soon
become reciprocal ; attacks are made by one party and
repelled by another, till there arises an habitual sense
of unkindness or ill-will.* The deduction from the
practical influence of religion upon the minds of men
which this effect of religious establishments occasions,
is great. The evil, I trust, is diminishing in the world ;

* I once met with rather a grotesque definition of religious
dissent, but it illustrates my proposition :—" Dissenterism " —
that is, " systematic opposition to the established religion."

"The placing all the religious sects (in America) upon an
equal footing with respect to the government of the country,
has effectually secured the peace of the community, at the same
time that it has essentially promoted the interests of truth and
virtue." — Mem. Dr. Priestley, p. 175. Mem. in the MS.

Pennsylvania. — " Although there are so many sects and such
a difference of religious opinions in this province, it is surpris-
ing the harmony which subsists among them ; they consider
themselves as children of the same father, and live like brethren
because they have the liberty of thinking like men ; to this
pleasing harmony, in a great measure is to be attributed the
rapid and flourishing state of Pennsylvania above all the other
provinces." Travels through the interior parts of North Amer-
ica, by an officer. 1791. Dond. The officer was Thomas
Aubery, who was taken prisoner by the Americans. Mem. in
the MS.

CHAP. VI I I.J RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 377

but then the diminution results, not from religious
establishments, but from that power of Christianity
which prevails against these evils.

III. Then as to the effect of religious establishments
upon the civil welfare of a state — we know that the
connection between religious and civil welfare is inti-
mate and great. Whatever therefore diminishes the
influence of religion upon a people, diminishes their
general welfare. In addition, however, to this general
consideration, there are some particular modes of the
injurious effects of religious establishments which it
may be proper to notice.

And, first, religious establishments are incompatible
with complete religious liberty. This consideration we
requested the reader to bear in mind when the question
of religious liberty was discussed.* "If an establish-
ment be right, religious liberty is not ; and if religious
liberty be right, an establishment is not." Whatever
arguments therefore exist to prove the rectitude of com-
plete religious liberty, they prove at the same time the
wrongness of religious establishments. Nor is this
aM ; for it is the manifest tendency of these establish-
ments to withhold an increase of religious liberty, even
when on other grounds it would be granted. The
secular interests of the state religion are set in array
against an increase of liberty. If the established church
allows other churches to approach more nearly to an
equality with itself, its own relative eminence is dimin-
ished ; and if by any means the state religion adds
to its own privileges, it is by deducting from
the privileges of the rest. The state religion is, be-
sides, afraid to dismiss any part even of its confessedly
useless privileges, lest, when an alteration is begun, it
should not easily be stopped. And there is no reason
to doubt that it is temporal rather than religious
* Essay 3, c. 4.

378 RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. [ESSAY III.

considerations— interest rather than Christianity— which
now occasions restrictions and disabilities and tests.

In conformity with these views, persecution has gen-
erally been the work of religious establishments. In-
deed, some alliance or some countenance at least from
the state is necessary to a systematic persecution.
Popular outrage may persecute men on account of their
religion, as it often has done ; but fixed stated perse-
cutions have perhaps always been the work of the relig-
ion of the state. It was the state religion of Rome
that persecuted the first Christians ; not to mention
that it was the state religion of Judea that put our
Saviour himself to death. — " Who was it that crucified
the Saviour of the world for attempting to reform the
religion of his country ? The Jewish priesthood. — Who
was it that drowned the altars of their idols with the
blood of Christians for attempting to abolish paganism ?
The pagan priesthood. — Who was it that persecuted to
flames and death those who, in the time of Wickliffe
and his followers, labored to reform the errors of
Popery? The Popish priesthood. — Who was it, and
who is it that, both in England and in Ireland since
the Reformation — but I check my hand, being unwil-
ling to reflect upon the dead, or to exasperate the liv-
ing."* We also are unwilling to reflect upon or to
exasperate, but our business is with plain truth. Who,
then, was it that since the Reformation has persecuted
dissentients from its creed, and who is it that at this hour
thinks and speaks of them with unchristian antipathy ?
The English priesthood. It was, and it is, the state
religion in some European countries that now perse-
cutes dissenters from its creed. It was the state relig-
ion in this country that persecuted the Protestants ;
since Protestantism has been established, it is the state

* Miscellaneous Tracts by Richard Watson, D. D., Bishop of
Landaff, v. 2.

CHAP. VIII.] RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. ^79

religion which has persecuted Protestant dissenters.
Is this the fault principally of the faith of these
churches, or of their alliance with the state ? No man
can be in doubt for an answer.

On the other hand, there are some advantages atten-
dant on the voluntary system which that of a legal
provision does not possess.

But this does not imply that even voluntary pay-
ment is conformable with the dignity of the Christian
ministry, with its usefulness, or with the requisitions
of the Christian law.

And heie I am disposed, in the outset, to acknowl-
edge that the question of payment is involved in an
antecedent question — the necessary qualifications of a
Christian minister. If one of these necessary qualifica-
tions be, that he should devote his youth and early
manhood to theological studies, or to studies or exer-
cises of any kind, I do not perceive how the propriety
of voluntary payment can be disputed ; for, when a
man who might otherwise have fitted himself, in a
counting-house or an office, for procuring his after-
support, employs his time necessarily in qualifying
himself for a Christian instructor, it is indispensable
that he should be paid for his instructions. Or if,
after he has assumed the ministerial function, it be his
indispensable business to devote all or the greater por-
tion of his time to studies or other preparations for the
pulpit, the same necessity remains. He must be paid
for his ministry, because, in order to be a minister, he
is prevented from maintaining himself.

But the necessary qualifications of a minister of the
gospel cannot here be discussed. We pass on, there-
fore, with the simple expression of the sentiment, that
how beneficial soever a theological education and theo-
logical enquiries may be in the exercise of the office,
yet that they form no necessary qualifications ; — that

380 REUGI0US ESTABLISHMENTS. [ESSAY III.

men may be, and that some are, true and sound min-
isters of that gospel, without them.

Now, in enquiring into the Christian character and ten-
dency of payment for preaching Christianity, one posi-
tion will perhaps be recognized as universally true — that
if the same ability and zeal in the exercise of the ministry
could be attained without payment as with it, the pay-
ment might reasonably and rightly be forborne. Nor will
it perhaps be disputed, that if Christian teachers of the
present day were possessed of some good portion of the
qualifications, and were actuated by the motives of the
first teachers of our religion, stated remuneration
would not be needed. If love for mankind, and the
- ' ability which God giveth," were strong enough to
induce and to enable men to preach the gospel without
payment, the employment of money as a motive
would be without use or propriety. Remuneration is
a contrivance adapted to an imperfect state of the
Christian church : — nothing but imperfection can make
it needful ; and, when that imperfection shall be re-
moved, it will cease to be needful again.

These considerations would lead us to expect, even
antecedently to enquiry, that some ill effects are at-
tendant upon the system of remuneration. Respect-
ing these effects, one of the advocates of a legal pro-
vision holds language which, though it be much too
strong, nevertheless contai?is much truth. " Upon the
voluntary plan," says Dr. Paley, " preaching, in time,
would become a mode of begging. With what sincer-
ity or with what dignity can a preacher dispense the
truths of Christianity, whose thoughts are perpetually
solicited to the reflection how he may increase his sub-
scription? His eloquence, if he possess any, resembles
rather the exhibition of a player who is computing the
profits of his theatre, than the simplicity of a man who,
feeling himself the awful expectations of religion, is

CHAP. VIII.] RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 381

seeking to bring others to such a sense and undertak-
ing of their duty as may save their souls. — He, not
only whose success but whose subsistence depends upon
collecting and pleasing a crowd, must resort to other
arts than the acquirement and communication of sober
and profitable instruction. For a preacher to be thus
at the mercy of his audience, to be obliged to adapt his
doctrines to the pleasure of a capricious multitude, to
be continually affecting a style and manner neither
natural to him nor agreeable to his judgment, to live
in constant bondage to tyrannical and insolent direc-
tors, are circumstances so mortifying not only to the
pride of the human heart but to the virtuous love of
independency, that they are rarely submitted to with-
out a sacrifice of principle and a depravation of char-
acter ; — at least it may be pronounced, that a ministry
so degraded would soon fall into the lowest hands ; for
it would be found impossible to engage men of worth
and ability in so precarious and humiliating a pro-
fession."*

To much of this it is a sufficient answer, that the
predictions are contradicted by the fact. Of those
teachers who are supported by voluntary subscriptions,
it is not true that their eloquence resembles the exhi-
bition of a player who is computing the profits of l;is
theatre ; for the fact is, that a very large proportion of
them assiduously devote themselves from better mo-
tives to the religious benefit of their flocks : — it is not
true that the office is rarely undertaken without what
can be called a depravation of character ; for the char-
acter, both religious and moral, of those teachers who
are voluntarily paid, is at least as exemplary as that of
those who are paid by provision of the state : — it is not
true that the office falls into the lowest hands, and that
it is impossible to engage men of worth and ability in

* Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 6, c. 10.

382 RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. [ESSAY III.

the profession, because very many of such men are
actually engaged in it.

But although the statements of the Archdeacon are
not wholly true, they are true in part. Preaching will
become a mode of begging. When a congregation wants
a preacher, and we see a man get into the pulpit ex-
pressly and confessedly to show how he can preach, in
order that the hearers may consider how they like him,
and when one object of his thus doing is confessedly to
obtain an income, there is reason — not certainly for
speaking of him as a beggar — but for believing that the
dignity and freedom of the gospel are sacrificed. —
Thoughts perpetually solicited to the reflection how he
may increase his subscription. Supposing this to be
the language of exaggeration, supposing the increase of
his subscription to be his subordinate concern, yet still
it is his concern, and being his concern, it is his temp-
tation. It is to be feared, that by the influence of this
temptation his sincerity and his independence may be
impaired, that the consideration of what his hearers.
wish rather than of what he thinks they need, may
prompt him to sacrifice his conscience to his profit, and
to add or to deduct something from the counsel of God.
Such temptation necessarily exists ; and it were only to
exhibit ignorance of the motives of human conduct to
deny that it will sometimes prevail. — To live in constant
bondage to insolent and tyrannical directors. It is not
necessary to suppose that directors will be tyrannical
or insolent, nor by consequence to suppose that the
preacher is in a state of constant bondage. But if they
be not tyrants and he a slave, they may be masters and
he a servant ; a servant in a sense far different from that
in which the Christian minister is required to be a ser-
vant of the Church — in a sense which implies an undue
subserviency of his ministrations to the will of men,

CHAP. VIII.] REUGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 383

and which is incompatible with the obligation to have
no master but Christ.

Other modes of voluntary payment may be and per-
haps they are adopted, but the effect will not be essen-
tially different. Subscriptions may be collected from a
number of congregations and thrown into a common
fund, which fund may be appropriated by a directory
or conference : but the objections still apply ; for he
who wishes to obtain an income as a preacher, has then
to try to propitiate the directory instead of a congrega-
tion, and the temptation to sacrifice his independence
and his conscience remains.

There is no way of obtaining emancipation from this
subjection, no way of avoiding this temptation, but by
a system in which the Christian ministry is absolutely
free.

But the ill effects of thus paying preachers are not
confined to those who preach. The habitual conscious-
ness that tiie preacher is paid, and the notion which
some men take no pains to separate from this con-
sciousness, that he preaches because he is paid, have a
powerful tendency to diminish the influence of his ex-
hortations, and the general effect of his labors. The
vulgarly irreligious think, or pretend to think, that it
is a sufficient excuse for disregarding these labors to say,
They are a matter of course — preachers must say some-
thing, because it is their trade. And it is more than to
be feared that notions, the same in kind however dif-
ferent in extent, operate upon a large proportion of the
community. It is not probable that it should be other-
wise ; and thus it is that a continual deduction is made
by the hearer from the preacher's disinterestedness or
sincerity, and a continual deduction therefore from the
effect of his labors.

How seldom can such a pastor say, with full demon-
stration of sincerity, "I seek not yours, but you."

3S4 RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. [ESSAY lit.

The flock may indeed be, and happily it often is, his
first and greatest motive to exertion ; but the demon-
strative evidence that it is so, can only be afforded by
those whose ministrations are absolutely free. The
deduction which is thus made from the practical influ-
ence of the labors of stipended preachers, is the same
in kind (though differing in amount) as that which is
made from a pleader's addresses in court. He pleads
because he is paid for pleading. Who does not per-
ceive, that if an able man came forward and pleaded in
a cause without a retainer, and simply from the desire
that justice should be awarded, he would be listened
to with much more of confidence, and that his argu-
ments would have much more weight, than if the same
words were uttered by a barrister who was fee'd? A
similar deduction is made from the writings of paid
ministers especially if they advocate their own particu-
lar faith. ■ ' He is interested evidence, ' ' says the reader
— he has got a retainer, and of course argues for his
client ; and thus arguments that may be invincible,
and facts that may be incontrovertibly true, lose some
portion of their effect, even upon virtuous men, and a
large portion upon the bad, because the preacher is paid.
If, as is sometimes the case, "the amount of the salary
given is regulated very precisely by the frequency of
the ministry required," — so that a hearer may possibly
allow the reflection, The preacher will get half a guinea
for the sermon he is going to preach — it is almost im-
possible that the dignity of the Christian ministry
should not be reduced, as well as that the influence of
his exhortations should not be diminished. "It is
however more desirable," says Milton, "for example
to be, and for the preventing of offence or suspicion, as
well as more noble and honorable in itself, and condu-
cive to our more complete glorying in God, to render
an unpaid service to the church, in this as well as in

CHAP. VIII.] RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 385

all other instances ; and, after the example of our
Iyord, to minister and serve gratuitously."*

Some ministers expend all the income which they
derive from their office in acts of beneficence. To
these we may safely appeal for confirmation of these
remarks. Do you not find that the consciousness, in
the minds of your hearers, that you gain nothing by
your labor, greatly increases its influence upon them ?
Do you not find that they listen to you with more con-
fidence and regard, and more willingly admit the truths
which you inculcate and conform to the advices which
you impart ? If these things be so — and who will dis-
pute it ? — how great must be the aggregate obstruction
which pecuniary remuneration opposes to the influence
of religion in the world.

But indeed it is not practicable to the writer to illus-
trate the whole of what he conceives to be the truth
upon this subject, without a brief advertence to the
qualifications of the minister of the gospel ; because,
if his view of these qualifications be just, the stipula-
tion for such and such exercise of the ministry, and
such and such payment is impossible. If it is ' ' ad-
mitted that the ministry of the gospel is the work of
the Lord, that it can be rightly exercised only in
virtue of his appointment," and only when " a neces-
sity is laid upon the minister to preach the gospel, ' ' —
it is manifest that he cannot engage beforehand to
preach when others desire it. It is manifest, that " the
compact which binds the minister to preach on the con-
dition that his hearers shall pay him for his preaching,
assumes the character of absolute inconsistency with
the spirituality of the Christian religion." f

* Christian Doctrine : p. 484.

t I would venture to suggest to some of those to whom these
considerations are offered, whether the notion that a preacher is

3^6 RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. [ESSAY J II.

" Freely ye have received, freely give." When we
contemplate a Christian minister who illustrates, both
in his commission and in his practice, this language of
his Lord ; who teaches, advises, reproves, with the
authority and affection of a commissioned teacher ;
who fears not to displease his hearers, and desires not
to receive their reward ; who is under no temptation to
withhold, and does not withhold, any portion of that
counsel which he thinks God designs for his church ; —
when we contemplate such a man, we may feel some-
what of thankfulness and of joy ; — of thankfulness and
joy that the Universal Parent thus enables his creatures
to labor for the good of one another, in that same
spirit in which He cares for them and blesses them him-
self.

I censure not, either in word or in thought, him who,
in sincerity of mind, accepts remuneration for his labors
in the church. It may not be inconsistent with the
dispensations of Providence, that in the present imper-
fect condition of the Christian family, imperfect prin-
ciples respecting the ministry should be permitted to
prevail : nor is it to be questioned that some of those
who do receive remuneration, are fulfilling their proper

a sine qua non of the exercise of public worship, is not taken
up without sufficient consideration of the principles which it
involves. If, ' ' where two or three are gathered together in the
name " of Christ, there He, the minister of the sanctuary, is
" in the midst of them," it surely cannot be necessary to the ex-
ercises of such worship, that another preacher should be there.
Surely, too, it derogates something from the excellence, some-
thing from the glory of the Christian dispensation, to assume
that, if a number of Christians should be so situated as to be
without a preacher, there the public worship of God cannot be
performed. This may often happen in remote places, in voyages
or the like : and I have sometimes been impressed with the im-
portance of these considerations when I have heard a person

say, " is absent, and therefore there will be no Divine

service this morning."

CHAP. IX.] PATRIOTISM. 387

allotments in the universal church. But this does not
evince that we should not anticipate the arrival, and
promote the extension, of a more perfect state. It does
not evince that a higher allotment may not await their
successors — that days of greater purity and brightness
may not arrive ; — of purity, when every motive of the
Christian minister shall be simply Christian ; and of
brightness, when the light of truth shall be displayed
with greater effulgence. When the Great Parent of all
shall thus turn his favor towards his people : when He
shall supply them with teachers exclusively of his own
appointment, it will be perceived that the ordinary
present state of the Christian ministry is adapted only
to the twilight of the Christian day ; and some of those
who now faithfully labor in this hour of twilight will
be amongst the first to rejoice in the greater glory of
the noon.

CHAPTER IX.
PATRIOTISM.

Patriotism as it is viewed by Christianity — A Patriotism which
is opposed to general benignity — Patriotism not the soldier's
motive.

We are presented with a beautiful subject of con-
templation, when we discover that the principles which
Christianity advances upon its own authority, are rec-
ommended and enforced by their practical adaptation
to the condition and the wants of man. With such a
subject I think we are presented in the case of patriot-
ism.

' ' Christianity does not encourage particular patriot-
ism in opposition to general benignity."* If it did, it

* Bishop Watson.

388 PATRIOTISM. [ESSAY III.

would not be adapted for the world. The duties of the
subject of one state would often be in opposition to
those of the subject of another, and men might inflict
evil or misery upon neighbor nations in conforming to
the Christian law. Christianity is designed to benefit,
not a community, but the world. The promotion of
the interests of one community by injuring another —
that is, ' ' patriotism in opposition to general benign-
ity,"— it utterly rejects as wrong ; and in doing this,
it does that which in a system of such wisdom and be-
nevolence we should expect.— " The love of our
country," says Adam Smith, " seems not to be derived
from the love of mankind."*

I do not mean to say that the word patriotism is to
be found in the New Testament, or that it contains
any disquisitions respecting the proper extent of the
love of our country — but I say that the universality of
benevolence which Christianity inculcates, both in its
essential character and in its precepts, is incompatible
with that patriotism which would benefit our own com-
munity at the expense of general benevolence. Pa-
triotism, as it is often advocated, is a low and selfish
principle, a principle wholly unworthy of that enlight-
ened and expanded philanthropy which religion pro-
poses.

Nevertheless Christianity appears not to encourage
the doctrine of being a M citizen of the world," and of
paying no more regard to our own community than to
every other. And why ? Because such a doctrine is
not rational ; because it opposes the exercise of natural
and virtuous feelings ; and because, if it were attempted
to be reduced to practice, it may be feared that it
would destroy confined benignity without effecting a
counterbalancing amount of universal philanthropy.

* Theo. Mor. Sent. The limitation with which this opinion
should be regarded, we shall presently propose.

CHAP. IX.] PATRIOTISM. 389

This preference of our own nation is indicated in. that
strong language of Paul, "I could wish that myself
were accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kins-
men according to the flesh, who are Israelites."* And
a similar sentiment is inculcated by the admonition —
" As we have therefore, opportunity, let us do good
unto all men, especially unto them who are of the
household of faith . " f I*1 another place the same senti-
ment is applied to more private life ; — "If any provide
not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he
hath denied the faith." \

All this is perfectly consonant with reason and with
nature Since the helpless and those who need assis-
tance must obtain it somewhere, where can they so
rationally look for it, where shall they look for it at
all, except from those with whom they are connected
in society ? If these do not exercise benignity to-
wards them, who will? And as to the dictate of
nature, it is a law of nature that a man shall provide
for his own. He is prompted to do this by the im-
pulse of nature. Who, indeed, shall support, and
cherish, and protect a child if his parents do not ?
That speculative philosophy is vain which would sup-
plant these dictates by doctrines of general philan-
thropy. It cannot be applicable to human affairs until
there is an alteration in the human constitution. Not
only religion therefore, but reason and nature, reject
that philosophy which teaches that no man should pre-
fer or aid another because he is his countryman, his
neighbor, or his child : — for even this, the philosophy
has taught us ; and we have been seriously told that,
in pursuance of general philanthropy, we ought not to
cherish or support our own offspring in preference to
other children. The effect of these doctrines, if they

* Rom. ix. 3. f Gal. vi. 10. % 1 Tim. v. 8.

39° PATRIOTISM. [KSSAY III,

were reduced to practice, would be, not to diffuse uni-
versal benevolence, but to contract or destroy the
charities of men for their families, their neighbors, and
their country. It is an idle system of philosophy
which sets out with extinguishing those principles of
human nature which the Creator has implanted for
wise and good ends. He that shall so far succeed in
practising this philosophy as to look with indifference
upon his parent, his wife, and his son, will not often
be found with much zeal to exercise kindness and
benevolence to the world at large.

Christianity rejects alike the extravagance of patriot-
ism and the extravagance of seeming philanthropy.
Its precepts are addressed to us as men with human
constitutions, and as men in society. But to cherish
and support my own child rather than others ; to do
good to my neighbors rather than to strangers ; to
benefit my own country rather than another nation,
does not imply that we may injure other nations,
or strangers, of their children, in order to do good to
our own. Here is the point for discrimination — a point
which vulgar patriotism and vulgar philosophy have
alike overlooked.

The proper mode in which patriotism should be exer-
cised is that which does not necessarily respect other na-
tions. 'He is the truest patriot who benefits his own coun-
try without diminishing the welfare of another. For
which reason, those who induce improvements in the ad-
ministration of justice, in the maxims of governing, in
the political constitution of the state — or those who ex-
tend and rectify the education, or in any other manner
amend the moral or social condition of a people, possess
incomparably higher claims to the praise of patriotism
than multitudes of those who receive it from the popu-
lar voice.

That patriotism which is manifested in political

CHAP. IX.] PATRIOTISM. 39I

partizanship, is frequently of a very questionable kind.
The motives to this partizanship are often far other
than the love of our country, even when the measure
which a party pursues tends to the country's good ;
and many are called patriots, of whom both the
motives and the actions are pernicious or impure. The
most vulgar and unfounded talk of patriotism is that
which relates to the agents of military operations. In
general, the patriotism is of a kind which Christianity
condemns ; because it is ft in opposition to general
benignity." It does more harm to another country
than good to our own. In truth, the merit often con-
sists in the harm that is done to another country,
with but little pretensions to benefiting our own.
These agents therefore, if they were patriotic at all,
would commonly be so in an unchristian sense.

Upon the whole, we shall act both safely and wisely
in lowering the relative situation of patriotism in the
scale of Christian virtues. It is a virtue ; but it is far
from the greatest or the highest. The world has given
to it an unwarranted elevation — an elevation to which
it has no pretensions in the view of truth ; and if the
friends of truth consign it to its proper station, it is
probable that there will be fewer spurious pretensions
to its praise.

392 WAR. [ESSAY III.

CHAPTER X.

WAR.

Causes of War. — Want of enquiry : Indifference to human
misery : National irritability : Interest : Secret motives of
Cabinets : Ideas of glory — Foundation of military glory.

Consequences oe War. — Destruction of human life : Taxa-
tion : Moral depravity : Familiarity with plunder : Implicit
submission to superiors : Resignation of moral agency : Bond-
age and degradation — Loan of armies — Effects on the com-
munity.

Lawfulness of War. — Influence of habit — Of appealing to
antiquity — The Christian Scriptures — Subjects of Christ's
benediction — Matt. xxvi. 52. — The Apostles and Evangelists
— The Centurion — Cornelius — Silence not a proof of approba-
tion— Luke xxii. 36. — John the Baptist — Negative evidence —
Prophecies of the old Testament — The requisitions of Chris-
tianity of present obligation — Primitive Christians — Example
and testimony of early Christians — Christian soldiers — Wars
of the Jews — Duties of individuals and nations— Offensive and
defensive war — Wars always aggressive — Paley — War wholly
forbidden.

Of the probable practical Effects of adhering to the
Moral Law in respect to War. — Quakers in America and
Ireland — Colonization of Pennsylvania — Unconditional reli-
ance on Providence — Recapitulation — General Observations.

It is one amongst the numerous moral phenomena
of the present times, that the enquiry is silently yet
not slowly spreading in the world — Is war compatible
with the Christian religion f There was a period when
the question was seldom asked, and when war was re-
garded almost by every man both as inevitable and
right. That period has certainly passed away ; and
not only individuals but public societies, and societies
in distant nations, are urging the question upon the
attention of mankind. The simple circumstance that
it is thus urged contains no irrational motive to inves-
tigation : for why should men ask the question if they

CHAP. X.] WAR. 393

did not doubt ; and how, after these long ages of pre-
scription, could they begin to doubt, without a reason?

It is not unworthy of remark, that whilst disquisi-
tions are frequently issuing from the press, of which
the tendency is to show that war is not compatible with
Christianity, few serious attempts are made to show
that it is. Whether this results from the circumstance
that no individual peculiarly is interested in the proof
— or that there is a secret consciousness that proof can-
not be brought — or that those who may be desirous of
defending the custom, rest in security that the impo-
tence of its assailants will be of no avail against a cus-
tom so established and so supported — I do not know ;
yet the fact is remarkable, that scarcely a defender is
to be found. It cannot be doubted that the question
is one of the utmost interest and importance to man.
Whether the custom be defensible or not, every man
should enquire into its consistency with the moral law.
If it is defensible he may, by enquiry, dismiss the
scruples which it is certain subsist in the minds of mul-
titudes, and thus exempt himself from the offence of
participating in that which, though pure, he " esteem-
eth to be unclean. " If it is not defensible, the pro-
priety of investigation is increased in a tenfold degree.

It may be a subject therefore of reasonable regret to
the friends and the lovers of truth, that the question of
the moral lawfulness of war is not brought fairly before
the public. I say fairly : because though many of the
publications which impugn its lawfulness advert to the
ordinary arguments in its favor, yet it is not to be as-
sumed that they give to those arguments all that vigor
and force which would be imparted by a stated and an
able advocate. Few books, it is probable, would tend
more powerfully to promote the discovery and dissemi-
nation of truth, than one which should frankly and
fully and ably advocate, upon sound moral principles,

394 WAR. [ESSAY III.

the practice of war. The public would then see the
whole of what can be urged in its favor without being
obliged to seek for arguments, as they now must, in
incidental or imperfect or scattered disquisitions : and
possessing in a distinct form the evidence of both parties,
they would be enabled to judge justly between them.
Perhaps if, invited as the public are to the discussion,
no man is hereafter willing to adventure in the cause,
the conclusion will not be unreasonable, that no man is
destitute of a consciousness that the cause is not a good
one.

Meantime it is the business of him whose enquiries
have conducted him to the conclusion that the cause is
not good, to exhibit the evidence upon which the con-
clusion is founded. It happens upon the subject of
war, more than upon almost any other subject of
human enquiry, that the individual finds it difficult to
contemplate its merits with an uninfluenced mind. He
finds it difficult to examine it as it would be examined
by a philosopher to whom the subject was new. He
is familiar with its details ; he is habituated to the idea
of its miseries ; he has perhaps never doubted, because
he has never questioned, its rectitude ; nay, he has
associated with it ideas not of splendor only but of
honor and of merit. That such an enquirer will not,
without some effort of abstraction, examine the ques-
tion with impartiality and justice, is plain ; and there-
fore the first business of him who would satisfy his
mind respecting the lawfulness of war, is to divest him-
self of all those habits of thought and feeling which
have been the result not of reflection and judgment,
but of the ordinary associations of life. And perhaps
he may derive some assistance in this necessary but not
easy dismissal of previous opinions, by referring first to
some of the ordinary causes and consequences of war.
The reference will enable us also more satisfactorily to

CHAP. X.] CAUSES OF WAR. 395

estimate the moral character of the practice itself : for
is no unimportant auxiliary in forming such an esti-
mate of human actions or opinions, to know how they
have been produced and what are their effects.

CAUSES OF WAR.

Of these causes one undoubtedly consists in the
want of enquiry. We have been accustomed from
earliest life to a familiarity with its ' ' pomp and cir-
cumstance ; " soldiers have passed us at every step,
and battles and victories have been the topic of every
one around us. It therefore becomes familiarized to
all our thoughts and interwoven with all our associa-
tions. We have never enquired whether these things
should be : the question does not even suggest itself.
We acquiesce in it, as we acquiesce in the rising of the
sun without any other idea than that it is a part of the
ordinary processess of the world. And how are we to
feel disapprobation of a system that we do not ex-
amine, and of the nature of which we do not think ?
Want of enquiry has been the means by which long-
continued practices, whatever has been their enormity,
have obtained the general concurrence of the world,
and by which they have continued to pollute or de-
grade it, long after the few who enquire into their
nature have discovered them to be bad. It was by
these means that the slave trade was so long tolerated
by this land of humanity. Men did not think of its
iniquity. We were induced to think, and we soon ab-
horred, and then abolished it. Of the effects of this
want of enquiry we have indeed frequent examples
upon the subject before us. Many who have all their
lives concluded that war is lawful and right, have found,
when they began to examine the question, that their
conclusions were founded upon no evidence ; — that they

39^ CAUSES OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

had believed in its rectitude not because they had pos-
sessed themselves of proof, but because they had never
enquired whether it was capable of proof or not. In
the present moral state of the world, one of the first
concerns of him who would discover pure morality
should be, to question the purity of that which now
obtains.

Another cause of our complacency with war, and
therefore another cause of war itself, consists in that
callousness to human misery which the custom in-
duces. They who are shocked at a single murder on
the highway, hear with indifference of the slaughter
of a thousand on the field. They whom the idea of a
single corpse would thrill with terror, contemplate that
of heaps of human carcasses mangled by human hands,
with frigid indifference. If a murder is committed, the
narrative is given in the public newspaper, with many
adjectives of horror — with many expressions of com-
miseration, and many hopes that the perpetrator will
be detected. In the next paragraph, the editor, per-
haps, tells us that he has hurried a second 'edition to
the press, in order that he may be the first to glad the
public with the intelligence, that in an engagement
which has just taken place, eight hundred and fifty of
the enemy were killed. Now, is not this latter intelli-
gence eight hundred and fifty times as deplorable as
the first? Yet the first is the subject of our sorrow,
and this — of our joy ! The inconsistency and dispro-
portionateness which has been occasioned in our senti-
ments of benevolence, offers a curious moral phe-
nomenon. *

* Part of the Declaration and Oath prescribed to be taken by
Catholics is this: "I do solemnly declare before God, that I
believe that no act in itself unjust, immoral, or wicked, can
ever be justified or excused by or under pretence or color that
it was done either for the good of the church or in obedience to

CHAP. X.] CAUSES OF WAR. 397

The immolations of the Hindoos fill us with compas-
sion or horror, and we are zealously laboring to pre-
vent them. The sacrifices of life by our own criminal
executions, are the subject of our anxious commisera-
tion, and we are strenuously endeavoring to diminish
their number. We feel that the life of a Hindoo or a
malefactor is a serious thing, and that nothing but
imperious necessity should induce us to destroy the
one, or to permit the destruction of the other. Yet
what are these sacrifices of life in comparison with the
sacrifices of war? In the late campaign in Russia,
there fell, during one hundred and seventy-three days
in succession, an average of two thousand nine hun-
dred men per day : more than five hundred thousand
human beings in less than six months ! And most of

any ecclesiastical power whatsoever. ' ' This declaration is re-
quired as a solemn act, and is supposed, of course, to involve a
great and sacred principle of rectitude. We propose the same
declaration to be taken by military men, with the alteration of
two words. " I do solemnly declare before God, that I believe
that no act in itself unjust, immoral, or wicked, can ever be
justified or excused by or under pretence or color that it was
done either for the good of the state or in obedience to any
military power whatsoever. ' ' How would this declaration assort
with the customary practice of the soldier? Put state for
church, and military for ecclesiastical, and then the world thinks
that acts in themselves most unjust, immoral, and wicked, are
not only justified and excused, but very meritorious : for in the
whole system of warfare, justice and morality are utterly disre-
garded. Are those who approve of this Catholic declaration
conscious of the grossness of their own inconsistency ? Or will
they tell us that the interests of the state are so paramount to
those of the church, that what would be wickedness in the ser-
vice of one, is virtue in the service of the other ? The truth we
suppose to be, that so intense is the power of public opinion,
that of the thousands who approve the Catholic declarations and
the practices of war, there are scarcely tens who even perceive
their own inconsistency. — Mem. in the MS.

OF THB

■UNIVERSITY

39$ CAUSES OF WAR. [ ESSAY III.

these victims expired with peculiar intensity of suffer-
ing. We are carrying our benevolence to the Indies,
but what becomes of it in Russia, or at Leipsic ? We
are laboring to save a few lives from the gallows, but
where is our solicitude to save them on the field ? I^ife
is life wheresoever it be sacrificed, and has every
where equal claims to our regard. I am not now say-
ing that war is wrong, but that we regard its miseries
with an indifference with which we regard no others :
that if our sympathy were reasonably excited respect-
ing them, we should be powerfully prompted to avoid
war ; and that the want of this reasonable and virtuous
sympathy, is one cause of its prevalence in the world.
And a?iother consists in national irritability. It is
assumed (not indeed upon the most rational grounds)
•that the best way of supporting the dignity, and main-
taining the security of a nation is, when occasions of
disagreement arise, to assume a high attitude and a
fearless tone. We keep ourselves in a state of irrita-
bility which is continually alive to occasions of offence ;
and he that is prepared to be offended readily
finds offences. A jealous sensibility sees insults and
injuries where sober eyes see nothing, and nations
thus surround themselves with a sort of artificial ten-
tacula, which they throw wide in quest of irritation,
and by which they are stimulated to revenge by every
touch of accident or inadvertency. They who are
easily offended will also easily offend. What is the
experience of private life ? The man who is always on
the alert to discover trespasses on his honor or his
rights, never fails to quarrel with his neighbors. Such
a person may be dreaded as a torpedo. We may fear,
but we vShall not love him ; and fear, without love,
easily lapses into enmity. There are, therefore, many
feuds and litigations in the life of such a man, that
would never have disturbed its quiet if he had not

CHAP. X.] CAUSES OF WAR. 399

captiously snarled at the trespasses of accident, and sav-
agely retaliated insignificant injuries. The viper that
we chance to molest, we suffer to live if he continue to
be quiet ; but if he raise himself in menaces of de-
struction we knock him on the head.

It is with nations as with men. If on every offence
we fly to arms, we shall of necessity provoke exasper-
ation ; and if we exasperate a people as petulant as
ourselves we may probably continue to butcher one
another, until we cease only from emptiness of ex-
chequers or weariness of slaughter. To threaten war,
is therefore often equivalent to beginning it. In the
present state of men's principles, it is not probable that
one nation will observe another levying men, and
building ships, and founding cannon, without provid-
ing men, and ships, and cannon themselves ; and when
both are thus threatening and defying, what is the
hope that there will not be a war ?

If nations fought only when they could not be at
peace, there would be very little fighting in the world.
The wars that are waged for ' ' insults to flags, ' ' and an
endless train of similar motives, are perhaps generally
attributable to the irritability of our pride. We are at
no pains to appear pacific towards the offender : our
remonstrance is a threat ; and the nation which would
give satisfaction to an enquiry, will give no other
answer to a menace than a menace in return. At
length we begin to fight, not because wTe are aggrieved,
but because we are angry. One example may be
offered : " In 1789, a small Spanish vessel committed
some violence in Nootka Sound, under the pretence
that the country belonged to Spain. This appears to
have been the principal ground of offence ; and with
this both the government and the people of England
were very angry. The irritability and haughtiness
which they manifested were unaccountable to the

400 CAUSES OF WAR. [ESSAY III

Spaniards, and the peremptory tone was imputed by
Spain, not to the feelings of offended dignity and
violated justice, but to some lurking enmity, and some
secret designs which we did not choose to avow.1'* If
the tone had been less peremptory and more rational,
no such suspicion would have been excited, and the
hostility which was consequent upon the suspicion
would, of course, have been avoided. Happily the
English were not so passionate, but that before they
proceeded to fight they negotiated, and settled the
affair amicably. The preparations for this foolish war
cost, however, three millions one hundred and thirty-
three thousand pounds !

So well indeed is national irritability known to be an
efficient cause of war, that they who from any motive
wish to promote it, endeavor to rouse the temper of a
people by stimulating their passions — just as the boys
in our streets stimulate two dogs to fight. These persons
talk of the insults, or the encroachments, or the con-
tempts of the destined enemy, with every artifice of
aggravation ; they tell us of foreigners who want to
trample upon our rights, of rivals who ridicule our
power, of foes who will crush, and of tyrants who will
enslave us. They pursue their object, certainly, by
efficacious means : they desire a war, and therefore irri-
tate our passions ; and when men are angry they are
easily persuaded to fight.

That this cause of war is morally bad — that petu-
lance and irritability are wholly incompatible with
Christianity, these pages have repeatedly shown.

Wars are often promoted from considerations of in-
terest, as well as from passion. The love of gain adds
its influence to our other motives to support them ;
and without other motives, we know that this love is
sufficient to give great obliquity to the moral judgment,
* Smollett's England.

CHAP. X.] CAUSES OF WAR. 401

and tempt us to many crimes. During a war of ten
years there will always be many whose income depends
on its continuance ; and a countless host of commissar-
ies, and purveyors, and agents, and mechanics, com-
mend a war because it fills their pockets. And
unhappily, if money is in prospect, the desolation of a
kingdom is often of little concern : destruction and
slaughter are not to be put in competition with a hun-
dred a-year. In truth, it seems sometimes to be the
system of the conductors of a war, to give to the sources
of gain endless ramifications. The more there are who
profit by it the more numerous are its supporters ; and
thus the projects of a cabinet become identified with
the wishes of a people, and both are gratified in the
prosecution of war.

A support more systematic and powerful is however
given to war, because it offers to the higher ranks of
society a profession which unites gentility with profit,
and which, without the vulgarity of trade maintains or
enriches them. It is of little consequence to enquire
whether the distinction of vulgarity between the toils
of war and the toils of commerce be fictitious. In the
abstract, it is fictitious ; but of this species of reputation
public opinion holds the arbitrium etjus et norma ; and
public opinion is in favor of war.

The army and the navy, therefore, afford to the
middle and higher classes a most acceptable profession.
The profession of arms is like the profession of law or
physic — a regular source of employment and profit.
Boys are educated for the army as they are educated
for the bar ; and parents appear to have no other idea
than that war is part of the business of the world. Of
younger sons, whose fathers in pursuance of the un-
happy system of primogeniture, do not choose to sup-
port them at the expense of the heir, the army and the
navy are the common resource. They would not know

402 CAUSES OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

what to do without them. To many of these the news
of a peace is a calamity ; and though they may not lift
their voices in favor of new hostilities for the sake of
gain, it is unhappily certain that they often secretly
desire it.

It is in this manner that much of the rank, the influ-
ence, and the wealth of a country become interested in
the promotion of wars ; and when a custom is promoted
by wealth, and influence, and rank, what is the wonder
that it should be continued ? It is said, (if my memory
serves me, by Sir Walter Raleigh,) " he thattakethup
his rest to live by this profession shall hardly be an
honest man."

By depending upon war for a subsistence, a powerful
inducement is given to desire it ; and when the question
of war is to be decided, it is to be feared that the
whispers of interest will prevail, and that humanity,
and religion, and conscience will be sacrificed to pro-
mote it.

Of those causes of war which consist in the ambition
of princes or statesmen or commanders, it is not neces-
sary to speak, because no one to whom the world will
listen is willing to defend them.

Statesmen however have, besides ambition, many
purposes of nice policy which make wars convenient :
and when they have such purposes, they are sometimes
cool speculators in the lives of men. They who have
much patronage have many dependents, and they who
have many dependents have much power. By a war,
thousands become dependent on a minister ; and if he
be disposed, he can often pursue schemes of guilt, and
intrench himself in unpunished wickedness, because the
war enables him to silence the clamor of opposition by
an office, and to secure the suffrages of venality by a
bribe. He has therefore many motives to war — in
ambition, that does not refer to conquest ; or in fear,

CHAP. X.] CAUSES OF WAR. 403

that extends only to his office or his pocket : and fear
or ambition, are sometimes more interesting considera-
tions than the happiness and the lives of men. Cab-
inets have in truth, many secret motives to wars of
which the people know little. They talk in public of
invasions of right, of breaches of treaty, of the support
of honor, of the necessity of retaliation, when these mo-
tives have no influence on their determinations. Some
untold purpose of expediency, or the private quarrel of
a prince or the pique or anger of a minister, are often
the real motives to a contest, whilst its promoters are
loudly talking of the honor or the safety of the
country.

But perhaps the most operative cause of the popu-
larity of war, and of the facility with which we engage
in it, consists in this ; that an idea of glory is attached
to military exploits, and of honor to the military pro-
fession. The glories of battle, and of those who
perish in it, or who return in triumph to their country,
are favorite topics of declamation w7ith the historian,
the biographer, and the poet. They have told us a thou-
sand times of dying heroes, who ' ' resign their lives
amidst the joys of conquest, and, filled with their
country's glory, smile in death;" and thus every
excitement that eloquence and genius can command, is
employed to arouse that ambition of fame which can
be gratified only at the expense of blood.

Into the nature and principles of this fame and glory
we have already enquired ; and in the view alike of virtue
and of intellect, they are low and bad. * ' ' Glory is
the most selfish of all passions except love."f — ,J I can-
not tell how or why the love of glory is a less selfish
principle than the love of riches. ' ' % Philosophy and
intellect may therefore well despise it, and Christianity

* See Essay II, c. 10. f West. Rev. No. 1, for 1827.
\ Mem. and Rem. of the late Jane Taylor.

404 CAUSES OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

silently, yet emphatically, condemns it. "Christian-
ity," says Bishop Watson, "quite annihilates the dis-
position for martial glory." Another testimony, and
from an advocate of war, goes further — No part of the
heroic character is the subject of the " commendation,
or precepts, or example of Christ ; " but the character
the most opposite to the heroic is the subject of
them all. *

Such is the foundation of the glory which has for so
many ages deceived and deluded multitudes of man-
kind ! Upon this foundation a structure has been
raised so vast, so brilliant, so attractive, that the
greater portion of mankind are content to gaze in ad-
miration, without any inquiry into its basis or any
splicitude for its durabilty. If, however, it should be,
that the gorgeous temple will be able to stand only till
Christian truth and light become predominant, it surely
will be wise of those who seek a niche in its apartments
as their paramount and final good, to pause ere they pro-
ceed. If they desire a reputation that shall outlive guilt
and fiction, let them look to the basis of military fame.
If this fame should one day sink into oblivion and con-
tempt, it will not be the first instance in which wide-
spread glory has been found to be a glittering bubble,
that has burst and been forgotten. Look at the days
of chivalry. Of the ten thousand Quixotes of the
middle ages, where is now the honor or the fame ? yet
poets once sang their praises, and the chronicler of
their achievements believed he was recording an ever-
lasting fame. Where are now the glories of the tour-
nament ? glories

11 Of which all Europe rang from side to side."

Where is the champion whom princesses caressed and
nobles envied? Where are now the triumphs of Duns
* Paley : Evidences of Christianity, p. 2, c. 2.

CHAP. X.] CAUSES OF WAR. 405

Scot us, and where are the folios that perpetiiated his
fame ? The glories of war have indeed outlived these ;
human passions are less mutable than human follies ;
but I am willing to avow my conviction, that these
glories are alike destined to sink into forgetfulness ;
and that the time is approaching when the applauses
of heroism, and the splendors of conquest, will be
remembered only as follies and iniquities that are past.
L,et him who seeks for fame, other than that which an
era of Christian purity will allow, make haste ; for every
hour that he delays its acquisition will shorten its dur-
ation. This is certain if there be certainty in the
promises of heaven.

Of this factitious glory as a cause of war, Gibbon
speaks in the Decline and Fall. ' ' As long as mankind, ' '
says he, "shall continue to bestow more liberal ap-
plause on their destroyers than on their benefactors,
the thirst of military glory will ever be the vice of the
most exalted characters. " " ' Tis strange to imagine, ' '
says the Earl of Shaftesbury, that war, which of all
things appears the most savage, should be the passion
of the most heroic spirits." — But he gives us the rea-
son.— " By a small misguidance of the affection, a lover
of mankind becomes a ravager ; a hero and deliverer
becomes an oppressor and destroyer."*

These are amongst the great perpetual causes of
war. And what are they ? First, that we do not en-
quire whether war is right or wrong. Secondly, That
we are habitually haughty and irritable in our inter-
course with other nations. Thirdly, That war is a
source of profit to individuals, and establishes profes-
sions which are very convenient to the middle and higher
ranks of life. Fourthly, That it gratifies the ambition
of public men, and serves the purposes oj state policy.
Fifthly, that notions of glory are attached to

* Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humor.

406 CONSEQUENCES OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

warlike affairs ; which glory is factitious and impure.
In the view of reason, and especially in the view of
religion, what is the character of these causes ? Are
they pure? Are they honorable? Are they, when
connected with their effects, compatible with the moral
law ? — Lastly, and especially, is it probable that a sys-
tem of which these are the great ever-during causes,
can itself be good or right ?

CONSEQUENCES OF WAR.

To expatiate upon the miseries which war brings
upon mankind, appears a trite and a needless employ-
ment. We all know that its evils are great and dread-
ful. Yet the very circumstance that the knowledge is
familiar, may make it unoperative upon our sentiments
and our conduct. It is not the intensity of misery,
it is not the extent of evil alone, which is necessary
to animate us to that exertion which evil and misery
should excite ; if it were, surely we should be much
more averse than we now are to contribute, in word or
in action, to the promotion of war.

But there are mischiefs attendant upon the system
which are not to every man thus familiar, and on
which, for that reason, it is expedient to remark. In
referring especially to some of those moral consequences
of war which commonly obtain little of our attention,
it may be observed, that social and political considera-
tions are necessarily involved in the moral tendency ;
for the happiness of society is always diminished by the
diminution of morality ; and enlightened policy knows
that the greatest support of a state is the virtue of the
people.

And yet the reader should bear in mind — what noth-
ing but the frequency of the calamity can make him
forget — the intense sufferings and irreparable depriva-
tions which one battle inevitably entails upon private

CHAP. X.] CONSEQUENCES OF WAR. 407

life. These are calamities of which the world thinks
little, and which, if it thought of them, it could not
remove. A father or a husband can seldom be re-
placed ; a void is created in the domestic felicity which
there is little hope that the future will fill. By the
slaughter of a war, there are thousands who weep in
unpitied and unnoticed secrecy, whom the world does
not see ; and thousands who retire, in silence, to hope-
less poverty, for whom it does not care. To these, the
conquest of a kingdom is of little importance. The
loss of a protector or a friend is ill repaid by empty
glory. An addition of territory may add titles to a
king, but the brilliancy of a crown throws little light
upon domestic gloom. It is not my intention to insist
upon these calamities, intense, and irreparable, and un-
numbered as they are ; but those who begin a war
without taking them into their estimates of its conse-
quences, must be regarded as, at most, half -seeing pol-
iticians. The legitimate object of political measures is
the good of the people ; — and a great sum of good a
war must produce, if it out-balances even this portion of
its mischiefs.

Nor should we be forgetful of that dreadful part of
all warfare, the destruction of mankind. The fre-
quency with which this destruction is represented to
our minds, has almost extinguished our perception of
its awfulness and horror. Between the years 1141 and
18 15, an interval of six hundred and seventy years,
our country has been at war, with France alone, two
hundred arid sixty-six years. If to this we add our
wars with other countries, probably we shall find that
one-half of the last six or seven centuries has been
spent by this country in war ! A dreadful picture of
human violence ! How many of our fellow-men, of our
fellow- Christians, have these centuries of slaughter cut

408 CONSEQUENCES OE WAR. [ESSAY III.

off ! What is the sum total of the misery of their
deaths ?*

When political writers expatiate upon the extent and
the evils of taxation, they do not sufficiently bear in
mind the reflection, that almost all our taxation is the
effect of war. A man declaims upon national debts.
He ought to declaim upon the parent of those debts.
Do we reflect that if heavy taxation entails evils and
misery upon the community, that misery and those
evils are inflicted upon us by war ? The amount of
supplies in Queen Anne's reign was about seventy mil-
lions ;f and of this about sixty-six millions! was ex-
pended in war. Where is our equivalent good ?

Such considerations ought, undoubtedly, to influence
the conduct of public men in their disagreements with
other states even if higher considerations do not influ-
ence it. They ought to form part of the calculations
of the evil of hostility. I believe that a greater mass
of human suffering and loss of human enjoyment are
occasioned by the pecuniary distresses of a war, than
any ordinary advantages of a war compensate. But
this consideration seems too remote to obtain our notice.
Anger at offence or hope of triumph, overpowers the
sober calculations of reason, and outbalances the weight
of after and long-continued calamities. The only ques-
tion appears to be, whether taxes enough for a war can
be raised, and whether a people will be willing to pay
them. But the great question ought to be, (setting
questions of Christianity aside,) whether the nation

* "Since the peace of Amiens more than four millions of
human beings have been sacrificed to the personal ambition of
Napoleon Bonaparte." — Quarterly Review, 25 Art. 1, 1825.

f The sum was ^69,815,457.

% The sum was ^65,853,799. " The nine years' war of 1739,
cost this nation upwards of sixty-four millions without gaining
any object." Chalmer's Estimate of the Strength of Great
Britain.

CHAP. X.] CONSEQUENCES OF WAR. 409

will gain as much by the war as they will lose by tax-
ation and its other calamities.

If the happiness of the people were, what it ought to
be, the primary and the ultimate object of national
measures, I think that the policy which pursued this
object, would often find that even the pecuniary dis-
tresses resulting from a war make a greater deduction
from the quantum of felicity, than those evils which
the war may have been designed to avoid.

' ' But war does more harm to the morals of men than
even to their property and persons."* If, indeed, it
depraves our morals, more than it injures our persons
and deducts from our property, how enormous must its
mischiefs be !

I do not know whether the greater sum of moral evil
resulting from war, is suffered by those who are imme-
diately engaged in it, or by the public. The mischief
is most extensive upon the community, but upon the
profession it is most intense.

" Rara fides pietasque viris qui castra sequuntur" — L,ucan.

No one pretends to applaud the morals of an army, and
for its religion, few think of it at all. The fact is too
notorious to be insisted upon, that thousands who had
filled their stations in life with propriety, and been vir.
tuous from principle, have lost, by a military life, both
the practice and the regard of morality ; and when they
have become habituated to the vices of war, have
laughed at their honest and plodding brethren, who are
still spiritless enough for virtue or stupid enough for
piety.

Does any man ask, What occasions depravity in mil-
itary life? I answer in the words of Robert Hall.f
" War reverses, with respect to its objects, all the rules
of morality. It is nothing less than a temporary repeal
* Erasmus. f Sermon, 1822.

4IO CONSEQUENCES OE WAR. [ESSAY III.

of all the principles of virtue. It is a system out of
which almost all the virtues are excluded, and in which
nearly all the vices are incorporated." And it requires
no sagacity to discover, that those who are engaged in
a practice which reverses all the rules of morality —
which repeals all the principles of virtue, and in which
nearly all the vices are incorporated, cannot, without
the intervention of a miracle, retain their minds and
morals undepraved.

I^ook for illustration to the familiarity with the
plunder of property and the slaughter of mankind
which war induces. He who plunders the citizen of
another nation without remorse or reflection, and bears
away the spoil with triumph, will inevitably lose some-
thing of his principles of probity.* He who is familiar
with slaughter, who has himself often perpetrated it,
and who exults in the perpetration, will not retain un-
depraved the principles of virtue. His moral feelings
are blunted ; his moral vision is obscured ; his princi-
ples are shaken ; an inroad is made upon their integ-
rity, and it is an inroad that makes after inroads the
more easy. Mankind do not generally resist the influ-
ence of habit. If we rob and shoot those who are
" enemies " to-day, we are in some degree prepared to
shoot and rob those who are not enemies to-morrow.
I^aw may indeed still restrain us from violence ; but
the power and efficiency of principle is diminished :
and this alienation of the mind from the practice, the
love, and the perception of Christian purity, therefore,
of necessity extends its influence to the other circum-
stances of life. The whole evil is imputable to war ;
and we say that this evil forms a powerful evidence
* See Smollett's England, vol. 4, p. 376. "This terrible
truth, which I cannot help repeating, must be acknowledged : —
indifference and selfishness are the predominant feelings in an
army." Miot's M^moires de l'Exp£dition en Egypte, &c.
Mem. in the MSS.

CHAP. X.I CONSEQUENCES OE WAR. 411

against it, whether we direct that evidence to the ab-
stract question of its lawfulness, or to the practical
question of its expediency. That can scarcely be law-
ful which necessarily occasions such wide-spread im-
morality. That can scarcely be expedient, which is so
pernicious to virtue, and therefore to the state.

The economy of war requires of every soldier an im-
plicit submission to his superior ; and this submission
is required of every gradation of rank to that above it.
' ' I swear to obey the orders of the officers who are set
over me: so help me, God." This system maybe
necessary to hostile operations, but I think it is un-
questionably adverse to intellectual and moral excel-
lence.

The very nature of unconditional obedience implies
the relinquishment of the use of the reasoning powers.
Little more is required of the soldier than that he be
obedient and brave. His obedience is that of an
animal, which is moved by a goad or a bit, without
judgment of his own ; and his bravery is that of a
mastiff that fights whatever mastiff others put before
him.* It is obvious that- in such agency the intellect
and the understanding have little part. Now I think
that this is important. He who, with whatever motive,
resigns the direction of his conduct implicitly to
another, surely cannot retain that erectness and inde-
pendence of mind, that manly consciousness of mental
freedom, which is one of the highest privileges of our
nature. A British captain declares that ' \ the tendency
of strict discipline, sucli as prevails on board ships of
war, where almost every act of a man's life is regulated
by the orders of his superiors, is to weaken the faculty

* By one article of the Constitutional Code even of republican
France, "the army were expressly prohibited from deliberating
on any subject whatever."

412 CONSEQUENCES OE WAR. [ESSAY III.

of independent thought."* Thus the rational being
becomes reduced in the intellectual scale : an
encroachment is made upon the integrity of its inde-
pendence. God has given us, individually, capacities
for the regulation of our individual conduct. To re-
resign its direction, therefore, to the absolute disposal
of another, appears to be an unmanly and unjustifiable
relinquishment of the privileges which he has granted
to us. And the effect is obviously bad ; for although
no character will apply universally to any large class
of men, and although the intellectual character of the
military profession does not result only from this un-
happy subjection ; yet it will not be disputed, that the
honorable exercise of intellect amongst that profession
is not relatively great. It is not from them that we
expect, because it is not from them that we generally
find, those vigorous exertions of intellect which dignify
our nature and which extend the boundaries of human
knowledge.

But the intellectual effects of military subjection
form but a small portion of. its evils. The great mis-
chief is, that it requires the relinquishment of our
moral agency ; that it requires us to do what is opposed
to our consciences, and what we know to be wrong.
A soldier must obey, how criminal soever the com-
mand, and how criminal soever he knows it to be. It
is certain, that of those who compose armies, many
commit actions which they believe to be wicked, and
which they would not commit but for the obligations
of a military life. Although .a soldier determinately
believes that the war is unjust, although he is con-
vinced that his particular part of the service is atro-
ciously criminal, still he must proceed — he must

* Captain Basil Hall : Voyage to L,oo Choo, c. 2. We make
no distinction between the military and naval professions, and
employ one word to indicate both.

CHAP. X.] CONSEQUENCES OF WAR. 4I3

prosecute the purposes of injustice or robbery, he
must participate in the guilt, and be himself a robber.

To what a situation is a rational and responsible
being reduced, who commits actions, good or bad, at
the word of another ? I can conceive no greater degra-
dation. It is the lowest, the final abjectness of the
moral nature. It is this if we abate the glitter of war,
and if we add this glitter it is nothing more.

Such a resignation of our moral agency is not con-
tended for, or tolerated in any one other circumstance
of human life. War stands upon this pinnacle of de-
pravity alone. She, only, in the supremacy of crime,
has told us that she has abolished even the obligation
to be virtuous.

Some writers who have perceived the monstrousness
of this system, have told us that a soldier should as-
sure himself, before he engages in a war, that it is a
lawful and just one ; and they acknowledge that, if
he does not feel this assurance, he is a " murderer. ' '
But how is he to know that the war is just ? It is fre-
quently difficult for the people distinctly to discover
what the objects of a war are. And if the soldier
knew that it was just in its commencement, how is he
to know that it will continue just in its prosecution?
Every war is, in some parts of its course, wicked and
unjust; and who can tell what that course will be?
You say — When he discovers any inj ustice or wicked-
ness, let him withdraw : we answer, He cannot ; and
the truth is, that there is no way of avoiding the evil,
but by avoiding the army.

It is an enquiry of much interest, under what cir-
cumstances of responsibility a man supposes himself to
be placed, who thus abandons and violates his own
sense of rectitude and of his duties. Either he is re-
sponsible for his actions, or he is not ; and the question

414 CONSEQUENCES OE WAR. [ESSAY III.

is a serious one to determine.* Christianity has cer-
tainly never stated any cases in which personal re-
sponsibility ceases. If she admits such cases, she has
at least not told us so ; but she has told us, explicitly
and repeatedly, that she does require individual obe-
dience and impose individual responsibility. She has
made no exceptions to the imperativeness of her obli-
gations, whether we are required by others to neglect
them or not ; and I can discover in her sanctions no
reason to suppose, that in her final adjudications she
admits the plea, that another required us to do that
which she required us to forbear. — But it may be feared,
it may be believed, that how little soever religion will
abate of the responsibility of those who obey, she will
impose not a little upon those who command. They,
at least, are answerable for the enormities of war : un-
less, indeed, any one shall tell me that responsibility
attaches nowhere ; that that which would be wicked-
ness in another man, is innocence in a soldier ; and that
heaven has granted to the directors of war a privileged
immunity, by virtue of which crime incurs no guilt
and receives no punishment.

And here it is fitting to observe, that the obedience
to arbitrary power which war exacts, possesses more
of the character of servility, and even of slavery, than
we are accustomed to suppose. I will acknowledge
that when I see a company of men in a stated dress,

* Vattel indeed tells us that soldiers ought to ' • submit their
judgment." " What," says he, "would be the consequence, if
at every step of the Sovereign the subjects were at liberty to
weigh the justice of his reasons, and refuse to march to a war
which, to them, might appear unjust? " Law of Nat. b. 3, c.
11, sec. 187. Gisborne holds very different language. "It is,"
he says, " at all times the duty of an Englishman steadfastly to
decline obeying any orders of his superiors, which his conscience
should tell him were in any degree impious or unjust." Duties
of Men.

CHAP. X.] CONSEQUENCES OF WAR. 415

and of a stated color, ranged, rank and file, in the at-
titude of obedience, turning or walking at the word of
another, now changing the position of a limb and now
altering the angle of a foot, I feel that there is some-
thing in the system that is wrong — something incon-
gruous with the proper dignity, with the intellectual
station of man. I do not know whether I shall be
charged with indulging in idle sentiment or idle affecta-
tion. If I hold unusual language upon the subject, let
it be remembered that the subject is itself unusual. I
will retract my affectation and sentiment, if the reader
will show me any case in life parallel to that to which
I have applied it.

No one questions whether military power be arbi-
trary. And what are the customary feelings of man-
kind with respect to a subjection to arbitrary power ?
How do we feel and think, when we hear of a person
who is obliged to do whatever other men command,
and who, the moment he refuses, is punished for at-
tempting to be free ? If a man orders his servant to
do a given action, he is at liberty, if he thinks the
action improper, or if, from any other cause, he choose
not to do it, to refuse his obedience. Far other is the
nature of military subjection. The soldier is compelled
to obey, whatever be his inclination or his will. It
matters not whether he have entered the service
voluntarily or involuntarily. Being in it, he has but
one alternative — submission to arbitrary power, or
punishment — the punishment of death perhaps — for
refusing to submit. Let the reader imagine to himself
any other cause or purpose for which freemen shall be
subjected to such a condition, and he will then see that
condition in its proper light. The influence of habit
and the gloss of public opinion make situations that
would otherwise be loathsome and revolting, not only
tolerable but pleasurable. Take away this influence

416 CONSEQUENCES OF WAR. [ESSAY III,

and this gloss from the situation of a soldier, and what
should we call it ? We should call it a state of degra-
dation and of bondage. But habit and public opinion,
although they may influence notions, cannot alter
things. It is a state intellectually, morally, and
politically, of bondage and degradation.

But the reader will say that this submission to arbi-
trary power is necessary to the prosecution of war. I
know it ; and that is the very point for observation. It
is because it is necessary to war that it is noticed here ;
for a brief but clear argument results : — That custom
to which such a state of mankind is necessary, must
inevitably be bad ; — it must inevitably be adverse to
rectitude and to Christianity . So deplorable is the bond-
age which war produces, that we often hear, during a
war, of subsidies from one nation to another, for the
loan, or rather for the purchase of an army. — To bor-
row ten thousand men who know nothing of our
quarrel and care nothing for it, to help us to slaughter
their fellows ! To pay for their help in guineas to their
sovereign ! Well has it been exclaimed,

" War is a game, that, were their subjects wise,
Kings would not play at."

A prince sells his subjects as a farmer sells his
cattle ; and sends them to destroy a people, whom, if
they had been higher bidders, he would perhaps have
sent them to defend. The historian has to record such
miserable facts, as that a potentate's troops were, dur-
ing one war, ' ' hired to the king of Great Britain and
his enemies alternately, as the scale of convenience
happened to preponderate ! " * That a large number
of persons with the feelings and reason of men, should
coolly listen to the bargain of their sale, should com-
pute the guineas that will pay for their blood, and

* Smollet's England, v. 4, p. 330.

CHAP. X.] CONSEQUENCES OE WAR. 417

should then quietly be led to a place where they are to kill
people towards whom they have no animosity, is simply
wonderful. To what has inveteracy of habit reconciled
mankind ! I have no capacity of supposing a case of
slavery, if slavery be denied in this. Men have been
sold in another continent, and philanthropy has been
shocked and aroused to interference ; yet these men
were sold not to be slaughtered but to work : but of
the purchases and sales of the world's political slave-
dealers, what does philanthropy think or care ? There
is no reason to doubt that, upon other subjects of
horror, similar familiarity of habit would produce
similar effects ; or that he who heedlessly contemplates
the purchase of an army, wants nothing but this
familiarity to make him heedlessly look on at the com-
mission of parricide.

Yet I do not know whether, in its effects on the mil-
itary character, the greatest moral evil of war is to be
sought. Upon the community its effects are indeed
less apparent, because they who are the secondary sub-
jects of the immoral influence, are less intensely affected
by it than the immediate agents of its diffusion. But
whatever is deficient in the degree of evil, is probably
more than compensated by its extent. The influence
is like that of a continual and noxious vapor : we
neither regard nor perceive it, but it secretly under-
mines the moral health.

Every one knows that vice is contagious. The de-
pravity of one man has always a tendency to deprave
his neighbors, and it therefore requires no unusual
acuteness to discover, that the prodigious mass of im-
morality and crime which is accumulated by a war,
must have a powerful effect in ' ' demoralizing ' ' the
public. But there is one circumstance connected with
the injurious influence of war, which makes it pecul-
iarly operative and malignant. It is, that we do not

4l8 CONSEQUENCES OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

hate or fear the influence, and do not fortify ourselves
against it. Other vicious influences insinuate them-
selves into our minds by stealth ; but this we receive
with open embrace. Glory, and patiotism, and brav-
ery, and conquest, are bright and glittering things.
Who, wrhen he is looking, delighted, upon these things,
is armed against the mischiefs which they veil ?

The evil is, in its own nature, of almost universal
operation. During a war, a whole people become
familiarized with the utmost excesses of enormity —
with the utmost intensity of human wickedness — and
they rejoice and exult in them ; so that there is proba-
bly not an individual in a hundred who does not lose
something of his Christian principles by a ten years'
war.

"It is, in my mind," said Fox, "no small misfor-
tune to live at a period when scenes of horror and blood
are frequent." — " One of the most evil consequences of
war is, that it tends to render the hearts of mankind
callous to the feelings and sentiments of humanity."*

Those who know what the moral law of God is, and
who feel an interest in the virtue and the happiness of
the world, will not regard the animosity of party and
the restlessness of resentment which are produced by a
war, as trifling evils. If any thing be opposite to
Christianity, it is retaliation and revenge. In the ob-
ligation to restrain these dispositions much of the char-
acteristic placability of Christianity consists. The very
essence and spirit of our religion are abhorrent from
resentment. — The very essence and spirit of war are
promotive of resentment ; and what, then, must be
their mutual adverseness ? That war excites these pas-
sions, needs not to be proved. When a war is in con-
templation, or when it has been begun, what are the
endeavors of its promoters ? They animate us by every
* Fell's Life of C. J. Fox.

CHAP. X.] CONSEQUENCES OF WAR. 419

artifice of excitement to hatred and animosity. Pam-
phlets, placards, newspapers, caricatures — every agent
is in requisition to irritate us into malignity. Nay,
dreadful as it is, the pulpit resounds with declamations
to stimulate our too sluggish resentment, and to invite
us to slaughter. — And thus the most unchristianlike of
all our passions, the passion which it is most the object
of our religion to repress, is excited and fostered.
Christianity cannot be flourishing under circumstances
like these. The more effectually we are animated to
war, the more nearly we extinguish the dispositions of
our religion. War and Christianity are like the oppo-
site ends of a balance, of which one is depressed by the
elevation of the other.

These are the consequences which make war dread-
ful to a state. Slaughter and devastation are suffi-
ciently terrible, but their collateral evils are their
greatest. It is the immoral feeling that war diffuses —
it is the depravation of principle, which forms the mass
of its mischief.

To attempt to pursue the consequences of war
through all their ramifications of evil, were, however,
both endless and vain. It is a moral gangrene, which
diffuses its humors through the whole political and
social system. To expose its mischief, is to exhibit all
evil ; for there is no evil which it does not occasion,
and it has much that is peculiar to itself.

That, together with its multiplied evils, war produces
some good, I have no wish to deny. I know that it
sometimes elicits valuable qualities which had other-
wise been concealed, and that it often produces collat-
eral and adventitious, and sometimes immediate
advantages. If all this could be denied, it would be
needless to deny it ; for it is of no consequence to the
question whether it be proved. That any wide-ex-
tended system should not produce some benefits, can

420 I,AWFUI,NESS OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

never happen. In such a system , it were an unheard-of-
purity of evil, which was evil without any mixture of
good. — But, to compare the ascertained advantages of
war with its ascertained mischiefs and to maintain a
question as to the preponderance of the balance, im-
plies, not ignorance, but disingenuousness, not inca-
pacity to decide, but a voluntary concealment of truth.
And why do we insist upon these consequences of
war ! — Because the review prepares the reader for a
more accurate judgment respecting its lawfulness.
Because it reminds him what war is, and because,
knowing and remembering what it is, he will be the
better able to compare it with the standard of rectitude.

LAWFULNESS OF WAR.

I would recommend to him who would estimate the
moral character of war, to endeavor to forget that he
has ever presented to his mind the idea of a battle, and
to endeavor to contemplate it with those emotions
which it would excite in the mind of a being wTho had
never before heard of human slaughter. The prevail-
ing emotions of such a being would be astonishment
and horror. If he were shocked by the horribleness of
the scene, he would be amazed at its absurdity. That
a large number of persons should assemble by agree-
ment, and deliberately kill one another, appears to the
understanding a proceeding so preposterous, so mon-
strous, that I think a being such as I have supposed
would inevitably conclude that they were mad. Nor
is it likely, if it were attempted to explain to him some
motives to such conduct, that he would be able to com-
prehend how any possible circumstances could make it
reasonable. The ferocity and prodigious folly of the
act wrould, in his estimation, outbalance the weight of

CHAP. X.] LAWFULNESS OF WAR. 421

every conceivable motive, and he would turn unsatis-
fied away.

" Astonished at the madness of mankind."

There is an advantage in making suppositions such
as these ; because when the mind has been familiar-
ized to a practice, however monstrous or inhuman, it
loses some of its sagacity of moral perception ; the
practice is perhaps veiled in glittering fictions, or the
mind is become callous to its enormities. But if the
subject is, by some circumstance, presented to the
mind unconnected wTith any of its previous associations,
we see it with a new judgment and new feelings ; and
wonder, perhaps, that we have not felt so or thought
so before. And such occasions it is the part of a wise
man to seek ; since, if they never happen to us, it will
often be difficult for us accurately to estimate the qual-
ities of human actions, or to determine whether we
approve them from a decision of our judgment, or
whether we yield to them only the acquiescence of
habit.

It may properly be a subject of wonder that the
arguments which are brought to justify a custom such
as war receive so little investigation. It must be a
studious ingenuity of mischief which could devise a
practice more calamitous or horrible ; and yet it is a
practice of which it rarely occurs to us to enquire into
the necessity, or to ask whether it cannot be, or ought
not to be avoided. In one truth, however, all will ac-
quiesce— that the arguments in favor of such a practice
should be unanswerably strong.

Let it not be said that the experience and the prac-
tice of other ages have superseded the necessity of en-
quiry in our own ; that there can be no reason to
question the lawfulness of that which has been sanc-
tioned by forty centuries ; or that he who presumes to

422 I,AWFUI,NESS OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

question it, is amusing himself with schemes of vision-
ary philanthropy. "There is not, it maybe," says
Lord Clarendon, " a greater obstruction to the investi-
gation of truth or the improvement of knowledge, than
the too frequent appeal, and the too supine resignation
of our understanding to antiquity."* Whosoever pro-
poses an alteration of existing institutions, will meet,
from some men, with a sort of instinctive opposition,
which appears to be influenced by no process of reason-
ing, by no considerations of propriety or principles of
rectitude which defends the existing system because it
exists, and which would have equally defended its
opposite if that had been the oldest. ■ ' Nor is it out
of modesty that we have this resignation, or that we
do, in truth, think those who have gone before us to be
wiser than ourselves ; we are as proud and as peevish
as any of our progenitors ; but it is out of laziness ; we
will rather take their words than take the pains to ex-
amine the reason they governed themselves by. "f To
those who urge objections from the authority of ages,
it is, indeed, a sufficient answer to say, that they apply
to every long-continued custom. Slave-dealers urged
them against the friends of the abolition ; Papists urged
them against Wickliffe and Luther, and the Athenians
probably thought it a good objection to an apostle,
" that he seemed to be a setter forth of strange gods."
It is some satisfaction to be able to give on a question
of this nature, the testimony of some great minds
against the lawfulness of war, opposed, as these testi-
monies are, to the general prejudice and the general
practice of the world. It has been observed by Bec-
caria, that ' ' it is the fate of great truths to glow only
like a flash of lightning amidst the dark clouds in which
error has enveloped the universe;" and if our testi-
monies are few or transient, it matters not, so that
* Ivord Clarendon's Essays. t Id.

CHAP. X.] LAWFULNESS OF WAR. 423

their light be the light of truth. There are, indeed,
many, who in describing the horrible particulars of a
siege or a battle, indulge in some declamation on the
horrors of war, such as has been often repeated, and
often applauded, and as often forgotten. But such
declamations are of little value and of little effect ; he
who reads the next paragraph finds, probably, that he
is invited to follow the path to glory and to victory ; — to
share the hero's da?iger and partake the hero's praise ;
and he soon discovers that the moralizing parts of his
author are the impulse of feelings rather than of prin-
ciples, and thinks that though it may be very well to
write, yet it is better to forget them.

There are, however, testimonies, delivered in the
calm of reflection, by acute and enlightened men,
which may reasonably be allowed at least so much
weight as to free the present enquiry from the charge
of being wild or visionary. Christianity indeed needs
no such auxiliaries ; but if they induce an examination
of her duties, a wise man will not wish them to be dis-
regarded.

"They who defend war," says Erasmus, "must de-
fend the dispositions which lead to war : and these dis-
positions are absolutely forbidden by the gospel. — Since
the time that Jesus Christ said, Put up thy sword into
its scabbard, Christians ought not to go to war. — Christ
suffered Peter to fall into an error in this matter, on
purpose that, when he had put up Peter's sword, it
might remain no longer a doubt that war was pro-
hibited, which, before that order had been considered as
allowable." — " Wickliffe seems to have thought it was
wrong to take away the life of man on any account,
and that war was utterly unlawful."* — "lam per-
suaded," says the Bishop of Landaff, " that when the
spirit of Christianity shall exert its proper influence war

* Priestly.

424 LAWFULNESS OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

will cease throughout the whole Christian world."*
"War," says the same acute prelate, "has practices
and principles peculiar to itself, which but ill quadrate
with the rule of moral rectitude, and are quite abhorrent
from the benignity of Christianity.''' f A living writer
of eminence bears this remarkable testimony : — ' ' There
is but one community of Christians in the world, and
that unhappily of all communities one of the smallest,
enlightened enough to understand the prohibition of
war by our Divine Master ; in its plai?i, literal, and un-
deniable sense, and conscientious enough to obey it,
subduing the very instinct of nature to obedience. ' ' X

Dr. Vicessimus Knox speaks in language equally
specific: — " Morality and religion forbid war, in its
motives, conduct and consequences." §

Those who have attended to the mode in which the
moral law is instituted in the expressions of the will of
God, will have no difficulty in supposing that it con-
tains no specific prohibition of war. Accordingly, if wre
be asked for such a prohibition, in the manner in which
Thou shall ?iot kill is directed to murder, we willingly
answer that no such prohibition exists ; — and it is not
necessary to the argument. Even those who would re-
quire such a prohibition, are themselves satisfied re-
specting the obligation of many negative duties on
which there has been no specific decision in the New
Testament. They believe that suicide is not lawful :
yet Christianity never forbade it. It can be shown,
indeed, by implication and inference, that suicide
could not have been allowed, and with this they are
satisfied. Yet there is, probably, in the Christian

* Life of Bishop Watson. | Id.

% Southey's History of Brazil.

\ Essays — The Paterines or Gazari of Italy in the nth, 12th,
and 13th centuries " held that it was not lawful to bear arms or
to kill mankind."

CHAP. X.] ^AWfUI^NESS OF WAR. 425

scriptures, not a twentieth part of as much indirect
evidence against the lawfulness of suicide as there is
against the lawfulness of war. To those who require
such a command as Thou shalt not engage in war, it is
therefore sufficient to reply, that they require that,
which, upon this and upon many other subjects,
Christianity has not seen fit to give.

We have had many occasions to illustrate, in the
course of these disquisitions, the characteristic nature
of the moral law as a law of benevolence. This benevo-
lence, this good -will and kind affections towards one
another, is placed at the basis of practical morality —
it is " the fulfilling of the law " — it is the test of the
validity of our pretensions to the Christian character.
We have had occasion, too, to observe, that this law of
benevolence is universally applicable to public affairs
as well as to private, to the intercourse of nations as
well as of men. Let us refer, then, to some of those
requisitions of this law which appear peculiarly to re-
spect the question of the moral character of war.

Have peace one with another. — By this shall all men
know that ye are my disciples ~, if ye have love one to
another.

Walk with all lowliness and meekness, with long-suf-
fering, forbearing one another in love.

Be ye all of one mind, having compassion one oj
a7iother ; love as brethren, be pitiful, be courteous : not
rendering evil for evil, or railifig for railing.

Be at peace among yourselves. See that none re?ider
evil for evil unto any ma?i. — God hath called us to peace.

Follow after love, patience, meekness. — Be gentle,
showing all meekness unto all men. — Live in peace.

Lay aside all malice. — Put off anger, wrath, ?nalice.
— Let all bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and clamor,
and evil speaking, be put away from you, with all ma-
lice.

426 I^AWFUENESS OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

Avenge ?iot yourselves. — If thine enemy hunger, feed
him: if he thirst, give him drink. — Recompense to no
man evil for evil. — Overcome evil with good.

Now we ask of any man who looks over these pas-
sages, What evidence do they convey respecting the
lawfulness of war ? Could any approval or allowance of
it have been subjoined to these instructions, without
obvious and most gross inconsistency ? — But if war is
obviously and most grossly inconsistent with the gen-
eral character of Christianity ; if war could not have
been permitted by its teachers, without an egregious
violation of their own precepts, we think that the evi-
dence of its unlawfulness, arising from this general
character alone, is as clear, as absolute, and as exclu-
sive, as could have been contained in any form of pro-
hibition whatever.

But it is not from general principles alone that the
law of Christianity respecting war may be deduced. —
Ye have heard that it hath been said, " An eye for an
eye, and a tooth for a tooth : but /say unto you, that
ye resist not evil : but whosoever shall smite thee
on thy right check, turn to him the other also. — Ye
have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love
thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy : but /say unto
you, L,o ve your enemies, bless them that curse you, do
good to them that hate you, and pray for them which
despitefully use you, and persecute you ; for if ye love
them which love you, what reward have ye?"*

Of the precepts from the Mount the most obvious
characteristic is greater moral excellence and superior
purity. They are directed, not so immediately to the
external regulation of the conduct, as to the restraint
and purification of the affections. In another precept
it is not enough that an unlawful passion be just so far
restrained as to produce no open immorality — the pas-
* Mat. v. 38, &c.

CHAP. X.] LAWFULNESS OF WAR. 427

sion itself is forbidden. The tendency of the discourse
is to attach guilt not to action only but also to thought.
It has been said, " Thou shalt not kill ; and whosoever
shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment : but /
say unto you, that whosoever is angry with his
brother, without a cause, shall be in danger of the
judgment."* Our Lawgiver attaches guilt to some
of the violent feelings, such as resentment, hatred,
revenge ; and by doing this, we contend that he at-
taches guilt to war. War cannot be carried on without
those passions which he prohibits. Our argument,
therefore, is syllogistical : — War cannot be allowed, if
that which is necessary to war is prohibited. This,
indeed, is precisely the argument of Erasmus: — " They
who defend war must defend the dispositions which lead
to war ; and these dispositions are absolutely forbidden."

Whatever might have been allowed under the Mosaic
institution as to retaliation or resentment, Christianity
says, "If ye love them only which love you, what
reward have ye? — L,ove your enemies." Now what
sort of love does that man bear towards his enemy, who
runs him through with a bayonet ? We repeat, that the
distinguishing duties of Christianity must be sacrified
when war is carried on. The question is between the
abandonment of these duties and the abandonment of
war, for both cannot be retained. f

It is however objected, that the prohibitions,

* Mat. v. 2if 22.

f Yet the retention of both has been, unhappily enough, at-
tempted. In a late publication, of which a part is devoted to
the defence of war, the author gravely recommends soldiers,
whilst shooting and stabbing their enemies, to maintain towards
them a feeling of good-will !" — Tracts and Essays by the late
William Hey, Esq., F. R. S. And Gisborne, in his Duties of
Men, holds similar language. He advises the soldier " never to
forget the comman ties of human nature by which he is insepa-
rably united to his enemy."

428 LAWFULNESS OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

"Resist not eviL," &c, are figurative ; and that they do
not mean that no injury is to be punished, and no out-
rage to be repelled. It has been asked with compla-
cent exultation, What would these advocates of peace
say to him who struck them on the right cheek ?
Would they turn to him the other ? What would these
patient moralists say to him who robbed them of a
coat ? Would they give a cloak also ? What wrould
these philanthropists say to him who asked them to
lend a hundred pounds ? Would they not turn away ?
This is argiimentum ad hominem; one example
amongst the many, of that low and dishonest mode of
intellectual warfare, which consists in exciting the feel-
ings instead of convincing the understanding. It is
however, some satisfaction, that the motive to the adop-
tion of this mode of warfare is itself an indication of a
bad cause ; for what honest reasoner would produce
only a laugh, if he were able to produce conviction ?

We willingly grant that not all the precepts from
the Mount were designed to be literally obeyed in the
intercourse of life. But what then ! To show that
their meaning is not literal, is not to show that they
do not forbid war. We ask in our turn, What is the
meaning of the precepts ? What is the meaning of
' ' Resist not evil ?' ' Does it mean to allow bombard-
ment— devastation — slaughter ? If it does not mean to
allow all this, it does not mean to allow war. What,
again, do the objectors say is the meaning of, "Love
your enemies, " or of, " Do good to them that hate
you?" Does it mean, " ruin their commerce " — " sink
their fleets" — "plunder their cities" — "shoot
through their hearts ?' ' If the precept does not mean
to allow all this, it does not mean to allow war. It is,
therefore, not at all necessary here to discuss the pre-
cise signification of some of the precepts from the
Mount, or to define what limits Christianity may admit

CHAP. X.] tAWFUtNESS OF WAR. 429

in their application, since whatever exceptions she may
allow, it is manifest what she does not allow :* for if
we give to our objectors whatever license of interpre-
tation they may desire, they cannot, without virtually
rejecting the precepts, so interpret them as to make
them allow war.

Of the injunctions that are contrasted with, " eye for
eye, and tooth for tooth," the entire scope and purpose
is the suppression of the violent passions, and the in-
culcation of forbearance and forgiveness, and benevo-
lence and love. They forbid not specifically, the act,
but the spirit of war ; and this method of prohibition
Christ ordinarily employed. He did not often con-
demn the individual doctrines or customs of the age,
however false or however vicious ; but he condemned
the passions by which only vice could exist, and incul-
cated the truth which dismissed every error. And this
method was undoubtedly wise. In the gradual altera-
tions of human wickedness, many new species of profli-
gacy might arise which the world had not yet practised :
in the gradual vicissitudes of human error, many new
fallacies might obtain which the wTorld had not yet
held : and how were these errors and these crimes to
be opposed, but by the inculcation of principles that
were applicable to every crime and to every error ? —
principles which define not always what is wrong, but
which tell us what always is right.

There are two modes of censure or condemnation;
the one is to reprobate evil, and the other to enforce

* It is manifest, from the New Testament, that we are not re-
quired to give a " cloak," in every case, to him who robs us of
1 ' a coat ;" but I think it is equally manifest that we are required
to give it not the less, because he has robbed us : the circum-
stance of his having robbed us, does not entail an obligation to
give ; but it also does not impart a permission to withhold. If
the necessities of the plunderer require relief, it is the business
of the plundered to relieve them.

430 I,AWtfUI,NESS OF WAR. [ ESSAY III.

the opposite good ; and both those modes were adopted
by Christ. — He not only censured the passions that are
necessary to war, but inculcated the affections which
are most opposed to them. The conduct and disposi-
tions upon which he pronounced his solemn benediction
are exceedingly remarkable. They are these, and in
this order : Poverty of spirit ; — mourning ; — meekness ;
— desire of righteousness ; — mercy ; — purity of heart ;
— peacemaking ; — sufferance of persecution. Now let
the reader try whether he can propose eight other
qualities, to be retained as the general habit of the mind
which shall be more incongruous with war.

Of these benedictions, I think the most emphatical
is that pronounced upon the peacemakers. " Blessed
are the peacemakers : for they shall be called the
children of God."* Higher praise or a higher title, no
man can receive. Now, I do not say that these bene-
dictions contain an absolute proof that Christ prohibited
war, but I say they make it clear that he did not ap-
prove it. He selected a number of subjects for his
solemn approbation ; and not one of them possesses any
congruity with war, and some of them cannot possibly
exist in conjunction with it. Can any one believe that
he who made this selection, and who distinguished the
peacemakers with peculiar approbation, could have
sanctioned his followers in destroying one another ? Or
does any one believe that those who were mourners,
and meek and merciful and peacemaking, could at the
same time perpetrate such destruction ? If I be told
that a temporary suspension of Christian dispositions,
although necessary to the prosecution of war, does not
imply the extinction of Christian principles ; or that
these dispositions may be the general habit of the
mind, and may both precede and follow the acts of
war, I answer that this is to grant all that I require,

* Matt. v. 9.

CHAP. X.] LAWFULNESS OF WAR. 43I

since it grants that, when we engage in war, we
abandon Christianity.

When the betrayers and murderers of Jesus Christ
approached him, his followers asked, " Shall we smite
with the sword?" and without waiting for an answer,
one of them " drew his sword, and smote the servant
of the high priest, and cut off his right ear." — " Put
up again thy sword into his place," said his Divine
Master ; "for all they that take the sword shall perish
with the sword."* There is the greater importance in
the circumstances of this command, because it prohib-
ited the destruction of human life in a cause in which
there were the best of possible reasons for destroying
it. The question, "shall we smite with the sword,"
obviously refers to the defence of the Redeemer from
his assailants, by force of arms. His followers wTere
ready to fight for him ; and if any reason for fighting
could be a good one, they certainly had it. But if, in
defence of Himself from the hands of bloody ruffians,
his religion did not allow the sword to be drawn, for
what reason can it be lawful to draw it ? The advocates
of war are at least bound to show a better reason for
destroying mankind, than is contained in this instance
in which it was forbidden.

It will, perhaps, be said, that the reason why Christ
did not suffer himself to be defended by arms, was,
that such a defence would have defeated the purpose
for which he came into the world, namely, to offer up
his life ; and that he himself assigns this reason in the
context. — He does indeed assign it ; but the primary
reason, the immediate context is, — "for all they that
take the sword shall perish with the sword." The
reference to the destined sacrifice of his life is an after
reference. This destined sacrifice might, perhaps,
have formed a reason why his followers should not

* Matt. xxvi. 52.

432 1,AWFUI,NKSS OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

fight then, but the first, the principal reason which he
assigned, was the reason why they should not fight at
all. — Nor is it necessary to define the precise import of
the words, ' ' for all they that take the sword shall
perish with the sword ; " since it is sufficient for us all,
that they imply reprobation.

It is with the apostles as with Christ himself. The
incessant object of their discourses and writings is the
inculcation of peace, of mildness, of placability. It
might be supposed that they continually retained in
prospect the reward which would attach to ' ' peace-
makers. ' ' We ask the advocate of war, whether he
discovers in the writings of the apostles or of the
evangelists, any thing that indicates they approved of
war. Do the tenor and spirit of their writings bear
any congruity with it ? Are not their spirit and tenor
entirely discordant with it ? We are entitled to renew
the observation, that the pacific nature of the apostolic
writings, proves, presumptively, that the writers dis-
allowed war. That could not be allowed by them as
sanctioned by Christianity, which outraged all the
principles that they inculcated.

' ' Whence come wars and fightings among you ? " is
the interrogation of one of the apostles, to some whom
he was reproving for their unchristian conduct : and he
answers himself by asking them, " Come they not
hence, even of your lusts that war in your members ? "*
This accords precisely with the argument that we
urge. Christ forbade the passions which lead to war ;
and now, when these passions had broken out into
actual fighting, his apostle, in condemning war, refers
it back to their passions. We have been saying that
the passions are condemned, and therefore war ; and now,
again, the apostle James thinks, like his master, that

* James iv. I.

CHAP. X.] LAWFULNESS OF WAR. 433

the most effectual way of eradicating war, is to eradi-
cate the passions which produce it.

In the following quotation we are told, not only
what the arms of the apostles wrere not, but what they
were. " The weapons of our warfare are not carnal
but mighty through God to the pulling down of strong-
holds ; and bringing into captivity every thought to the
obedience of Christ."* I quote this, not only because
it assures us that the apostles had nothing to do with
military weapons, but because it tells us the object of
their warfare — the bringing every thought to the obe-
dience of Christ ; and this object I would beg the
reader to notice, because it accords with the object of
Christ himself in his precepts from the Mount — the
reduction of the thoughts to obedience. The apostle
doubtless knew, that, if he could effect this, there was
little reason to fear that his converts wrould slaughter
one another. He followed the example of his master.
He attacked wickedness in its root ; and inculcated
those general principles of purity and forbearance,
which, in their prevalence, wTould abolish war, as they
would abolish all other crimes. The teachers of Chris-
tianity -addressed themselves not to communities but to
men. They enforced the regulation of the passions
and the rectification of the heart, and it was probably
clear to the perceptions of apostles, although it is not
clear to some species of philosophy, that whatever
duties were binding upon one man, were binding upon
ten, upon a hundred, and upon the state.

War is not often directly noticed in the writings of
the apostles. When it is noticed, it is condemned, just
in that way in which we should suppose any thing
would be condemned that was notoriously opposed to
the whole system — just as murder is condemned at the
present day. Who can find, in modern books, that

* 2 Cor. x. 4.

434 LAWFULNESS OE WAR. [ESSAY III.

murder is formally censured ? We may find censures
of its motives, of its circumstances, of its degrees of
atrocity ; but the act itself no one thinks of censuring,
because every one knows that it is wicked. Setting
statutes aside, I doubt whether, if an Otaheitan should
choose to argue that Christians allow murder because
he cannot find it formally prohibited in their writings,
we should not be at a loss to find direct evidence against
him. And it arises, perhaps, from the same causes, that
a formal prohibition of war is not to be found in the writ-
ings of the apostles. I do not believe they imagincdW\2X
Christianity would ever be charged with allowing it.
They write, as if the idea of such a charge never occurred
to them. They did, nevertheless, virtually forbid it ;
unless any one shall say that they disallowed the pas-
sions which occasion war, but did not allow war itself :
that Christianity prohibits the cause but permits the
effect ; which is much the same as to say, that a law
which forbade the administering arsenic did not forbid
poisoning.

But although the general tenor of Christianity and
some of its particular precepts appear distinctly to con-
demn and disallow war, it is certain that different con-
clusions have been formed ; and many, who are un-
doubtedly desirous of performing the duties of Chris-
tianity, have failed to perceive that war is unlawful to
them.

In examining the arguments by which war is de-
fended, two important considerations should be borne
in mind — first, that those who urge them are not
simply defending war, they are also defending them-
selves. If war be wrong, their conduct is wrong ; and
the desire of self -justification prompts them to give im-
portance to whatever arguments they can advance in
its favor. Their decisions may, therefore, with reason,
be regarded as in some degree the decisions of a party

CHAP. X.] I,AWFUI,NESS OF WAR. 435

in the cause. The other consideration is, that the de-
fenders of war come to the discussion prepossessed in
its favor. They are -attached to -it by their earliest
habits. They do not examine the question as a
philosopher would examine it, to whom the subject
was new. Their opinions had been already formed.
They are discussing a question which they had already
determined : and every man, who is acquainted with
the effects of evidence on the mind, knows that under
these circumstances a very slender argument in favor
of the previous opinions, possesses more influence than
many great ones against it. Now all this cannot be
predicated of the advocates of peace, they are opposing
the influence of habit ; they are contending against the
general prejudice ; they are, perhaps, dismissing their
own previous opinions : and I would submit it to the
candor of the reader, that these circumstances ought to
attach, in his mind, suspicion to the validity of the
arguments against us.

The narrative of the centurion who came to Jesus at
Capernaum to solicit him to heal his servant, furnishes
one of these arguments. It is said that Christ found
no fault with the centurion's profession ; that if he had
disallowed the military character, he would have taken
this opportunity of censuring it ; and that, instead of
such censure he highly commended the officer, and said
of him, "I have not found so great faith, no, not in
Israel."*

An obvious weakness in this argument is this ; that
it is founded not upon an approval, but upon silence.
Approbation is indeed expressed, but it is directed, not
to his arms, but to his " faith ; " and those who will
read the narrative, will find that no occasion was given
for noticing his profession. He came to Christ, not as
a military officer, but simply as a deserving man. A

* Matt. viiL 10.

436 LAWFULNESS OF WAR. [FSSAY III.

censure of his profession might undoubtedly have been
pronounced, but it would have been a gratuitous cen-
sure, a censure that did not naturally arise out of the
case. The objection is, in its greatest weight, pre-
sumptive only ; for none can be supposed to counte-
nance every thing that he does not condemn . To observe
silence * in such cases, was indeed the ordinary practice
of Christ. He very seldom interfered with the civil or
political institutions of the world. In these institutions
there was sufficient wickedness around him ; but some
of them flagitious as they were, he never, on any oc-
casion, even noticed. His mode of condemning and
extirpating political vices, was, by the inculcation of
general rules of purity, which, in their eventual and uni-
versal application, would reform them all.

But how happens it that Christ did not notice the
centurion's religioyi ? He surely was an idolater.
And is there not as good reason for maintaining that
Christ approved idolatry because he did not condemn
it, as that he approved war because he did not con-
demn it? Reasoning from analogy, we should con-
clude that idolatry was likely to have been noticed
rather than war ; and it is therefore peculiarly and
singularly unapt to bring forward the silence respecting
war, as an evidence of its lawfulness.

A similar argument is advanced from the case of
Cornelius, to whom Peter was sent from Joppa, of
which it is said, that although the gospel was imparted
to Cornelius by the especial direction of heaven, yet we
do not find that he therefore quitted his profession, or

* "Christianity, soliciting admission into all nations of the
world, abstained, as behoved it, from intermeddling with the
civil institutions of any. But does it follow, from the silence of
Scripture concerning them, that all the civil institutions which
then prevailed were right, or that the bad should not be ex-
changed for better ? " — Paley.

CHAP. X.] I,AWFUI,NESS OF WAR. 437

that it was considered inconsistent with his new char-
acter. The objection applies to this argument as to
the last — that it is built upon silence, that it is simply
negative. We do not find that he quitted the service :
I might answer, neither do we find that he continued
in it. We only know nothing of the matter ; and
the evidence is therefore so much less than proof,
as silence is less than approbation. Yet that the
account is silent respecting any disapprobation of
war, might have been a reasonable ground of
argument under different circumstances. It might
have been a reasonable ground of argument, if
the primary object of Christianity had been the re-
formation of political institutions, or, perhaps, even if
her primary object had been the regulation of the ex-
ternal conduct ; but her primary object was neither of
these. She directed herself to the reformation of the
heart, knowing that all other reformation would follow.
She embraced, indeed, both morality and policy, and
has reformed, or will reform, both — not so much im-
mediately as consequently — not so much by filtering
the current, as by purifying the spring. The silence
of Peter, therefore, in the case of Cornelius, will serve
the cause of war but little : that little is diminished
when urged against the positive evidence of commands
and prohibitions, and it is reduced to nothingness when
it is opposed to the universal tendency and object of the
revelation.

It has sometimes been urged that Christ paid taxes
to the Roman government at a time when it was en-
gaged in war, and when, therefore, the money that he
paid would be employed in its prosecution. This we
shall readily grant ; but it appears to be forgotten by
our opponents, that if this proves war to be lawful,
they are proving too much. These taxes were thrown
into the exchequer of the state, and a part of the

438 LAWFULNESS OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

money was applied to purposes of a most iniquitous
and shocking nature — sometimes, probably, to the
gratification of the emperor's personal vices, and to his
gladiatorial exhibitions, &c. , and certainly to the sup-
port of a miserable idolatry. If, therefore, the payment
of taxes to such a government proves an approbation of
war, it proves an approbation of many other enormities.
Moreover, the argument goes too far in relation even to
war ; for it must necessarily make Christ approve of all
the Roman wars, without distinction of their justice or
injustice — of the most ambitious, the most atrocious, and
the most aggressive — and these, even our objectors will
not defend. The payment of tribute by our Lord, was
accordant with his usual system of avoiding to inter-
fere in the civil or political institutions of the world.

1 ■ He that hath no sword, let him sell his garment
and buy one. ' ' * This is another passage that is brought
against us. ' ' For what purpose, " it is asked, ' 'were they
to buy swords, if swords might not be used ?" It may
be doubted whether with some of those who advance
this objection, it is not an objection of words rather
than of opinion. It may be doubted whether they
themselves think there is any weight in it. To those,
however, who may be influenced by it, I would observe

* Luke xxii. 36. Upon the interpretation of this passage of
Scripture, I would subjoin the sentiments of two or three
authors. Bishop Pearce says, " It is plain that Jesus never in-
tended to make any resistance, or suffer a sword to be used on
this occasion. ' ' And Campbell says, ' ' We are sure that he did
not intend to be understood literally, but as speaking of the
weapons of their spiritual warfare. ' ' And Beza : ' ! This whole
speech is allegorical. My fellow soldiers, you have hitherto
lived in peace, but now a dreadful war is at hand ; so that omit-
ting all other things, you must think only of arms. But when
he prayed in the garden, and reproved Peter for smiting with
the sword, he himself showed what these arms were." — See Peace
and War, an essay. Hatchard, 1824.

CHAP. X.] I,AWFUI,NESS OF WAR. 439

that, as it appears to me, a sufficient answer to the objec-
tion may be found in the immediate context : ' ' Lord,
behold here are two swords," said they, and he immedi-
ately answered, "It is enough." How could two be
enough when eleven were to be supplied with them ?
That swords in the sense, and for the purpose, of mili-
tary weapons, were even intended in this passage,
there appears much reason for doubting. This reason
will be discovered by examining and connecting such
expressions as these : ' ' The Son of Man is not come
to destroy men's lives, but to save them," said our
Lord. Yet, on another occasion, he says, " I came not
to send peace on earth, but a sword." How are we to
explain the meaning of the latter declaration? Ob-
viously, by understanding "sword" to mean some-
thing far other than steel. There appears little reason
for supposing that physical weapons were intended in
the instruction of Christ. I believe they were not in-
tended, partly because no one can imagine his apostles
were in the habit of using such arms, partly because
they declared that the weapons of their warfare were
not carnal, and partly because the word ' ' sword ' ' is
often usen to imply "dissension," or the religious
warfare of the Christian. Such an use of language is
found in the last quotation ; and it is found also in
such expressions as these : ' ' shield of faith , " — " helmet
of salvation, " — " sword oi the spirit, " — " I have: fought
the good 'fight of faith."

But it will be said that the apostles did provide them-
selves with swords, for that on the same evening they
asked, "Shall we smite with the sword?" This is
true, and it may probably be true also, that some of
them provided themselves with swords in consequence of
the injunction of their Master. But what then? It
appears to me that the apostles acted on this occasion
upon the principles on which they had wished to act on

440 LAWFULNESS OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

another, when they asked, "Wilt thou that we com-
mand fire to come down from heaven, and consume
them?" And that their Master's principles of action
were also the same in both — "Ye know not what
manner of spirit ye are of ; for the Son of Man is not
come to destroy men's lives, but to save them." This
is the language of Christianity ; and I would seriously
invite him who now justifies M destroying men's lives,"
to consider what manner of spirit he is of.

I think then, that no argument arising from the in-
struction to buy swords can be maintained. This, at
least, we know, that when the apostles were completely
commissioned, they neither used nor possessed them.
An extraordinary imagination he must have, who con-
ceives of an apostle, preaching peace and reconciliation,
crying ''forgive injuries," — "love your enemies," —
" render not evil for evil ;" and at the conclusion of
the discourse, if he chanced to meet violence or insult,
promptly drawing his sword and maiming or murder-
ing the offender. We insist upon this consideration.
If swords were to be worn, swords were to be used ;
and there is no rational way in which they could have
been used, but some such as that which we have been
supposing. If, therefore, the words, "He that hath
no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one," do
not mean to authorize such an use of the sword, they do
not mean to authorize its use at all : and those who
adduce the passage, must allow its application in such
a sense, or they must exclude it from any application
to their purpose.

It has been said again, that when soldiers came to
John the Baptist to enquire of him what they should
do, he did not direct them to leave the service, but to
be content with their wages. This, also, is at best but
a negative evidence. It does not prove that the mili-
tary profession was wrong, and it certainly does not

CHAP. X.] I,AWFUI,NESS OF WAR. 441

prove that it was right. But in truth, if it asserted the
latter, Christians have, as I conceive, nothing to do
with it : for I think that we need not enquire what
John allowed, or what he forbade. He, confessedly,
belonged to that system which required ' ' an eye for an
eye, and a tooth for a tooth;" and the observations
which we shall by and by make on the authority of the
law of Moses, apply, therefore, to that of John the
Baptist. Although it could be proved (which it
cannot be) that he allowed wars, he acted not incon-
sistently with his own dispensation ; and with that dis-
pensation we have no business. Yet, if any one still
insists upon the authority of John, I would refer him
for an answer to Jesus Christ himself. What authority
He attached to John on questions relating to His own
dispensation, may be learnt from this — M The least in
the kingdom of heaven is greater than he. ' '

It is perhaps no trifling indication of the difficulty
which writers have found in discovering in the Chris-
tian Scriptures arguments in support of war, that they
have had recourse to such equivocal and far-fetched
arguments. Grotius adduces a passage which he says
is " a leading point of evidence, to show that the right of
war is not taken away by the law of the gospel. ' ' And
what is this leading evidence ? That Paul, in writing
to Timothy, exhorts that prayer should be made ' ' for
kings!"* — Another evidence which this great man
adduces is, that Paul suffered himself to be protected
on his journey by a guard of soldiers, without hinting
any disapprobation of repelling force by force. But
how does Grotius know that Paul did not hint this ?
And who can imagine that to suffer himself to be
guarded by a military escort, in the appointment of
which he had no control, was to approve war ?

But perhaps the real absence of sound Christian
* See Rights of War and Peace.

442 I,AWFUI,NESS OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

arguments in favor of war, is in no circumstance so re-
markably intimated as in the citations of Milton in his
Christian Doctrine. ' ' With regard to the duties of
war," he quotes or refers to thirty-nine passages of
Scripture — thirty-eight of which are from the Hebrew
Scriptures : and what is the individual one from the
Christian ? — ' ' What king going to make war against
another king !" &c*

Such are the arguments which are adduced from the
Christian Scriptures by the advocates of war. In these
five passages, the principal of the New Testament evi-
dences in its favor, unquestionably consist : they are
the passages which men of acute minds, studiously
seeking for evidence, have selected. And what are
they ? Their evidence is in the majority of instances
negative at best. A ' ' not ' ' intervenes. The cen-
turion was not found fault with : Cornelius was not
told to leave the profession : John did not tell the sol-
diers to abandon the army ; Paul did not refuse a mili-
tary guard. I cannot forbear to solicit the reader to-
compare these objections with the pacific evidence of
the gospel which has been laid before him ; I would
rather say, to compare it with the gospel itself ; for the
sum, the tendency, of the whole revelation is in our favor.

In an enquiry whether Christianity allows of war,
there is a subject that always appears to me to be of
peculiar importance — the prophecies of the Old Testa-
ment respecting the arrival of a period of universal
peace. The belief is perhaps general amongst Chris-
tians, that a time will come when vice shall be eradi-
cated from the world, when the violent passions of
mankind shall be repressed, and when the pure
benignity of Christianity shall be universally diffused.
That such a period will come we indeed know as-
suredly, for God has promised it.

* Iyuke xiv. 31.

CHAP. X.] LAWFULNESS OF WAR. 443

Of the many prophecies of the Old Testament re-
specting this period, we refer only to a few from the
writings of Isaiah. In his predictions respecting the
"last times," by which it is not disputed that he re-
ferred to the prevalence of the Christian religion, the
prophet says — "They shall beat their swords into
ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks :
nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither
shall they learn war any more." * Again, referring to
the same period, he says — "They shall not hurt nor
destroy in all my holy mountain : for the earth shall be
full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover
the sea."f And again, respecting the same era —
" Violence shall no more be heard in thy land, wasting
nor destruction within thy borders. ' ' J

Two things are to be observed in relation to these
prophecies ; ist, that it is the will of God that war
should eventually be abolished. This consideration is
of importance ; for if war be not accordant with His
will, war cannot be accordant with Christianity, which
is the revelation of His will. Our business, however,
is principally with the second consideration — that
Christianity will be the means of introducing this period
of peace. From those who say that Qur religion
sanctions war, an answer must be expected to ques-
tions such as these : — By what instrumentality and by
the diffusion of what principles, will the prophecies of
Isaiah be fulfilled ? Are we to expect some new sys-
tem of religion, by which the imperfections of Chris-
tianity shall be removed and its deficiencies supplied ?
Are we to believe that God sent his only Son into the
world to institute a religion such as this, a religion
that, in a few centuries, would require to be altered and
amended ? If Christianity allows of war, they must
tell us what it is that is to extirpate war. If she
* Isa. ii. 4. | Id. xi. 9. % Id. lx. 18.

444 LAWFULNESS OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

allows " violence, and wasting, and destruction," they
must tell us what are the principles that are to pro-
duce gentleness, and benevolence, and forbearance. — I
know not what answer such enquiries will receive from
the advocate of war, but I know that Isaiah says the
change will be effected by Christianity : and if any one
still chooses to expect another and a purer system, an
apostle may perhaps, repress his hopes ; — " Though we
or an angel from heaven," says Paul, "preach any
other gospel unto you, than that which we have
preached unto you, let him be accursed." *

Whatever the principles of Christianity will require
hereafter, they require now. Christianity, with its
present principles and obligations, is to produce uni-
versal peace. It becomes, therefore, an absurdity, a
simple contradiction, to maintain that the principles of
Christianity allow of war, when they, and they only
are to eradicate it. If we have no other guarantee of
peace than the existence of our religion, and no other
hope of peace than in its diffusion, how can that relig-
ion sanction war ?

The case is clear. A more perfect obedience to that
same gospel, which, we are told, sanctions slaughter,
will be the means, and the only means, of exterminat-
ing slaughter from the world. It is not from an altera-
tion of Christianity, but from an assimilation of Chris-
tians to its nature that we are to hope. It is because
we violate the principles of our religion, because we are
not what they require us to be, that wars are continued.
If we will not be peaceable, let us then, at least, be
honest, and acknowledge that we continue to slaughter
one another, not because Christianity permits it, but
because we reject her laws.

The opinions of the earliest professors of Christianity
upon the lawfulness of war are of importance, because

* Gal. i, 8.

CHAP. X.] I,AWFUI,NESS OF

they who lived nearest to the time of its Founder were
the most likely to be informed of his intentions and
his will, and to practise them without those adultera-
tions which we know have been introduced by the lapse
of ages.

During a considerable period after the death of
Christ, it is certain, then, that his followers believed
he had forbidden war, and that, in consequence of this
belief, many of them refused to engage in it whatever
were the consequence, whether reproach, or imprison-
ment, or death. These facts are indisputable. " It is
as easy," says a learned writer of the seventeenth cen-
tury, " to obscure the sun at mid-day, as to deny that
the primitive Christians renounced all revenge and
war. ' ' Christ and his apostles delivered general pre-
cepts for the regulation of our conduct. It was neces-
sary for their successors to apply them to their practice
in life. And to what did they apply the pacific pre-
cepts which had been delivered ? They applied them
to war ; they were assured that the precepts absolutely
forbade it. This belief they derived from those very
precepts on which we have insisted ; they referred ex-
pressly, to the same passages in the New Testament,
and from the authority and obligation of those passages,
they refuse to bear arms. A few examples from their
history will show with what undoubting confidence
they believed in the unlawfulness of war, and how
much they were willing to suffer in the cause of peace.

Maximilian, as it is related in the Acts of Ruin art,
was brought before the tribunal to be enrolled as a sol-
dier. On the proconsul's asking his name, Maximilian
replied, "lama Christian and cannot fight." It was,
however, ordered that he should be enrolled, but he
refused to serve, still alleging that he was a Christian.
He was immediately told that there was no alternative
between bearing arms and being put to death. But his

446 tAWFUtNESS OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

fidelity was not to be shaken : — >" I cannot fight," said
he, "if I die." He continued steadfast to his princi-
ples, and was consigned to the executioner.

The primitive Christians not only refused to be en-
listed in the army, but when they embraced Christian-
ity, whilst already enlisted, they abandoned the
profession at whatever cost. Marcellus was a centurion
in the legion called Trajana. Whilst holding this
commission, he became a Christian ; and believing in
common with his fellow- Christians, that war was no
longer permitted to him, he threw down his belt at the
head of the legion, delaring that he had become a
Christian, and that he would serve no longer. He was
committed to prison ; but he was still faithful to Chris-
tianity. " It is not lawful," said he, " for a Christian
to bear arms for any earthly consideration ;" and he
was, in consequence, put to death. Almost immedi-
ately afterwards, Cassian, who was notary to the same
legion, gave up his office. He steadfastly maintained
the sentiments of Marcellus ; and, like him was con-
signed to the executioner. Martin, of whom so much
is vSaid by Sulpicius Severus, was bred to the profession
of arms, which, on his acceptance of Christianity, he
abandoned. To Julian the Apostate, the only reason
that we find he gave for his conduct was this : — "I am
a Christian, and therefore I cannot fight."

These were not the sentiments, and this was not the
conduct, of insulated individuals who might be actuated
by individual opinion, or by their private interpreta-
tions of the duties of Christianity. Their principles
were the principles of the body. They were recognized
and defended by the Christian writers, their contempo-
raries. Justin Martyr and Tatian talk of soldiers and
Christians as distinct characters ; and Tatian says that
the Christians declined even military commands.
Clemens of Alexandria calls his Christian contempora-

CHAP. X.] LAWFULNESS OF WAR. 447

ries the " followers of peace," and expressly tells us
1 ' that the followers of peace used none of the imple-
ments of war." L,actantius, another early Christian,
says expressly, " It can never be lawful for a righteous
man to go to war. ' ' About the end of the second cen-
tury, Celsus, one of the opponents of Christianity,
charged the Christians with refusing to bear arms even
in case of necessity . Origen, the defender of the Chris-
tians, does not think of denying the fact ; he admits
the refusal, and justifies it, becatise war was unlawful.
Even after Christianity had spread over almost the
whole of the known world, Tertullian, in speaking of
a part of the Roman armies, including more than one-
third of the standing legions of Rome, distinctly informs
us that " not a Christian could be found amongst
them."

All this is explicit. The evidence of the following
facts is, however, yet more determinate and satisfac-
tory. Some of the arguments which, at the present
day, are brought against the advocates of peace, were
then urged against these early Christians : and these
arguments they examined and repelled. This indicates
investigation and enquiry, and manifests that their be-
lief of the unlawfulness of war was not a vague opin-
ion, hastily admitted and loosely floating amongst
them, but that it was the result of deliberate examina-
tion, and a consequent firm conviction that Christ had
forbidden it. The very same arguments which are
brought in defence of war at the present day, were
brought against the Christians sixteen hundred years
ago ; and sixteen hundred years ago, they were repelled
by these faithful contenders for the purity of our relig-
ion. It is remarkable too, that Tertullian appeals to
the precepts from the Mount, in proof of those princi-
ples on which this chapter has been insisting : — that
the dispositions which the precepts i?iculcate are not

448 t,AWFUI,NESS OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

compatible with war, and that war, therefore, is irreconcila-
ble with Christia?iity .

If it be possible, a still stronger evidence of the prim-
itive belief, is contained in the circumstance, that some
of the Christian authors declared that the refusal of the
Christians to bear arms, was a fulfilment of ancient
prophecy. The peculiar strength of this evidence con-
sists in this — that the fact of a refusal to bear arms is
assumed as notorious and unquestioned. Irenseus, who
lived about the year 180, affirms that the prophecy of
Isaiah, which declared that men should turn their
swords into plough-shares and their spears into prun-
ing hooks, had been fulfilled in his time ; " for the
Christians," says he, " have changed their swords and
their lances into instruments of peace, and they know
not how to fight." — Justin Martyr, his contemporary,
writes — " That the prophecy is fulfilled you have good
reason to believe, for we, who in times past killed one
another, do not now fight with our enemies." Tertul-
lian, who lived later, says, " You must confess that the
prophecy has been accomplished, as far as the practice
of every i?idividual is co?icerned, to whom it is applica-
ble."

It has been sometimes said, that the motive which
influenced the early Christians to refuse to engage in
war, consisted in the idolatry which was connected
with the Roman armies. — One motive this idolatry
unquestionably afforded ; but it is obvious, from the
quotations which we -have given, that their belief of
the unlawfulness of fighting, independent of any ques-
tion of idolatry, was an insuperable objection to engag-
ing in war. Their words are explicit : "I cannot
fight, if I die." — " I am a Christian, and therefore I
cannot fight." — "Christ," says Tertullian, " by dis-
arming Peter, disarmed every soldier;" and Peter
was not about to fight in the armies of idolatry. So

CHAP. X.J LAWFULNESS OF WAR. 449

entire was their conviction of the incompatibility of
war with our religion, that they would not even be
present at the gladiatorial rights, ''lest," says Theo-
philus, " we should become partakers of the murders
committed there." Can any one believe that they,
who would not even witness a battle between two men,
would themselves fight in a battle between armies?
And the destruction of a gladiator, it should be re-
membered, was authorized by the state, as much as
the destruction of enemies in war.

It is therefore indisputable, that the Christians who
lived nearest to the time of our Saviour, believed, with
undoubting confidence, that he had unequivocally for-
bidden war ; — that they openly avowed this belief ;
and that, in support of it they were willing to sacrifice,
and did sacrifice, their fortunes and their lives.

Christians, however, afterwards became soldiers : and
when ? — When their general fidelity to Christianity be-
came relaxed ; — when, in other respects, they violated
its principles ; — when they had begun ' ' to dissemble ' '
and "to falsify their word," and "to cheat ; " — when
1 ' Christian casuists ' ' had persuaded them that they
might usit at meat in the idol's temple;'" — when
Christians accepted even the priesthoods of idolatry. In
a word, they became soldiers when they had ceased to
be Christians.

The departure from the original faithfulness, was,
however, not suddenly general. Like every other cor-
ruption, war obtained by degrees. During the first
two hundred years, not a Christian soldier is upon
record. In the third century, when Christianity be-
came partially corrupted, Christian soldiers were com-
mon. The number increased with the increase of the
general profligacy ; until at last, in the fourth century,
Christians became soldiers without hesitation, and per-
haps without remorse. Here and there, however, an

450 I,AWFUI,NESS OE WAR. [ESSAY III.

ancient father still lifted up his voice for peace ; but
these, one after another, dropping from the world, the
tenet that war is unlawful, ceased at length to be a
tenet of the church.

Ivet it always be borne in mind, by those who are
advocating war, that they are contending for a corrup-
tion which their forefathers abhorred ; and that they
are making Jesus Christ the sanctioner of crimes,
which his purest followers offered up their lives be-
cause they would not commit.

An argument has sometimes been advanced in favor
of war, from the Divine communications to the Jews
under the administration of Moses. It has been said,
that as wars were allowed and enjoined to that people,
they cannot be inconsistent with the will of God.

The reader, who has perused the first essay of this
work, will be aware that to the present argument our
answer is short : — If Christianity prohibits war, there
is, to Christians, an end of the controversy. War can-
not then be justified by the referring to any antecedent
dispensation. One brief observation may, however, be
offered, that those who refer, in justification of our
present practice, to the authority by which the Jews
prosecuted their wars, must be expected to produce
the same authority for our own. Wars were com-
manded to the Jews, but are they commanded to us ?
War, in the abstract, was never commanded : and
surely those specific wars which were enjoined upon
the Jews for an express purpose, are neither authority
nor example for us, who have received no such injunc-
tion, and can plead no such purpose.

It will, perhaps, be said, that the commands to pros-
ecute wars, even to extermination, are so positive, and
so often repeated, that it is not probable, if they were
inconsistent with the will of heaven, that they would
have been thus peremptorily enjoined. We answer,

CHAP. X.] LAWFULNESS OF WAR. 451

that they were not inconsistent with the will of heaven
then. But even then, the prophets foresaw that they
were not accordant with the universal will of God,
since they predicted, that when that will should be ful-
filled, war should be eradicated from the world. And
by what dispensation was this will to be fulfilled ? By
that of the "Rod out of the stem of Jesse." It is
worthy of recollection, too, that David was forbidden
to build the temple because he had shed blood. ' ' As
for me it was in my mind to build an house unto the
name of the Lord my God : but the word of the Lord
came to me, saying, Thou hast shed blood abundantly,
and hast made great wars ; thou shall not build an
house unto my name, because thou hast shed much
blood upon the earth in my sight."* So little ac-
cordancy did war possess with the purer offices even of
the Jewish dispensation.

Perhaps the argument to which the greatest import-
ance is attached by the advocates of war, and by which
thinking men are chiefly induced to acquiesce in its
lawfulness is this — That a distinction is to be made be-
tween rules which apply to us as i?idividuals, and rules
which apply to us as subjects of the state ; and that the
pacific injunctions of Christ from the Mount, and all the
other kindred commands a7id prohibitions of the Christian
Scriptures, have ?io reference to our conduct as members
of the political body.

If there be soundness in the doctrines which have
been delivered at the commencement of the essay upon
the "elements of political rectitude," this argument
possesses no force or application.

When persons make such broad distinctions between
the obligations of Christianity on private and on public
affairs, the proof of the rectitude of the distinction
must be expected of those who make it. General rules

* i Chron. xxii. 7, 8.

452 LAWFULNESS OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

are laid down by Christianity, of which, in some cases,
the advocate of war denies the applicability. He,
therefore, is to produce the reason and the authority
for the exception. And that authority must be a com-
petent authority — the authority mediately or immedi-
ately of God. It is to no purpose for such a person to
tell us of the magnitude of political affairs — of the
greatness of the interests which they involve — of
"necessity," or of expediency. All these are very
proper considerations in subordiiiation to the moral
law : — otherwise they are wholly nugatory and irrele-
vant. Let the reader observe the manner in which the
argument is supported. — If an individual suffers ag-
gression there is a power to which he can apply that is
above himself and above the aggressor ; a power by
which the bad passions of those around him are re-
strained, or by which their aggressions are punished.
But amongst nations there is no acknowledged superior
or common arbitrator. Even if there were, there is no
way in which its decisions could be enforced, but by
the sword. War, therefore, is the only means which
one nation possesses of protecting itself from the ag-
gression of another. The reader will observe the fun-
damental fallacy upon which the argument proceeds. —
It assumes, that the reason why an individual is not
permitted to use violence is, that the laws will use it for
him. Here is the error ; for the foundation of the duty
of forbearance in private life, is not that the laws will
punish aggression, but that Christianity requires for-
bearance.

Undoubtedly, if the existence of a common arbitrator
were the. foundation of the duty, the duty would not
be binding upon nations. But that which we require
to be proved is this — that Christianity exonerates
nations from those duties which she has imposed upon
individuals. This, the present argument does not

CHAP. X.] I,AWFUI,NKSS OF WAR. 453

prove : and, in truth, with a singular unhappiness in
its application, it assumes, in effect, that she has im-
posed these duties upon neither the one nor the other.

If it be said, that Christianity allows to individuals
some degree and kind of resistance, and that some re-
sistance is therefore lawful to states, we do not deny it.
But if it be said, that the degree of lawful resistance
extends to the slaughter of our fellow Christians — that
it extends to war — we do deny it : we say that the
rules of Christianity cannot, by any possible latitude of
interpretation, be made to extend to it. The duty of
forbearance, then, is antecedeiit to all considerations re-
specting the condition of man ; and whether he be
under the protection of laws or not, the duty of for-
bearance is imposed.

The only truth which appears to be elicited by the
present argument is, that the difficulty of obeying the
forbearing rules of Christianity is greater in the case of
nations then in the case of individuals : The obligation
to obey them is the same in both. Nor let any one urge
the difficulty of obedience in opposition to the duty ;
for he who does this, has yet to learn one of the most
awful rules of his religion — a rule that was enforced by
the precepts, and more especially by the final example,
of Christ, of apostles and of martyrs — the rule which
requires that we should be "obedient even unto death."

Let it not, however, be supposed that we believe the
difficulty of forbearance would be great in practice as
it is great in theory. Our interests are commonly pro-
moted by the fulfilment of our duties ; and we hope
hereafter to show, that the fulfilment of the duty of
forbearance forms no exception to the applicability of
the rule.

The intelligent reader will have perceived that the
"war" of which we speak is all war, without refer-
ence to its objects, whether offensive or defensive. In

454 IvAWFUI^NESS OF WAR. [ESSAY m.

truth, respecting any other than defensive war, it is
scarcely worth while to entertain a question, since no
one with whom we are concerned to reason will advo-
cate its opposite. Some persons indeed talk with much
complacency of their reprobation of offensive war.
Yet to reprobate no more than this, is only to condemn
that which wickedness itself is not wont to justify.
Even those who practise offensive war, affect to veil its
nature by calling it by another name.

In conformity with this, we find that it is to defence
that the peaceable precepts of Christianity are directed.
Offence appears not to have even suggested itself. It
is, "Resist not evil?" it is, "Overcome evil with
good :" it is, " Do good to them that hate you :" it is,
"Love your enemies:" it is, "Render not evil for
evil:''' it is, " Unto him that smiteth thee on the one
cheek" All this supposes previous offence, or injury,
or violence ; and it is then that forbearance is enjoined.

It is common with those who justify defensive war,
to identify the question with that of individual self-
defence ; and although the questions are in practice
sufficiently dissimilar, it has been seen that we object
not to their being regarded as identical. The rights
of self-defence have already been discussed, and the
conclusions to which the moral law appears to lead,
afford no support to the advocate of war.

We say the questions are practically dissimilar ; so
that if we had a right to kill a man in self-defence, very
few wars would be shown to be lawful. Of the wars
which are prosecuted, some are simply wars of aggres-
sion ; some are for the maintenance of a balance of
power ; some are in assertion of technical rights ; and
some, undoubtedly, to repel invasion. The last are
perhaps the fewest ; and of these only it can be said
that they bear any analogy whatever to the case which
is supposed ; and even in these, the analogy is seldom

CHAP. X.] LAWFULNESS OF WAR. 455

complete. It has rarely indeed happened that wars
have been undertaken simply for the preservation of
life, and that no other alternative has remained to a
people than to kill, or to be killed. And let it be re-
membered, that unless this alternative alone remai?is,
the case of individual self-defence is irrelevant : it ap-
plies not, practically, to the subject.

But indeed you cannot in practice make distinctions,
even moderately accurate, between defensive war and
war for other purposes.

Supposing, the Christian Scriptures had said, An
army ?nay fight in its own defence \ but not for any other pur-
pose.— Whoever will attempt to apply this rule in prac-
tice, will find that he has a very wide range of justifiable
warfare : a range that will embrace many more wars,
than moralists, laxer than we shall suppose them to be,
are willing to defend. If an army may fight in de-
fence of their own lives, they may, and they must fight
in defence of the lives of others : if they may fight in
the defence of the lives of others, they will fight in
defence of their property : if in defence of property,
they will fight in defence of political rights : if in de-
fence of rights, they will fight in promotion of inter-
ests : if in promotion of interests, they will fight in
promotion of their glory and their crimes. Now let
any man of honesty look over the gradations by which
we arrive at this climax, and I believe he will find
that, in practice, no curb can be placed upon the con-
duct of an army until they reach that climax. There
is, indeed, a wide distance between fighting in defence
of life, and fighting in furtherance of our crimes ; but
the steps which lead from one to the other will follow
in inevitable succession. I know that the letter of our
rule excludes it, but I know that the rule will be a
letter only. It is very easy for us to sit in our studies,
and to point the commas, and semicolons, and periods

456 LAWFULNESS OF WAR. [ESSAY III.

of the soldier's career : it is very easy for us to say, he
shall stop at defence of life, or at protection of prop-
erty, or at the support of rights ; but armies will never
listen to us : we shall be only the Xerxes of morality,
throwing out idle chains into the tempestuous ocean of
slaughter.

What is the testimony of experience? When nations
are mutually exasperated, and armies are levied, and
battles are fought, does not every one know that with
whatever motives of defence one party may have begun
the contest, both, in turn, become aggressors? In the
fury of slaughter, soldiers do not attend, they cannot
attend, to questions of aggression. Their business is
destruction, and their business they will perform. If
the army of defence obtains success, it soon becomes an
army of aggression. Having repelled the invader, it
begins to punish him. If a war has once begun, it is
vain to think of distinctions of aggression and defence.
Moralists may talk of distinctions, but soldiers will
make none ; and none can be made ; it is without the
limits of possibility.

Indeed, some of the definitions of defensive or of just
war which are proposed by moralists, indicate how im-
possible it is to confine warfare within any assignable
limits. " The objects of just war," says Paley, " are
precaution, defence, or reparation." — " Every just war
supposes an injury perpetrated, attempted, or feared."

I shall acknowledge, that if these be justifying mo-
tives to war, I see very little purpose in talking of
morality upon the subject.

It is in vain to expatiate on moral obligations, if we
are at liberty to declare war whenever an " injury is
feared:" — an injury, without limit to its insignifi-
cance ! a fear, without stipulation for its reasonable-
ness ! The judges, also, of the reasonableness of fear,
are to be they who are under its influence ; and who

CHAP. X.] LAWFULNESS OF WAR. 457

so likely to judge ainiss as those who are afraid?
Sounder philosophy than this has told us, that ' ' he
who has to reason upon his duty when the temptation
to transgress it is before him, is almost sure to reason
himself into an error. ' '

Violence, and rapine, and ambition, are not to be
restrained by morality like this. It may serve for
the speculations of a study ; but we will venture to
affirm that mankind will never be controlled by it.
Moral rules are useless, if, from their own nature they
cannot be, or will not be applied. Who believes that
if kings and conquerors may fight when they have
fears, they will not fight when they have them not ?
The morality allows too much latitude to the passions,
to retain any practical restraint upon them. And a
morality that will not be. practised, I had almost said,
that cannot be practised, is an useless morality. It is
a theory of morals. We want clearer and more exclu-
sive rules ; we want more obvious and immediate
sanctions. It were in vain for a philosopher to say to
a general who wjas burning for glory, ' ! You are at
liberty to engage in the war provided you have suf-
fered, or fear you will suffer an injury — otherwise
Christianity prohibits it. ' ' He will tell him of twenty
injuries that have been suffered, of a hundred that
have been attempted, and of a thousand that he fears.
And what answer can the philosopher make to him?

If these are the proper standards of just war, there
will be little difficulty in proving any war to be just,
except, indeed, that of simple aggression ; and by the
rules of this morality, the aggressor is difficult of dis-
covery, for he whom we choose to "fear," may say
that he had previous "fear" of us, and that his
1 ' fear, ' ' prompted the hostile symptoms which made
us "fear" again. The truth is, that to attempt to
make any distinctions upon the subject is vain. War

45§ PROBABLE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF [ESSAY III.

must be wholly forbidden, or allowed without restric-
tion to defence ; for no definitions of lawful and un-
lawful war, will be, or can be, attended to. If the prin-
ciples of Christianity, in any case, or for any purpose,
allow armies to meet and to slaughter one another, her
principles will never conduct us to the period which
prophecy has assured us they shall produce. There is
no hope of an eradication of war, but by an absolute
and total abandonment of it.

OF THE PROBABLE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF ADHE-
RING TO THE MORAL LAW IN RESPECT TO WAR.

We have seen that the duties of the religion which
God has imparted to mankind require irresistance ; and
surely it is reasonable to hope, even without a refer-
ence to experience, that he will make our irresistance
subservient to our interests : that if, for the purpose of
conforming to his will, we subject ourselves to diffi-
culty or danger, he will protect us in our obedience,
and direct it to our benefit : that if he requires us not
to be concerned in war, he will preserve us in peace :
that he will not desert those who have no other protec-
tion, and who have abandoned all other protection be-
cause they confide in His alone.

This we may reverently hope ; yet it is never to be
forgotten that our apparent interests in the present life
are sometimes, in the economy of God, made subordi-
nate to our interests in futurity.

Yet, even in reference only to the present state of
existence, I believe that we shall find that the testi-
mony of experience is, that forbearance is most con-
ducive to our interests. There is practical truth in the
position, that " When a man's ways please the Lord,"
he " maketh even his enemies to be at peace zvith him.'''

The reader of American history will recollect, that
in the beginning of the last century a desultory and

CHAP. X.] ADHERING TO THE MORAI, UW, ETC. 459

most dreadful warfare was carried on by the natives
against the European settlers ; a warfare that was pro-
voked— as such warfare has almost always originally
been — by the injuries and violence of the Christians.
The mode of destruction was secret and sudden. The
barbarians sometimes lay in wait for those who might
come within their reach, on the highway or in the
field, and shot them without warning : and sometimes
they attacked the Europeans in their houses, "scalp-
ing some, and knocking out the brains of others."
From this horrible warfare the inhabitants sought
safety by abandoning their homes, and retiring to
fortified places, or to the neighborhood of garrisons ;
and those whom necessity still compelled to pass be-
yond the limits of such protection, provided themselves
with arms for their defence. But amidst this dreadful
desolation and universal terror, the Society of Friends,
who were a considerable portion of the whole popula-
lation, were steadfast to their principles. They would
neither retire to garrisons nor provide themselves with
arms. They remained openly in the country, whilst
the rest were flying to the forts. They still pursued
their occupations in the fields or at their homes, with-
out a weapon either for annoyance or defence. And
what was their fate ? They lived in security and quiet.
The habitation which, to his armed neighbor, was the
scene of murder and of the scalping-knife, was to the
unarmed Quaker a place of safety and of peace.

Three of the Society were however killed. And who
were they? They were three who abandoned their
principles. Two of these victims were men who, in the
simple language of the narrator, " used to go to their
labor without any weapons, and trusted to the Al-
mighty, and depended on his providence to protect
them (it being their principle not to use weapons of
war to offend others, or to defend themselves ;) but a

460 PROBABLE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF [ESSAY III.

spirit of distrust taking place in their minds, they took
weapons of war to defend themselves, and the Indians
who had seen them several times without them and let
them alone, saying they were peaceable men and hurt
nobody, therefore they would not hurt them — now see-
ing them have guns, and supposing they designed to
kill the Indians, they therefore shot the men dead."
The third wrhose life was sacrificed was a woman,
"who had remained in her habitation," not thinking
herself warranted in going "to a fortified place for
preservation, neither she, her son, nor daughter, nor
to take thither the little ones ; but the poor woman
after some time began to let in a slavish fear, and ad-
vised her children to go with her to a fort not far from,
their dwelling. ' ' She went ;— and shortly afterwards
1 ' the bloody, cruel Indians, lay by the way, and killed
her."*

The fate of the Quakers during the Rebellion in Ire-
land was nearly similar. It is well known that the
Rebellion was a time not only of open war but of
cold-blooded murder ; of the utmost fury of bigotry,
and the utmost exasperation of revenge. Yet the
Quakers were preserved even to a proverb ; and when
strangers passed through streets of ruin and observed a
house standing uninjured and alone, they would some-
times point, and say, — "That, doubtless, is the house
of a Quaker, "f So complete indeed was the preserva-
tion which these people experienced, that in an official
document of the Society they say, — ' ' no member of our
Society fell a sacrifice but one young man ;" — and that
young man had assumed regimentals and arms. J

* See Select Anecdotes, &c. by John Barclay, pages 71, 79.

f The Moravians, whose principles upon the subject of war
are similar to those of the Quakers, experienced also similar
preservation.

% See Hancock's Principles of Peace Exemplified.

CHAY X.] ADHERING TO THE MORAI, I<AW, ETC. 461

If it were to no purpose to say, in opposition to the
evidence of these facts, that they form an exception to
a general rule. — The exception to the rule consists in
the trial of the experiment of non-resistance, not in its
success. Neither were it to any purpose to say, that
the savages of America or the desperadoes of Ireland,
spared the Quakers because they were previously known
to be an unoffending people, or because the Quakers
had previously gained the love of these by forbearance
or good offices : — we concede all this ; it is the very
argument which we maintain. We say, that an uniform
u?ideviating regard to the peaceable obligations of
Christianity, becomes the safeguard of those who practice
it. We venture to maintain, that no reason whatever
can be assigned, why the fate of the Quakers would
not be the fate of all who should adopt their conduct.
No reason can be assigned why, if their number had
been multiplied tenfold or a hundred-fold, they would
not have been preserved. If there be such a- reason,
let us hear it. The American and Irish Quakers were,
to the rest of the community, what one nation is to a
continent. And we must require the advocate of war
to produce (that which has never yet been produced)
a reason for believing, that although individuals ex-
posed to destruction were preserved, a nation exposed
to destruction would be destroyed. We do not how-
ever say, that if a people, in the customary state of
men's passions, should be assailed by an invader, and
should, on a sudden, choose to declare that they would
try whether Providence would protect them — of such a
people, we do not say, that they would experience pro-
tection, and that none of them would be killed : but
we say, that the evidence of experience is, that a
people who habitually regard the obligations of Chris-
tianity in their conduct towards other men, and who
steadfastly refuse, through whatever consequences, to

462 PROBABLE PRACTICAI, EFFECTS GF [ ESSAY III.

engage in acts of hostility will experience protection in
their- peacefulness : — And it matters nothing to the
argument, whether we refer that protection to the im-
mediate agency of Providence, or to the influence of
such conduct upon the minds of men.*

Such has been the experience of the unoffending and
unresisting, in individual life. A natio?ial example of
a refusal to bear arms, has only once been exhibited to
the world : but that one example has proved, so far as
its political circumstances enabled it to prove, all that
humanity could desire and all that scepticism could de-
mand, in favor of our argument.

It has been the ordinary practice of those who have
colonized distant countries, to force a footing, or to
maintain it, with the sword. One of the first objects
has been to build a fort and to provide a military. The
adventurers became soldiers, and the colony was a gar-
rison. Pennsylvania was however colonized by men
who believed that war was absolutely incompatible
with Christianity, and who therefore resolved not to
practice it. Having determined not to fight, they
* Ramond, in his "Travels in the Pyrenees," fell in from
time to time with those desperate marauders who infest the
boundaries of Spain and Italy — men who are familiar with
danger and robbery and blood. What did experience teach him
was the most efficient means of preserving himself from injury?
To go " unarmed.'1'' He found that he had " little to apprehend
from men whom we inspire with no distrust or envy, and every
thing to expect in those from whom we claim only what is due
from man to man. The laws of nature still exist for those who
have long shaken off the law of civil government." — "The
assassin has been my guide in the defiles of the boundaries of
Italy : the smuggler of the Pyrenees has received me with a
welcome in his secret paths. Armed, I should have been the
enemy of both : unarmed, they have alike respected me. In
such expectation I have long since laid aside all menacing ap-
paratus whatever. Arms irritate the wicked and intimidate the
simple ; the man of peace amongst mankind has a much more
sacred defence — his character."

CHAP. X.] ADHERING TO THE M0RAI, I.AW, ETC. 463

maintained no soldiers and possessed no arms. They
planted themselves in a country that was surrounded
by savages, and by savages who knew they were un-
armed. If easiness of conquest, or incapability of de-
fence, could subject them to outrage, the Pennsylva-
nians might have been the very sport of violence.
Plunderers might have robbed them without retaliation,
and armies might have slaughtered them without resist-
ance. If they did not give a temptation to outrage, no
temptation could be given. But these were the people
who possessed their country in security, whilst those
around them were trembling for their existence. This
was a land of peace, whilst every other was a land of
war. The conclusion is inevitable, although it is extra-
ordinary : — they were in no need of arms, because they
would not use them.

These Indians were sufficiently ready to commit
outrages upon other States, and often visited them
with desolation and slaughter : with that . sort of
desolation, and with that sort of slaughter, which
might be expected from men whom civilization had
not reclaimed from cruelty, and whom religion had not
awed into forbearance. ' \ But whatever the quarrels
of the Pennsylvanian Indians were with others, they
uniformly respected and held as it were sacred, the
territories of William Penn."* ''The Pennsylvanians
never lost man, woman or child by them ; which neither
the colony of Maryland, nor that of Virginia could say,
no more than the great colony of New England, "f

The security and quiet of Pennsylvania was not a
transient freedom from war, such as might accidentally
happen to any nation. She continued to enjoy it "for
more than seventy years," J and "subsisted in the
midst of six Indian nations, without so much as a

* Clarkson. f Oldmixon, Anno 1708.

% Proud.

464 PROBABLE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF [ESSAY III.

militia for her defence. " * M The Pennsylvanians
became armed, though without arms ; they became
strong, though without strength ; they became safe,
without the ordinary means of safety. The constable's
staff was the only instrument of authority amongst
them for the greater part of a century, and never dur-
ing the administration of Penn, or that of his proper
successors, was there a quarrel or a war. ' ' f

I cannot wonder that these people were not molested
— extraordinary and unexampled as their security was.
There is something so noble in this perfect confidence
in the Supreme Protector, in this utter exclusion of
' ' slavish fear, ' ' in this voluntary relinquishment of the
means of injury or of defence, that I do not wonder
that even ferocity could be disarmed by such virtue.
A people generously living without arms amidst
nations of warriors ! Who would attack a people such
as this ? There are few men so abandoned as not to
respect such confidence. It were a peculiar and an unus-
ual intensity of wickedness that would not even revere it.

And when was the security of Pennsylvania mo-
lested, and its peace destroyed? — When the men who
had directed its counsels ] and who would not engage in
war, were outvoted in its legislature ; when they who
supposed that there was a greater security in the sword
than in Christianity , became the predominating body.
From that hour the Pennsylvanians transferred their
confidence in Christian principles, to a confidence in
their arms ; and from that hour to the present they
have been subject to war.

Such is the evidence, derived from a national ex-
ample, of the consequences of a pursuit of the Christian
policy in relation to war. Here are a people who ab-
solutely refused to fight, and who incapacitated them-
selves for resistance by refusing to possess arms ; and
* Oldmixon. t Clarkson's Life of Penn.

CHAP. X.] ADHERING TO THE MORAI, UW, ETC. 465

these were the people whose land, amidst surrounding
broils and slaughter, was selected as a land of security
and peace. The only national opportunity which the
virtue of the Christian world has afforded us, of ascer-
taining the safety of relying upon God for defence, has
determined that it is safe.

If the evidence which we possess do not satisfy us of
the expediency of confiding in God, what evidence do
we ask or what can we receive ? We have his promise
that he will protect those who abandon their seeming
interests in the performance of his will ; and we have
the testimony of those who have confided in him , that
he has protected them. Can the advocate of war pro-
duce one single instance in the history of man, of a
person who had given an unconditional obedience to the
will of Heaven, and who did not find that his conduct
was wise as well as virtuous, that it accorded with his
interests as well as with his duty. We ask the same
question in relation to the peculiar obligations to irre-
sistance. Where is the man who regrets, that, in ob-
servance of the' forbearing duties of Christianity, he
consigned his preservation to the superintendence of
God ? — And the solitary national example that is be-
fore us, confirms the testimony of private life ; for
there is sufficient reason for believing, that no nation,
in modern ages, has possessed so large a portion of
virtue or of happiness, as Pennsylvania before it had
seen human blood. I would therefore repeat the ques-
tion— What evidence do we ask or can we receive ?

This is the point from which we wander WE do

NOT BELIEVE IN THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD. When

this statement is formally made to us, we think, per-
haps, that it is not true; but our practice is an evidence
of its truth ; for if we did believe, we should also c<mfide
in it, and should be willing to stake upon it the conse-

466 PROBABLE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OE [ESSAY III.

quences of our obedience,* We can talk with sufficient
fluency of " trusting in Providence ;" but in the appli-
cation of it to our .conduct in life, we know wonderfully
little. Who is it that confides in Providence, and for
what does he trust him ? Does his confidence induce
him to set aside his own views of interest and safety,
and simply to obey precepts which appear inexpedient
and unsafe ? This is the confidence that is of value, and
of which we know so little. There are many who be-
lieve that war is disallowed by Christianity, and who
would rejoice that it were for ever abolished ; but there
are few who are willing to maintain an undaunted and
unyielding stand against it. They can talk of the love-
liness of peace, ay, and argue against the lawfulness of
war ; but when difficulty or suffering would be the
consequence, they will not refuse to do what they know
to be unlawful, they will not practise the peacefulness
which they say they admire. Those who are ready to
sustain the consequences of undeviating obedience, are
the supporters of whom Christianity stands in need.
She wants men who are willing to suffer for her prin-
ciples.

The positions, then, which we have endeavored to
establish are these —

I. That those considerations which operate as gen-
eral causes of war, are commonly such as Chris-
tianity condemns :

II. That the effects of war, are to a very great ex-
tent, prejudicial to the moral character of a people,
and to their social and political welfare :

III. That the general character of Christianity is

* ■ ' The dread of being destroyed by our enemies if we do not
go to war with them, is a plain and unequivocal proof of our
disbelief in the superintendence of Divine Providence." — The
Lawfulness of Defensive War impartially considered. By a
member of the Church of England.

CHAP. X.] ADHERING TO THE MORAI, I,AW, ETC. 467

wholly incongruous with war, and that its general
duties are incompatible with it :

IV. That some of the express precepts and declara-
tions of the Christian Scriptures virtually forbid
it:

V. That the primitive Christians believed that
Christ had forbidden war : and that some of them
suffered death in affirmance of this belief :

VI. That God has declared, in prophecy, that it is
His will that war should eventually be eradicated
from the earth ; and that this eradication will be
effected by Christianity, by the influence of its
present principles :

VII. That those who have refused to engage in
war, in consequence of their belief of its inconsist-
ency with Christianity, have found that Providence
has protected them.

Now, we think that the establishment of any consid-
erable number of these positions is sufficient for our
argument. The establishment of the whole forms a body
of evidence, to which I am not able to believe that an
enquirer, to whom the subject was new, would be able
to withhold his assent. But since such an enquirer
cannot be found, I would invite the reader to lay pre-
possession aside, to suppose himself to have now first
heard of battles and slaughter, and dispassionately to
examine whether the evidence in favor of peace be not
very great, and whether the objections to it bear any
proportion to the evidence itself. But whatever may
be the determination upon this question, surely it is
reasonable to try the experiment, whether security
cannot be maintained without slaughter. Whatever be
the reasons for war, it is certain that it produces enor-
mous mischief. Even waiving the obligation of Chris-
tianity, we have to choose between evils that are certain

468 PROBABLE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF [ESSAY III.

and evils that are doubtful ; between the actual endur-
ance of a great calamity, and the possibility of a less.
It certainly cannot be proved, that peace would not be
the best policy : and since we know that the present
system is bad, it were reasonable and wise to try
whether the other is not better. In reality I can
scarcely conceive the possibility of a greater evil than
that which mankind now endure ; an evil, moral and
physical, of far wider extent, and far greater intensity,
than our familiarity writh it allows us to suppose. If a
system of peace be not productive of less evil than the
system of war, its consequences must indeed be enor-
mously bad ; and that it would produce such conse-
quences, we have no warrant for believing, either from
reason or from practice — either from the principles of
the moral government of God, or from the experience
of mankind. Whenever a people shall pursue, steadily
and uniformly, the pacific morality of the gospel, and
shall do this from the pure motive of obedience, there
is no reason to fear for the consequences : there is no
reason to fear that they would experience any evils
such as we now endure, or that they would not find
that Christianity understands their interests better than
themselves ; and that the surest, and the only rule of
wisdom, of safety, and of expediency, is to maintain
her spirit in every circumstance of life.

" There is reason to expect," says Dr. Johnson,
"that as the world is more enlightened, policy and
morality will at last be reconciled. ' ' * When this en-
lightened period shall arrive, we shall be approaching,
and we shall not till then approach, that era of purity
and of peace, when "violence shall no more be heard
in our land — wasting nor destruction within our
borders ; " — that era in which God has promised that
"they shall not hurt nor destroy in all his holy
* Falkland's Islands.

CHAP. X.] ADHERING TO THE MORAL LAW, ETC. 469

mountain. ' ' That a period like this will come, I am not
able to doubt ; I believe it, because it is not credible
that he will always endure the butchery of man by
man ; because he has declared that he will not endure
it ; and because I think there is a perceptible approach
of that period in which he will say — "it is enough."*
In this belief the Christian may rejoice ; he may re-
joice that the number is increasing of those who are
asking — ''Shall the sword devour forever?" and of
those who, whatever be the opinions or the practice of
others, are openly saying, " I am for Peace." f

It will perhaps be asked, what then are the duties of
a subject who believes that all war is incompatible
with his religion, but wThose governors engage in a war
and demand his service ? We answer explicitly,// is
his duty, mildly and temperately, yet firmly to refuse to
serve. — Let such as these remember, that an honorable
and an awful duty is laid upon them. It is upon their
fidelity, so far as human agency is concerned, that the
cause of peace is suspended. Let them then be willing
to avow their opinions and to defend them. Neither
let them be contented with words if more than words,
if suffering also, is required. It is only by the un-
yielding fidelity of virtue that corruption can be extir-
pated. If you believe that Jesus Christ has prohibited
slaughter, let not the opinions or the commands of a
world induce you to join in it. By this " steady and
determinate pursuit of virtue," the benediction which
attaches to those who hear the sayings of God and do
them, will rest upon you ; and the time will come
when even the world wall honor you, as contributors to
the work of human reformation.

* 2 Sam. xxiv. 16.
f Ps. cxx. 7.

47° CONCLUSION. [KSSAY III.

CONCLUSION.

That hope which was intimated at the commence-
ment of this volume — that a period of greater moral
purity would eventually arrive — has sometimes oper-
ated as an encouragement to the writer, in enforcing
the obligations of morality to an extent which few who
have written such books have ventured to advocate.
In exhibiting a standard of rectitude such as that which
it has been attempted to exhibit here — a standard to
which not many in the present day are willing to con-
form, and of which many would willingly dispute the
authority, some encouragement was needed ; and no
human encouragement could be so efficient as that
which consisted in the belief, that the principles would
progressively obtain more and more of the concurrence
and adoption of mankind.

That there are indications of an advancement of the
human species towards greater purity in principle and
in practice cannot, I think, be disputed. There is a
manifest advancement in intellectual concerns : —
Science of almost every kind is extending her empire ;
— political institutions are becoming rapidly amelio-
rated ;* — and morality and religion, if their progress
be less perceptible, are yet advancing with an onward
pace.f

* ' ' The degree of scientific knowledge which would once
have conferred celebrity and immortality, is now, in this coun-
try, attained by thousands of obscure individuals." — Fox's Lec-
tures. "To one who considers coolly of the subject, it will
appear that human nature in general, really enjoys more lib-
erty at present, in the most arbitrary governments of Europe,
than it ever did during the most flourishing period of ancient
times." — Hume.

t Not that the present state, or the prospects of the world,
afford any countenance to the speculations — favorite specula-
tions with some men — respecting " human perfectibility. " In
the sense in which this phrase is usually employed, I fear there

CHAP. X.] CONCLUSION. 471

Lamentations over the happiness or excellence of
other times, have generally very little foundation in
justice or reason.* In truth they cannot be just, be-
cause they are perpetual. There has probably never
been an age in which mankind have not bewailed the
good times that were departed, and made mournful
comparisons of them with their own. If these regrets
had not been ill-founded, the world must have per-
petually sunk deeper and deeper in wickedness, and
retired further and further towards intellectual night.
But the intellectual sun has been visibly advancing
towards its noon ; and I believe there never was a
period in which, speaking collectively of the species,
the power of religion was greater than it is now : at
least there never was a period in which greater efforts
were made to diffuse the influence of religion amongst
mankind. Men are to be judged of by their fruits ;
and why should men thus more vigorously exert them-
selves to make others religious, if the power of religion
did not possess increased influence upon their own
minds ? The increase of crime — even if it increased in
a progression more rapid than that of population, and
the state of society which gives rise to crime — is a very

is little hope of the perfection of man ; at least there
is little hope, if Christianity be true. Christianity declares that
man is not perfectible except by the immediate assistance of
God ; and this immediate assistance the advocates of ' ■ human
perfectibility ' ' are not wont to expect. The question in the
sense in which it is ordinarily exhibited, is in reality a question
of the truth of Christianity.

* ' ' This humor of complaining proceeds from the frailty of
our natures ; it being natural for man to complain of the pres-
ent, and to commend the times past." — Sir Josiah Child, 1665.
This was one hundred and fifty years ago. The same frailty
appears to have subsisted two or three thousands of years be-
fore : "Say not thou what is the cause that the former days
were better than these ? for thou dost not enquire wisely con-
cerning this." — E)ccles. vii 10.

472 CONCLUSION. [ESSAY III.

imperfect standard of judgment. Those offences of
which civil laws take cognizance, form not an hun-
dredth part of the wickedness of the world. What
multitudes are there of bad men who never yet were
amenable to the laws ! How extensive may be the ad-
ditional purity without any diminution of legal crimes!

And assuredly there is a perceptible advance in the
sentiments of good men towards a higher standard of
morality. The lawfulness is frequently questioned
now of actions of which, a few ages ago, few or none
doubted the rectitude. Nor is to be disputed, that
these questions are resulting more and more in the con-
viction, that this higher standard is proposed and en-
forced by the moral law of God. Who that considers
these things will hastily affirm, that doctrines in moral-
ity which refer to a standard that to him is new, are
unfounded in this moral law ? Who will think it suffi-
cient, to say that strange things are brought to his
ears ? Who wTill satisfy himself with the exclamation,
these are hard sayings, who can hear them ? Strange
things must be brought to the ears of those who have
not been accustomed to hear the truth. Hard sayings
must be heard by those who have not hitherto prac-
tised the purity of morality.

Such considerations, I say, have afforded encourage-
ment in the attempt to uphold a standard which the
majority of mankind have been little accustomed to
contemplate ; — and now and in time to come, they will
suffice to encourage, although that standard should be,
as by many it undoubtedly will be, rejected and con-
temned.

I am conscious of inadequacy — what if I speak the
truth and say, I am conscious of unworthiness — thus to
attempt to advocate the law of God. Let no man
identify the advocate with the cause, nor imagine, when
he detects the errors and the weaknesses of the one,

chap, x.] conclusion. 473

that the other is therefore erroneous or weak. I apolo-
gize for myself : especially I apologize for those
instances in which the character of the Christian may
have been merged in that of the exposer of the evils of
the world. There is a Christian love which is para-
mount to all ; — a love which he only is likely sufficiently
to maintain, who remembers that he who exposes an
evil and he who partakes in it, will soon stand together
as suppliants for the mercy of God.

And finally, having written a book which is devoted
almost exclusively to disquisitions on morality, I am
solicitous lest the reader should imagine that I regard
the practice of morality as all that God requires of man.
I believe far other, and am desirous of here expressing
the conviction, that although it becomes not us to limit
the mercy of God, or curiously to define the conditions
on which he will extend that mercy — yet that the true
and safe foundation of our hope is in ' ' the redemption
that is in Christ Jesus."

INDEX.

PAGE.

Affirmations instead of oaths, The advantages of, considered 216

Amusements not lawful when injurious to morals 283

— Popular, not necessary to the happiness of life 291

Ancient classics, The tendency of the study of, adverse to Christianity 267
Arbitration instead of litigation recommended by the early Christians.. 164

—The advantages of 167

Benevolence as it is proposed in the Christian vScriptures 49

— The exercise of, required by the Divine will 97

— No circumstances in life, in which the exercise of, is suspended... 299
— Imperatively required of men, according to their opportuni-
ties 315, 346

— Sets limits to patriotism 387

— The exercise of, incompatible with war 1 425

Books, he who writes or sells, which will in all probability injure the

reader, is accessory to the mischief which may be done 225

— The writers of some, have probably occasioned unnumbered

murders 238

—The great responsibility of those who derange the moral judg-
ment through 258

—Great increase in the number of, calculated to benefit the young.. 264

— The tendency of the study of the ancient classics adverse to the

acceptance of Christianity 267

Bravery apart from courage not endued with moral qualities 241, 411

Brotherhood of man, Remarks on the 93

Ceremonial institutions and devotional formularies, On 123

Christ Jesus, The true and safe foundation of our hope is in the re-
demption that is in 473

Christianity with its present principles and obligations to produce uni-
versal peace 444

— The obligations of, binding upon nations as well as individ-
uals 102, 318, 451

Christians, Testimony of the early, against war 445

Civil liberty enjoyed where the principles of political truth and recti-
tude are practised 324

— A relative and not a positive enjoyment 324

— Does not necessarily depend upon forms of government 325

Civil obedience, The obligations of, considered 327

Complimentary untruths, On 199

476 INDEX.

PAGE.

Conscience, The nature and authority of 53

— Is not an enlightening principle, but a principle which is enlight-
ened 62

— The dictates of , to be obeyed 271

Courage, Christian, exemplified 243, 304, 335

Crime, The punishment of, considered 346

— The repetition of, prevented if the offender is reformed 347

— The effects of the death penalty upon, examined 351

Days, The observance of particular, as of special sanctity, not counte-
nanced by Scripture 117

Death to be preferred to killing an assailant 296

Debts, Why is a man obliged to pay his 135

— The obligation to pay, perpetual 135

— A legal discharge of, by creditors not necessarily a moral dis-
charge 135

— Until fully paid, the property of a debtor cannot in equity be con-
sidered his own 138

—Incurred by minors 143

— Of unprincipled extravagance incurred by wives 144

— A man is unjust who will not pay his, unless compelled to do so... 146

Devotion, Remarks on sincere, and on factitious semblances of 112

— On formularies of 123

— When true, is duly maintained, forms of prayer are not needed... 129
— The offices of public, frequently do not supply opportunities for

calmness of recollection 275

Divine attributes, On endeavoring to deduce rules of conduct from

reasoniugs respecting the 25

Duelling, The obligations of morality disregarded in no

—Public opinion responsible for the continuance of 235

Education, On moral 262

— Of the poor, Reasons for the general 277

—The, of the people effects the political welfare 279 345

— The habit of inquiry a valuable effect of 281

Enjoyment, The greatest sum of, that which is quietly and constantly

induced 290

Example, The necessity of virtuous as an agency in moral reform, in-
culcated 223

—The powerful influence of, particularly of parents 263

Expediency not the standard of right and wrong 4

Expediency, The principles of, fluctuating and inconsistent 6

— The doctrine of, examined, and condemned 13, 47, 196, 265

— Obligations resulting from 96

— European politics have long been founded on 322

Falsehood and deception 188, 216

— Encouraged by the use of oaths '. 221

Fame, Enduring, to be accorded to him who is good as well as great.... 254

Faults of great men, Animadversions on the disposition to treat the,

leniently 254

index. 477

PAGE*

Field-sports, The ill effects of 287

First day of the week, On the rightful observance of the, as a day for

the exercise of public worship 117

Forbearance, The nature and effects of Christian 304

Gambling, Remarks on paying debts incurred in 10$

—A general accompaniment of horse-racing 289

Government, The authority and limits of civil 82

—The authority of, explicitly asserted in the Christian Scriptures.. 82
—Injustice, etc., committed by, would be much lessened if repu-
table men did not lend their agency 229

—The servant of the community 310

— Measures of, should commend themselves to the judgment and

affections of the people 313

— Obedience to, enforced both by expediency and Christianity 327

— When obedience to, may be withdrawn 331

— Alterations in, may be effected by Christian methods 331

— The proper object of, the happiness of the people 342

History, The rectification of public opinion on important subjects may

be largely aided by writers on 260

— The sickening details of, in Europe largely due to vicious and

mistaken principles of government 317

Holy Scriptures, Moral legislation as exhibited in the, is a system

founded upon authority 9

—The will of God when communicated through the, is final 10

— Those who have not the, are not destitute of a direct communi-
cation of the will of God 20

—Of the Patriarchal, Mosaic and Christian dispensations the latter

areof paramount obligation 29

—On the mode of applying the precepts of, to questions of duty 37

— The wide practical applicability of precepts of the, an argument

of great wisdom 43

—Remarks on certain precepts in the, of general application 44

— Testimony of the, to the immediate communication of the will of

God 70

— The authority of civil government explicitly asserted in the 82

—Oaths forbidden by the New Testament 204

— The dispositions which lead to war condemned by the 425

Horse-racing an amusement of almost unmingled evil 289

Houses of infamy , 154

Infidelity, There is no rest to the mind, in the reasonings of 35

— Professed by those who usually do not know what Christianity is 130
— Professed by some from motives which arccontemptible or de-
testable 132

Immoral agency of reputable men, On the 223

Insane, The most scrupulous observance of good faith necessary in the

treatment of the 197

Insolvency, The obligations which morality enjoins in reference to 135

— The dishonesty of endeavoring to obtain credit by deceptive

appearances 151

Introversion of mind a great auxiliary of moral character 275

478 index.

PAGE

Judicial oaths prohibited by Jesus Christ 208

Judgment of actions should be formed with reference to the motives,

Our 28

Law of honor, The character and obligation of the 108

Law of the land, The authority and limits of the 82

—Not everything which is in accordance with the, is morally

right 85, 171

— Arbitration to be preferred to the, in the settlement of disputes... 164

— Equity at times sacrificed to the 171

— The temptations and difficulties met by the conscientious lawyer

resulting from the general system of the 184

Law of nations, Obligations and authority of the 102

Law of nature, The authority and limits of the authority of the. 89

—Involves no obligation but that which is imposed by the Divine

will 96

Law of rectitude, An internal, to be implicitly obeyed 270

Laws. Useless, do harm 326

Legal practice, The morality of, examined 170, 251

— Effects of. upon the personal character of the profession 186

—The probable results of sterling integrity in reforming 187

Lies, always, and for whatever purpose prohibited by the Divine will.. 194

Libraries in many cases, a source of moral injury 228

Litigation discouraged by the early Christians 164

Legislation, The primary object of, to promote virtue 342

Love, The inculcation of in the Christian Scriptures, as of paramount

obligation, a characteristic of the present dispensation 49

Magistrate, Obedience to the, enforced by Christianity 327, 348

— The powers of the, cease, when it becomes immoral to obey 336

Masquerades afford to many an opportunity for covert licentiousness .. 286

Military glory, The desire for, a powerful incentive to war 238, 403

— Destined to sink into forgetfulness 247, 404

Ministry of the gospel, A theological education not necessary to the 379

— Stated remuneration for the, adapted to an imperfect state of the

Christian church 380

— Voluntary payment in connection with the, considered 380

— The ill effects of paying for preaching 382

— The qualifications for the, stated 385

Moral education, On 272

— The requisites necessary in 263

Moral law, The, as exhibited in the Christian Scriptures of paramount

authority .*. 29

Moral legislation, The promotion of virtue, and the punishment of vice

the two objects of 342

Moral obligation, The foundation of 1

— Identical authority of, with religious obligation 23

Moral sense, Review of opinions respecting a 61

Morality founded upon a law written externally, and a law communi-
cated to the heart 81

— Religion the basis of 263

INDEX. 479

PAGE

Morality of legal practice examined, The 170

—The injury to, by war 409

—An advance towards a higher standard of, perceptible 472

— The practice of , not all that God requires of man 473

Music, The deceptive effects of sacred, upon the mind 113

Nations, The principles of morality are binding upon as well as upon

individuals 102, 318, 451

—The claims of, to other countries by right of discovery, considered 105

—Treaties do not oblige, to do that which is morally wrong 107

—The greatest resource of, a strict attention to the principles of

justice 322

Newspapers, The great influence, and corresponding responsibility

connected with the publication of 258

Oaths, Moral objections to the use of 201

—All, forbidden by Jesus Christ 204

— Judicial, prohibited 208

—The efficacy of, as securities for veracity examined 211

— Proved to be needless 2x9

— Tend powerfully to deprave the moral character 220

—Refusing to take, obligatory upon the Christian 222

Oratorios, etc., do not promote religion 286

Parents, The duty of, to strengthen the moral character of the child, 266, 272

— Obedience of children to, necessary 272

—Should frequently refer children to the dictates of an enlightened

conscience in their own minds 273

Patriotism, The virtue of, extravagantly overrated 245

— As viewed by Christianity 387

—Does not imply the injury of others 390

— The, manifested in political paxlizanship often of a questionable

kind 39°

Penn, William, The sound principles acted upon by, in acquiring

rights in Pennsylvania 106

Pennsylvania, Religious liberty in, promotive of harmony 376

— Colonized by those who believed that war is incompatible with

Christianity 462

—Security and quiet of, without war for more than seventy years.. 463

Political affairs. Men are not exempt from the obligations of the

moral law in 229

—Truth, The fundamental principles of 308

— Power possessed only by the consent of the community 309

— Is rightly exercised only when it subserves the

welfare of the community 314

—Influence and patronage considered 338

— Often resorted to, to obtain concurrence with meas-
ures of doubtful rectitude 339

Prayer, The use of forms of , considered 127

—Acceptable, that only which is according to the will of God 129

Promises, On the obligation of 188

— Not binding if performance is unlawful 190

Property. On the foundation of the right to 133

480 INDEX.

PAGE

— The law of the land not always a sufficient warrant for maintain-
ing possession of 134

— The obligations of morality respecting the distribution of, among

legatees and heirs 140

— On the plundering of, by privateering 146

— The acceptance of confiscated, sometimes irreconcilable with

integrity 148

—Endangering the, of others by speculation, dishonest 150

— The immorality of accepting returns from certain kinds of liter-
ary 154

— A limit to be observed to the accumulation of 156

— The taking of life, in the protection of, not lawful 302

Providence of God, Violations of the precepts of Christianity, resulting

from an unbelief in the 465

Public opinion, the great influence of, upon the practice of virtue 231

— The misdirection of, an obstacle to virtue 233

— Reformations resulting from an enlightened 280

Punishment, The proper ends of 346

The reformation of the offender the primary object of 348

Punishment of death, The, regards but one of the three objects of pun-
ishment 351

—The defenders of, do not take into account the dictates of Chris-
tianity 352

— Examples of, not efficient in deterring from crime 354

— The effect of, very hardening upon other criminals 356

— Public executions believed to promote both murder and suicide... 357
— Punishments of a milder nature produce a far more powerful

effect 358

— Arguments in favor of, examined 359

— Sentence of, pronounced at times upon grounds necessarily un-
certain 362

—Speculations of philosophers upon, considered 363

Rectitude, To deviate from, impolitic as well as wrong 323

Religious and moral obligations, The authority of, identical 23, 299

— Feelings, The legitimate effects of, upon the character 114

— Conversation, The danger of, in enfeebling religious character.... 115
— Ceremonies, The obligation of, to be constituted by an expression

of the Divine will 123

—Establishment, A, defined 365

— No, existed until the church had lost much of its

purity 367

— Establishments, The utility of, considered 369

—No evidence in favor of, afforded by a comparison

with communities where they do not exist.... 371

— Arguments in favor of , examined 371

— Temptations held out by, to equivocation and

hypocrisy 373

— Generate ill will and animosities 376

— Incompatible with complete religious liberty 377

—Persecution has generally been the work of 378

Resistance to aggression, The duty of, considered.* 304

Rewards, A man of integrity would not accept, for being honest 155

Sabbatical institutions considered 117

INDEX. 481

PAGE

Scepticism entertained by those usually who do not know what Chris-
tianity is 130

Self-defence, The limits of the rights of 93, 295, 454

Standard of right and wrong is the will of God, The 2

Standards of right and wrong, Subordinate, considered 21

Suicide, The effects of religion in arming the mind against the tempta-
tions to 292

" Sunday papers " ill adapted to the cultivation of religious feeling 121

Swearing forbidden by Jesus Christ 201

Theatre, All who attend the, promote its tendency to evil 284

Treaties do not oblige nations to do that which is morally wrong 107

Unchastity, The reprobation of, in men, should be greatly increased 253

Utility, Obligations resulting from considerations of 96

—Cannot be properly consulted without taking into account our

interests in futurity 98

—The dictates of, deplorably disregarded, in affairs relating to the

moral and religious welfare of mankind 100

Virtue denned to be conformity with the standard of rectitude 27

—Is real wisdom 100

—The best promoter of the general welfare. 342

War, The frequency of, largely due to a misdirection of public opinion, 237

— The real character of military virtues considered 238

— The motives of those who perish in, examined 244

— The obligations of religion and morality in reference to 247

— A great cause of the diminution of civil liberty 325

—The Revolutionary, might have been avoided, had the Americans

acted on Christian principles 334

— The enquiry spreading in the world, whether, is compatible with

the Christian religion 392

— The causes of, considered 395

— The desire for military glory a powerful incentive to 403

— One of the consequences of, the wide-spread, silent misery of

the people 407

— The dreadful destruction of mankind by ] 407

—National debts largely caused by , 408

— The depravity of the people from 409

— Servility of individual character a result of 411

— The reign of wickedness in a community accompanying 418

— The lawfulness of, considered 420

—Testimonies of eminent men respecting . 423

— The Christian Scriptures condemn the dispositions which lead to 425
—Cannot be carried on without violating the commands of Christ... 427

—Arguments of those who defend, examined 434

-» Prophecies of the Old Testament that Christianity will be the

means of abolishing 443

—Testimony of the early Christians against 445

—All, is aggressive 453

—Wholly forbidden by Christianity 457

482 INDEX.

PAGE

—The probable effects of adhering to the moral law in respect to ... 458

— The preservation of Quakers in America and Ireland during 459

— The evils of, greater than any that could be expected by the

abandonment of 467

—The duty of those who believe that, is incompatible with religion 469

Wealth, Proper limits to the acquisition of, to be observed 156

—A pernicious inequality in the distribution of, among children to

be avoided 161

Will of God is the standard of right and wrong, The 2, 10

— Notice of different theories respecting the 3

— The communication of the 6

— Both moral and religious obligations are founded on the 24

— On the immediate communication of the, to the mind of

man 52, 58, 270

Wills, legatees and heirs, Moral considerations respecting 140, 161

Worship of God, Remarks on true and factitious semblances of 113

— The effects of ceremonial observances in connection with the,

considered 123, 275

— The presence of a minister not necessary for the performance of

public 385

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